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CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS: 
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University of Pittsburgh, 2010
 
 
In my dissertation I seek to answer the question of why some non-state armed groups in modern 
conflicts recruit children whereas others do not. I argue that four factors help explain the difference in 
rebels’ recruitment of minors. The first two are related to the armed group-specific characteristics of 
fighting capacity relative to the government and the scope of belligerents’ territorial access and 
control within and across the conflict country borders. Both of these factors positively affect the 
insurgency’s propensity to recruit children, especially for armed groups that are unpopular among 
their constituency. The third and fourth contextual and individual factors of poverty and presence of 
ethnic persecution in a country, I argue, also have a positive influence on the outcome of child 
recruitment, especially for popular insurgencies. My findings are based on both quantitative and 
qualitative research. I conducted large-N tests on a dataset of 112 insurgencies that I newly compiled. 
I also analyzed data which I collected on Liberian armed groups and former underage combatants 
from the surveys which I administered in the field. I complemented my statistical analysis with 
comparative and process-tracing temporal case studies, as well as the plausibility probe on FARC 
armed group from Colombia and the LTTE faction of Sri Lanka. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
A tremendous variance in the manifestation of child recruitment practice occurs across different non-
state armed groups of diverse intrastate wars, when controlled for conflict duration, intensity, and type. 
For example, in protracted high intensity civil wars with the government, the Sudan’s SPLA, on the one 
hand, was estimated to have over 20,000 children in its ranks towards the end of the war of 1985-2005, 
while the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM), on the other hand, was not found to engage 
in recruitment of minors during the country’s 1980-91 severe internal armed struggle.1 Similarly, during 
its long-lasting but low-intensity secessionist conflict in Angola between 1985 and 2006, the Front for the 
Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), as well as its factions, were all found to recruit children 
extensively.2 At the same time, the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance 
(MFDC) of Senegal, in its protracted but mild insurgency of 1990-2006 against government forces, was 
reported to have children in supportive roles only occasionally.3  
                                                
What is it that differs so much in the otherwise more or less comparable military organizations of the 
SPLA and the EPDM that leads to opposite patterns of their child soldier recruitment? Similarly, what 
could have made or allowed the Angolan secessionist movement of FLEC to recruit children in contrast to 
its Senegalese counterpart of the MFDC? This variation in child soldier recruitment practices by armed 
groups generates the following research question, which is addressed in this dissertation: Why do some 
insurgencies recruit children whereas others do not or, equivalently, why do some rebels have more 
children in their ranks than others? 
 
 
1 “From 2001 to April 2006 an estimated 20,000 children from the SPLA were demobilized and returned to their 
families and communities with UNICEF support” (UNICEF, “UNICEF Welcomes Child Demobilisation in 
Southern Sudan,” 24 April 2006, http://www.unicef.org/media/media_33579.html). I could not locate any report on 
recruitment of children for the EPDM. The average intensity of the Sudanese conflict was calculated to be 1.83 on 
the scale between 1 (minor intensity) and 2 (full scale war). The calculation procedure for the conflict intensity index 
is described in Chapter 4 of this dissertation on methodology.  On the same scale, the average conflict intensity for 
the EPDM in Ethiopia was estimated to equal 2.  
2 CSUCS, “Angola,” Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 46. Conflict intensity for the Angolan struggle between 
government and FLEC equaled 1 (minor intensity). The calculation procedure for the conflict intensity index is 
described in Chapter 4 of this dissertation on methodology.  
3 According to the CSUCS, “The extent to which children were associated with the MFDC was not documented, 
although it appeared that there was no widespread recruitment of children” (CSUCS, “Senegal,” in Child Soldiers 
Global Report 2008, p. 293). The following account of an independent researcher supports this claim of the CSUCS: 
“There is no evidence of impressment of child fighters of the kind witnessed in Sierra Leone and Uganda, and the 
MFDC was probably sincere in its denial, through a spokesman in Gambia in April 2004, that this occurs. However, 
there are accounts of child maquisards, albeit not as frontline combatants: a reliable eyewitness in Bissau during the 
1998–99 civil war said that among the Front Sud contingent bolstering Mané’s forces were a number of young 
teenagers, 13–15 years old, who carried out support operations such as transporting munitions” (Martin Evans, 
“Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC),” Briefing Paper (Chatham House, 
Africa Programme, Armed Non-State Actors Project, AFP BP 04/02, December 2004), p. 7). Conflict intensity for 
the MFDC insurgency in Senegal equaled 1 (minor intensity). The calculation procedure for the conflict intensity 
index is described in Chapter 4 on methodology. 
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 The Child Soldier Problem, Puzzle, and Research Question 
Awareness of the child soldiers phenomenon has recently grown around the world.4 Many are 
familiar these days with images of gun-wielding children from photos in newspaper articles and on book 
covers, as well as from internet and TV.5 As probably intended, these pictures shock the Western 
audience typically perceiving childhood as innocent and naïve. No matter how exaggerated, however, 
such visual depictions of child soldiers do reflect one side of today’s reality: minors are used as fighters 
and foot soldiers in modern conflicts and actively participate in horrific atrocities inherent in armed 
struggle. The fact that the first U.S. serviceman killed in combat in Afghanistan “was fatally shot by a 14-
year-old boy” was alarming for the American army.6 Even more disturbing was the assessment of the 
situation on the ground by military observers, who reported that units containing child soldiers were 
carrying out a “much higher” number of human rights violations in and outside of the battlefields.7 
Rwandan history bears evidence to this claim: in the infamous 1994 genocide in the country, whether 
forced or not, children were found alongside adults perpetrating massacres, with some being charged with 
killing up to ninety civilians.8 Hence, it is no wonder that when several international workers were 
trapped in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) conflict in 2004, their biggest fear was of armed 
children, not of flying bullets or artillery shelling.9  
                                                 
4 In this study a child soldier is defined as a person below the age of 18 “who participates actively in a violent 
conflict as a member of an organization that applies violence in a systematic way.” This formulation is based on the 
working definition employed in Jens Christopher Andvig and Scott Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed 
Conflict,” Working Paper, 2007, p. 2. To the Andvig and Gates’ definition I added the restriction on age, which they 
avoid on purpose but which is embedded in the working definition used by international organizations. For the 
discussion of potential methodological problems related to this definition, as well as for the texts of other definitions 
of a child soldier, please see Chapter 4 of this dissertation on methodology.   
5 For examples of such images please refer to the photos accompanying the following articles: Mark Doyle, “Call to 
Help Liberia’s Child Soldiers,” BBC News, February 2, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3450263.stm; 
Lydia Polgreen, “A Master Plan Drawn in Blood,” New York Times, April 2, 2006, 
http://www.wehaitians.com/a%20master%20plan%20drawn%20in%20blood.html; Mike Pflanz, “Rwanda Recruited 
Child Soldiers for Congo Rebels,” Telegraph, December 11, 2008, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/rwanda/3708901/Rwanda-recruited-child-
soldiers-for-Congo-rebels.html. The identical photo of a Liberian teenager in full combat gear appeared on at least 
two book covers: one on the book by the British journalist Mark Huband, The Liberian Civil War (London and 
Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), and the other on the book by Ilene Cohn and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill’s 
book called Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
6 Among many sources that reported this incident was Carin Zissis, “Children in Camo: Underage Warriors Become 
Growing Concern,” Fox News, October 14, 2005, 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,172173,00.html, accessed on May 6, 2006. 
7 Centre for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, Marine Corps Warfighing Laboratory, “Child Soldiers: 
Implications for U.S. Forces,” Seminar Report, November 2002, CETO 005-02. 
8 Jimmie Briggs, Innocents Lost: When Child Soldiers Go to War (Basic Books, 2005), p. 18. 
9 Dr. Samantha Nutt, a Canadian physician and professor, was among fifteen foreigners who stayed at the hotel in 
Bukavu when one night it found itself in the midst of an armed skirmish. The following is her recollection of the 
event shared in her interview with the University of Toronto Magazine: “I wasn’t concerned about bullets flying 
through windows. I wasn’t even all that concerned about a mortar hitting our location, although that was a 
possibility… I was more concerned that Mai-Mai Congolese [child] soldiers or Rwandan rebel [child] soldiers were 
2 
 As perpetrators, child soldiers became the issue on the pages and screens of current media. On the 
mandates of international and nongovernmental organizations (IOs and NGOs), however, they are 
appearing typically as victims of adult masterminded wars and military strategy. Besides promoting such 
position in their documents, activists also resort to images which depict child soldiers as guiltless and 
childlike.10 Similarly, some IOs and NGOs refuse to use the term ‘child soldiers’ and instead employ an 
alternative expression ‘children associated with armed (or fighting) forces’.11 The perception of child 
soldiers as victims is supported by multiple stories of former underage warriors who were often recruited 
by force and pushed into the toughest war circumstances, against their will. Such are the accounts of 
many Liberian child ex-combatants whom I interviewed in 2008. Besides ubiquitous instances of 
everyday beatings, rape (both female and male children), killings on military bases and in combat alike, 
many of my informants had to go through even more horrifying experiences, if a comparative scale can be 
attributed to such events. Some witnessed the rape of sisters, mothers, and grandmothers; while others 
saw their parents beheaded. One informant reported being made to drink acid while another had his ears 
cut off after trying to escape the faction.  
Besides such testimonies, the attention of the IOs to the problem of underage recruitment is fuelled by 
troublesome statistics on a wide scale. The severity of the child soldier tragedy is indeed immense. 
Between 2004 and 2007, over 70 military organizations in 19 countries and territories around the world 
were recruiting and using children in armed hostilities.12 In 2001, child soldiers constituted some 10% of 
all active combatants in the world.13 Children are recruited by government and rebel forces alike, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
going to show up in the hotel armed to the teeth with their semi-automatic weapons and start killing people or raping 
people… That’s what you worry about. Because you do not want to be stuck with a 12-year old pointing a gun at 
you. You just don’t” (Stacey Gibson, “Witness to War,” University of Toronto Magazine, Autumn 2007, p. 25). 
10 For ‘innocent’ images of child soldiers please see photos on cover pages and inside of the following reports: 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Child Soldiers (Geneva: ICRC, July 2003), 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0824/$File/ICRC_002_0824.PDF!Open; Jeannie Annan, 
Christopher Blattman and Roger Horton, The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern Uganda: Findings 
from the Survey for War Affected Youth (Uganda: UNICEF, September 2006), http://www.sway-
uganda.org/SWAY.Phase1.FinalReport.pdf; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS), Child Soldiers 
Global Report 2008 (London, UK: CSUCS, 2008), http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org (see images in the 
photo gallery of this report). 
11 For example, in its documents the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) often uses the term ‘children 
associated with armed forces’ (CAAF) instead of ‘child soldiers’. The issue is also defined in similar language in the 
Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups. Other organizations, 
such as Small Arms Survey group, also employ the CAFF as a more neutral definition of child soldiers. 
12 The number of countries where children were used in conflicts is taken from the following source: CSUCS, Child 
Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 2. The number of military organizations that used children in these countries’ armed 
struggles was also obtained from the same source. Note that in the cited 19 countries children were actively 
participating in military hostilities. Otherwise, the military recruitment of youth under 18 years old “takes place in 
one form or another in at least 86 countries and territories worldwide” (CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, 
p. 12). 
13 Peter W. Singer, “Caution: Children at War,” Parameters, Vol. XXXI, No. 4, Winter 2001-2002, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2001/1201usmilitary_singer/20011203singer.pdf, pp. 40-56.  
3 
 often serve in paramilitary, militia or self-defense armed groups backed by state authorities.14 Child 
soldiers appear in militarized conflicts across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and are playing an increasingly 
important role in armed struggles of the Middle East.15 While the overall number of underage warriors in 
the world cannot be determined with a high degree of precision, estimates broken down by countries offer 
more trustworthy, staggering figures. For example, in 2003, about 70,000 children were serving in 
Myanmar government forces alone.16 A conservative estimate of 40,000 was reported as the number of 
children who have been involved in the Angolan armed conflict of 1975-2002.17 During the 
demobilization process in the DRC between 2003 and 2006, some 30,000 underage soldiers were released 
from both regular military units and insurgent armed groups.18  
The nature of recruitment varies from conflict to conflict and from one armed group to another. The 
existing studies based on interviews and mini-surveys show different prevalence of forced conscription, 
abduction and voluntary enlistment of children in various conflict situations.19 A survey of child ex-
combatants from Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, for example, revealed that 40% of these children were 
abducted, 40% were forcibly recruited, and only 20% joined voluntarily.20 A somewhat different 
conclusion was reached by a study of the International Labor Office (ILO), however, in which 36% of 
                                                 
14 In Angola, for instance, up to one third of the government forces were children (Vera Achvarina and Simon 
Reich, “No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers,” International 
Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 127–164, at p. 129). Somalia and Zimbabwe are just two examples of 
countries where the government, which was not recruiting minors itself, did support militia and paramilitaries that 
engaged in child soldier use practice (CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 (London, UK: CSUCS, 2004), p. 
13).  
15 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Adult Wars, Child Soldiers (Bangkok: UNICEF, October 2002), 
http://www.unicef.org/eapro/AdultWarsChildSoldiers.pdf, p.8. 
16 The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS), Child Soldier Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN 
Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict, 16 January 2004, 
http://www.centrodirittiumani.unipd.it/a_news/rapporto.pdf, p. 2. 
17 Christian Children’s Fund (CCF), “Peace in Angola Brings Critical Needs,” July 11, 2002,  
www.christianchildrensfund.org/emergencies/angola_ peace (last accessed in 2008). 
18 UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo,” S/2007/391, June 28, 2007, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/390/16/PDF/N0739016.pdf?OpenElement, p. 12. 
19 In my work I conceptually distinguish between three different types of recruitment, following a study by the 
International Labor Office (ILO) on former child combatants. The ILO report identifies abduction, that “refers to 
situations in which children have been taken forcibly or under threat of arms”; forced conscription, that involves 
“cases in which the child did not have a choice” and joined “because of moral pressure or the obligation to enlist”; 
and voluntary decision, that signifies the situations “whereby the child took the initiative to become a member of the 
armed group” (“The Use of Children in Armed Conflict in Central Africa: from Recruitment to Release,” Chapter 3, 
in International Labor Office (ILO), Wounded Childhood: The Use Of Children In Armed Conflict In Central Africa 
(Geneva: ILO, 2003), p. 27).  
20 Christina Wille, “Children Associated with Fighting Forces (CAFF) and Small Arms in the Mano River Union 
(MRU),” p. 187, in Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman, eds., Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns and 
Human Security in the ECOWAS Region (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005). 
4 
 former child soldiers from Burundi, Congo-Brazaville, DRC and Rwanda reported being forcibly 
recruited or abducted, whereas 64% admitted voluntary enlistment.21  
During their time with armed groups, child soldiers perform different roles varying most frequently 
over the following duties: “participation in combat, laying mines and explosives; scouting, spying, acting 
as decoys, couriers or guards; training, drill or other preparations; logistics and support functions, 
portering, cooking and domestic labour.”22 Sexual abuse is yet another facet of life of child soldiers. Most 
of the children recruited are boys, but girls also end up with armed factions, representing roughly about 
20 to 25% of all child soldiers.23 According to one influential study on girl soldiers, from 1990 to 2003 
underage females participated in military organizations of 55 countries, with direct conflict involvement 
in 38 of them.24 Sexual slavery is apparently not the only or exclusive role that girls are assigned to by 
their commanders; in 34 countries they were reported to serve as combat fighters.25 Ages of child soldiers 
vary across armed groups, with the average falling somewhere between 12 and 16, and in some extreme 
instances going as low as six years old.26  
*** 
In response to the problem of child soldiers, a series of international protocols and Security Council 
Resolutions were issued in an attempt to eliminate recruitment of minors.27 In 1998, a number of well-
                                                 
21 ILO, Wounded Childhood, p. 27. Conclusions of such studies, however, should be interpreted with caution. The 
reason for that has been expressed by many fieldworkers and sometimes authors of the reports themselves – that 
being a tendency of demobilized children to tell the “forced recruitment” story as opposed to “voluntary 
participation” narrative in an attempt to downplay their agency and appear as non-perpetrators of violence. 
22 CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 411. 
23 This estimate comes from my analysis of conflicts for which I had data on gender distribution among child 
soldiers. These data are based on both observers’ opinions and surveys and should probably be treated as the low 
estimate, because the latter would have a tendency to have fewer females in the study samples due to general 
unwillingness of girls to report their participation with armed groups.    
24 Susan McKay and Dyan Mazurana, Where are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra 
Leone and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War (Montreal: Rights and Democracy: International Center 
for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2004), p. 14. 
25 Ibid., p. 14. 
26 For example, the average age of recruitment reported by former child soldiers in Sierra Leone was around 12, 
“compared with ages 14 in Liberia and 16 in Guinea” (Wille, “Children Associated with Fighting Forces (CAFF) 
and Small Arms in the Mano River Union (MRU),” p. 186). The average age of recruited youth in Uganda 
demonstrated a mid-range between 12 and 16 as it converged somewhere around 14 years old, according to 
Blattman: “The distribution of abduction age in the sample indicates that three times as many males aged 14 were 
abducted as those aged 9 or 23” (Christopher Blattman, “Causes of Child Soldiering: The Evidence from Northern 
Uganda,” Working Paper, 2007, p. 6). On the lowest reported age of child recruits please see Amnesty International 
(AI), “Help End the Use of Child Soldiers,” http://www.amnestyusa.org/children/child-soldiers/background–help-
end-the-use-of-child-soldiers/page.do?id=1191009. There were several boys among my survey informants who were 
recruited at an age close to six years old. Because they were very small and did not remember or knew the exact age 
at the time of recruitment, they provided an age estimate. 
27 The most important formal international conventions and protocols related to recruitment of children in armed 
conflicts are: Geneva Convention, Additional Protocol I (API) (relating to international armed conflicts), Article 
77(2); Additional Protocol II (APII) (relating to non-international armed conflicts), Article 4(3)c; Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), Article 38; Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court (ICC), Article 8 (on War 
5 
 known NGOs formed the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS) to promote the most 
important of these documents – the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict.28 In just a decade, by 2008, over three-quarters of all 
governments have signed, ratified or accepted the Optional Protocol.29 With such formation of the 
collective expectation among states and the near universal consensus about the need to curb recruitment 
of minors into armed conflicts, child soldier practice, however, has not abated. On the contrary, as the 
evidence suggests, the number of conflicts using underage recruits rose from twenty in 2001 to twenty 
seven in 2004. Their subsequent drop to seventeen in 2008 was largely attributed to the decrease in armed 
hostilities in the world, rather than a changing practice of child recruiters.30 Despite the significant 
moderation of the number of conflicts between 2004 and 2008, the number of governments that used 
children in militarized struggles decreased only by one from nine to eight.31 This divergence between 
global initiatives and the actual compliance of governmental military organizations with regard to child 
soldier recruitment is indeed puzzling, especially when promotion of protocols and campaigns in other 
issue areas, such as women’s rights or use of landmines, was followed by a favorable change in behavior 
of state actors.32   
                                                                                                                                                       
crimes), section 2 b) (xxvi); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-CAC), Article 4(1) and (2); the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child (ACRWC); the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed 
Groups. Most of these documents were listed in CSUCS, Child Soldiers 1379 Report (London, UK: CSUCS, 
November 2002), pp. 7, 8. 
28 The Coalition was headed by “a Steering Committee of six NGOs”: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
International Federation Terre des Hommes, International Save the Children Alliance, Jesuit Refugee Service, the 
Quaker United Nations Office-Geneva and World Vision International. The main goal of the Optional Protocol was 
to raise the minimum age for military recruitment and use in hostilities from 15 to 18 years. “The Coalition to Stop 
the Use of Child Soldiers has been formed in response to the failure of negotiations within the United Nations to 
agree a prohibition on keeping children out of armed forces” (Amnesty International (AI), “International Campaign 
Launched against the Use of Child Soldiers,” Amnesty International News, Geneva, 30 June 1998, AI Index: ACT 
76/01/98, p. 1).  
29 CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 12. 
30 For the number of countries using child soldiers in 2001 see Human Rights Watch (HRW), “U.N. Cites Child 
Recruiters but Omits Leading Offenders,” Human Rights News, December 16, 2002, 
http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2460.pdf. For the lack of significant progress by 2004 see, for example, Jo Becker, 
“Children as Weapons of War,” in Human Rights Watch, World Report 2004: Human Rights and Armed Conflict 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004), http://www.hrw.org/wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf, p. 219. On recent 
decline in the number of conflicts in the world refer to Human Security Center, The University of British Columbia, 
Canada, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century (New York, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005) and CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 12. 
31 For the list of these governments in 2004 and 2008 see CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004, p. 13, and 
CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 16. 
32 For an overview of the successful women suffrage campaign see Nitza Berkovitch, “From Motherhood to 
Citizenship: The Worldwide Incorporation of Women into the Public Sphere in the Twentieth Century,” Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Stanford University, 1995. On the results achieved by the international anti-landmine initiative refer to 
“Promoting the Safety of People: Banning Anti-Personnel Landmines,” Chapter 5, in Fen Osler Hampson, ed., 
Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Richard 
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 In the absence of compliance from states, the failure to comply on the part of non-state military actors can 
be anticipated. Not surprisingly, between the years of 2001 and 2007, the number of such organizations that 
used children in armed hostilities did not decrease.33 What is not so obvious, however, is the fact that 
non-compliance occurred despite the recent relatively intensive attention to non-state actors from the 
international community regarding the issue of child soldiers. Non-state military organizations, which do 
not hold the right to sign international protocols under current international law, are pressed by IOs to 
express commitment to the ‘universal consensus’ against the use of children in armed hostilities by 
making a pledge to the designated United Nations’ (UN) delegates and by issuing public communiqués to 
the people of their country.34 These commitments are then monitored on the ground by the pertinent 
activist organizations, and violators are subject to public ‘naming and shaming’ in the UN Secretary-
General’s reports and to the prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) or Special Courts, such 
as the one for Sierra Leone, in the most extreme cases.35 Nevertheless, peace processes aside, the impact 
of such measures which include negotiations with rebel leaders and commanders, has been rather limited, 
“reaching only a few groups and benefiting relatively small numbers of children.”36  
Another perplexing observation about the phenomenon of child soldiers is the enormous variation in 
child soldiers’ ratios relative to adult combatants in different conflicts. In the absence of any previous 
systematic data collection, I have examined numerous IO and NGO reports and compiled a new dataset 
for 19 African intrastate conflicts between 1975 and 2002 on child soldier ratios to all combatants in each 
of these conflicts. As Table 1 below reveals, child soldier ratios varied from 0 to 45%.37 This 
heterogeneity prompts the question of why some intrastate conflicts have larger share of child soldiers 
relative to all combatants than others.   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” International Organization 52 
(3), Summer 1998. 
33 In 2001 the number of military organizations (both government and non-state) that were reported to use child 
soldiers was 72 (HRW, “U.N. Cites Child Recruiters but Omits Leading Offenders”). It has declined only by two 
lowering to 70 in 2007 (CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 2). The number of government forces has 
not changed in this sample since 2001, suggesting that the number of non-state recruiters has not changed either.   
34 From my interview with an official from the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict, United Nations, New York, April 2005.  
35 For more information on the measures developed by international activists to deal with non-state armed actors 
involved in recruitment of children see CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 and CSUCS, Child Soldiers 
Global Report 2008. 
36 CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, pp. 23, 22. Consider the following statement by the CSUCS on the 
lack of compliance of armed non-state actors with the international standards and efforts aimed at stopping the use 
of child soldiers: “Despite progress, the overall picture is one of armed groups that have ignored international law 
and standards, that renege on commitments, are resistant to pressure and persuasion, or have so far proved to be 
beyond the reach of efforts to end the involvement of children in conflict and political violence” (CSUCS, Child 
Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 23). 
37 For a more detailed explanation of how this table was created refer to Achvarina and Reich, “No Place to Hide,” 
pp. 141-144. 
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 Table 1. Child Soldiers: Conflicts and Percentages, 1975-2002 
 
Country and Conflict Child 
Sold # 
Adult 
Sold # 
Child 
Sold% 
Country and Conflict Child 
Sold # 
Adult 
Sold # 
Child 
Sold% 
Senegal (1990-95) 0  0% Rwanda (1990-95) 17,500 70,000 25% 
Senegal (1997-2001) 0  0% Sierra Leone (1991-2000) 10,000 45,000 25% 
South Africa (1966-78) 0  0% Angola (1996-2002) 20,000 72,500 28% 
South Africa (1979-88) 0  0% Mozambique (1976-92) 25,498 92 881 28% 
South Africa (1989-93) 0  0% Liberia (1989-95) 17,500 60,000 29% 
Niger (1990-97) 0  0% Burundi (1995-99) 14,000 45,000 31% 
Chad (1997-2002) 0  0% Sudan (1993-2002) 15,700 40,000 39% 
Angola (1975-94) 8,000 194,000 4% DRC (1996-2001) 30,000 72,000 42% 
Burundi (1993-93) 5,000 50,000 10% Liberia (2000-02) 18,000 40,000 45% 
Uganda (1994-2002) 10,000 74,000 14%     
 
A more insightful comparison of underage recruitment practice, however, can be performed across 
specific actors, not conflicts. It is possible that not all armed groups and forces engaged in the same armed 
struggle might recruit minors, as the following cases suggest. Consider that in Congo-Brazzaville, armed 
groups such as United Democratic Forces (FDU), Cocoes and Ntsiloulous were not found to be recruiting 
child soldiers during their existence in late 1990s, whereas the Ninjas were reported to engage in the 
practice quite actively.38 Moreover, even if factions within the same conflict might all use child soldiers, 
as in the case of five Liberian armed groups participating in the country’s first civil war of 1989-96, the 
child to adult ratios in these military organizations varied considerably. While the National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia (NPFL) and Liberia Peace Council (LPC) represented the heaviest recruiters in terms of 
proportion of children to adults in their ranks, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy 
– Johnson faction (ULIMO-J) and the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) were the 
most moderate, with the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy – Kromah faction 
(ULIMO-K) falling somewhere in between these two categories of ‘high’ and ‘low’ child to adult ratios.39  
As the examples above of armed factions with child recruitment practice (such as the SPLA of Sudan 
or FLEC of Angola) and military organizations without minors in their ranks (such as and the EPDM of 
Ethiopia and MFDC of Senegal) demonstrated, child recruitment practices can also differ across 
insurgencies of different countries. This variation in child soldier recruitment practices by armed groups, 
both within countries and across conflicts, generates the following research question: Why do some 
insurgencies recruit children whereas others do not or, equivalently, why do some rebels have more 
children in their ranks than others? 
 
                                                 
38 For recruitment of children into the Ninja militia see CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004, p. 56.  
39 These data come from my fieldwork interviews and surveys of former Liberian child soldiers in Ghana, 2008. For 
more information on the assessment of relative recruitment of children across Liberian armed factions refer to case 
studies in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
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 Argument 
By comparing and contrasting different armed groups, I reveal and empirically test potential causes of 
their child recruitment. My explanatory framework consists of supply and demand factors determining the 
probability of child soldier recruitment. After conducting a statistical analysis of the large-N cross-
insurgency dataset that I compiled and survey data on Liberian armed groups and former underage 
combatants which I collected in the field, as well as after performing comparative and process-tracing 
temporal case studies on the data from secondary sources and my own interviews, I argue that four factors 
for child soldiers explain the difference in rebels’ behavior in relation to recruitment of minors. Below I 
review two of these demand driven explanations, and two supply-based factors.  
First, I contend that recruitment of children is more likely for armed groups whose fighting capacity 
is high. The variable of rebels’ fighting capacity relative to the opponent is defined as insurgents’ ability 
to challenge the government and prevail in combat. The variable of fighting capacity serves as an 
indicator of the presence of intense fighting in the country, for which one may expect high battle related 
casualties and exigent need for additional numbers of soldiers. In addition, in conflicts of high intensity 
the supply of adults diminishes for many reasons. On the one hand, a wide scale conflict requires large 
numbers of foot soldiers to perform intense military operations and maintain a necessary level of fighting; 
on the other hand it leads to numerous battle deaths and civilian casualties alike. Therefore, the intense 
fighting generates both the higher demand for additional combatants and pressure on the supply of adult 
fighters, which, in turn, generates demand for children. Similarly, the voluntary supply of children in the 
situations of intense fighting can intensify.40   
In addition to this underlying logic of conflict intensity behind the fighting capacity explanation, I 
argue that non-state armed groups with high levels of military effectiveness relative to the government are 
more likely to participate in the battles for the most strategic targets, such as the capital or highly valued 
military installations elsewhere in the country. These strategic targets, however, involve conventional 
warfare, as opposed to guerrilla tactics. One of the differences between the two is that conventional 
warfare “finds expression mostly on the operational level, where the enemy is directly attacked in 
confrontations with the armed forces of the opposing state or in an offensive against its capital.”41 In 
guerilla fighting, rebels engage predominantly in “tactical strikes on railway bridges, power installations 
and the lives of politicians.”42 I argue that those armed groups which engage in conventional warfare – 
                                                 
40 For further discussion and examples of child voluntarism in insecure environments refer to the section below 
called “Legitimacy and Insecure Environments.” Also, different intensity of armed struggle might reflect different 
degrees of educational and employment structures’ disruption, which was said to affect the decisions of some 
children to join armed groups.  
41 Duyvesteyn, Clausewitz and African War, p. 17. 
42 Ibid., p. 17. 
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 defined as involving face to face open battles with an opponent for large military and state power targets –
will require additional mobilization of fighters. There are two reasons for this proposition. 
First, conventional warfare in the open battlefield, as opposed to guerrilla fighting in the bush or 
hidden terrain, generates the need for larger armies of foot soldiers in the ranks of the attacking side. 
According to Isabelle Duyvesteyn, the capital cannot be “taken by the use of small arms alone, nor could 
it be captured by a small number of fighters.”43 This is because the strategic military targets, such as the 
capital, are most likely to be rigorously defended by the opposing state army. Second, rigid defenses 
against open attacks are often implemented with the use of heavy weapons artillery, and as such, these 
battles will have higher number of military casualties than guerrilla attacks. It is very likely that adults are 
more reluctant to participate in such high-risk missions reminiscent of the pre-21st century historical 
battles. As a result, child combatants become very convenient for conventional warfare as “fearless” 
(relative to adults) and “disposable” bodies.44    
Second, I propose that armed groups with higher material capacity are less likely to have children in 
their ranks. When demand for combatants, determined externally by certain characteristics of armed 
conflict (the variable of fighting capacity in my model), is high, the degree of the armed groups’ 
leadership access to material resources and its ability to provide pecuniary incentives to new recruits 
should be negatively correlated with child soldier ratios. This is due to the pool of adults willing to join 
the military organization in exchange for cash. Moreover, armed groups might be interested in recruiting 
adults, rather than children, even if they have to pay, because adult fighters might be arguably more likely 
to win battles, or, the rebel leaders might be constrained by normative standards in the local communities 
against recruitment of minors.  
The above logic of the material capacity argument, however, refers only to the military organizations 
which manage their finances from the top down. Thus, if an insurgency receives financial support from a 
diaspora, for example, then it might establish an institutional distribution of some of such resources down 
the chain of command to recruitment of fighters. When the access of an armed group to material resources 
occurs from the bottom up, as in the case of rebels’ access to natural resources, then, I argue, the above 
logic does not hold. On the contrary, in the latter case low-ranking commanders of insurgencies have a 
vested interest in not sharing the rewards to which they have personal access and the opportunity to enrich 
themselves. Under such circumstances, rich armed groups will resort to underage recruitment, as children 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 101. 
44 After reviewing psychological studies that examined fearlessness of children in peacetime contexts, Andvig and 
Gates concluded that young people may outperform adults in this characteristic (Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting 
Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 17). Refer to the literature review in Chapter 2 for a further discussion of this 
point.   
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 become more suitable candidates for enlistment or rather conscription, as commanders can avoid paying 
young recruits and can sustain forcible recruitment and retention of minors, unlike adults.  
My third explanation of the child soldier practice suggests that armed groups that operate in conflicts 
with ethnic persecution are more likely to have children in their ranks. This supply-based proposition 
postulates that in the situations of extreme insecurity during the conflict, when civilians are not only 
becoming collateral casualties of ongoing battles but are also targeted in masses, such as in the case of 
persecution on ethnic grounds, crowds of children would seek protection within armed movements. While 
it is very difficult to imagine a conflict that is safe for a child, I nevertheless argue that conflicts with 
ethnic persecution can pose a graver threat to the lives of children and civilian adults than others. While 
many vulnerable groups in conflicts can be identified, it is ethnicity that often defines the victims of 
targeted violence and mass killings.45 Sometimes the fear and the motives of self-defense are so strong, 
that children and adults alike join the perpetrators of ethnic killings, when potential protectors are too 
weak to provide defense or where they are stationed in inaccessible areas behind impenetrable rebel lines.  
Besides adding to the supply of children for armed groups, the ethnic persecution factor might also 
affect the demand for children by conscientious groups which care about their image among civilians. 
Demand for combatants, or an abundant supply of children, does not necessarily lead to a decision by an 
armed group to recruit children. An insurgency might not be able to proceed to conscription or enlistment 
of minors if there is a cost associated with such a strategy. This cost can be manifested in the withdrawal 
of civilian backing from insurgents relying on local populations for financial support, logistics, and 
recruits. Such groups would be unable to recruit children without tarnishing their popular credentials 
unless some extreme circumstances, such as ethnic persecution in a country, legitimize child recruitment 
for defense purposes.  
In the fourth proposition of my argument, I postulate that armed groups with larger territorial access 
are more likely to recruit children. Once an insurgency arrives at a decision to recruit children, it might 
have to deal with the problem of low supply of underage recruits. Whether the areas are  depopulated due 
to migration and resettlement of the population, or unwilling children hide and try to avoid recruitment, 
rebels might not see any children around for enlistment or conscription. If the rebels control a substantial 
portion of a territory, I argue, they would have a larger chance to encounter people in the first place, and 
might thus have an unfettered access to children. Likewise, access to territories in neighboring countries 
which host war refugees might also offer belligerents an advantage of convenient “fishing grounds” with 
massive numbers of people clustered together in unprotected camps on a small geographical space. Thus, 
                                                 
45 Because literature on violence against civilians has just started to emerge recently, it is not possible to generalize 
yet which groups of population are most victimized in armed conflicts. However, more often than not, it is ethnicity, 
rather than any other identity distinction among civilian groups of population, that becomes the primary target of 
deliberate selective violence. 
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 armed groups are known to infiltrate camps and “enlist or seize inhabitants (including children) through 
the use of coercion or propaganda – a phenomenon referred to as “refugee manipulation and 
militarization.”46 
It is also possible that armed groups with larger territories might have higher mobility and ability to 
be stationed further away from their primary constituency or supportive civilian settlements. This, in turn, 
means that such armed groups might have more freedom in violating certain norms of domestic 
population by recruiting children while being away from the eyes of their supporters and thus avoiding 
reputation losses.  
Having established the above four explanatory factors of my argument, I further propose that 
insurgents differ in their child recruitment decision making process depending on how popular they are 
among their base constituencies. I define popularity of a military organization as its ability to draw 
participatory support from a particular segment of the society on the basis of some ideological ground. 
The literature on mobilization of people for armed conflict suggests a number of potential ideological 
motivations driving recruits to participation in armed violence. According to Russell Hardin’s book “One 
for All,” the following ideological grounds, among others, stimulate mobilization of people for violence: 
ethnic hatred, nationalism, self-defense, self-determination, and territorial considerations. One might also 
add communist ideologies and religious or cultural divisions leading to specific group self-identification 
resulting in allegiance to its goals.  
All these motives can serve as potential ideological means for insurgents to utilize in order to attract 
people into their ranks. Rebel efforts and strategies to do so, however, vary across different contexts, 
resulting in different degrees of popularity exhibited by various insurgencies. For instance, the TPLF 
movement of Ethiopia (1976-91) is regarded as a popular insurgency: “The persistent call of the young 
educated class — basically students and teachers — for radical change, with the self-determination of 
Tigray as a rallying slogan, inflamed popular aspirations.”47 In contrast, “while a small number of 
civilians volunteered for the LRA” of Northern Uganda in the early days of the group’s existence, it is 
agreed that “in general there was little support for Kony’s movement.”48 
By distinguishing between popular and unpopular groups in my argument, I further suggest that my 
proposed explanations of child recruitment bear different relevance to each of these categories. In 
particular, I propose that popular armed groups are more likely to recruit children if their fighting 
                                                 
46 Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner, “Refugees as Resources in War,” in Stedman and Tanner, Refugee 
Manipulation, p. 4. 
47 Aregawi Berhe, “The Origins of The Tigray People’s Liberation Front,”  African Affairs (2004), 103/413, 569–
592, p. 583. 
48 Blattman, “The Causes of Child Soldiering,” p. 4. Balttman cited Gersony (1997) or Behrend (1999). “Other authors 
argue that Kony initially received broader support (e.g. Finnström, 2003; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999). There is more 
agreement that by 1990 popular support for Kony had in essence ended” (Ibid., p. 4). 
12 
 capacity is high and if they operate in conflicts where military actors engage in ethnic persecution. 
Meanwhile, territorial access and material capacity variables, as well as fighting capacity, better predict 
child soldier recruitment of unpopular armed groups. The logic of this extended argument is briefly 
summarized as follows.  
Military organizations enjoying popular support from their countrymen are having inflows of 
committed adult fighters, and substitution of children for adults under such circumstances is 
counterproductive. Thus, popular armed groups might take children only if 1) the insurgency in question 
requires more combatants to achieve its military objective than the current inflow of adults provides (in 
case of the belligerents’ high fighting capacity), or if 2) children themselves approach the rebels for 
defense in insecure environments (the situation of ethnic persecution in a conflict).  
Unpopular armed groups attract fewer adult recruits on ideological grounds. This alone, however, 
does not necessarily suggest their high demand for additional fighters. First, if a group’s fighting capacity 
is low, its goals will be relatively benign in accordance with its military capabilities, which will result in 
few or no large-scale battles and low demand for soldiers as a result. Second, in the absence of 
ideologically motivated adults willing to join the insurgency, the group leadership might offer material 
rewards to attract an additional pool of grown-ups. If the need for soldiers is still not met, the rebels 
might wish to recruit children. Unpopularity of the armed movement, however, will make these very 
children seek shelter and hide from undesirable conscription. Therefore, armed groups with more 
territorial access, I argue, will have a higher chance to locate and engage underage recruits forcibly. 
Why Interesting?  
Conflict Studies Literature 
After the end of the Cold War, the conflict studies literature has contributed a number of works in 
which the authors suggested the distinction between the old and new wars.49 Most versions of the 
distinction between old and new civil wars imply that new civil wars are criminal, depoliticized, private, 
and predatory while old civil wars are considered ideological, political, collective, and even noble.50 The 
post–cold war manifestation of this type of argument can be traced in part to authors of popular literature 
who reported graphic accounts of recent civil wars in places such as Liberia, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone.51 
                                                 
49 The most prominent and well-known work in this regard is the book by Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: 
Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).  
50 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New’ And ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?” World Politics (October 2001), 54 (1), 
pg. 99-118, p. 100. 
51 Ibid., p. 101. Kalyvas refers to the following works in the security studies literature and the international relations 
field, which propose such claim: Edward N. Lutwack, “Great-powerless Days,” Times Literary Supplement, June 16, 
1995; Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Chris 
Hables Gray, Post-Modern War: The New Politics of Conflicts (London: Routledge, 1997); Mark Duffield, “Post-
modern Conflict:Warlords, Post-adjustment States and Private Protection,” Civil Wars 1, no. 1 (1998); David Keen, 
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 In his 2001 article, Stathis Kalyvas contended that this distinction is not valid. He concluded his review of 
old and new wars by suggesting that “differences tend to be less pronounced than usually argued and that 
they may not array themselves neatly and dichotomously around the end of the cold war.”52 
Despite this debate in the conflict studies literature on the necessity of the old versus new civil war 
distinction, some prominent works on child soldiers take the position of clearly favoring the distinction. 
Thus, Peter Singer suggests that the nature of armed conflict has changed since 1990s, and that “a general 
norm held against child soldiers across last four millennia of warfare” has collapsed.53 Unlike Singer, in 
my work I do not attribute new wars with the special feature of norm abrogation. Instead, in line with the 
debate in the conflict studies literature, I initially assume and subsequently validate by observation that 
compliance with the norm against child soldiers varies across different armed groups and thus is subject 
to certain conditions other than the historical timing of conflict. In other words, some militarized non-
state actors attach more meaning to the norm than others during the same time period. Thus, my work 
sheds new light into this prominent debate about the new and old wars.  
As to the normative aspect of insurgents’ behavior in civil war, recent works in the conflict studies 
literature, and more specifically its branch on violence against civilians, have produced a number of 
interesting findings. A prominent study by Jeremy Weinstein, for example, offers a powerful distinction 
between armed groups based on material and ideational endowments.54 The implication for normative 
behavior of insurgents was that the discipline was more likely to be violated and civilians abused if the 
perpetrators originated from the military organizations relying on material resources, as opposed to 
ideological rewards based on future promises. This distinction based on armed groups’ endowments in the 
conflict studies literature does not apply to child soldier recruitment though, as I show with the empirical 
evidence in my dissertation. Child soldiers cannot be treated as a special case of violence against 
civilians. Instead, the issue corresponds more closely to theories of recruitment which explore the 
intricacies of demand and supply of combatants for armed groups. Those theories from the conflict 
studies literature will be utilized as a starting benchmark in this study.55 
Another prominent theme in the literature on conflict studies, related to the concept of new wars, is 
the issue of weak and failed states. Recruitment of children in civil wars of strong states will likely prove 
counterproductive in the face of potent national armies with advanced military capabilities and heavy 
weapons. Indeed, the latter can defeat the armies of children at relative ease. For example, at one point in 
                                                                                                                                                       
“The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars,” Adelphi Paper 320 (1998); Mats Berdal and David M. 
Malone, eds, Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 
52 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New’ And ‘Old’ Civil Wars,” p. 117. 
53 Peter W. Singer, Children at War (New York: Pantheon, 2005), p. 15. 
54 Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
55 For a review of recruitment theories which were applied to the issue of child soldiering refer to this dissertation’s 
Chapter 3 on the theoretical framework. 
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 1992 when ECOMOG forces in Liberia resorted to air bombings of the NPFL positions near Barnesville 
and Harbel, the rebels’ forces consisting of many child soldiers broke out into fear and chaos, as they tried 
to escape the horrifying effect and devastation power of aerial bombardment. However, most of today’s 
civil wars, according to Ann Hironaka, occur in the weak but independent states created after 1945, which 
are incapable of defending themselves against rebel insurgency.56 At times without foreign intervention in 
the conflict, child recruits in such civil wars can withstand the feeble resistance of poorly equipped and 
often ill-disciplined government soldiers, thus contributing to conflict onset, escalation, and duration. 
Hence, in the weak states demand for child soldiers increases relative to ones with strong and 
functioning institutions, including a potent army. Nonetheless, even within a single weak state (Liberia) 
we can observe variance across the ratios of child soldiers among different armed groups. Similarly, not 
all weak and independent states exhibit the presence of child soldiers. But the states’ weakness might 
affect my independent variable of fighting capacity, which is a major explanatory factor behind the 
groups’ demand for child soldiers.  
Child Soldier Studies Literature 
Despite the gravity of the child soldier problem, there is a lack of systematic analysis in the literature 
on the issue that would illuminate why some armed groups recruit children whereas others do not. To my 
knowledge, there has been no published study that examined the variance of child recruitment across 
different insurgencies. By far the highest number of general reports that touch upon various aspects of the 
child soldier issue is produced by the NGO and IO community. Although varying in the depth of analysis, 
a large bulk of these studies are non-systematic, anecdotal, and reflects on a handful of interviews. Such 
interview-based reports were published by Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
Save the Children (SC), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), among others.57 
Studies on child soldiers that are based on a small number of interviews represent a valuable first 
stage of theory building. However, by their nature, they are not designed to reveal systematic patterns in 
the phenomenon. For example, the study by Rachel Brett and Irma Specht claims to reach conclusions 
about causes of child soldiering after interviewing 53 former child soldiers from ten different war 
                                                 
56 Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 7.  
57 For examples of such reports please refer to Human Rights Watch (HRW), Easy Prey: Child Soldiers in Liberia, 
(USA: Human Rights Watch/Africa, Human Rights Watch Children’s Right Project, 1994), 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1994/liberia2/; UNICEF, Adult Wars, Child Soldiers. 
For the academic literature theorizing on the basis of published interview accounts please see Afua Twum-Danso, 
Africa's Young Soldiers: The Co-option of Childhood, Monograph 82, Institute for Security Studies, April 2003, 
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No82/Content.html; Laura A. Barnitz, Child Soldiers: Youth Who 
Participate in Armed Conflict (Washington: Youth Advocate Program International, 1997); Goodwin-Gill and 
Cohn, Child Soldiers; Peter Singer, Children at War. 
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 “situations” – that is between five and seven informants from each war “situation.”58 Such a sample size 
can hardly be considered representative of the entire child soldier population. Graça Machel’s report 
claims to be based on 24 case studies of different conflicts. However, these case studies are never 
referenced in the report and there is no clear methodology offered by its author about how and even if 
informants were actually selected for the interviews.59 Similarly, Guy Goodwin-Gill and Ilene Cohn base 
their conclusions about child participation in conflicts on an unknown number of interviews with 
unspecified subjects from El Salvador, Guatemala, Israeli-occupied territories, Liberia and Sri Lanka.60  
Information obtained from a small number of respondents might describe the characteristics of a 
highly unrepresentative sample, especially if a study does not provide a clear description of the 
methodology used for designing questionnaires and selecting informants for the interviews. In addition, 
such studies typically do not interview the subjects from a control sample – one that would be composed 
of children who did not join armed groups during the conflicts in question. This is a very serious 
limitation from the methodological point of view.61 Information from the control sample is critical as it 
provides an essential benchmark for comparison of former child soldiers with non-participants in order to 
identify any potential statistically significant difference in the characteristics of these two groups.   
Within the academic community, there have been a few systematic studies of the child soldier 
phenomenon. Only some of them, however, conducted a cross-sectional analysis that would attempt to 
examine the problem comparatively across conflicts or conflict regions. In general, cross-country macro 
studies of child soldier recruitment are very rare. One of my previous coauthored works on the subject 
examined child recruitment in 19 African intrastate conflicts during 1975-2002.62 Another coauthored 
work of mine analyzed local patterns of recruitment in 690 sub-national regions in 52 African countries in 
the period 1990–2004.63 In line with many other cross-country studies in social science, however, 
research utilizing macro data might be subject to the ecological fallacy in making conclusions about 
individual behavior on the basis of country level variables. 
                                                 
58 Rachel Brett and Irma Specht, Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight (ILO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2004). 
The war “situations” mentioned in their study are armed struggles in Afghanistan, Colombia, Congo, the DRC, 
Pakistan, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and United Kingdom (with different interviews with underage 
participants in paramilitaries of Northern Island and British Army). 
59 Graça Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, UN Report, August 26 1996, http://www.unicef.org/graca/. 
60 Goodwin-Gill and Cohn, Child Soldiers. From the context of the book one understands that Ilene Cohn 
interviewed humanitarian workers, politicians, as well as former child soldiers, but it is not clear what the 
proportions or numbers of those were in any given conflict case.  
61 See, for example, Barry Ames, “Methodological Problems in the Study of Child Soldiers,” Paper presented at the 
Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, September 2006, pp. 6-7. 
62 Achvarina and Reich, “No Place to Hide.” 
63 Vera Achvarina, Ragnhild Nordås, Gudrun Østby, and Siri C. Aas Rustad, “Regional Poverty and Child Soldier 
Recruitment: A Disaggregated Study of Sub-National African Regions, 1990–2004,” forthcoming, Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift (PVS) (Political Science Quarterly), Special Issue “Identity, Institutions and Economy: Causes 
of internal political violence,” 2009. 
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 Single-country, micro-level, survey-based studies of former child and adult combatants have started to 
appear recently, albeit sporadically. These are performed by scholars interested in the micro-foundations 
of recruitment. Surveys of relatively large samples of individuals have been conducted on youth from 
Colombia, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Uganda.64 Survey research offers invaluable insights 
into the decisions of individuals and armed groups’ personnel as opposed to groups and children in 
general. Findings from such studies help build testable theoretical propositions and provide support for 
certain assumptions employed in work with macro data. Invaluable as they are, most of these survey 
studies, unfortunately, do not include a control sample.65 Moreover, while uncovering individual 
decisions in one particular country, conflict, or an armed group, these studies are also non-generalizable 
unless their implications based on intricate analysis, are subjected to systematic testing across armed 
groups. In addition, micro studies of this kind are often constrained by their own virtue of having the most 
restrictive experimental design, that is of one armed group examined or one type of recruitment (forced or 
voluntary) considered.  
Academic authors of theoretical papers have attempted to apply various existing approaches from 
other disciplines, such as principal-agent modeling, to organize stylized facts of child soldier recruitment 
into theoretical frameworks.66 Several alternative models have been suggested for the decision-making 
process of military organizations, distinguishing between voluntary and forced recruitment situations, and 
                                                 
64 Three widely known surveys, which were specifically addressing the issue of child recruitment, are the one on 
Uganda by Annan, Blattman and Horton, The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern Uganda; the one on 
Liberia by James Pugel, “Disaggregating the Causal Factors Unique to Child Soldiering,” Working Paper, presented 
at the Child Soldiers Initiative Working Group Session in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15-16 September 2006; and the 
one on Colombia by Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors,” Working Paper, presented at the Child 
Soldiers Initiative Working Group Session in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15-16 September 2006. 
65 Thus, out of three country studies of child recruitment specifically, only one included into the analysis a control sample of non-
abducted children: Ugandan study by Annan, Blattman and Horton, The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern 
Uganda. The other two studies on Colombia and Liberia did not compare their findings with any group of non-participants in 
armed struggle: Colombian survey by Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors” and a study on Liberia by James Pugel, 
“Disaggregating The Causal Factors Unique To Child Soldiering.” Psychosocial studies of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) assessment in former child soldiers have a mixed record of inclusion of a control sample in their analysis. The 
following surveys did not include a control sample: Christophe Pierre Bayer, Fionna Klasen, Hubertus Adam, 
“Association of Trauma and PTSD Symptoms with Openness to Reconciliation and Feelings of Revenge among 
Former Ugandan and Congolese Child Soldiers,” The Journal of American Medical Association (JAMA), 298(5), 
2007, pp. 555-559; Theresa Betancourt, Marie de la Soudière, Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Former 
Child Combatants in Sierra Leone: a Longitudinal Study, Report of baseline data assessment, Sierra Leone: International Rescue 
Committee, 2003. Yet, others did compare their results with a control group: Theresa Betancourt, Shawna Pochan, Marie de 
la Soudière, Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Child Ex-Soldiers in Sierra Leone - Follow-Up 
Analysis (Sierra Leone: International Rescue Committee, 2005); Brandon Kohrt, Mark Jordans, Wietse Tol, et. al., 
“Comparison of Mental Health between Former Child Soldiers and Children Never Conscripted by Armed Groups in Nepal,” The 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), 300 (6), 2008, pp. 691-702.  
66 The first model of child soldier recruitment based on the principal-agent approach and reviewed in the subsequent 
section of this dissertation has been offered in the work of Scott Gates, “Recruiting Child Soldiers,” Paper presented 
at the CSCW Workshop on Techniques of Violence in Civil War, PRIO, August 20-21, 2004, Oslo.  
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 demand and supply of child and adult recruits.67 Without empirical testing, however, the factors offered 
in such studies remain conjectures and cannot claim to represent the actual causes of child soldiering.  
                                                
Despite the methodological limitations of the existing child soldier literature, many of these studies 
have proposed a number of explanations behind the recruitment of minors. Such factors behind child 
vulnerability as poverty, orphans, lack of education and employment, spread of small arms and 
displacement of people were suggested by various authors to explain the underage recruitment from the 
point of view of child vulnerability to enlistment and coercion.68 These factors are recycled in the 
literature repeatedly. Some of them have been subjected to certain forms of empirical verification. 
Nevertheless, as I show in the literature review section, the evidence used to assess many of such factors 
that are claimed to affect child enlistment with armed groups is highly anecdotal and mixed regarding the 
effects. In addition, there is currently no work that would review all of these factors in a unified testing 
framework in order to explore which of them might play more important role than others.  
The existing explanations of the child soldier phenomenon from the perspective of armed groups, 
focusing on the latter’s needs to engage in recruitment of minors, have received even less attention in the 
literature. Such marginal factors include conflict duration, intensity and timing; an armed group’s material 
endowments, fighting capacity, and presence of central control by the leadership of the organization; as 
well as certain characteristics of children that make them a valuable military asset for recruiters. Most of 
these factors have been mentioned occasionally by non-systematic or non-empirical studies as speculative 
potential explanations.   
In my work I offer a so far missing test of most of these proposed factors which I treat as independent 
or control variables in my explanatory framework. In my analysis, however, most of the existing 
explanations are proposed to have a different causal logic in their effect on child soldier recruitment.69 
 
67 For alternative models see the following works which are reviewed in my dissertation in Chapter 3 on the 
explanatory framework: 1) Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict”; 2) Bernd Beber and 
Christopher Blattman, “The Industrial Organization of Rebellion: The Logic of Forced Labor and Child Soldiering,” 
Working Paper, October 2008. 
68 For the full list of citations please refer to Chapter 2 on literature review. Poverty, for example, was mentioned in 
Goodwin-Gill and Cohn, Child Soldiers, pp. 23, 31, and 38; Twum-Danso, Africa's Young Soldiers, pp. 8, 10; 
Barnitz, Child Soldiers, p. 23; Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, p. 11; and CSUCS, “Child Soldier 
Use 2003,” p. 2. Orphaning was cited as a factor behind child enlistment by the following authors and reports among 
others: Brett and McCallin, Children; HRW, Easy Prey, pp. 15-19, and UNICEF, Adult Wars, Child Soldiers, p. 19. 
The link between education and unemployment among youth is stressed in Henrik Urdal, “The Devil in the 
Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000,” Paper No. 14, Social 
Development Papers (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004). Small arms argument is prominent in such works as 
Singer, Children at War, pp. 38, 55; UNICEF, “No Guns, Please: We Are Children,” UNICEF Booklet, 2001; 
McManimon, “Use of Children as Soldiers.” 
69 The factor of groups fighting capabilities is one of such potential explanations that I propose to have a positive 
effect on child soldier recruitment, whereas other scholars believe it has a negative relationship with the latter as 
numerous battles should be negatively correlated with the presence of children among insurgents  (Andvig and 
Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 16).  
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 Moreover, my explanatory framework is primarily based on factors that I newly identify – such as ethnic 
persecution in the armed conflict, an armed group’s fighting capacity to challenge an opponent, as well as 
insurgents’ territorial control ability at home and abroad. The existing literature on child soldiers has not 
mentioned these factors as potential explanations of the phenomenon. In addition, my work adds a unique 
perspective by identifying and empirically testing the conditions which determine the different 
explanatory power of each proposed factor.       
By theorizing about diverse military organizations, I utilize both a deductive logic and comparative 
research design which allow me to identify and test my newly proposed explanations. My explanatory 
framework builds, to some extent, on the existing theoretical approaches, but it departs from them 
significantly as I offer an original design for empirical analysis. By utilizing statistical techniques and 
case study analysis on the macro and micro data which I compiled from secondary sources and collected 
during my fieldwork in Africa, I empirically test my arguments and assess some speculative implications 
from the existing literature on child recruitment.  
The need for performing empirical work across different conflicts has been advocated by prominent 
scholars in the field. Thus, Chris Blattman after presenting his own results from the survey-based analysis 
of youth abductions by the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda, promotes the following 
discussion: “Based on data from a single case, these policy implications are best regarded as unproven but 
testable implications of a general theory of recruitment, to be examined in other contexts. The literature 
on children in armed conflict, while rich in qualitative case studies, is short on hypothesis-testing. Future 
qualitative and quantitative research would do best to focus on evidence that allows us to discriminate 
between competing hypotheses, or fills the psychological gap in our understanding of indoctrination and 
disorientation of children.”70 My work bears on this suggestion, thereby providing a valuable contribution 
to the research on the child recruitment phenomenon. 
Why Important? 
The child soldier issue is regarded by some international organizations as a variant of the child labor 
problem.71 The undesirability of merging these two distinct problems becomes apparent when we take 
into account the conclusions of researchers opposing the campaign against child labor who show that in 
some contexts children deprived of work may end up in worse circumstances than adult-like toiling. 
Meanwhile, it is hard to find a proponent of underage recruitment who would argue that soldiering can be 
a remedy for children against some other, possibly worse, situation. Child soldiering can perhaps be 
                                                 
70 Blattman, “Causes of Child Soldiering,” p. 26.  
71 For example, the following report of Amnesty International advocated in 1999 for an inclusion of the child soldier 
issue in the International Labor Organization Convention (Amnesty International, Child Soldiers: One of the Worst 
Abuses of Child Labour (Amnesti International Report, January 1999, IOR 42/01/99). On the official website of the 
ILO the issue of children in armed conflict is treated under the category of child labor: 
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/areas/Armedconflict/lang–en/index.htm. 
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 viewed in analogy with land mines, which are very easy to plant, but may be extremely difficult and 
expensive to dismantle.72 It may be virtually effortless to recruit minors, but it is typically hard to 
rehabilitate them at a later stage because child soldiering inflicts heavy psychosocial damage on this 
young segment of the country’s population.73  
Below, I review some of the consequences of child soldiering which are problematic to reverse – such 
as mental and physical health trauma, drug and substance abuse – as well as social and economic 
reintegration problems. Whereas efforts can be made, as I show, to mitigate some of the harmful 
outcomes of child soldiering, it is a much more challenging enterprise than designing preventative 
measures to curtail the practice of underage recruitment. When left unaddressed, however, the 
humanitarian consequences of child soldiering become the links in a chain leading from prior recruitment 
of minors to intergenerational violence and repeated armed struggles within certain societies, as I discuss 
further in this section. The consequences of child soldering for the post-war society development are 
further exacerbated by the repercussions of child recruitment that affect dynamics of the conflict itself and 
the associated intensity of destruction. These geostrategic consequences of child soldiering are also 
discussed below. 
Humanitarian Consequences 
Exposure to Violence. As some of the examples used in this chapter demonstrate, in today’s intrastate 
conflicts children simultaneously become victims and agents of brutality. The process of child recruitment 
in itself, especially when forced, is frequently accompanied by violent and aggressive treatment of 
recruits, such as beating or torture.74 Often, children are conscripted in the immediate aftermath of 
violence performed against their family members for ethnic, economic, grievance or other reasons. Upon 
their capture or enlistment, children themselves are habitually coerced by recruiters to kill or commit 
                                                 
72 It costs $3 to plant a landmine and between $300 and $1,000 to dismantle it (Thomas Weiss and Cindy Collins, 
Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and the Dilemmas of Help (Boulder: Westview Press, 
2000), p. 112).   
73 The term “psychosocial” in the psychological literature refers to the “dynamic relationship between psychological 
and social effects, each continually influencing the other. “Psychological effects” are those that affect emotion, 
behavior, thoughts, memory, learning ability, perceptions and understanding. “Social effects” refer to altered 
relationships due to death, separation, estrangement and other losses, family and community breakdown, damage to 
social values and customary practices, and the destruction of social facilities and services. Social effects also extend 
to the economic sphere as many individuals and families become destitute through the material and economic 
devastation of armed conflict” (Theresa Betancourt, Ivelina Borisova, Julia Rubin-Smith, Tara Gingerich, Timothy 
Williams, Jessica Agnew-Blais, Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Children Associated with 
Armed Forces and Armed Groups: The State of The Field and Future Directions (Cambridge, MA: Psychology 
Beyond Borders and François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights/Harvard School of Public 
Health, May 1, 2008), p. 14. 
74 Although there is not enough evidence to believe that recruitment of children is predominantly forced, this type of 
recruitment practice is indeed known to occur in many if not most conflicts.    
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 atrocities against relatives, neighbors, or friends.75 For instance, former youth abductees in Northern 
Uganda reported being forced to beat, cut, or kill their friends or family members.76 
During their stay with armed groups, child soldiers are recipients of, perpetrators of and witnesses of 
even more violent behavior – beatings, sexual abuse, killings and mass murders, rape, abuse of dead 
bodies, and torture. For example, Ugandan young male abductees witnessed and were subject to most of 
these atrocities during their stay with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), unlike children who were not 
conscripted.77 A total of 54.4% of 169 surveyed child soldiers from Uganda and DRC “reported having 
killed someone and 27.8% reported that they were forced to engage in sexual contact.”78 Similarly, in 
Nepal, former child soldiers were found to suffer a higher exposure to bombings, torture and brutal death 
scenes, as opposed to their non-conscripted peers.79 These are just some of the most common experiences 
that child soldiers go through and that were captured with the pre-formulated questions of researchers.80 
Yet, we are unaware of the extent of other atrocities to which child soldiers may have been exposed.81  
                                                 
75 Such recruitment practice is designed to minimize if not eliminate the chances of new recruits to return home to 
their communities. It also introduces newly conscripted young soldiers to the violent practices routinely employed 
by rebels against civilians in many conflicts today. It is not only the underage recruits who are subject to this 
recruitment strategy involving harming civilians. As one Liberian survey of adult ex-combatants demonstrated, 
7.8% of all male informants were made to kill family or friends upon forced recruitment (Kirsten Johnson, Jana 
Asher, Stephanie Rosborough, et. al., “Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence With Health and 
Mental Health Outcomes in Postconflict Liberia,” The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), 
300(6), 2008, pp. 676-690, at p. 682). 
76 Blattman, Annan and Horton, The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern Uganda, p. 52. 
77 On difference in exposure to atrocities between abducted and non-abducted youth, as well as for the full list of 
traumatic experiences in the Ugandan context refer to, for example, Blattman, Annan and Horton, The State of Youth 
and Youth Protection in Northern Uganda, Table 9 on p. 52. 
78 Christophe Pierre Bayer, Fionna Klasen, Hubertus Adam, “Association of Trauma and PTSD Symptoms with 
Openness to Reconciliation and Feelings of Revenge among Former Ugandan and Congolese Child Soldiers,” The 
Journal of American Medical Association (JAMA), 298(5), 2007, pp. 555-559, at p. 555. 
79 Kohrt, Jordans, Tol, et. al., “Comparison of Mental Health between Former Child Soldiers and Children Never 
Conscripted by Armed Groups in Nepal,” pp. 695-696.  
80 For additional examples of child soldier exposure to extreme violence see also Michael Wessells, Child Soldiers: 
from Violence to Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); UNICEF, Adult Wars, Child 
Soldiers; Herrendra De Silva, “Conscription of Children in Armed Conflict: Clarifications,” British Medical Journal 
(323), 2001.  
81 Thus, eyewitnesses of genocidal wars recall other examples of “gruesome and nightmarish” atrocities: “a 
pitchfork stuck in the gut, the private parts of women excised, limbs severed, teeth removed one by one, amputations 
of tongues and noses, Achilles tendons sliced by machetes so that victims cannot run away, and the lingering stench 
of piles of dead bodies” (Book Review by Tony Miksanek of James E. Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary 
People Commit Genocide And Mass Killing (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), in The Journal of the 
American Medical Association (JAMA), 300(6), August 13, 2008, p. 737). This list comes from records of the 
Holocaust, Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo and Rwanda genocide survivors and observers. For examples of horrific 
atrocities committed during the Liberia’s civil war see the book by Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The 
Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War (London, UK: Hurst & Company 
Publisher, 1999). 
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 Trauma. The degree to which witnessing and experiencing brutality has an effect on children’s mental 
health has recently received attention in the fields of psychology and psychiatry.82 Yet, the issue still 
remains relatively unexplored. Outside of the context of armed conflict, studies in psychology established 
“links between childhood experience of violence and violent and other anti-social behavior in childhood 
and later life,” although a small part of psychological literature also emphasizes the “resiliency of youth 
to extreme stressors.”83 Within the context of armed struggle, short-term and long-term effects of a 
child’s exposure to violence have been identified in a number of the interview-based and ethnographic 
studies in Angola, Mozambique, DRC, and Sierra Leone, as well as by survey-based research conducted 
on children in Northern Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nepal among others.84   
                                                
Quantitative studies conducted shortly after the reintegration of ex-combatants, while “using various 
measures of psychosocial wellbeing and mental health” all identified psychosocial problems in former 
child soldiers.85 Allen and Schomerus found high levels of psychological trauma and social dislocation 
among former child abductees from Northern Uganda, while Derluyn et. al. identified extremely high 
rates of posttraumatic stress reactions among their informants from the same conflict region.86 The 
presence of symptom criteria for PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) was also detected among a mixed 
 
82 The following discussion is based on the literature review of recent studies on mental health of war-affected 
children offered in Betancourt, et. al., Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Children Associated 
with Armed Forces and Armed Groups. For review of the studies published prior to 2007 see also Christopher 
Blattman and Jeannie Annan, “The Consequences of Child Soldiering,” HiCN Working Paper 22, 2007. 
83 On the link between childhood experience of violence and anti-social behavior see United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (New York: UNICEF, 
2002), p. 258. On resilience of children to extreme stressors refer to Ann Masten, “Ordinary Magic: Resilience 
Processes in Development,” American Psychologist, 56(3), 2005, 227-238, cited in Blattman and Annan, “The 
Consequences of Child Soldiering,” p. 7. 
84 For such studies conducted by researchers from outside of psychology or psychiatry fields see: Guy Goodwin-Gill 
and Ilene Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict (New York: Clarendon Press, 1994); 
Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa: The Ethnography of Political Violence (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Susan Shepler, “The Rites of the Child: Global Discourses of Youth and Reintegrating 
Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone,” Journal of Human Rights, 4(2), 2005, pp.197-211; Zack-Williams, “Child Soldiers 
in Sierra Leone and the Problems of Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration into Society: Some Lessons 
for Social Workers in War-Torn Societies,” Social Work Education, 25(2), 2006, pp.119-128; Krijn Peters and Paul 
Richards, “Why We Fight: Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone,” Africa, 68(2), 1998, pp. 83-215. 
85 Betancourt, et. al., Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces 
and Armed Groups, p. 14.  
86 Tim Allen and Mareike Schomerus, “A Hard Homecoming: Lessons Learned From the Reception Center Process 
in Northern Uganda,” (Washington, DC: Management Systems International, 2006); Ilse Derluyn, Eric Broekaert, 
Gilberte Schuyten, Els De Temmerman, “Post-Traumatic Stress in Former 
Ugandan Child Soldiers,” Lancet (363), 2004, 861-863. The study of Allen and Schomerus “collected data on a 
large (N=886), although nonrepresentative, sample of combatants under 18 in Uganda. The report surveyed youth 
who had recently reintegrated into their communities after an often-brief stay at an interim rehabilitation center.” 
“The authors did not use standardized measures of mental health” (Betancourt, et. al., Psychosocial Adjustment and 
Social Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups, p. 14). The study of Derluyn et 
al. “evaluated 71 former child soldiers, using the Impact of Event Scale-Revised.” “This study has been critiqued 
due to its recruitment methods” (Betancourt, et. al., Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Children 
Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups, p. 14). 
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 sample of Ugandan and DRC former child soldiers.87 Findings of other studies suggested that effects of 
war violence on children might persist over time. Emotional problems such as “vivid memories and 
dreams of war related violence,” insomnia and nightmares, were all recorded in former child soldiers 
from El Salvador ten years after the end of the conflict.88 The studies that attempted to measure 
systematically the long-term psychosocial impact of child soldiering and processes of mental health 
adjustment among war underage participants over time came to similar conclusions.89 This longitudinal 
research established the inability of former child soldiers to “escape their violent pasts” years after 
conflicts terminated, with symptoms of depression, anxiety, hostility, low levels of confidence, and anti-
social behaviors remaining.90 Moreover, one study also identified deterioration over time in mental health 
of those informants who were exposed to “intimate victimization and perpetration.”91 
These and numerous other studies have thus concluded that former child soldiers exhibit enduring 
patterns of distress. However, very few have analyzed whether children who did not end up with armed 
groups enjoyed better mental health after the war than former child soldiers. Rare quantitative studies that 
                                                 
87 Bayer et. al., “Association of Trauma and PTSD Symptoms with Openness to Reconciliation and Feelings of 
Revenge among Former Ugandan and Congolese Child Soldiers.” This work by Bayer et. al. “studied 169 former 
child soldiers in rehabilitation centers in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and found that about 
one-third (34.9%) of the children interviewed met clinical symptom criteria for PTSD” (Betancourt, et. al., 
Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups, p. 
14). 
88 Maria Santacruz and Rubi Arana, “Experiences and Psychosocial Impact of the El Salvador Civil 
War on Child Soldiers,” Biomedica (22), 2002, Supplement 2, 283-397. Although this study “lacks data on mental 
health problems at the time of reintegration, it provides a valuable perspective on the enduring difficulties former 
child soldiers face. The authors interviewed 293 former child soldiers who had belonged to one of El Salvador’s two 
armed groups (FMLN and the FAES) and explored the frequency with which the interviewees experienced mental 
and emotional problems resulting from their participation in the armed conflict. Although not all the interviewees 
showed signs of emotional problems, almost three out of five continued to have vivid memories and dreams of war 
related violence, 20% suffered from constant insomnia and 16% had nightmares. In addition, 39% said that they felt 
tired and depressed quite often; a similar number of interviewees felt nervous” (Betancourt, et. al., Psychosocial 
Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups, p. 15). 
89 A longitudinal study by Boothby followed 39 male former combatants from Mozambique over a period from 1988 
to 2003 (Neil Boothby, “What happens when child soldiers grow up? The Mozambique case study,” Intervention 
2006, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 244-259). 
90 The study of Boothby on Mozambican child soldiers found that “recurrent thoughts and memories of traumatic 
events” which boys experienced immediately after the war in 1988 all continued 16 years later (Neil Boothby, 
“What Happens When Child Soldiers Grow Up? The Mozambique Case Study,” Intervention 2006, Vol. 4, No. 3, 
pp. 244-259, p. 245). Overall, this study followed 39 male former combatants from Mozambique over a period from 
1988 to 2003. Another longitudinal research was performed in Sierra Leone and found that the symptoms of 
depression, anxiety and hostility, as well as the levels of confidence and pro-social (positive) behaviors, were all 
present in former child soldiers upon conflict termination and remained at the same levels three years later 
(Betancourt, de la Soudière, Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Former Child Combatants in 
Sierra Leone). The researchers in Sierra Leone first interviewed 266 former child soldiers (male and female) at re-
entry into their communities. Three years later, the project leaders re-interviewed 133 youth from the original 
sample. This study was using “a locally validated measure of psychosocial adjustment developed by the Oxford 
Center for Refugee Studies” (Betancourt, et. al., Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Children 
Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups, p. 15). 
91 Betancourt, et. al., Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Former Child Combatants in Sierra 
Leone. Thus, researchers observed increased levels of depression and anxiety. 
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 meanwhile offered a comparison with a control group provide mixed evidence, indicating in some cases 
no difference, whereas in other cases substantial difference between former child soldiers and other war-
affected youth in terms of mental health. A research project comparing Sierra Leonean child soldiers from 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) with non-conscripted children, for example, uncovered similar 
rates of psychosocial problems, including depression, anxiety and hostility, among both groups. It also 
“found no significant differences between former child soldiers and the comparison group in terms of 
positive psychosocial adjustment outcomes, such as confidence and prosocial behaviors.”92 In their study 
of Ugandan abductees, Annan and Blattman found that aggression among former abductees was low 
compared to a control sample of non-abducted children, while social integration was strong.93 Even 
though this study claims no support for “the prevailing view that participation in war leads to broad-based 
‘traumatization’,” their analysis nevertheless revealed some, albeit minor, psychological impact of 
abduction with mild distress and depression signs in the subjects. 94 Yet another project on children in 
Nepal, based on the survey of both former child soldiers and children that were not conscripted, “found 
that child soldiers had worse mental health outcomes (symptoms of depression, PTSD, general 
psychological difficulties, and function impairment) than the comparison groups, with the exception of 
anxiety symptoms.”95 
There appears to be no well-established agreement on the extent of the differences in the 
psychological effects on former child soldiers compared to non-conscripted youth. It has been 
documented though that “the concentration of traumatic stress is likely driven by the concentration of 
extreme violence experienced.”96 Moreover, it is a specific type of violence – namely sexual abuse – that 
                                                 
92 Theresa Betancourt, Shawna Pochan, Marie de la Soudière, Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of 
Child Ex-Soldiers in Sierra Leone - Follow-Up Analysis (Sierra Leone: International Rescue Committee, 2005). In 
this study, the “baseline interviews with former child soldiers were compared to assessments of 135 community 
youth who were not associated with the RUF” (Betancourt et. al., Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration 
of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups, p. 16). 
93 Blattman and Annan, “The Consequences of Child Soldiering,” pp. 7, 15. “This is a representative survey of 741 
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conflict. 
94 Blattman and Annan, “The Consequences of Child Soldiering,” pp. 1, 16.  
95 Kohrt et. al., “Comparison of Mental Health between Former Child Soldiers and Children Never Conscripted by 
Armed Groups in Nepal,” pp. 696, 700. “In Nepal, Kohrt surveyed 140 returned children and 142 children never 
associated with armed groups” (Betancourt, et. al., Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Children 
Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups, p. 16). 
96 Blattman and Annan, “The Consequences of Child Soldiering,” p. 17. Kohrt et. al. also arrived at the same 
conclusion: “The difference in mental health outcomes between child soldiers and never-conscripted children can be 
explained in part by greater exposure to traumatic events among child soldiers…” (Kohrt et. al., “Comparison of 
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 is most likely connected with the highest levels of mental disorder among both combatants and civilians 
alike.97 With exposure to violence identified as a predictor of impaired mental health, it is possible that 
non-conscripted youth from conflict environments have been exposed to violence of a comparable degree 
to child soldiers.98  
Attrition rates. Those former child soldiers who shared their gruesome stories survived the war. 
Meanwhile, an unknown number of child soldiers perished during conflicts, never having a chance to 
narrate their stories. Unlike adults, children are the ones being sent into combat first, often untrained, and 
sometimes simply used as “cannon fodder.”99 In my own survey of former Liberian child soldiers 45% of 
informants responded that children were more likely to die in their units than adults.100 One third of 
former adult combatants stated that children were better fighters because they “fight with ignorance,” they 
are “more risky,” “do not know what they are doing,” and “run forward” in battles. “Fearlessness” was 
the most cited reason offered by children themselves behind their own widespread belief (42% of my 
informants) that they were better fighters than adults.101  
                                                                                                                                                       
Mental Health Between Former Child Soldiers and Children Never Conscripted by Armed Groups in Nepal,” p. 
700). These results are also said to be “reinforced by a broad literature on refugee war trauma using similar 
measures,” cited in Annan and Blattman’s work on p. 17. 
97 Betancourt and de la Soudière, Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reintegration of Former Child Combatants in 
Sierra Leone. Kohrt et. al.’s study also speculated about the potentially larger effect of sexual abuse trauma on 
mental health, as opposed to other trauma types. However, without having data on sexual abuse, that study did not 
aim at proving such conjecture statistically.  
98 For this reason, the results from two of such studies on Uganda and Sierra Leone should be treated with caution. 
Both cases, I would argue, represent extreme outliers in terms of how violence manifested itself during the conflict. 
Consider that in the crucial Ugandan case the violence experienced by abducted children was short lived and of 
lower level, compared to other armed conflicts. For example, the average length of stay of Ugandan abductees with 
the LRA was nine months. This is about five times shorter than the average stay of four years in my own survey of 
Liberian ex-combatants. Similarly, the exposure to lower levels of violence by Ugandan abducted youth is revealed 
in the study that compared them with the DRC child soldiers. The latter were found to have higher participation in 
battles and combat, and were reported to have “killed someone personally” more often as a result of it (Bayer et. al., 
“Association of Trauma and PTSD Symptoms with Openness to Reconciliation and Feelings of Revenge among 
Former Ugandan and Congolese Child Soldiers,” p. 558).  
In the Sierra Leonean conflict, on the contrary, violence manifested itself as the most extreme unparalleled one 
committed in recent history. Not only the atrocities recorded were horrendous and heinous, they were also widely 
spread across the country and affected different societal groups on a mass scale. Therefore, similar levels of distress 
in former child soldiers and non-conscripted youth claimed by the two otherwise methodologically superior studies 
in question could be attributed to shorter and lower level of violence exposure by children within the LRA in 
Uganda, on the one hand, and an extremely high degree of atrocities experienced by most of the population in Sierra 
Leone during the conflict, on the other hand. 
99 For a discussion on how children were made to perform this role see HRW, Easy Prey, pp. 32–34. Similarly, 
Indian sources reported that the smallest boys from armed groups operating in the north-east of the country “were 
placed closest to the enemy” “as the most fearless” (“Child Soldiers in Northeast Raise Concerns,” New Delhi TV, 
May 5, 2007, www.ndtv.com, cited in CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 171).   
100 Eighteen percent of my informants reported the reverse trend – that of adults being more likely to die, whereas 
37% said that there was no difference in the death toll of adults and children.  
101 Twenty five percent of former child soldiers answered that adults were better fighters, and 33% suggested that 
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 Drug or substance abuse and physical health. Those children who do return home, in addition to 
mental health problems also suffer overwhelmingly from addiction to alcohol and drugs, both of which 
are given to child and adult recruits by many armed groups. For example, 39% of one survey participants 
– former child soldiers from Sierra Leone – reported being “forced to take drugs regularly.”102 Similarly, 
almost half of adult male combatants from Liberia used drugs during the war (44.9%) and more 
frequently than noncombatants.103 Besides the intended short-term effects of these mind altering 
substances, manifest in increased fearlessness and bravery in combat, the drugs also tend to have a long 
term effect on the physical health of former fighters. During the Liberian war, for instance, child soldiers 
were “mainly served up a type of crack known locally as “brown-brown,” which generates “irreversible 
consequences on the brain.”104 With several exceptions in my own survey, almost all former child soldiers 
from Liberia reported smoking marijuana on a daily basis – even up to ten years after disassociation with 
armed groups. Liberian former combatants were also reported to be “more likely to have increased their 
drug usage since the war ended” (12.1% increase for males).105 Several years after the secession of armed 
hostilities in Liberia, the country’s sole psychiatric hospital in Monrovia still treats former child soldiers 
for drug abuse.106  
War-related injuries and wounds are yet another consequence of conflict participation with which 
former child soldiers have to cope. About 60% of former Liberian child soldiers in my survey reported 
being injured during the war, almost half of those more than once. Bullet or bayonet wounds were 
exacerbated by instances of beatings and torture. Liberian adult ex-combatants exhibited higher rates of 
“serious head trauma” than non-combatants.107 Survey from the Sierra Leone reported 27% of former 
child soldiers to be injured or having “developed a disability as a result of their time with the fighting 
forces.”108 
Developmental Consequences 
Socio-economic integration. Another adverse consequence of child soldiering is the potential 
marginalization of former combatants in a post-conflict society. Military service results in the loss of 
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 education and societal stigma, both of which in turn lead to fewer economic opportunities. A study by 
Annan and Blattman found that the most significant impact of military service on Ugandan youth was 
upon their skills and productivity due to the loss of education. As they report, abducted youth attained 
about nine fewer months of education than non-abducted children, which lowered their skilled 
employment by a half and earnings by a third.109 In contrast, consider a loss of education years for child 
soldiers in other conflicts who, unlike Ugandan youth with an average of nine months spent with the 
LRA, often stayed with armed groups for many years. For example, in my own survey, the average stay 
of child soldiers with Liberian factions was about four years. Meanwhile, as observed by the Amnesty 
International in the DRC, in the “dire economic climate” of the post-conflict society, “employment 
opportunities are limited for everyone and former child soldiers are at a disadvantage compared to their 
civilian peers who were able to continue with their schooling and are now better-educated.” 110  
Besides educational loss, upon their return home or settling elsewhere in the country, former child 
soldiers also have to face the challenge of societal stigma. Whereas community acceptance of former 
child soldiers may vary from context to context, there is a reason to believe that the degree of 
stigmatization is linked to the level of atrocities committed by former combatants while with an armed 
group. According to Humphreys and Weinstein’s survey of ex-fighters in Sierra Leone, “individuals who 
perpetrated widespread human rights abuses face significant difficulty in gaining acceptance from their 
families and communities after the war.”111 Meanwhile, although this study does not explore the link 
between community acceptance and employability, it is conceivable that societal stigma might jeopardize 
employment of former child soldiers, as demonstrated by the following examples. In the DRC, Amnesty 
International noticed instances of poor relations between former child soldiers and their co-dwellers, 
“with mutual distrust, prejudice and hostility,” resulting in a community’s assignment of jobs to other 
people but ex-combatants.112 Social stigma in Rwanda led to refusal by many secondary schools to accept 
former child soldiers – an act that resulted in these children’s decision to return to the government army 
after the secession of hostilities.113  
This grim picture of poor social integration of former child soldiers is not shared by all researchers. 
Boothby’s study of former child soldiers in Mozambique, mentioned above, found that 16 years after the 
war, “the vast majority” of former underage combatants “have become productive, capable, and caring 
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 adults.”114 Moreover, most of them “have regained a foothold in the economic life of rural Mozambique, 
are perceived by their spouses to be “good husbands,” are taking active steps to ensure their own 
children’s welfare, and are engaged in the collective affairs of their communities.”115 While the study of 
success of Mozambican former child soldiers is noteworthy, we should also take into account that this 
case was based on the assessment of a very small targeted, effective, and resourceful reintegration 
campaign, supported by the country’s government and carried out by the Save the Children organization 
on only 39 former boy soldiers. During this particular program, all the subjects went through extensive 
psychological and social assistance that included counseling and community reintegration assistance.116 
Meanwhile, the existence, scope, performance, and funding of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration 
and rehabilitation (DDRR) programs for children and adults elsewhere in the world are varied, as I 
demonstrate further below.117 Pessimistic conclusions about poor socio-economic integration of former 
child soldiers might, therefore, reflect a more representative trend in the post-conflict societies.  
Child Soldiers and DDR Programs. Assisting children with PTSD, reintegration and other problems 
is not easy. While the potentially positive effect of DDR programs on the mental health adjustment of 
former child soldiers has been established by existing studies, such initiatives are not widespread and their 
success is not guaranteed.118 Although DDR programs are more frequent nowadays, they are still not 
established in all post-conflict situations.119 Consider, for instance, the following account of an NGO 
worker on the absence of the reintegration program in Liberia after the first war of 1989-96: 
“.. Also, another problem was that after the first disarmament, people left them [child soldiers] 
just like that. The process wasn’t complete – there was no job training or assistance with 
reintegration. After 1997 the situation started going bad and because of economic hardship, 
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 violence came again and the same children went back into the game, but this time they did it 
voluntarily. While some were forced – the majority went in voluntarily.”120 
 
 In places where DDR(R) programs were implemented, there were other issues that hampered their 
full effectiveness. In Liberia, for example, the international community took note of the negative 
consequences of the absence of reintegration programs in 1996 and launched a full-scale DDRR initiative 
after the second Liberian civil war of 1997-2003.121 With about 90,000 participants and a widespread 
acceptance of ex-combatants into the communities, the DDRR program in Liberia was generally 
considered “a success.”122 Meanwhile, surveys not linked to DDR programs have not found such an 
overwhelming participation rate among ex-combatants. For example, a survey of 549 ex-soldiers across 
Liberia in 2008 found that “post-conflict DDR programs were attended by only a minority of both male 
and female former combatants.”123 A 2007 survey that evaluated the DDRR process in Liberia discovered 
the following: “the reintegration programme has failed to provide sustainable alternative livelihoods for 
ex-combatants” with the majority of them still being unemployed at the time, and thousands having been 
“regrouped for the purpose of illegally exploiting natural resources in diamond and gold mining areas, as 
well as on rubber plantations.”124 The widely known exclusion of girls, purposeful or inadvertent, from 
DDR programs in general and in Liberia specifically, has also been a well-documented tendency.125  
Indeed, most of these problems are related to the overall lack of funding for DDR programs resulting 
from the short-term commitment of their donors. Consider, for example the following account of a UN 
worker regarding DDR funding problems, referring to the specific example of the program in Sierra 
Leone:  
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 “But the other portion, the other part of the DDR process beyond family tracing and reunification 
is to get them [former child soldiers] back into their communities and to get them back into 
school. And education is not a six-month process. That is the process of several years. And the 
challenge we have with donors is to get them think more elastically about DDR for children 
including in terms of funding. One of the crises that we faced in Sierra Leone was that we had 
what was considered a successful DDR process including children in terms of the number of 
children who participated, the percentage that we were able to reunify, but the success, the 
ultimate success of DDR in Sierra Leone is still a story that is in writing because the UNICEF 
education program had tremendous challenges and difficulty in trying to maintain its level of 
funding for the education programs. Precisely because donor interest shifts quickly, DDR is 
finished in Sierra Leone.” 126 
 
Intergenerational Violence 
A problematic transition to peace in some countries, as shown in this section on the examples from 
Liberia, highlights yet another important consequence of child soldiering – the re-recruitment of young 
men and women for subsequent civil wars that occur in the same countries or elsewhere in the region. The 
humanitarian consequences of child soldering outlined above, when combined with the developmental 
repercussions of a lack of viable economic opportunities in post-conflict societies, may push former child 
soldiers back into violence for the sake of survival.  
The recycling of child soldiers in ongoing conflicts has been reported for numerous armed struggles 
where they participate.127 The cases of Angola and Liberia, however, stand out, with children re-recruited 
there for renewed fighting even after the conclusion of peace treaties and the cessation of earlier military 
activities.128 Evidence from my own work suggests that the re-recruitment rate of former NPFL child 
soldiers from the first Liberian Civil War (1989-1996) into the Second Civil War (1997-2003) was about 
50%. Ex-combatants from the second Liberian war, in turn, spread the conflict further around the region 
as former child soldiers were re-recruited to fight in the conflicts in Ivory Coast and Guinea.129 
One reason for a re-recruitment of child soldiers is the persistence of ties between commanders and 
former combatants, especially underage ones. Some former Liberian child soldiers whom I interviewed in 
Ghana mentioned maintaining contact with their ex-commanders in Liberia, who reportedly were calling 
my respondents on their cell phones from time to time.130 This persistent connection between 
                                                 
126 From my confidential interview with an official from the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict, United Nations, New York, April 2005.  
127 On re-recruitment in non-terminated conflicts see reports on Sri-Lanka, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Uganda 
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 commanders and ex-combatants is made possible by a strong sense of group cohesion and loyalty to the 
organization and its leadership that children particularly develop during their stay with armed groups. The 
study of abductees from Northern Uganda showed that “the proportion of youth reporting that they ‘ever 
felt allegiance to Kony’ was over 30 percent among those abducted before age 11,” declining to “roughly 
20 percent for those abducted in their late twenties.”131 Such ties are hard to break during the 
demobilization and reintegration processes, especially in geographically small countries like Liberia, 
Burundi, and Sierra Leone. But even geography might not pose an obstacle to highly motivated recruiters: 
during the second Liberian war commanders from the country traveled all the way to Ghana in an attempt 
to re-recruit former child soldiers residing there.132  
Another reason for the child re-recruitment phenomenon is an overwhelming economic deprivation in 
postconflict situations and the failure of reintegration and rehabilitation programs to assist former 
combatants with sustainable means of survival. The absence of employment for ex-combatants as well as 
inadequate provision of necessary skills for future job opportunities are the push factors behind the re-
recruitment of former child soldiers. Following the 1994 Lusaka peace treaty in Angola, for example, 
“banditry became a major threat to peace – some of it committed by former child soldiers who viewed the 
gun as their best means of earning a living.”133  
The rotation of combatants, especially children, from conflict to conflict throws some countries into 
the vicious cycle of intergenerational violence and, as a result, never-ending wars. The trend of 
intergenerational violence outlined above offers two specific examples of mechanisms which Paul Collier 
identified behind the link between country’s experience of a civil war and the armed struggle’s high 
chance of recurrence within five years.134 According to Collier, “once a country has stumbled into 
conflict powerful forces – the conflict trap – tend to lock it into a syndrome of future conflict.”135 The 
author speculates that one such conflict trap mechanism is that “violent conflict changes the balance of 
assets in the society.”136 One type of such violent-specific assets can be, for example, the “hierarchical 
rebel management structure.”137 As my previous reference to strong ties between commanders and their 
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 youngest soldiers demonstrates, child soldiering can serve as one specific example of such a mechanism 
at work, when violent-specific assets feed into recurrence of conflicts.  
Another conflict trap mechanism which, according to Collier, increases the chance of a recurrence of 
civil war, is ineffective international intervention in “stabilizing the society during the first postconflict 
decade.”138 Insufficient international peace-building efforts, such as disarmament, demobilization, 
rehabilitation and development that fail to reduce and sometimes even address incentives for child re-
recruitment and re-enlistment, as described above, belong to specific examples of the conflict trap 
mechanism. One practitioner summarizes the issue quite succinctly:   
“A society that mobilizes and trains its young for war weaves violence into the fabric of life, 
increasing the likelihood that violence and war will be its future. Children who have been robbed 
of education and taught to kill often contribute to further militarization, lawlessness, and violence.  
The use of child soldiers also threatens fragile cease-fires and blocks reconciliation and peace. 
Not infrequently, conflict continues at the local level even after a cease-fire has been signed. 
Child soldiers are pawns in local conflicts because they provide a ready group for recruitment by 
warlords, profiteers, and groups that foment political instability.”139 
 
Geostrategic Consequences 
Underage warriors may directly influence conflict onset, conflict escalation, and conflict duration – 
the major variables examined in the conflict studies literature. The geostrategic importance of the 
phenomenon is highlighted when child soldiers appear in wars involving major powers.  
Conflict onset. Underage recruits may facilitate wars which otherwise would not have occurred, thus 
making the issue directly linked to the problem of conflict onset. Quick deployment of forces can often be 
a decisive element for a fast victory in the initial military offensive, with children representing a critical 
pool of soldiers, as some internal armed struggles demonstrate. For example, President Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila of the DRC enrolled thousands of children for his initial military campaign against the Mobutu 
government in 1996-1997.140 In the first year of its existence, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) under the command of Charles Taylor was recruiting children in the Nimba County and in 
Monrovia alike to ensure successful and expedite capture of the capital.141 At the beginning stage of the 
Burundian conflict between 3,000 and 5,000 children below the age of 18 were reported to be sent to the 
Central African Republic, Rwanda and Tanzania for training.142 Similarly, children were recruited by the 
Burundian government forces in substantial numbers since the start of the civil war.143 
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 The existence of child soldiers may not only contribute to the onset of a conflict in a home country, 
but also spread the violence to the neighboring states, facilitating a broader regional instability. For 
instance, the majority of soldiers fighting with the RUF in the first months of the conflict in Sierra Leone 
(1991-2000) were Liberian fighters who included significant number of children.144 In a snow-ball effect, 
these very ex-combatants from Sierra Leone along with other ones from Liberia spread the armed struggle 
elsewhere in the region as former child soldiers of RUF and all the factions from the second Liberian war 
(1997-2003) were re-recruited to fight in the conflicts of neighboring Ivory Coast and Guinea.145 Some of 
the Liberian commanders and recruiters clandestinely went as far as Liberian refugee settlements near 
Accra in Ghana in search of former child soldiers demonstrating that the considerable geographic distance 
was apparently worth the reward.146  
Conflict escalation. As children boost the ranks of insurgents, fighting can further reach higher 
intensity than it otherwise would have been the case. While NGO and IO reports often depict child soldier 
conscription as a consequence of conflict escalation, it is the very presence of underage recruits that may 
actually enable the rebels to boost and sustain the high intensity of military confrontation. The Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) was reported to increase its recruitment of children 
prior to mounting an offensive in 2002.147 Likewise, it was cited by the CSUCS that escalation of fighting 
in Ivory Coast in December 2002 coincided with the enlistment of children into both government and 
rebel forces.148  
Conflict duration. Similar to their impact on the scale of armed contestation, child soldiers can 
prolong wars as they are often recruited to offset a decreasing supply of adult soldiers. In the context of 
high battle and indirect war-related death tolls, as well as diminishing willingness of adults to join armed 
movements as conflict persists, children comprise an additional resource available to belligerents. For 
example, thousands of children were recruited by the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) 
armed group precisely at times when it was experiencing a shortage of adult males.149 In addition, not 
                                                 
144 Enrique Restoy, “Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Trying to Influence an Army of 
Children,” CSUCS, Paper presented at the Forum on Armed Groups and the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict, Chateau de Bossey, Switzerland, 4 to 7 July 2006, http://www.child-
soldiers.org/childsoldiers/CSC_AG_Forum_case_study_June_2006_Sierra_Leone_RUF.pdf, p. 4. “Anecdotal 
accounts from ex-combatants interviewed by Human Rights Watch corroborate reports from academic and official 
sources on the numbers involved: these estimates suggest that at least five hundred NPFL and a similar number of 
ULIMO fighters took part in Sierra Leone’s armed conflict” (HRW, Youth, Poverty and Blood, p. 13). 
145 The following report is dedicated entirely to the spread of child soldier recruitment in the West African region: 
HRW, Youth, Poverty and Blood, p. 3. 
146 Information from my own interviews with former Liberian child soldiers in Ghana in winter 2008. 
147 CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004, p. 76. 
148 CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004, p. 59. 
149 Human Rights Watch Children’s Rights Project, Children in Combat, January 1996, cited in Restoy, “Sierra 
Leone,” pp. 4-5. 
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 only do children boost the ranks of the rebels, they are actually the ones who are more likely to stay as 
opposed to adults who have a higher tendency to defect and run away.150  
Moreover, the issue of child soldiering, just by contributing directly to one of these conflict features – 
onset, escalation, or duration, – may, in fact, indirectly affect all three of them. The literature on war and 
natural resources, for example, identified a link between the access of belligerents to lootable 
commodities and the duration of civil war, as resources acquired in war allowed armed groups to pay for 
and sustain their further military operations.151 Meanwhile, all three major diamond conflicts of the 20th 
century – those in Angola, the DRC, and Sierra Leone – involved children. In the DRC and Sierra Leone 
child soldiers contributed to the onset of conflict. Thus, by enabling armed groups to access and control 
lootable commodities, child soldiers further lock the conflicts through the control of natural resources 
permitting the escalation and prolongation of the armed struggle.  
Wars of great powers. The consequences of child soldier recruitment in resource-rich conflicts extend 
beyond their impact on internal conflict dynamics. There is a considerable geostrategic implication of the 
ability of child soldiering to facilitate armed struggle and help rebels gain access to natural resources. 
This implication is related to the fact that West African warlords of resource conflicts, in turn, often 
support Islamic terrorists. Thus, reports claim that Al Qaeda operatives “benefited from the sales of 
millions of dollars of conflict diamonds mined by rebels in Sierra Leone.”152 This link between diamond 
civil wars and terrorist movements is a real concern for western powers: “…Such interconnections 
painted West Africa not only as a “wild zone” endangering the locals, but also as a “rogue zone” 
threatening the West.”153 While child participation in conflicts aids the cause of local rebels and warlords, 
the latter may also assist other militarized actors in their wars against super-powers.  
Child soldiers also have a more direct geo-strategic implication by their increasing appearance in 
conflict zones of great powers’ direct engagement, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, thus gaining further 
importance for international security. For instance, in 2002 about 8,000 children were found in 
Afghanistan among various armed groups opposing the U.S. forces.154 Similarly, the issue of child 
participation in conflict came to the U.S. Army’s attention when some boys as young as 12 years of age 
were reported to be used by insurgent groups across Iraq to “purchase weapons, work as informants and 
                                                 
150 Blattman, “Causes of Child Soldiering.”  
151 Michael L. Ross, “What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?” Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol. 41, No. 3, May, 2004, pp. 337-356. 
152 Philippe Le Billon, “Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars,” Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, Vol. 98, No. 2 (2008), pp. 345-372, at p. 361, citing Global Witness (2003) 
and Farah (2004). 
153 Philippe Le Billon, “Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)terrorist Consumer,” Antipode 38:4 , 
2006, pp. 778-801, at p. 783. 
154 Zissis, “Children in Camo.”  
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 messengers, and detonate bombs.”155 Children have also repeatedly been used as suicide bombers in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,156 in the war in Iraq,157 as well as in the Chechen armed struggle.158 The U.S. 
military itself sees the implications of child soldiering for its forces.159 
*** 
With these problematic humanitarian, developmental, and geostrategic consequences of child 
soldiering, the efforts of IOs and NGOs to address the problem of underage recruitment are indeed 
noteworthy. At the same time, according to the activists’ own assessment, their initiatives have had a 
limited effect on child recruiters so far, if any.160 For example, despite intense negotiations with multiple 
rebel leaders, “large-scale releases of children from armed forces or groups have rarely taken place before 
hostilities ended.”161 The deterrent impact of the international and regional tribunal courts that have 
recently started to prosecute individuals involved in recruitment of minors also remains uncertain.162 
However, international activists have not lost hope that these strategies can have a “beneficial effect” and 
“should continue wherever possible and appropriate.”163 At the same time, there is an apparent need for 
these mechanisms to be critically examined in order to identify their limits. More specifically, “strategies 
must take into account that what may be effective in influencing one group may have little impact on 
another,” because armed groups “have widely varying characters, ideologies, aims, capacities and 
                                                 
155 Ibid. Declassified information provided by Capt. Patricia Brewer, a U.S. military spokeswoman in Iraq. 
156 For further discussion on this subject please refer to the Human Rights Watch, “Erased in a Moment: Suicide 
Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians,” http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002.pdf, and 
Children and Armed Conflict Unit, Defense for Children International, Palestine Section, “Use of Children in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories: Perspective on Child Soldiers,” July 2004, 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/00205.pdf. 
157 For instances of the use of child suicide bombers in Iraq see Radio Free Europe, “Iraq: Kirkuk Suicide Bomber 
Believed to be a Boy,” November 2, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1062582.html; MSNBC Associated 
Press, “Minister: Suicide Bomber a Handicapped Child,” 31 January 2005. 
158 For examples of cases involving Chechen girl and boy martyrs please refer to the following English and Russian 
language sources: Khassan Baiev, The Oath: A Surgeon Under Fire, Simon & Schuster, 2003, p. 163; Boris 
Mikhailov, “Soldati v korotkih shtanishkah (Soldiers in Short Pants)” Novoye Mnenie, 07 June 2005;  “Terroristy 
gotoviat v shahidi detei (Terrorists Train Children for Martyrs),” Informatsionnoe agenstvo Regioni, 17 May 2004; 
Alexander Vitkovsky, “V Dospekhah Smertnikov (In the Martyrs’ Armory),” Parlamentskaya Gazeta, Moscow, 14 
February 2001; Vladimir Yanchenko, “Put k Dzhihadu (The Road  to Jihad),” Trud, 19 January 2006; Svetlana 
Meteleva, “Slishkom Moloda, Chtobi Umeret (She is Too Young to Die),” Moskovsky Komsomolets, 2004. 
159 Centre for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, Marine Corps Warfighing Laboratory, “Child Soldiers: 
Implications for U.S. Forces,” Seminar Report, November 2002, CETO 005-02. This report notes the possibility of 
increased lethality in combat involving children, as adult soldiers may get distracted by the presence of children on 
the battlefield. Similarly, killing children in battles often has a demoralizing effect on combat forces. One of the 
historical cases of such consequence, brought up by the report, is the engagement of U.S. forces with units from 
Hitler Youth at the end of the Second World War.   
160 CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 24.  
161 Ibid., p. 27. 
162 Moreover, CSUCS believes that “members of many armed groups will, in all likelihood, continue to regard 
themselves as beyond the reach of international justice and remain confident that national-level prosecutions are 
unlikely” (CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 27). 
163 CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 25. 
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 constituencies, and they operate in diverse, often rapidly changing and frequently insecure 
environments.”164 Thus, “greater attention must be paid,” according to the CSUCS, “to questions of 
where children are recruited by armed groups and, critically, why.” 165  
                                                
In the presence of such a need for more research on armed groups recruiting children, my work has 
the potential to assist the efforts by practitioners and scholars alike to increase our understanding of what 
kind of non-state groups and under what circumstances they are more likely to conscript and enlist 
minors. Thus, I argue that armed groups which possess certain characteristics are more likely to recruit 
children. Those characteristics include: high fighting capacity of insurgency relative to the government, 
low material capacity in the form of finance channels to the organizations’ leaders to compensate adult 
fighters (or, alternatively, higher access to natural resources), established control and access to territories 
at home and abroad. I also propose one contextual explanatory factor of child recruitment, which relates 
to the characteristic of a conflict in which an insurgency operates. More specifically, I suggest that when 
ethnic persecution of civilians constitutes a part of the armed struggle between the opponents, the 
likelihood of child recruitment is higher.  
My argument also includes a proposition that such characteristic of armed groups, as their popularity 
among some constituencies which support the insurgents, can further dictate which of these four 
explanations will explain the outcome of child soldiering. Thus, my argument suggests that in dealing 
with popular armed groups, international organizations might expect to see child recruitment in those of 
them which have a higher fighting capacity and operate in conflicts with ethnic persecution. For 
unpopular armed groups, we might observe resort to child recruitment if rebels, again, have high fighting 
capacity, low financial inflows (or higher access to natural resources), and larger access to territories.  
Thus, by examining (a) why some armed groups have incentives and capacity to recruit more 
underage soldiers than others, and (b) why some children are more vulnerable to forced and voluntary 
recruitment than others, in this dissertation I test and develop further our knowledge about the 
determinants of child recruitment. The results of such a study might, therefore, help international 
organizations anticipate the problem in advance and possibly take preventative measures to curb the 
practice before its onset. My intent is that this work’s findings will contribute to new child protection 
strategies, as well as offer guidance to the adjustment of the existing ones towards more effective results.  
 
 
 
 
 
164 Ibid., p. 25. 
165 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
36 
 Roadmap 
The remainder of my dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I examine how the existing 
studies address the question of child soldier recruitment practice by armed groups and establish how my 
analysis is distinct from them. I look at the anecdotal and systematic studies alike in order to identify 
which child motivation and sources of vulnerability have been proposed to affect the enlistment and 
conscription of minors into armed factions. I also examine the existing studies on insurgents’ perspective 
in relation to their demand for child soldiers.   
In Chapter 3, I outline my explanatory framework by describing in detail my own argument, its logic 
and causal mechanisms. I first provide a simple version of my argument based on four explanatory factors 
accounting for the demand and supply of child soldiers. I then offer an extension of my theoretical 
framework by introducing an armed groups’ characteristic of popularity, which explains different 
explanatory power of my four explanatory factors for those two types of insurgencies. In this chapter I 
also examine the alternative theoretical approaches to the study of the child soldier phenomenon and 
establish how my theoretical framework is different from them. At the end, I also evaluate the list of 
existing alternative explanations which I include into my model as control variables. 
The methodology I employ in this study to test my explanations is described in Chapter 4. There, I 
elaborate on how I compile my data and sample for empirical testing. I explain how I collected secondary 
data for my large-N cross-group sample of 112 African insurgencies. I also elaborate on how I 
constructed a survey-based sample from the data which I collected during my fieldwork in Ghana on over 
200 Liberian former child soldiers and non-participants of conflict. In this chapter I outline how I select 
my case studies, and how I operationalize and measure the concepts employed in my argument. I also 
describe the quantitative tools and the comparative case study approach which I utilize to test my 
hypotheses.  
In Chapter 5, I discuss different model specifications I utilize for my statistical analysis and present 
the results of the first test – the large-N empirical analysis. I offer an interpretation of my findings, 
especially the ones which do not support the initial hypotheses of my dissertation. I also identify outliers 
in my model estimation and discuss potential reasons for nonconformity with my theoretical framework. 
Methodological caveat of potential endogeneity problem and ways to fix it are addressed in this chapter  
as well.  
Comparative static and dynamic case studies comprise the second test of my explanations and are 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 contains a detailed examination of five Liberian armed factions 
during the first civil war in the country: NPFL, INPFL, Ulimo-J, Ulimo-K, and LPC. I reconstruct the 
values of all the independent variables in my argument and compare the predicted child soldier 
recruitment outcomes for those armed groups with the actual established practice, which I also identify in 
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this chapter. Chapter 7 introduces the conditioning variable of groups’ popularity and examines whether it 
affects the relative explanatory power of my four explanatory factors for two different categories of 
insurgents. It also traces the changes in my explanatory factors over time for one Liberian armed faction – 
the NPFL. I determine whether the varying trend in child soldier practice of this group is explained by the 
changes in the independent variables.  
A synthetic Chapter 8 describes my attempt to apply the argument to other geographic contexts 
beyond Africa. Thus, I examine two armed groups in conflicts of Asia and Latin America – the LTTE and 
the FARC. I analyze one of these groups, the FARC, further in order to demonstrate how my theoretical 
framework should be understood in interpreting the child soldier behavior of this faction, which at first 
might appear to be non-conforming with my theoretical framework.  
I conclude with the summary of my findings, their interpretation, and broader implications for 
conflict studies, child soldier literature, and international relations. Based on the results of my work, I also 
suggest some practical strategies for the policy community. I discuss the limitations of this study related 
to definitions, data collection and analysis, and elaborate on the opportunities for future research in this 
field.  
 Chapter 2: Literature Review  
Rigorous research on child soldiers is still rare, despite the gravity of the problem of child soldiering 
and the increasing number of non-systematic, interview-based studies dedicated to the issue. To my 
knowledge, there has been no published or publicly available study that would attempt to answer why and 
under what conditions some armed groups recruit children and others do not?166 The existing studies in 
the literature addressing the child soldier issue can be broadly divided into 1) ones that attempt to offer 
some answers to why children enlist with armed groups and 2) others that investigate why children might 
be attractive to armed groups as recruits.  
Examining the answers to these questions might guide our exploration of the variance in child 
recruitment across military organizations. More specifically, in order to answer my research question, I 
model the behavior of both armed groups and children as I assess the relative presence of children among 
rebels. Therefore, in the literature on the subject the more relevant information for my work is the 
findings of the existing studies about the decisions of children to join armed groups (the supply of child 
soldiers) and the factors that make minors attractive and essential for recruitment from the group’s 
perspective (the demand for child soldiers). While reviewing the existing arguments I either show that 
they are sustained by evidence and explain why, or outline how they are used in my model and why. 
Most studies overdetermine the explanation of why children join armed groups, suggesting that 
essentially “everything contributes” to children “becoming easy prey for the recruiters” due to the extent 
to which armed conflicts “upturn traditional social structures.”167 “Families are dispersed and displaced, 
most people lose their means of living, and schools close down or deteriorate. Children are idle, destitute 
and bewildered by the violence they witness.”168 The biggest problem of this approach is that virtually 
every conflict has the mentioned effects on the society, and yet children end up with insurgents in some 
armed struggles while not in others.  
While the reasons given in the existing studies on child enlistment are plenty, the rationale of why 
armed groups recruit underage soldiers is somewhat understudied. Thus, among the related factors are 
the collapse of the norm against using children in war; overwhelming spread of light weaponry suitable 
for minors; and a child’s optimum cost-productivity ratio in the context of forced recruitment. Table 2 
summarizes the factors that I have identified in my review of the existing literature. These reflect a child’s 
motivations, vulnerability and utility from the military perspective. 
                                                 
166 A small number of studies performed a systematic examination of limited number of cases, without conducting 
any large-N analysis. Even in those rare comparisons across conflicts, however, social science methodology of 
comparison across cases was not employed.  
167 ILO, Wounded Childhood, p. 24. 
168 Ibid., p. 24. 
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 Table 2. Potential Causes of Child Soldiering: Current State of the Literature 
 
1. Child Motivations  
(Supply of Child Soldiers) 
2. Child Vulnerability  
(Demand for Child Soldiers) 
3. Child Utility 
(Demand for Child Soldiers) 
 
Major Factors: 
Impoverishment  
Orphaning 
Lack of education and employment 
 
Marginal Factors: 
Collapse of family and societal structures 
Militarization of daily life  
Social, community and family values 
Peer pressure 
Feelings of helplessness/vulnerability 
Desire to revenge 
Identity formation 
 
Small arms proliferation 
(Unprotected) displacement 
 
Structural factors: 
Conflict duration 
New wars 
 
Children Characteristics: 
Obedience 
Loyalty 
Disorientation 
High retention 
Military effectiveness  
Cheap maintenance  
Gullibility to propaganda and 
indoctrination 
 
The existing studies offering some explanatory factors behind child recruitment (both of supply and 
demand nature) can be further classified into four categories depending on the methodology used and the 
level of analysis (implicit or explicit) employed: 1) descriptive books and reports based on interviews 
with former child soldiers; 2) empirical cross-country macro analyses (quantitative and/or case studies); 
3) empirical single-country micro-level survey-based studies; and 4) non-empirical theoretical papers. 
Below I review all four categories of studies in detail and, within the divide, those where children or 
armed groups are the primary unit of analysis.  
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1, I first review the literature that attempts to answer 
the question of why children join armed groups. Here I examine and assess the explanatory power of the 
most cited and most empirically justifiable factors appearing in the literature and offer a brief overview of 
other existing explanations. I evaluate their relevance to my argument. In Section 2, I assess the utility 
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 and offer a discussion of the predictive strength of the existing explanations for children’s vulnerability to 
recruitment. In Section 3, conversely, I examine the existing studies reflecting on why armed groups need 
children and comment on their utility in answering my research question. I conclude by summarizing the 
gaps in the literature on child soldiers and specify how my work aims to offer a valuable contribution to 
our understanding of recruitment of minors.  
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 Section 1. Child Motivations: Why do children enlist into armed groups? 
In general, the NGO and IO literature on child soldiers, as well as studies by sociologists and 
anthropologists, tend to focus on the agency of children and the reasons behind their decisions to join 
military organizations.169 As such, these works do not explore the different needs of diverse armed groups 
for recruiting minors. This type of literature on child soldiers stresses the importance of poverty, loss of 
family, and lack of education or employment as the key factors that drive children to join insurgencies. In 
addition, the mentioned motives also include religious or ethnic identity, militarization of daily life and 
idleness, “revenge, a desire to escape abusive family situations, a quest for power and excitement, 
protection and survival...”170 Below I review all these factors and their relevance to my argument in more 
detail.  
1. Poverty 
Poverty has been widely cited as the leading cause for child recruitment into armed groups.171 Strong 
statements about the relationship between poverty and child recruitment have been offered by several 
works. Graça Machel’s report, for example, specifically stated that “one of the most basic reasons that 
children join armed groups is economic.”172 Peter Singer claims in his book that the economic factor is “a 
                                                 
169 There is some debate in the literature whether children actually have a full agency to decide for themselves or 
not. Andvig and Gates comment on the agency of children by referring to studies on child labor. In most countries, 
they claim, “children must shoulder adult work responsibilities at an earlier age than is accepted in the West” 
(Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 5). They cite results of studies on child migration 
in India which reached a conclusion that “boys aged 12 -14 regularly made labor migration decisions independently 
of their parents and often without the consent or even informing the parents about their departure” (Vegard Iversen, 
“Segmentation and Rural Network Multipliers in Rural-urban Migration, Working Paper T 9, Development 
Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, University of Sussex, 2005, p.11, cited in Andvig and 
Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 5). Andvig and Gates therefore conclude that “despite many 
cultural differences, it is also at about this age that children may seek military employment on their own and solve 
many of the simpler military tasks independently, if employed” (Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed 
Conflict,” p. 5). According to Michael Wessells, however, the degree of choice exhibited by children is overstated: 
“Although children are politically active and make decisions to join without obvious external coercion, it is 
simplistic to attribute these decisions unilaterally to “free choice.” The desperation and paucity of options in war 
zones beg the term “voluntary recruitment” and alternate terms such as “non-forced recruitment” may be more 
appropriate. Children may join because they have no other means of obtaining food, or they want protection or 
health care that’s accessible only in armed groups” (Michael Wessells, “A Living Wage: The Importance of 
Livelihood in Reintegrating Former Child Soldiers,” in Neil Boothby, Alison Strang and Michael Wessells, A World 
Turned Upside Down:  Social Ecologies of Children and War (Kumarian Press, 2006). 
170 Wessells, “A Living Wage.” 
171 For examples see Goodwin-Gill and Cohn, Child Soldiers, pp. 23, 31, and 38; Twum-Danso, Africa's Young 
Soldiers, pp. 8, 10; Barnitz, Child Soldiers, p. 23; Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, p. 11; CSUCS, 
“Child Soldier Use 2003,” p. 2; and CSUCS, Child Soldiers: Global Report 2001, June 2001, 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LGEL-5CSHGX?OpenDocument. 
172 On the basis of case study analysis, Graça Machel argues that “the children most likely to become soldiers are 
those from impoverished and marginalized backgrounds and those who have become separated from their families” 
(Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, p. 11). 
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 particularly strong” one.173 Rachel Brett and Irma Specht argue that poverty “is perhaps the most obvious 
common feature of child soldiers generally, which is one of the reasons why it is frequently identified as 
the cause of child soldiering.”174 Michael Wessells suggests that “one of the most common motivations 
for non-forced recruitment is economic – the quest for money, material gain, and status.”175 Yet other 
studies, while admitting that poverty matters, do not suggest that it might have a stronger predictive 
power of child recruitment than other factors. For example, the earliest comprehensive book on child 
soldiers by Guy Goodwin-Gill and Ilene Cohn identifies poverty as a factor without assigning it a greater 
value than other variables.176 Alcinda Honwana also identifies poverty as one of the “push factors” among 
others behind a child’s motivation to join an armed group.177 
Logic of Argument. There are several ways in which the poverty argument relates to voluntary 
recruitment. It is quite conceivable that “chronic poverty is among the most important, if damaging, 
aspects of the social ecologies of war zones. Poverty corrodes the health and well-being of all children 
and often obstructs positive options such as education or a means of earning a living.”178 Thus, according 
to the Machel report, children can be given away to armed forces by impoverished parents in exchange 
for the child soldier’s wages or loot that go directly to the family; they can volunteer themselves “if they 
believe that this is the only way to guarantee regular meals, clothing or medical attention”; or children can 
become de facto child soldiers if the whole family keeps moving along with the armed forces for 
economic reasons.179 These scenarios resonate with the one outlined by Wessells: “some children join 
these groups in hope of gaining otherwise unattainable wealth, often with the goal of sending money 
home to help support their families.”180 Thus, children were paid by Ugandan government and militias 
                                                 
173 Peter Singer, as well as Shannon McManimon, independently argue that high levels of poverty, interactively with 
other variables, can explain the growth in the number of child soldiers. Interaction terms whose potential effect is 
suggested by both authors include proliferation of small and cheap weapons, and the changing nature of warfare 
(Singer, Children at War, pp. 38, 55; Shannon McManimon, “Use of Children as Soldiers,” Foreign Policy in 
Focus, Vol. 4, N. 27 (November 1999), http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol4/v4n27child_body.html. 
174 Brett and Specht, Young Soldiers, p. 14. Brett and Specht call poverty “the major environmental factor” that 
makes children and young people “vulnerable to involvement in armed forces and armed groups.” Moreover, Brett 
and Specht extend the poverty argument beyond conflicts to peaceful situations in which armies recruit children 
(Ibid, p. 14). 
175 Wessells, “A Living Wage.” 
176 Goodwin-Gill and Cohn, Child Soldiers. 
177 Among other main push factors identified in Honwana’s work are migration, political ideology, and the 
“mutability of youth” (Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, p. 28).  
178 Wessells, “A Living Wage.” 
179 Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, p. 12. Often such “volunteering” involves parents “who 
encourage their daughters to become soldiers if their marriage prospects are poor.” 
180 Wessells, “A Living Wage.” Wessells brings up an account of a Cambodian boy who joined an armed group at 
age 13: “I send most of the money I am paid each month back home. To this day I have never admitted to my family 
that I am in the army – I am too afraid that they would force me to return home. How would I provide for them?” 
(UNICEF 2003, p. 31, cited in Wesselss, “A Living Age”). Wessells also mentions in this context that such logic is 
not unique only to African child soldiers, but is similar to the decision making processes of youth in the Western 
countries. “It would be a mistake to view voluntary (non-forced) child soldiering for economic gain as a 
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 and by army-backed paramilitary groups in Colombia for their military services.181 Both government 
forces and belligerents participate in looting, and thus children may have the opportunity to reap the 
benefits for themselves and their families.182 As Wessells notes, “the power of looting as an incentive to 
join indicates that having a livelihood is not equated with amassing money” as “in many developing 
countries, wealth resides in one’s possessions (even if stolen), livestock, and services useful in 
bartering.”183 Of course in many cases the pecuniary promises are never delivered to children and instead 
are used only as an incentive to attract new recruits.184  
These mechanisms behind the poverty argument are somewhat similar to what Goodwin-Gill and 
Cohn propose as different scenarios of poverty effects on the child motivation to join, in line with the 
classical literature on the relationship between poverty and conflict. More specifically, their causal 
mechanisms of survival (children and adults join to get food for the day or “assume the risk of voluntary 
participation to obtain a subsistence wage”) are similar to the generic logic of the poverty argument 
proposed by Machel.185 The third causal mechanism of poverty, suggested by Goodwin-Gill and Cohn, 
however, is somewhat different and resembles more the logic of radicalization described below in this 
section. That is grievance, or the “social and economic injustice” that “motivates adults and children to 
take up arms, sometimes with a long-term vision of affecting change.”186 Consider how Wessells 
describes the importance of grievances behind decisions of young adults to join armed movements:  
“Many war zones feature a combustible mixture of unemployment, lack of educational and training 
opportunities, and failed expectations. The resulting sense of hopelessness and futility, coupled with 
the desire to change a failed political system, can convert ordinary teenagers into activists who 
                                                                                                                                                       
phenomenon unique to developing countries. In the United States and the United Kingdom, among other places, 
volunteer recruits come disproportionately from lower socioeconomic classes, for whom the military offers a way 
out of poverty and a gateway to opportunities. Poor, young Americans are often attracted by the lure of the U. S. 
military, because of its successful mixture of patriotic appeals and lucrative training and education opportunities.” 
181 On Uganda see CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004, p. 106. On Colombia see 1) CSUCS, Child Soldiers 
Global Report 2004, p. 127; 2) Briggs, Innocents Lost, p. 48; 3) Human Rights Watch, You’ll Learn Not to Cry: 
Child Combatants in Colombia (Human Rights Watch: New York, Washington, London, Brussels, 2003), p. 41, 
cited in Wessells, “A Living Wage,” with an account of a Colombian boy who had joined a paramilitary group: 
“After school I was a baker’s assistant. It was hard work and paid badly. I went to work on a farm but the work was 
hard too, so finally I joined the paras. I had friends inside. It paid 300,000 [U.S. $100] a month. It seemed like an 
easier life.” 
182 This notion is supported by my interviews with former Liberian child soldiers.  
183 Wessells, “A Living Wage.” 
184 This trend is supported by multiple accounts of organizations and researchers interviewing Liberian child 
soldiers. The following account of an East Timorese boy joining an armed group at 17 years old also demonstrates 
this point: “I was paid once, when I first joined the militia. I got 25,000 rupiah (about $3-$5). After that I was never 
paid again” (UNICEF, Adult Wars, Child Soldiers, p. 49). 
185 Goodwin-Gill and Cohn, Child Soldiers, p. 23. 
186 Ibid., p. 23. For greed and grievance concepts in the literature on civil wars please refer to Jeffrey Herbst, 
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 foment political rebellion. The radicalization of youth, which includes 15- to 24-year-olds, has played 
a prominent role in political change throughout history (Goldstein 2001). Young people’s engagement 
in political rebellion is likely to be a potent force in developing countries, where people under 18 
years of age comprise half the population, and economic pressures make livelihood issues a profound 
concern at progressively younger ages.”187 
 
The poverty argument can be further extended to the forced recruitment of children as well. For 
instance, according to Singer, the targeted children are “usually from special risk groups: street children, 
the rural poor, refugees, and others displaced.”188 He explains the logic of this argument by introducing 
the concept of “efficient recruiting sweeps” pertinent to these four groups in particular.189 Some literature 
by practitioners, as Machel’s report, also notes that “in all conflicts, children from wealthier and more 
educated families are at less risk” of forced recruitment.190 According to Machel, these children are either 
left “undisturbed” or “released if their parents can buy them out” or “sent out of the country to avoid the 
possibility of forced conscription.”191 Poor communities may also exhibit lower resistance to forced 
recruitment, as they can be less capable of defending themselves and have a lower chance of becoming a 
strategic territory for government defense, as opposed to richer regions. Moreover, impoverished 
populations may possess less informational capacity to anticipate the armed groups’ marches towards 
their settlements, as well as suffer from hampered mobility in relocating to refugee or internally displaced 
people’s (IDP) camps. 
Open Debate. Despite the intuitive appeal of the above arguments, there are a number of studies that 
challenge the belief that poverty matters to such a large extent, if at all. Thus, Rachel Brett states that 
“there are many more poor children who do not become child soldiers than do, even in war zones. What is 
true is that children who are not living in poverty rarely become child soldiers.” This insight opens a 
discussion about a potential methodological problem of interview-based studies claiming causality of the 
poverty factor, and suggests that poverty can be only a necessary but not a sufficient condition behind 
child soldiering. Along similar lines, Andvig and Gates note that the contextual factor of poverty does not 
“vary much from one war-zone to another,” while child recruitment does, again suggesting only the 
necessity of the poverty explanation at best. Claims of sufficiency of poverty are also countered with yet 
another argument by Francisco Gutierres-Sanin, who makes a valid point about the existence of 
alternative ways (at least in the Colombian context) of escaping poverty besides voluntary enlistment into 
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 armed groups, such as illegal crop production or migration.192 Moreover, even when today’s rich 
countries were poor centuries ago, they did not extensively use child soldiers.193  
Preliminary Evidence. The existing empirical investigations neither properly refute nor 
overwhelmingly support the poverty argument. Many interview-based books and reports, as well as some 
survey studies, suggested that poverty was indeed mentioned as a reason for joining by their child soldier 
informants. These include the interview-based studies by Brett and Specht, Goodwin-Gill and Cohn, and 
UNICEF among others, which claim poverty to be an explanatory factor because they or some third party 
observers noticed extreme poverty among their interviewees.194 The methodological deficiency of un-
representativeness of the sample of such interview-based studies, outlined above, undermines the validity 
of the resulting findings about the predictive power of the poverty factor.195 These studies do, however, 
shed light on the causal logic between impoverishment and child soldiering. Consider, for example, the 
ILO’s finding that half of the 34% of former child soldiers from four African countries who claimed 
joining armed groups for material reasons said that “it was for their immediate survival,” with the other 
half reporting their enrollment to be a “longterm strategy for earning a livelihood.”196 
The existing systematic cross-country analyses have mixed results regarding the relationship between 
poverty and child recruitment. In one of my coauthored works, we performed a test on the absolute levels 
of national poverty against child soldier rates in the sample of 19 African conflicts.197 No relationship was 
established between the two variables in this context. Concerned with the size of the dataset used for this 
study and the potential problem of ecological fallacy, mentioned above, in my other coauthored work I 
attempted to increase the sample size and disaggregate the country-level data to account for the large 
regional variations in poverty and child soldier recruitment rates. As Goodwin-Gill and Cohn emphasize, 
“children differ widely, both within and across areas of armed conflict, in the nature of their pre-war and 
war-related experiences.”198 Meanwhile, studies that utilize nation-wide measures of factors whose effect 
they are trying to capture cannot account for such sub-national variation. In addition, as Beber and 
Blattman suggested, while child soldiering should be “more likely in poor countries where children’s 
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 economic opportunities are poor relative to that of adults, and where their access to education and 
information… is less,” “the important point is that a nation’s absolute poverty may not be sufficient” as 
“relative opportunities matter.”199  
My later cross-sectional coauthored study therefore examined the underage recruitment and absolute 
and relative levels of poverty in 690 regions of 52 countries in Africa in the period 1990–2004.200 
Measuring regional poverty by infant mortality rates and socioeconomic welfare indicators, we obtained 
mixed results. We found partial support for the poverty hypothesis by observing that regions with higher 
infant mortality rates were more likely to have undergone recruitment of children than regions with lower 
infant mortality rates. At the same time, our analysis revealed a negative relationship between poverty and 
child soldiering when using indices of household assets as proxies for economic well-being in the region.  
Survey analysis also offers mixed findings, but with the prevalent support for the poverty hypothesis. 
From a survey of ex-child combatants in Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein found that the majority 
of former recruits were uneducated and poor, and that many had left school due to the inability to pay 
school fees or closure of the facilities.201 Among the surveys suggesting that poverty matters is also the 
work of Martin Crill, which reports on 300 demobilized child soldiers in a DRC transit center.202 Sixty 
one percent of the respondents in his survey admitted having no family income and more than half of the 
informants had at least six siblings. The major limitation of these studies’ research design – an absence of 
a control sample for the analysis – makes their findings about the degree of the role of poverty in child 
recruitment questionable.  
One way to avoid this problem of over-reporting the poverty influence, even without a comparison 
group, is to examine the reasons that children give for joining, as opposed to looking at the absolute 
numbers of poor children in the ranks of rebel movements. Once this is done, the low share of poverty 
behind the motives of children somewhat undermines the importance of this factor. Consider that 90% of 
the interviewed Islamist child soldiers from the Philippines “told about ideological reasons while 
none mentioned material needs.”203 Similarly, while indeed many poor children could have been found 
among Liberian armed groups, one survey showed that fewer than 10% of former child combatants from 
the country’s Second Civil War referred to money as a motivation for joining, and under 10% of them 
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 said they joined because people in the armed group “lived better,” altogether making economic reasons 
prevalent in under 20% of all respondents.204  
The Liberian example cited above also suggests that the survivalist motive behind children’s 
enlistment into armed groups, probably more common for African contexts, is further complemented by 
the motives of greed. After analyzing data on former combatants in Colombia, both children and adults, 
Gutierrez-Sanin’s work revealed that “by far and large the FARC members had a job before joining, and 
earned above the national average.”205 Thus, the enlistment was probably not dictated by a survivalist 
strategy. However, this study did not find a similar empirical support for the relative, as opposed to 
absolute poverty, with only a small set of Colombian young peasants in the sample reporting entering an 
armed organization that offered “much worse material conditions than what they had.”206 
When the actual comparison of recruited and non-recruited children is performed, however, 
conclusions about the importance of the poverty factor seem to fade. Consider, for example, that one 
survey cited above referred to the importance of poverty after observing a high number of six siblings 
among former child soldiers in the DRC.207 A simple comparison with the rest of the population, 
meanwhile, reveals no difference between the cited number of siblings and the average country fertility 
rate of 6.3 - 6.7 children per woman during the 1990s.208 The findings of surveys with control sample 
generated partial support for the poverty argument. For example, the study of Blattman and Annan on 
child soldiering in Northern Uganda revealed that child soldiers enlisted into the Local Defense Units 
(LDU) militia came “from poorer and more agricultural households.”209 Meanwhile, the forced 
conscription of youth by the LRA armed group was not found to be predicated on the poverty levels of 
the subjects in this study.210  
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 In sum, poverty has been mentioned by many studies as a factor with significant predictive power in 
explaining the instance of child recruitment. Some studies claim that up to 20% of children reported 
poverty as the reason behind their decision to join armed groups and, therefore, poverty might indeed be 
one of the factors, albeit not the strongest one, behind child recruitment. As the same time, however, the 
existing studies that tested the poverty argument either suffer from methodological problems or provide 
mixed evidence for such a claim. Thus, cross-sectional studies have mixed results, with support for the 
argument increasing with the level of desegregation of the data on poverty. Micro level surveys provide 
somewhat inconclusive evidence for the poverty argument.  
In addition, the literature on child soldiers still debates the necessity of poverty for child recruitment 
from the theoretical point of view. Therefore, with mixed results of the previous studies and debatable 
rationale behind the poverty argument, I do not choose poverty to be a potential key explanatory factor in 
my analysis. However, due to the attention that this factor obtained in both empirical and theoretical 
literature, I do control for its effects when examining other factors by including it as one of the control 
variables into my model.  
2. Orphaning 
Whether related to a conflict or exhibited in the country’s pre-war levels, orphaning has been cited in 
the literature as a distinct factor leading to child enlistment into armed groups. Descriptive monographs 
by Afua Twum-Danso and Laura Barnitz claim that children from a “disrupted family background” are 
more likely to join armed forces and that “loss of parents and family” and “weakened bonds with family 
members” increase the chances of children to end up with armed groups.211 HRW and UNICEF reports 
also note that orphans are particularly vulnerable to recruitment and provide narratives that describe the 
recruitment of orphans and illustrate this point.212 Russian history bears examples of the so-called “syny 
polka” (regiment’s sons) – children orphaned by the war clung to the armed forces in search of protection 
during the Second World War. During the same historical period, the leaders of the Jewish resistance 
movement specifically targeted orphans in their recruiting campaign.213  
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 Logic of Argument. It is easily conceivable that orphaned children will search for protection among 
armed groups, especially in the absence of other viable structures in the society to take care of them.214 
This survivalist logic is suggested by many accounts in the practitioners’ literature, most of which 
resemble the one cited in the ILO report: “during the war in 1998-99, the whole family was dispersed and 
I was left alone. To be able to survive, I had to join a group of ‘Cocoyes’.”215 As Singer suggests, 
“children, particularly those orphaned or disconnected from civil society, may volunteer to join any group 
if they believe that this is the only way to guarantee regular meals, clothing, or medical attention.”216 This 
problem, according to Singer, “is similar to regions where warfare, disease and disasters have left children 
without shelter or family,” and children orphaned by AIDS in many parts of Africa are vulnerable to 
recruitment.217 An alternative logic of the ‘orphans argument’ was uncovered in the surveys of the ILO of 
former child soldiers from Burundi, Congo, the DRC, and Rwanda. According to this report, “very often 
it is the death or departure of the father or big brother that disrupts the family, leaving the mother on her 
own to shoulder both the material and moral responsibility for the children.”218 As a result, some children 
quit school and join the idle gangs as a precursor for enlistment into an armed group.219  
Preliminary Evidence. According to Singer, in Afghanistan children associated with Taliban were 
primarily “kids who have lost their parents, kids who wouldn’t be able to get a square meal anywhere 
else, kids who join because it’s the only way to stay alive.”220 However, this statement was not backed by 
any interviews or surveys of former Taliban young combatants. Similar unsubstantiated claims about the 
large numbers of orphans in armed forces were made for the Uganda National Resistance Army (NRA) 
and the NPFL armed group in Liberia.221 Humphreys and Weinstein’s survey recorded many subjects 
among ex-combatants in Sierra Leone who lost one or both parents prior to recruitment.222  
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 My previous coauthored work represents the only cross-country study known to me that tested and 
refuted the relationship between orphans (measured as a percentage of orphaned children to the total 
population of children in a country) and child soldiers (measured as a percentage of children to all 
belligerents in the conflict).223 The absence of an affirmative finding in this particular work, however, 
might be subject to the aforementioned problem of ecological fallacy and, therefore, it is important to 
examine what the survey studies of individuals have to say about children’s personal situations in regard 
to orphaning.  
The surveys that recorded the percentage of former child soldiers who were orphaned prior to 
recruitment generally provide a figure of around 10-20%. Thus, the survey of underage recruits of Mai-
Mai armed group in the DRC revealed that 12% of all respondents were orphans.224 In my own survey of 
Liberian ex-combatants, that number fell somewhere between 13% and 22%.225 Similarly, over 15% of 
surveyed children who served in the armed groups in Burundi, Congo, DRC, and Rwanda, were found to 
be separated from their parents at the moment of recruitment.226 Twenty percent of young conscripts in 
Angola also reported to live without parents prior to their entry into armed groups.227  
The proportion of orphaned child soldiers to all conscripted children might be even larger if we 
consider children who lost only one parent and also became vulnerable to recruitment from the ‘orphans 
argument’ point of view. Using such a calculation, we would observe the cited percentage of orphaned 
children in the Mai-Mai armed group example rising from 12% to 44%. For the Liberian example the 
number would increase from between 13% and 22% to 54%. The survey of child soldiers from the LTTE 
in Sri Lanka shows a similar proportion of 53% of respondents coming from families that are separated or 
where one parent has remarried or where one parent died.228  
While the fraction of orphaned children to all conscripted youth indeed supports the ‘orphans 
argument’, it would be premature to jump to conclusions about the explanatory power of this factor 
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 without juxtaposing these percentages against the control sample of children who have never joined or 
have never been taken by armed groups. Neither of the above survey examples, except my own, examined 
the significance of differences between these two groups. There is only one study that I am aware of, 
besides my own research, that looked comparatively at orphan rates among recruited and non-recruited 
children. In his analysis of survey of youth abductions in Northern Uganda, Chris Blattman found that 
orphaning did not appear as a determinant for selection of young candidates into the armed group.229 This 
finding, however, should be interpreted in the context of overwhelmingly forced recruitment by the LRA 
armed group. Meanwhile, as mentioned above, the logic of the ‘orphans argument’ applies mostly to the 
voluntary enlistment, upon which orphaned children are more likely to search for protection, shelter, food 
and some substitute organization instead of the lost family.  
What the survey by Blattman also suggests, however, is that “younger abductees respond to poor 
outside options, especially orphaning, by remaining with the LRA longer.”230 This finding does offer 
hypothetical support for the logic of the ‘orphans argument’ when applied in the situations of voluntary 
enlistment. It also suggests that more strategic armed groups than the LRA and the ones that learn from 
their experience of recruiting children, might prefer orphaned children even in the situations of forced 
recruitment, since “the adolescents are, on average, more lasting and loyal recruits [as opposed to adults] 
since they are more likely to respond to family loss and dislocation by remaining with the rebel group.”231 
Overall, the existing evidence in favor of the ‘orphans argument’ is insufficient to warrant a definitive 
conclusion. While cross-sectional macro studies exhibit varying results, micro level surveys have not yet 
included a study that would provide a comparison group of non-conscripted children covering both forced 
and voluntary recruitment. Without conducting a micro-level analysis, it is also virtually impossible to 
subject the variable of orphans to a proper test, as national levels of poverty might not necessarily 
represent the actual orphan rates in rebel areas of operation or among those who joined their ranks.  
3. Inadequate Social Structures: Lack of Education and Unemployment  
Somewhat related to the poverty argument is the claim that the lack of education and employment 
opportunities might affect child decisions to join armed groups. According to Wessells, the collapse of the 
education system during armed struggle (as well as a lack of access to free basic education in many 
developing countries during peacetime) produces generation of idle and disgruntled youth. High 
unemployment levels of up to 80% in some war zones “create emotional burdens on young people.”232 
The “youth bulge” hypothesis in the conflict literature postulates that high prevalence of young people 
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 (between 15 and 25 years old) in the society may lead to an armed political violence especially when 
coupled with high levels of unemployment or lack of education opportunities.233 Not only “abundant 
supply of youths with low opportunity costs” may provide “greater opportunities for violence,” but also 
“stronger motives for violence may arise as youth bulges are more likely to experience institutional 
crowding, in particular unemployment.”234 Indeed, “present economic hardship and a lack of future 
economic alternatives alienate youth and children from the prevailing order, plant the seeds for 
revolution, and propel children into armed groups.”235  
This is exactly what researchers claim happened in the context of Sierra Leonean conflict. According 
to Richards, a lack of access to education in Sierra Leone “sparked the discontent that fueled youths’ 
desire to join the rebel group called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and overthrow the 
government.”236 “The ravages of war…foreclose or sharply reduce these [job] opportunities, casting 
many young men into a state of unemployment, idling, and hopelessness.”237 Consider the following 
account of a youth from Sierra Leone that emphasizes this point: 
                                                
“There is no job facility. You will see educated youths without jobs, just moving around. If at the end 
of the day that person hears about some rebels, he can join them, just to survive. That is why most of 
these guys decided to join the rebels, because they were not having jobs. Some were educated, but 
they decided to join the rebels instead of sitting down and waste their time. That is why most of the 
youths joined the rebels. That is the major reason. Because of lack of jobs.”238 
 
From their surveys of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, many of whom were under age at the time of 
demobilization, Humphreys and Weinstein also found that many of former recruits had left school due to 
an inability to pay school fees or closure of the facilities.239  
Again, without a comparison sample, it is hard to assess by how much school attendance and 
employment opportunities actually precludes adolescents from enlisting in armed groups or getting 
conscripted by rebels. Consider, for example, the figure that was reported for the former child soldiers of 
the Mai-Mai military faction in the DRC, with only 52% of underage recruits attending school prior to 
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 recruitment.240 This percentage, meanwhile, cannot be regarded as representative of certain recruitment or 
enlistment strategy, as the national average of school attendance in the country was also reported to be 
around 50%.241 Liberian youth from my interviews in Ghana named the non-existence of free education 
and job opportunities in the refugee camps as the reasons of re-recruitment of former child soldiers from 
there. At the same time, however, all camp dwellers were facing similar constraints and yet most of them 
did not join fighting groups to go back to Liberia for such a risky enterprise.  
An interesting point can be raised from comparing the examples cited above with the results of the 
following study: analysis of the data collected from the 4,306 Liberian child soldiers who demobilized in 
1996-1997 revealed that more than four-fifths (82%) of the children had been attending school when the 
war started.242 This example demonstrates that the massive recruitment of children may occur even in 
countries with the proper pre-war education system establishments. Overall, I therefore argue that from 
the methodological point of view, it cannot be claimed that the lack of education and unemployment can 
explain the variance of child soldier recruitment across different armed groups or conflicts. In other 
words, while most (if not all) conflicts face the collapse of the societal structures, not all of them feature 
recruitment of children. Similarly, as the examples above demonstrate, the existence of a pre-war 
education system does not spare certain countries from child recruitment during armed struggle. As such, 
therefore, the factor of inadequate social structures cannot be considered crucial in explaining child 
soldier recruitment.  
*** 
 In my argument I do account for a child’s motivations. However, I argue that the first of them 
outlined in this section – namely poverty – is less important in explaining the difference in child soldier 
recruitment than other factors accounting for the motivations of children. For example, in my model I 
propose that high insecurity experienced by children in the highly dangerous contexts of some conflicts, 
especially the ones marked by ethnic persecution, motivates them to join armed groups and, at the same 
time, justifies the ‘protectionist’ behavior of insurgents accepting minors into their ranks. The term ethnic 
persecution is used in my work to signify mass killings of civilians on ethnic grounds by any party to the 
conflict, as opposed to non-targeted collateral civilian casualties of ongoing battles. 
Thus, I suggest that the factor of ethnic persecution can better predict child recruitment than the 
poverty argument. Theoretically, unprotected and vulnerable children have higher chances of joining 
                                                 
240 Clemesac, Understanding the Phenomenon of Child Soldiers, p. 9. 
241 Save the Children, “Return to the Cradle: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Child Soldiers in DRC,” 2003, 
cited in Clemesac, Understanding the Phenomenon of Child Soldiers, p. 9. 
242 “Education was disrupted as schools were turned into training camps or destroyed in battle. The pre-war school 
attendance rate fell from 82% to zero. In 1999, the World Health Organization reported that 75% of high-school 
children in Monrovia had witnessed someone being raped, tortured or killed” (Olawale Ismail, “Liberia’s Child 
Combatants: Paying the Price of Neglect,” Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 2002, p. 125). 
54 
 rebels than the ones simply living in poverty. All the conflicts create poverty, to one degree or another. 
Yet, recruitment pools differ substantially from one conflict situation to another. All African countries are 
extremely poor. Nonetheless, we do observe some African insurgencies having higher child soldier rates 
than others. As to insecurity, however, I argue that this characteristic affecting child motivations actually 
varies from one context of armed struggle to another. Some civil wars are bloodier that others; some 
insurgencies are more cruel to civilians than others; some governments are tougher on the rebel support 
bases than others.  
 As to the factors of orphaning and inadequate social structures, I argue that my factor of insecurity, 
or ethnic persecution, is superior as it encompasses in a measurable (and thus testable) conceptualization 
of both of these variables. Thus, in my large-N analysis I treat orphaning as a special case within the 
outcomes of ethnic persecution in a country. I argue that killings and prosecutions in a conflict along 
ethnic lines create especially vulnerable populations of both adults and children of a certain ethnicity who 
willingly seek armed protection in militarized organizations. In a sense, while orphans generally may or 
may not represent a vulnerable group of children seeking armed protection, the orphans of the most 
unprotected ethnic groups indeed contribute to the pool of volunteers, both children and adults. Therefore, 
I argue, the orphaning element is embedded in the ethnic persecution in a country and, as such, is 
accounted for in my explanatory model. 
As to the inadequate social structures argument, I also suggest that it might constitute merely one of 
the mechanisms behind my factor of conflict intensity measured by fighting capacity. Different conflict 
intensity might result in a different degree of the disruption or collapse of educational and employment 
structures within a society. While the factor of inadequate social structures would be very hard to 
measure and thus account for in the empirical analysis, I look at the variable of conflict intensity instead 
and use it as a proxy for inadequate social structures.  
4. Other Factors 
Aside from the primary factors of poverty, orphaning, and lack of education and employment, which 
the literature on child soldiering cited virtually uniformly and even subjected to some degree of empirical 
examination or testing, many other explanations of a child’s motivations have also been offered by 
practitioners and academics, but without any empirical justification. Such explanations include collapse of 
societal structures, militarization of daily life, feelings of helplessness and vulnerability, desire for 
revenge, and mere proximity to a conflict zone. However, all these factors, I argue, can be essentially 
viewed as consequences of any armed conflict. Their extent might vary only with the intensity of armed 
struggle for which I control in my analysis.  
Some other potential explanations of child enlistment into armed groups, such as peer pressure or 
identity formation, are pertinent to child characteristics in all societies including the ones with conflicts 
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 characterized by varying degrees of child recruitment. Thus, all these specific factors might indicate a 
certain prevalence of characteristics in the profile of a child soldier once he or she is recruited, but they 
might not serve as predictors of the practice of child soldiering to occur in the first place. For that, it has 
to be shown by survey analysis that all these features vary significantly between the individuals who 
joined rebels and those who did not.  
Section 2. Child Vulnerability: What makes minors susceptible to recruitment? 
Several factors in the literature are suggested to contribute to the child recruitment phenomenon but at 
the same time they neither affect children’s decisions to enlist per se nor change the preferences of armed 
groups to recruit minors. These factors refer more to the vulnerability of children as a group and include 
the spread of small arms and prevalence of displacement during the conflict, especially in unprotected 
environments. They are identified as the most cited in this kind of the literature and thus will be reviewed 
in this section in more detail. 
1. Small Arms  
The rapid spread of small arms into regions of new conflicts is widely believed to be a reason for 
growth in child soldiers’ numbers.243 According to the UNICEF, for example, “one consequence of the 
availability of small arms and light weapons and their subsequent use in conflicts around the world is the 
unconscionable use of CAFF [children associated with fighting forces].”244 In the words of Shannon 
McManimon of the American Friends Service Committee, “Th[e] use of children in war is greatly 
facilitated by an estimated 500 million small arms and assault weapons worldwide. These weapons are 
very inexpensive—an AK-47 and two clips of ammunition can be bought for $12 on the Mozambican 
border. They are also durable, small, lightweight, easy to maintain, and simple enough for a 10-year-old 
to handle.”245 Peter Singer argued that the flood of arms into the international market after the end of the 
Cold War and technological improvements that have made small arms lighter and easier for children to 
use were two out of the three major factors contributing to the rise of child soldiers.246 
The small arms argument, however, suffers from several methodological and empirical problems. The 
most serious one is probably posed by the notion that the small arms explanation represents neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for an armed group to engage in child soldier recruitment practice. As 
                                                 
243 Singer, Children at War, pp. 38, 55; The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing 
Deadly Conflict: Small Arms Survey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 203-231; Keith Krause, 
“Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm Building, and U.N. Conferences: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” 
Global Governance, Vol. 8, No. 2 (April-June, 2002), pp. 247-263; and Thomas Jackson, Nicholas Marsh, Taylor 
Owen and Anne Thurin, Who Takes the Bullet? The Impact of Small Arms Violence, Understanding the Issues 
Series, Report No. 3/2005 (Oslo: Norwegian Church Aid, 2005). For more background on the small arms issue, 
including the United Nations 2001 Programme of Action, see http://www.iansa.org, 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org, http://www.nisat.org. 
244 UNICEF, “No Guns, Please: We Are Children,” UNICEF Booklet, 2001. 
245 McManimon, “Use of Children as Soldiers.” 
246 Singer, Children at War, p. 38. 
56 
 to its necessity, there are plenty of cases when the absence of small arms did not discourage participation 
of children in armed groups. Consider, for instance, the issue of arms shortage in a historical example of 
Jewish resistance during the Second World War, for which underage youth was actively mobilized. “The 
most pressing problem for ghetto fighters, outside of war itself,” according to David Rosen, “was the 
shortage of weapons.”247 Thus, “in the Warsaw ghetto, the Jewish fighting organization (JFO)… had 
virtually no arms when it was formed in 1942.”248 Liberian armed group of the NPFL had children in its 
ranks from the very onset of the militarized movement, when insurgents suffered from a lack of 
weaponry.249 The Rwandan genocide of 1994 is especially notorious in this regard as both adults and 
children participated in massacres with indigenously ubiquitous weapons – the machetes. The small arms 
argument does not exhibit the characteristics of being a sufficient explanation either. The increased spread 
of small arms does not make children the primary users of such weapons because the latter might be 
demanded by and distributed among adults.  
In my previous coauthored work we also point out some other problems with the small arms 
argument.250 First, we argue that globalization of small arms causes criminalized violence, which, in turn, 
is probably more responsible for recruitment of children than small arms themselves. Second, the 
lightness of small arms does not necessarily ensure that children may use these weapons effectively due 
to, for instance, the recoil force that may be very powerful despite the lightness of the weapon. Third, and 
most importantly, the use of children is often depicted in the context of logistic supportive roles and as 
“cannon fodder” in battle – tasks that do not require a possession of a weapon. Indeed, according to the 
survey of former child soldiers in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, their “tasks were generally diverse 
and did not necessarily involve the use of firearms... In more poorly organized and equipped groups, 
CAFF also portered weapons and ammunition, and maintained the firearms of superiors.”251 
Alternatively, children are often sacrificed in combat by military commanders when used as “cannon 
fodder” and “sent into battle unarmed as a diversionary tactic….”252 The latter two reasons could have 
been the real motives behind a somewhat different interpretation of such tactics used by the LRA: “often 
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 guided by dreams of spiritual signs, he [Kony] sent them [children] into battle unarmed. When moving 
toward an objective, commanders forced them to march in a single file and essentially act as shields.”253  
The fourth problem of the small arms argument identified in my coauthored work was a lack of data 
on the actual stocks of small arms available to different armed groups. This problem has been reduced 
somewhat recently when the qualitative data on armed groups’ ability to procure arms became available. 
However, these data in my sample of 111 African armed groups showed no statistically significant 
difference between the mean arms procurement capability of insurgents who used child soldiers and those 
who did not.254 Due to all the reasons contradicting the small arms argument cited above, I do not 
consider it to be a crucial factor in explaining the variation in child recruitment practice by armed groups.  
2. (Unprotected) Displacement 
In my previous coauthored work, I have argued and empirically tested that the key determinant of 
recruitment of children is their particular vulnerability to conscription or abduction from refugee and IDP 
camps. Existing literature on child soldiers, as well as refugee and IDP studies, have drawn attention to 
the fact of vulnerability of displaced children to forced and voluntary recruitment, pointing out frequent 
evidence of this practice. Graça Machel’s report states that “ideally, camps for refugees or the internally 
displaced should be places of safety, offering protection and assistance. However […] there are often high 
levels of violence, substance abuse, sexual assault, domestic violence and forcible recruitment.”255 The 
report also stresses that one subgroup of displaced children, namely the ones separated from their parents, 
constitute “one of the categories most ‘at risk’ of becoming child soldiers.”256 The UNHCR also suggests 
that “refugee children are among the most vulnerable groups in the world” and “are disproportionately 
likely to be victims of sexual abuse or military recruitment.”257 As Harrell-Bond puts it, “perhaps the 
worst threat refugee children face is that of forcible recruitment into the armies of guerrilla fighters. Being 
in a camp is no protection from this.”258 Rachel Brett argues that “even if children escape from an 
immediate war zone, they may not escape recruitment. Some refugee camps have been militarized. Cross-
border recruitment is a problem.”259 According to Lisa Alfredson, “displacement and child recruitment 
are not merely parallel or unrelated offshoots of war; they are often deeply inter-related. In fact, whether 
                                                 
253 Briggs, Innocents Lost, p. 122. 
254 For more detailed description of how the ability of armed groups was measured in the existing data refer to the 
empirical results of this dissertation in Chapter 5. 
255 Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. 
256 Ibid. 
257 UNICEF, “Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child,” p. 309. 
258 Barbara Harrell-Bond, “Are Refugee Camps Good for Children?” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, August 
2000. 
259 Rachel Brett, “The Connection between Flight and Child Soldiers,” Refugees (UNHCR), vol. 1, no. 122, 2002, p. 19. 
58 
 during war or peace, there appears to be a strong correlation between risk of recruitment during 
displacement, as well as risk of displacement as an outcome of recruitment.”260   
Logic of Argument. It is conceivable that camps are ideal places for forced recruitment of children for 
several reasons, including lack of civilians outside of camps, proximity of camps to conflict zones, 
demographics of camps skewed towards an overwhelming presence of children, availability of 
humanitarian aid in camps, and lack of physical protection or international community presence serving 
as a deterrence to such behavior.261 There might also be several logical explanations for the occurrence of 
voluntary recruitment of children in refugee camps. According to one study, “refugees’ sense of 
frustration, loss and resentment” sometimes related to “traumatic experiences which caused their flight”; 
“their marginalization vis-à-vis domestic political processes; their tremendous dependency on the outside 
world, not only for economic survival, but also for information and empowerment,” – all can either 
contribute to the rise of sympathy for the rebels (as in case of Hutu refugees in Tanzania) or make 
refugees extremely vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation.262 In the case of internally displaced 
children, all these general reasons should also hold, adding further difficulties in coping with extreme 
idleness in the absence of education, especially secondary, in most refugee and IDP camps.263 If the 
poverty argument proves to be valid in general, it could then be also applied to refugee and IDP camps. 
Voluntary recruitment can be seen as an option to hunger if camps are unassisted, as it is often the case.264 
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 Preliminary Evidence. The existing evidence largely supports the above statements.265 For example, 
recruitment of Sierra Leonean children from refugee camps in Guinea to join “the Kamajors, the militia 
organization collaborating with the Sierra Leone Army (SLA),” was documented in 1997.266 All parties to 
the Burundian civil war have often reportedly recruited children from refugee and regroupment camps.267 
Furthermore, in the late 1980s and 1990s, for example, a number of Sudanese refugees were recruited into 
the Ugandan LRA and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF).268 The LRA reportedly abducted between 
6,000 and 8,000 IDP children in Gulu and Kitgum region between 1993 and 1998.269 IDPs were 
extensively recruited in Liberian conflict by all parties.270 
My prior cross-sectional coauthored work demonstrated the existence of a positive relationship 
between access to refugee and IDP camps by recruiters and ratios of child soldiers in African intrastate 
conflicts.271 My other coauthored study mentioned above confirmed that the presence of refugee camps in 
some of the 690 sub-national regions of 52 African countries in the period 1990–2004 significantly 
increased the likelihood of child soldier recruitment, with the people displacement factor being more 
robust than either absolute or relative poverty.272  
In order to assess the extent of the role that refugee and IDP camps play in the recruitment of 
children, however, one should also examine the survey data on the percentage of children recruited from 
the camps as opposed to villages and towns. Note in this regard how one NGO report specified the 
problem in the Liberian context: “while children living in internally displaced people’s camps have been 
particularly vulnerable to forced recruitment, many children were also abducted from the street, market 
places, their homes or schools.”273 This observation is supported by the numbers from my survey, which 
found that the maximum of only 10% of all child soldiers were recruited in refugee and IDP camps. Also, 
quite interestingly, almost nobody (only five respondents out of over 200 informants in my survey) 
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 answered positively the question about the preference of armed groups to attack displacement settlements 
as opposed to villages and towns. Besides my own survey, I am not aware of any other study that assessed 
a distribution of respondents by the place of recruitment.   
Overall, the cross-sectional and case study tests largely support the displacement argument. At the 
same time, my survey evidence from Liberian context has not confirmed the crucial role of the place of 
recruitment in relation to refugee and IDP camps. Therefore, the importance of the displacement factor 
needs to be further verified. Hence I incorporate the logic of this argument into my own explanatory 
framework, but in a slightly different setting that fits my overarching argumentation structure, as I 
describe in the next chapter.  
*** 
As I show above, the existing vulnerability factor of small arms withstands neither simple tests of 
logic nor the empirical testing on several alternative datasets. The technological innovations in a 
weapons’ weight have affected the entire world equally after small arms became available in every corner 
of the world including the least developed countries. Child soldier ratios, however, vary across the 
countries and armed groups. As to the displacement factor, I would argue that the factor of territorial 
access in my argument is superior because it represents a broader concept and, as such, encompasses the 
effect of unprotected displacement while including the effects of other important geographic 
characteristics of rebel movements. More specifically, I argue that access of rebels to refugee and IDP 
camps is one of a group’s overall ability to reach its potential recruits. This supply pool is especially 
important when the armed movement is unpopular and civilians tend to flee any potential encounters with 
rebels. A more detailed discussion on this is to be presented in Chapter 3 on the theoretical framework. 
Section 3. Conflict, Group and Child Characteristics: Why do armed groups need children? 
The literature that specifies the demand of armed groups for child recruits is scarce and mostly non-
empirical. There are two major types of factors offered by the existing studies as explanations behind the 
armed group’s need for child soldiers: 1) the ones that relate to the conflict dynamics, such as conflict 
duration and conflict timing; and 2) the ones that relate to certain qualities of children that make them 
attractive candidates for recruitment by insurgents from the military strategy point of view. Below I 
review these two types of factors.  
Conflict Dynamics Factors 
1. Conflict duration  
There is a popular belief in the literature that as conflicts ensue, the recruitment of minors intensifies. 
This ‘conflict duration’ argument claims that “the longer conflicts last, the greater the risk of recruiting 
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 soldiers that are younger and younger.”274 “Indeed, the “stock” of adult men diminishes and there is a 
need to dig into the “reserves” that are available and abundant.”275 “Thus, even if children under 18 are 
not specifically sought after by the military, recruiters will have a tendency to bend procedures to recruit 
minors, when the opportunity arises, in order to swell their ranks.”276  
Logic of Argument. The logic of the conflict duration argument rests on the notion that shortages of 
manpower are exacerbated towards the end of the conflict due to battle related and civilian casualties, 
famine and other consequences of war devastation. However, conflict casualties actually vary greatly 
across conflicts and over time and are not merely subject to the duration of conflict. Consider that “six 
years of fighting in the jungles of eastern Congo killed nearly 100,000 people, while forty years of 
violence in Colombia has resulted in less than 20,000 deaths. While 2001 brought the deaths of 643 
civilians in the Nepalese civil war, 4,647 perished in the following year.”277 As these examples 
demonstrate, some protracted conflicts may therefore have only a small number of casualties. In a sense, 
this particular logic of the duration argument when expressed in the number of battle deaths is more 
relevant to the factor of conflict intensity, which is more likely to suggest the scope of war casualties.  
Conflict duration, however, might still play a role in explaining child recruitment due to its other 
potential consequences. For example, there is a possibility that the willingness of adults to fight 
diminishes over time, as people get tired of fighting or they flee the conflict zone. The end of the armed 
struggle might correlate with more intensive child soldier recruitment for two other reasons. First, the 
later stage of a conflict is arguably the time for most active negotiations involving belligerent parties and 
international actors, when sizes of armed forces, as well as territories under control, are often associated 
with the bargaining power at such talks. The sudden demand for boosting forces with additional bodies 
may therefore result in child soldier recruitment. Second, the recruitment of children has been reported to 
precede the DDR programs at the end of conflicts with the goal of armed groups’ leaders to take the 
money packages from those ‘puppet’ soldiers recruited solely for subsequent cash exchange. 
Preliminary Evidence. The existing empirical evidence offers mixed findings for the relationship 
between conflict duration and child soldiering. Thus, the case evidence suggests that there is no single 
stage of conflict, including the end of armed struggle, when child soldier recruitment should be expected 
to occur. Consider that the average recruitment age of the members of RENAMO in Mozambique fell 
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 from twenty-five in 1978 to seventeen (16.93) years in 1987, suggesting an increasing trend in child 
recruitment towards the end of the war, as the argument in question suggests.278 At the same time, 
however, the average age of recruitment in some Liberian factions, on the contrary, was rising, signifying 
a higher tendency to recruit children in the initial stages of the conflict.279 There were other conflicts 
besides the Liberian one that started with armies of rebels already filled with young recruits, as was the 
case in Burundi, the DRC and Sierra Leone.280 After examining child soldier rates and conflict duration in 
the sample of 19 African conflicts, my coauthored work established no support for the conflict duration 
claim in that context.281 However, a subsequent coauthored study of mine uncovered a relationship 
between child recruitment and the years of armed struggle in 296 conflict regions of 28 African 
countries.282 With the present ambiguity about the role of conflict duration, I include this variable as a 
control into my large-N analysis.  
2. Time of Conflict 
There is a claim in the literature that “wars where children have become active soldiers now typify 
the wars of today.”283 History, nevertheless, offers numerous examples of child participation in civil and 
other wars of the past, from ancient through medieval times to Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War 
and the Second World War.284 After all, the word infantry originates from infanteria – a collective of 
infantes (literally “child”) or “young soldiers who followed knights into battle on foot.”285 At the same 
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 time, what might indeed be true is the fact that the past child soldier practice was not as widespread as in 
modern conflicts. Whether or not the practice of child recruitment increased over time, there is no 
agreement in the literature on child soldiers about what might cause the escalating effect. As has been 
mentioned above, Singer links this time dimension of child recruitment to the recent spread of small arms 
and the advancement in technology.286 That argument, however, was refuted in the previous section. 
Honwana offers a different argument suggesting that child soldering practice spread across the African 
continent as a proven effective military strategy.287 Similar to the small arms argument, however, the 
latter explanation also does not withstand closer scrutiny.  
For Honwana’s argument to hold, one should expect that conflicts neighboring each other should both 
have child soldiers. Nevertheless, this is not the case. For example, in early 1990s, none of the active 
insurgencies in Chad was reported to recruit children. Meanwhile, the SPLA faction in Chad’s 
neighboring Sudan was widely recruiting children at that time. Moreover, as evidence suggests, even two 
armed groups operating in the same country might not necessarily both employ the practice or the degree 
to which they do may vary considerably in the scope of child recruitment. As has been mentioned earlier, 
Congolese armed groups of late 1990s, with varying child recruitment practice, can serve as such an 
example.288 Overall, there is a lack of robust theoretical support for the logic of the conflict timing 
argument. Therefore, I do not view it as a crucial explanation for child soldier recruitment.  
*** 
In my argument, the interpretation of attributes of the conflicts themselves is reduced to the level of 
their effects on the characteristics of armed groups relevant for child recruitment. Therefore, having 
armed groups as the level of analysis in my work, any specific attributes of conflicts matter only to the 
extent to which they shape the characteristics of the actors involved in them. Thus, certain conflict 
features discussed in this section, such as conflict duration and timing do not enter themselves into my 
argument, but they do shape certain characteristics of armed groups, which, in turn, affect child 
soldiering, as I propose. Since none of these conflict attributes has an effect on my variables of armed 
group’s fighting capacity or material capacity, as I show later, I believe that the inclusion of armed 
groups’ as opposed to a conflict’s attributes into my argument represents a superior and more precise 
strategy in assessing the level of child recruitment across non-state armed actors. 
As I explain in the third chapter, there is one potential methodological reason for directly including 
the conflict duration factor into my empirical testing as a control variable. This is because an armed 
                                                 
286 Singer, Children at War, p. 38.  
287 Ibid. 
288 In Congo-Brazzaville, armed groups such as United Democratic Forces (FDU), Cocoes and Ntsiloulous were not 
found to be recruiting child soldiers during their existence in late 1990s, whereas the Ninjas were reported to engage 
in the practice quite actively. 
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 group’s characteristic of material capacity is potentially not invariant over time. In other words, an armed 
group’s ability to pay its combatants might change over time. Therefore, I include the variable of conflict 
duration into the analysis as a control variable. This treatment of the groups’ longevity helps alleviate a 
potential endogeneity problem caused by omitted variable bias. Otherwise, I do not postulate that, in 
theory, conflict duration should in itself directly affect child soldier recruitment rates. 
I also argue that even if conflict timing correlates with the increased child soldier recruitment in the 
modern world, as such, it does not explain why this trend is occurring. The change over time that one 
might observe is, in the end, arguably the result of a change in certain crucial characteristics of armed 
groups. In the next chapter I demonstrate that, in fact, all four of my independent variables (fighting 
capacity, material capacity, ethnic persecution and territorial access) were found to increase in their 
values over time.289 I therefore include the variable of conflict timing into my analysis as a control 
variable to account for conflict epoch and avoid the potential endogeneity problem.290 Otherwise, I do not 
include this factor into my argument as an explanation for the child soldier phenomenon.   
Characteristics of children  
The literature on child soldiers in general assumes that children are substitutable for adults in the 
context of armed struggle. Moreover, as evident from accounts below, it is often alleged that underage 
warriors are actually “better fighters” than adults. What specific qualities do children possess in this 
regard? Anecdotal evidence depicts them as more obedient and loyal, braver, and cheaper to maintain – 
the characteristics essential for making them effective in military strategy: “They’re cheap, malleable, 
they obey orders and they don’t have the same fears as adults,” according to an emergency child 
protection specialist who worked in Liberia.291 One Congolese rebel officer summarized “why children 
make very good soldiers” in the following words: “they obey orders; they are not concerned with getting 
back to their wife and family; and they don’t know fear.”292 In addition, children might possess certain 
features that make it easier for potential recruiters to convince them to join, such as gullibility to 
propaganda and indoctrination.293  
                                                 
289 For example, the mean value for the variable of fighting capacity for armed groups that operated after 1997 was 
0.49 – an increase by 20% from the mean of 0.41 for groups that ceased to exist prior to 1997. Similarly, the mean 
values of the variable territory control by unpopular groups rose from 0.71 to 0.91. Ethnic persecution values also 
increased in case of popular groups from the mean of 0.24 to 0.48 for pre-1997 and post-1997 groups respectively. 
The variable of material compensation also increased over time, from 0.66 to 0.85. 
290 For further discussion on potential endogeneity problem refer to the empirical results of this dissertation in 
Chapter 5.   
291 International Rescue Commission (IRC) worker cited in Esther Pan, “Liberia: Child Soldiers,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, August 29, 2003. 
292 Account from “Children Under Arms,” The Economist, July 10, 1999, pp. 21-23, at p. 22, cited in Andvig and 
Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 2. 
293 Survey research on LRA abducted youth from Northern Uganda revealed higher levels of indoctrination among 
younger soldiers of the faction who were most gullible to the spiritual training, and to a lesser extent to 
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 These characteristics of children have been confirmed in the literature on child labor and child 
psychology in peacetime, and by survey research in the context of armed conflict. Andvig and Gates 
identified some experimental evidence from the psychology literature on minors in peacetime revealing 
that “children more tightly bond to a group” and “may ‘forget’ quicker that they were recruited by 
force.”294 The survey-based study of Chris Blattman claims that young adolescents possess a unique 
combination of military effectiveness and ease of retention, thus yielding “the largest expected net gain to 
the rebel leader.”295 Besides his finding on higher allegiance rates to the rebel organization among 
younger LRA abductees, Blattman also demonstrated that familiarity with the location of escape from the 
armed group improved with age, “with young adults nearly 20 percentage points more likely to know 
their location at the time of escape compared to young children.”296 Blattman’s study therefore provides 
ample evidence for the ease of child indoctrination and geographical disorientation. 
In many other contexts but the Ugandan one, recruiters also mentioned that children are “competent,” 
and “more effective for difficult and delicate missions like laying mines, acting as scouts or intelligence 
agents.”297 After all, children might possess enough physical strength for the necessary military tasks. In a 
comparable child labor context, they are said to be able to perform adult work from a certain age and 
“from an economic point of view” can be regarded as “substitutes for adults.”298 At the same time, 
however, other examples like the one below raise certain doubts about the proclaimed military 
effectiveness of children. Consider that there were reported directives issued by some rebel groups “to 
                                                                                                                                                       
misinformation, strategic use of fear and violence (Blattman, “Causes of Child Soldiering,” p. 18). Blattman also 
points out that “the root causes of effectiveness and ease of indoctrination and disorientation (in particular, why they 
vary by age) remain unidentified. Physical strength, agility, mental composure, self-discipline, material 
circumstances, and outside social support may all play a role. The evidence is suggestive on these matters, but far 
from conclusive. It is especially silent on the internal psychology of the recruit” (Ibid., p. 25). 
294 Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 8. Here Andvig and Gates refer to the linear 
public goods experiment reported in William Harbaugh, Kate Krause and Lise Vesterlund, “Risk Attitudes of 
Children and Adults: Choices Over Small and Large Probability Gains and Losses,” University of Oregon 
Department of Economics Working Papers, 2001. “In this case children like adults start out by being more generous 
than one would predict on the basis of pure rational choice models. Age has no influence here. But unlike adults, 
children’s voluntary contributions do not decline and even increase with the number of repetitions. Group 
attachment has an increasing effect. If we by a leap of faith allow the transfer of this result to child soldier situations, 
we may not expect children to have a stronger tendency to run away than adults” (Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting 
Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 4).  
295 Blattman, “The Causes of Child Soldiering,” p. 2. 
296 Blattman, “The Causes of Child Soldiering,” pp. 2, 17. “A linear approximation of the relationship, including 
controls, suggests that an abductee is 1.2 percentage points more likely to know his location for every year of age.” 
Ease of disorientation of young recruits, suggested by empirical findings of Blattman’s work, might not apply in all 
conflict contexts, however. Thus, rebels often operate in larger cities or in well established geographical places 
known to children equally well as to adults. The latter is especially common when armed groups control a certain 
amount of the country’s territory, as opposed to hiding in the forests as the LRA did, for instance. 
297 ILO, Wounded Childhood, p. 26. 
298 Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 2. 
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 limit the use of children in conflict as they are less reliable than adults.”299 In addition, there might be 
armed groups which rely more on heavy weapons and professional intelligence, as opposed to infantry, 
guerrilla warfare or spying, with the former roles being performed much better by adults, rather than 
children. In the same spirit, Andvig and Gates suggest that for armed groups in a situation of excess 
supply of volunteers, “we should expect recruitment to be more selective” with “ideological, ethnic and 
religious criteria” being imposed “in addition to a soldier’s ability to engage in violent activity.”300 Under 
such circumstances, it can be argued that “children are likely to be viewed as second-best labor and fewer 
of them will be recruited.”301 
In their theoretical study, Andvig and Gates found that general “myths” from practitioners’ literature 
about child obedience, fearlessness, and cheap cost of maintenance do make sense from the perspective of 
child psychology and child labor studies.302 The myth of obedience is the most circulated one. As 
recruitment agents from the DRC commented themselves, children are docile, have a tendency to obey 
orders, and can be manipulated.303 This may be because “children, who are eager to please and may not 
have developed a sense of right and wrong yet, are relatively easy to condition into obedient killing 
machines.”304 According to Andvig and Gates, children may “respond better to punishment than adults” 
and “they are more used to getting publicly admonished and taking orders without question.”305   
The myth of fearlessness emerges from the NGO and IO accounts, some of them interview-based. For 
example, in Sierra Leone, an observer claimed that “one of the reasons for the higher casualty rate of 
children was the children’s ‘fearlessness.’”306 According to recruiters from the DRC and Burundi, 
“children are daring because they are unaware of death” and “they are tough and dynamic.”307 Andvig 
and Gates suggest that characteristic of fearlessness could be potentially attributed to the lower risk 
avoidance of children compared to adults. Thus, the experimental observations in child psychology 
                                                 
299 Guillaume Landry, “Child Soldiers and Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration in West 
Africa: A Survey of Programmatic Work on Child Soldiers in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea,” 15 
December 2005. 
300 Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 15. 
301 Ibid., p. 15. 
302 “Given the lack of concrete evidence from child soldiers, we juxtapose casual observations of child soldiers’ 
behavior with experimental evidence of children in the United States in quiet, peaceful conditions” (Andvig and 
Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 3).   
303 ILO, Wounded Childhood, p. 26. 
304 IRC worker cited in Pan, “Liberia: Child Soldiers.”  
305 Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 7. 
306 Amnesty International, “Sierra Leone: Childhood the Casualty of Conflict,” 2000, p. 2, cited in Andvig and 
Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 3. 
307 ILO, Wounded Childhood, p. 26. 
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 literature attest to the fact that “children underestimate low probability risks when associated with losses, 
even if the risk of loss is fairly high.”308  
                                                
To these reasons behind child fearlessness one might add the consequence of the established 
relationship between age and exposure to superstitious beliefs. In my survey of Liberian child soldiers, 
almost all respondents reported believing in a so-called ‘protection medicine’ conferred on them by a 
ritual of the traditional societies’ leaders to which commanders of Liberian factions took their recruits. 
Thus, ‘protection medicine,’ according to my informants, made them immune to bullets and knives and 
helped avoid wounds, injuries, and death. This belief, indeed, contributed to the fearlessness of children 
who walked directly into the midst of battles being certain of the protective force of the ‘medicine.’ 
Interestingly, I did not find such an overwhelming belief in the power of ‘protection medicine’ among 
former adult combatants. The accounts of Liberian child soldiers are similar to the stories of Ugandan 
youth introduced by the LRA leaders to the sacred protective qualities of holy water and magic stones.309      
The potential ease of keeping children from sharing the loot and their higher propensity to act on 
promises of future benefits indeed makes them cheaper for organizations to maintain. Armed groups vary 
in their practices of handing out payments to young recruits. While some of them do, as the examples of 
Colombia and Uganda cited earlier demonstrate, most of them do not. According to the ILO study, 94% 
of the interviewed young soldiers “had received no remuneration from the group for which they 
worked.”310 According to my interviews with Liberians, some armed groups in that country who actually 
offered material incentives to their recruits had a different going rate for adults and children, with the 
latter being substantially lower.311 However, the overall price of child recruitment should reflect all other 
costs that this strategy might incur, such as the decline in domestic approval of the group by local 
populations and subsequent potential reduction of logistic and membership support. 
Another important characteristic of children cited in the literature is their susceptibility to propaganda 
and indoctrination which makes them easier targets for rebels looking for recruits. Religion, ideology, 
community and family values all play a role here. However, without any proper comparison we do not 
know how much more gullible children are relative to adults. Consider, for example, the descriptive 
profile of former Liberian adult combatants, who reported being “disillusioned” after the war for falling 
into the misleading and unfulfilled promises of the military factions’ leaders.312 Indeed, all idealistic and 
 
308 Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 4, citing Harbaugh et al., “Risk Attitudes of 
Children and Adults.” 
309 Briggs, Innocents Lost, pp. 122-23. 
310 ILO, Wounded Childhood, p. 26.  
311 The MODEL armed group, according to one informant, was offering $150 to adults and $75 to children during its 
recruitment rallies.  
312 From the profile of a typical Liberian adult combatant compiled by Dr. Edward Snoch Grant, a Liberian 
practicing psychiatrist, cited in Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 127-28. 
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 revolutionary movements are based on propaganda and yet history is not short of examples when such a 
strategy greatly succeeded in attracting very large numbers of deeply committed adult recruits.  
Overall, with some degree of doubt, most of the characteristics of children reviewed here make them 
useful for armed groups. With their unconfirmed but possible good military effectiveness, “children may 
in a technical sense substitute for adults to a degree that is surprising given Western attitudes to and 
expectations about childhood.”313 At the same time, the characteristics of age are universal across 
countries and conflicts, making children equally “valuable” for all armed groups. And yet, puzzlingly, 
some armed groups take advantage of these “good fighters” by recruiting children whereas others do not.  
In my theoretical framework I assume that all these characteristics make children relatively good 
substitutes for adult combatants. These characteristics in themselves cannot explain the variance across 
different armed groups. However, on the basis of the relative substitutability assumption I can 
hypothesize about the factors that actually do explain this variance. It is possible that some groups 
actually do not believe that children are good fighters, or rather it is more likely that they simply face a 
different degree of demand for underage soldiers or combatants in general, as well as different constraints 
in their capability to recruit minors. It is these demands and constraints that I explore systematically in my 
dissertation and review in detail in the following Chapter 3.  
Summary 
Despite the recent calls in the child soldier literature for testing the existing anecdotal evidence 
behind the recruitment of minors, there are only few empirical studies on the subject, and the state of the 
art remains largely populated with non-systematic, interview-based reports and books. But even among 
these existing works there is none that attempts to answer my research question about why some armed 
groups recruit children and others do not. 
My review of the most cited literature on child soldiers that focused on the reasons behind a child 
decision to enlist into armed groups revealed mostly mixed or insufficient evidence to either support or 
contest the existing claims convincingly. Thus, the poverty argument was found to have mixed evidence 
in the studies that do and do not offer support for this otherwise logically sound claim. The orphaning 
argument, albeit tested in some studies, lacks a proper methodological examination in order to make 
conclusive generalizations. As to the lack of education and unemployment argument, I refute this factor 
on theoretical grounds. I also show that all other marginal factors in the literature explaining child agency 
to join – such as collapse of societal structures, militarization of daily life, feelings of helplessness and 
vulnerability and desire to revenge, proximity to a conflict zone, peer pressure or identity formation – 
cannot constitute crucial explanations because they have very low variance across cases, especially in the 
context of armed struggle.  
                                                 
313 Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 5. 
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My evaluation of the studies that attempted to answer the question of what makes children 
vulnerable for recruitment concluded that the small arms argument, for example, cannot explain the 
variation of child soldier recruitment across armed groups. The unprotected displacement claim, at the 
same time, could potentially become an explanatory factor, but due to the mixed evidence cited above its 
effects are not well established. The existing studies reflecting on why armed groups need children 
neither provide empirical evidence, nor withstand additional scrutiny. Thus, the logic behind the structural 
factors of conflict duration and conflict timing was refuted on the basis of evidence and theoretical 
arguments. The characteristics of children that were proposed in the literature as potential explanations 
for child soldier recruitment appear very important for understanding the possibility of the phenomenon 
occurrence, but, unfortunately, cannot be viewed as crucial explanatory factors as they are universal to all 
children in the world and cannot vary much (if at all) across groups of children or countries and conflicts.  
The factors pertinent to the actual characteristics of armed groups which might explain the varying 
need across military organizations to recruit children or different constraints that they face in resorting to 
this practice are strikingly absent from the literature on child soldiering. This, in combination with the 
lack of empirical studies to test the existing explanatory factors that focus on recruits rather than 
recruiters, represents the biggest gap in the literature on child soldiering that needs to be addressed. I 
therefore focus in my work on the identification of potential explanations behind rebels’ varying demand 
for underage warriors, their process of decision making to resort to child recruitment, and constraints that 
they face in implementing it. In the next chapter I will show how existing theoretical approaches that 
attempt to model child recruitment from an armed group’s perspective omit important parts of the rebel’s 
decision making process and certain explanatory factors as a result, as well as generate propositions that 
are not amenable to empirical testing. In proposing my own unique explanatory framework of varying 
child recruitment practices by armed groups, I contribute to the existing literature by extending the 
methodology of child recruitment analysis in modeling jointly the rebels’ and children’s motives, unlike 
much of the previous literature which treats these aspects separately, if at all. In addition, I present the 
largely missing empirical tests of my new claims, as well as some of the existing conjectures. 
 Chapter 3: Explanatory Framework 
In this chapter I present my explanatory framework of recruitment of children by armed groups. I first 
outline in Section 1 the child soldier recruitment model from the point of view of armed groups’ demand 
for adult and underage warriors, as well as availability of children for enlistment and conscription. On the 
basis of this model, I offer four hypotheses as the answers to the question of why some armed groups 
recruit children whereas others do not. I then extend my model by introducing in Section 2 the 
conditioning variable of groups’ popularity which differentiates the strength of the explanatory power of 
the proposed four explanations for popular and unpopular armed groups. After describing my own 
explanatory framework, I contrast it in Section 3 with the existing theoretical approaches by other 
researchers who model the issue of child soldier recruitment. I show how my own explanatory framework 
builds on the existing efforts and where and how it departs from them as I offer an original design for 
empirical analysis and testing, as well as data evidence. At the end of this chapter, in Section 4, I 
introduce some other alternative explanations from the existing literature which I believe have some 
theoretical and empirical justification to enter my model as control variables.  
Section 1. Child Recruitment from the Perspective of Armed Groups and Children  
Where does the need of an armed group to recruit children come from? In order to model insurgencies 
and explain their behavior with regard to the use of child soldiers, I treat underage recruitment as a subset  
of the broader issue of mobilization of people for conflict.314 Understanding 1) when armed groups might 
need additional combatants, and 2) whether this demand for combatants transfers into the demand for 
child soldiers specifically, as well as 3) whether rebels are capable of reaching children – is a potentially 
useful way of thinking about the problem of underage recruitment. Consider, for example, that no matter 
how desperately some Chechen children wanted to fight on the side of “boeviki” against the Russian 
army, the run-away minors were returned to their communities by the rebel leaders – whether the result of 
low demand for additional combatants or some normative restriction established by commanders on their 
units.315 Alternatively, an armed group that is desperate to fill its ranks with children might not 
necessarily find underage conscripts to be readily available for recruitment, as their willingness to join a 
faction or the degree of vulnerability to a forced conscription can vary depending on many factors. Thus, 
the explanatory model of underage recruitment, I argue, should involve the interaction of supply and 
demand factors behind child soldiering, where both contextual variables and rebel characteristics can be 
                                                 
314 Andvig and Gates also note that the assumption of substitutability of adults for children makes the understanding 
of the “nature of the market for soldiers in general” desirable in order to explain the phenomenon of child soldiers 
(Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 17). 
315 My written correspondence with the Amnesty International in Moscow, 2004. It should be noted, though, that 
Chechen boeviks were reported to sometimes use children as suicide bombers (Khassan Baiev, The Oath: A Surgeon 
Under Fire (London, UK: Simon and Schuster, 2003), p. 163). Overall, however, child soldiering did not seem to be 
a widespread practice among Chechen boeviks, but rather an occasional instance.      
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 the driving forces of insurgents’ intent and ability to recruit children.316 Figure 1 summarizes my 
explanatory framework based on the supply and demand factors determining the probability of child 
soldier recruitment, P(CS). The figure also shows how my proposed factors enter the explanatory 
framework by offering a visual depiction of the outcome of the causal chains between the independent 
variables of fighting capacity, material capacity, ethnic struggle and access to people, and the dependent 
variable of the probability of child soldier recruitment, each of which I describe below in more detail.  
 
Figure 1. Model of Prediction of Child Soldier Recruitment by Armed Groups 
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Demand for Combatants 
Intensity of Armed Struggle. The ultimate need for additional combatants by an armed group should 
first and foremost be a function of some factor related to the nature of armed conflict. In the situations of 
intense fighting, I argue, one may expect high battle related casualties and exigent need for additional 
numbers of soldiers to tip over the balance of forces and replace the dead combatants alike. In addition, in 
conflicts of high intensity the supply of adults diminishes for many reasons. It is a wide scale conflict 
which, on the one hand, requires large numbers of foot soldiers to perform intense military operations and 
maintain a necessary level of fighting, and, on the other hand, leads to numerous battle deaths and civilian 
casualties alike. Therefore, the intense fighting generates both the higher demand for additional 
                                                 
316 This approach corresponds with the following insight of Andvig and Gates: “To best understand why there are so 
many children participating in some military organizations and few or none in others, we need not only look at 
demand and supply in isolation, but to see how supply and demand mesh” (Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children 
for Armed Conflict,” p. 14). 
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 combatants and pressure on the supply of adult fighters, which, in turn, generates demand for children. 
Similarly, the voluntary supply of children in the situations of intense fighting can intensify.317   
With the conceivable link between conflict intensity and intensified mobilization campaign pursued 
by all parties to the conflict, as well as between conflict intensity and combat casualties, the causal chain 
leading from conflict intensity to depletion of adult manpower in the country is not so obvious and 
deserves some more attention. It is quite possible that the numbers of adults available for recruitment in 
the country diminish 1) with the increased mobilization of people; 2) with the decreased will of adults to 
join the riskier and more dangerous intense fighting; 3) with higher death tolls of adult combatants and 
civilians; as well as 4) the latter’s flight from the country as refugees in the face of insecure environments 
that high conflict intensity generates.  
As more and more adults get recruited, both their absolute numbers and their will to participate in 
armed hostilities, especially the more intense ones with higher risk of getting killed, might be fading 
away. High civilian combat casualties that typify many modern conflicts of today reduce the absolute 
numbers of potential adult recruits even further. Consider in this regard that civilians nowadays represent 
90 percent of the war casualties, compared to 5 percent in the First World War and 48 per cent in the 
Second World War.318 With such a rate, for example, civil wars since 1945 claimed from 16 to 25 million 
of civilian lives.319 As to specific countries, in Angola, for example, about 10 percent of the population 
“was killed by civil conflict since independence.”320 Armed violence in the DRC between 1998 and 2001 
claimed an estimated 2.5 million lives, or about 5% of the total 50 million population in the country as of 
1999.321 Researchers from the survey project conducted by the ICRC in the country estimate the number 
                                                 
317 For further discussion and examples of child voluntarism in insecure environments refer to the section below 
called “Legitimacy and Insecure Environments.” Also, different intensity of armed struggle might reflect different 
degrees of educational and employment structures’ disruption, which was said to affect the decisions of some 
children to join armed groups.  
318 On comparison of civilian casualties through history see 1) “Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict Condemns Attacks on Civilians and Use of Child Soldiers,” UN Department of Public 
Information, HR/4388, 9 November 1998; 2) Simon Chesterman (ed.), Civilians in War (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001) cited in Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil 
War: Determinants of the Strategies of Warring Factions,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, September 2, 2004, p. 2. 
319 Thus, one source reported that the overall death toll in civil wars since 1945 has reached about 16.2 million 
people, if “not including the countless millions that perished because of starvation and disease induced by war” 
(Humphreys and Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War,” p. 2). Yet another research project 
estimated this number to be much higher – over 25 million people (Ruth Sivard, World Military and Social 
Expenditures, 1996 edition, and Stephen M. Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and 
International. Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), cited in Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: 
The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War, Harvard University Press, 2005, p. 
2). It is possible that this estimate includes the victims of hunger and diseases resulted from civil strife. 
320 Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, cited in Hironaka, Neverending Wars.  
321 The population estimate offered by the National Information and Communications Infrastructure (NICI) in Africa 
is 50,335,000 million (NICI, “Country Profiles: Democratic Republic of Congo,” URL: 
http://www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/country_profiles/DRCongo/drcab.htm). By 2007, the amount of war casualties in the 
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 of violent deaths during this period to be at 350,000.322 According to the Battle Deaths project, about 
145,000 of these account for combat casualties, with the latter constituting “only about 6% of the fatalities 
due to the war.”323 The remaining 2.15 million were all “war-related deaths, primarily driven by disease” 
and malnutrition.324 According to Lacina and Gleditsch, “this disparity between battle deaths and war 
deaths is not unique” to the DRC only and is observed in a number of African countries.325 All these 
casualty numbers do not include additional millions that “have become homeless or have fled as 
refugees.”326 Meanwhile, consider that in only the initial stages of the Liberian conflict, for example, in 
early 1990s, 59% of the country’s population of 2.6 million was displaced in refugee and IDP camps.327  
Demographers offer mixed support for the possibility of adult manpower availability to be a crucial 
factor behind child soldiering. Jon Pedersen, for example, suggests that the demographics of a country can 
never alter to such a degree when there are no adult men available, even in the most violent civil wars in 
terms of casualties. He notes that “even in the situations with quite skewed age structures due to migration 
and mortality there is usually a quite sufficient supply of young adults.”328 At the same time, however, he 
also mentions that a “plentiful supply of young men is not always the case.”329 The example Pedersen 
brings to stress this point concerns the two and a half million populated Eritrea (at the end of the war), 
whose 5.9% of male population in their 18-29 years of age “would have been more or less exhausted if 
they should have filled the 125,000 strong army.”330  
                                                                                                                                                       
DRC rose to 3.8 million, or 7.6% of the 1999 total population of about 50 million and 6.7% of the 2007 estimates 
(IRIN, “Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Humanitarian Country Profile,” February 2007, 
http://www.irinnews.org/country.aspx?CountryCode=CD&RegionCode=GL. “The UN and international NGOs 
estimate that at least 1,200 Congolese die every day from conflict-related causes: preventable diseases, poverty and 
gender-based violence” (Ibid.). 
322 Roberts, L., Ngoy, P., Mone, C, Lubula, Ch., Mwezse, L., Zantop, M. and Despines, M., Mortality in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey (Bukavu/New York: International Rescue 
Committee: 2003), p. 2. 
323 Lacina and Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat,” p. 159. 
324 Lacina and Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat,” p. 159. 
325 “Although there is great uncertainty associated with these data, they strongly suggest that protracted conflicts in 
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 Which operationalization of conflict intensity will most closely approximate both the scale of fighting 
generating the need for additional numbers of fighters and the attrition rates of an armed group? The 
literature on armed conflict uses two basic indicators to represent conflict intensity: number of armed 
events and the scope of battle deaths.331 In my work I refrain from utilizing either of these indicators, 
though, for the following reasons. Conflict intensity is represented by the number of armed events that 
each actor participated in can be a good proxy for the demand for additional combatants to sustain the 
fighting. Unfortunately, the existing dataset with the systematic collection and classification of such 
events is limited only to eight African conflicts and as a result does not offer enough coverage for my 
large-N dataset. At the same time, the number of armed events in which groups participate might not tell 
us much about attrition rates, as the number of battles does not necessarily correlate with attrition rates if 
rebels, for example, achieve battle victories against the government relatively efficiently. Battle deaths, as 
yet another operationalization of conflict intensity, would have to be used to complement the number of 
armed events indicator in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture. However, the existing data on 
battle deaths are also quite limited as the numbers available do not disaggregate between different armed 
groups in conflicts. Meanwhile, battle deaths often occur disproportionately on one side only, be it 
government or rebels.332 In addition, the available battle deaths data lump together civilian and military 
casualties alike, which also makes it problematic to use in the intended context.333  
Which alternative operationalization of conflict intensity can then be utilized to represent the demand 
for combatants by an armed group? I argue that the best indicator would have to reflect if or how often 
rebels have to engage in fighting for the most challenging military targets, the ultimate one being the 
capital. These battles for the capital or large regional centers, as well as important military and logistical 
establishments or bases of the opponent, such as weapons warehouses, airports, or seaports, are usually 
                                                 
331 The number of armed events, including battles, represents a useful way of conceptualizing the conflict intensity, 
as it seems to be a natural indication of how intense an armed struggle in a particular conflict or for a particular 
armed group was. For more information on the data on armed events see Clionadh Raleigh, Håvard Hegre, 
“Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset,” Paper presented at the conference on 
‘Disaggregating the Study of Civil War and Transnational Violence’, University of California Institute of Global 
Conflict and Cooperation, San Diego, CA, 7–8 March, 2005. The utility of battle deaths in operationalizing and 
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Deaths Dataset. Thus, they “believe that battle deaths are the best measure of combat intensity” (Lacina and 
Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat,” p. 151). 
332 This situation is conceivable if we think, for example, about the Liberian conflict, where at the beginning of the 
armed contest with rebels the government army was loosing most of its soldiers in Nimba County to the NPFL 
group which faced almost no losses at all (Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 77-78, and Bayo Ogunleye, Behind Rebel 
Lines: Anatomy of Charles Taylor’s Hostage Camps (Nigeria: Delta Publications, 1995), p. 17). I use battle deaths 
as the measurement of the control variable of conflict intensity in my analysis.  
333 Thus, the Battle Deaths Dataset does not distinguish between different parties to a conflict, as well as between 
combatants and civilians, with the latter also being counted as casualties of battles (Lacina and Gleditsch, 
“Monitoring Trends in Global Combat”). Since the categorical variable of conflict intensity from the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset is based on the Battle Deaths Dataset, it does not distinguish between different categories of 
war casualties either (Gleditsch et. al., “Armed Conflict 1946–2001,” 2002). 
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 associated with a conventional warfare, as opposed to guerilla fighting. One of the differences between 
the two is that conventional warfare “finds expression mostly on the operational level, where the enemy is 
directly attacked in confrontations with the armed forces of the opposing state or in an offensive against 
its capital.”334 In guerilla fighting, rebels engage predominantly in “tactical strikes on railway bridges, 
power installations and the lives of politicians.”335 Those armed groups which engage in conventional 
warfare – that being defined here as involving face to face open battles with an opponent for large 
military and state power targets – I argue, will require additional mobilization of fighters. There are two 
reasons for this belief. 
First, conventional warfare in the open battlefield, as opposed to guerrilla fighting in the bush or 
hidden terrain, generates the need for larger armies of foot soldiers in the ranks of the attacking side. 
According to Isabelle Duyvesteyn, the capital cannot be “taken by the use of small arms alone, nor could 
it be captured by a small number of fighters.”336 As evidence from Somalian and Liberia suggests, 
“factions commanded a large number of fighters during the advance on the capital.”337 This is because the 
strategic military targets, such as the capital, are most likely to be rigorously defended by the opposing 
state army. For example, even in the case of Liberia in 1990, when “Monrovia did not have any formal 
defences,” the loosing government soldiers were still relying on their comparative advantage of 
possessing heavy artillery weapons to fight for the capital prior to the arrival of the ECOMOG forces.338  
Second, aside from the initial need of large armies to overtake highly defended installations, 
insurgents engaging in the conventional warfare are most likely to have higher attrition rates, which, in 
turn, generate the high demand for additional combatants. Rebel fighters in conventional warfare have to 
operate openly, as opposed to covertly, and in most cases against the defensive fire of heavy weapons 
artillery. As such, these battles will have higher number of military casualties than guerrilla attacks. It is 
possible that adults will be more reluctant to participate in such suicidal massacres reminiscent of the pre-
21st century historical battles, which will make such a direct armed contestation even more relevant to 
child soldier recruitment. Ironically, child combatants become very convenient for conventional warfare 
as “fearless” (relative to adults) and “disposable” bodies.339    
                                                 
334 Duyvesteyn, Clausewitz and African War, p. 17. 
335 Ibid., p. 17. 
336 Ibid., p. 101. 
337 Ibid., p. 101. 
338 Ibid., p. 29. For the description of the first battle and government soldiers’ defense of Monrovia see Ogunleye, 
Behind Rebel Line, p. 19. 
339 After reviewing psychological studies that examined fearlessness of children in peacetime contexts, Andvig and 
Gates concluded that young people may outperform adults in this characteristic (Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting 
Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 17). Refer to the literature review in Chapter 2 for a further discussion of this 
point.   
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 After establishing that, from the conflict intensity point of view, the most direct conceptual 
representation of demand for combatants would be an indicator of whether an armed group participated in 
battles for strategic targets, I need to find the way of operationalizing the latter concept. While it is 
possible to identify whether an armed group had fought with the opposing side over the capital, it is 
indeed very difficult to compile data on whether insurgents engaged in other battles of strategic 
importance, such as regional centers, weapons warehouses, airports, or seaports.340 Therefore, I propose a 
variable that, as I argue, signifies the propensity of an armed group to engage in battles for strategic 
military targets, which in turn requires conventional warfare and large numbers of foot soldiers. This 
variable is the rebels’ fighting capacity relative to the opponent, defined as the insurgents’ ability to 
challenge the government and win battles. The fighting capacity concept is not contingent on rebel 
numbers, but is rather linked to the idea of efficiency of the armed forces of rebels. For example, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), while having fewer troops than the government, was winning the battles 
and thus exhibited greater fighting capacity than the state army.341  
With more victories over the opponent, groups with higher fighting capacity, I argue, are more likely 
to arrive closer to their ultimate goal of the military campaign – be it secession or a transfer of state 
power, achievement of autonomy, or acquisition of a political post in a ruling state system. Military 
victories of “successful” groups can further alter their initial modest objectives to more ambitious goals. 
Overtaking the capital or a major strategic site will achieve a military triumph that can be used to shift the 
balance of domestic or internationalized political negotiations to the group’s advantage. In order to move 
to such a decisive step, “successful” (as opposed to “unsuccessful”) armed groups with high fighting 
capacity will have to boost their ranks of combatants even higher.342 Thus, I propose the following 
Hypothesis 1: Armed groups are more likely to recruit children if their fighting capacity is high. 
Somewhat similar to my hypothesis, Andvig and Gates also suggested that war intensity might 
determine the demand for child soldiers in the situations of excess supply of combatants.343 However, in 
their view the direct competition of an armed group with its opponents in severe and numerous battles 
                                                 
340 My effort to collect data on whether armed groups fought over the capital during the conflicts has inconclusive 
results as of now. In my next project, however, this measurement of struggle intensity and conventional warfare will 
also be utilized.   
341 Alan Kuperman, “Explaining the Ultimate Escalation in Rwanda: How and Why Tutsi Rebels Provoked a 
Retaliatory Genocide,” Working Paper, Prepared for delivery at the 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 28 – 31, 2003.  
342 This proposition is seemingly counterintuitive to the natural expectation that “successful” groups with high 
fighting capacity are the ones that do not require any additional soldiers as they are already challenging the 
government. I propose here exactly the opposite logic which suggests that the more an armed group engages its 
opponent militarily, the more ambitious its goals become and the need for fighters increases with every military 
victory.   
343 Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 16. 
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 should be negatively correlated with the presence of children among insurgents.344 Such groups, they 
argue, will favor the adults. Part of the logic of their argument can be summarized in their own words as 
follows: “if the violent competition is a low scale one, it is easier to organize consumption in the military 
units in the same way as in ordinary households, so they will include many tasks that are ordinarily 
performed by children, and will demand more children for non-combatant tasks.”345 Yet another logical 
explanation for Andvig and Gates’ argument can be found in their belief that “if heavy, expensive and 
complex weapons or the disciplined coordination of large units of soldiers are necessary, children are less 
useful.”346 These authors also suggest that loss of battles (low fighting capacity) will create an additional 
pressure on the armed groups to recruit more personnel, and probably children.347 Neither in Andvig and 
Gates’ theoretical paper nor elsewhere has this statement been subject to empirical testing. 
Material Rewards for Adults to Join. Demand for combatants, generated by the nature of armed 
struggle in which military factions engage, may or may not be met by existing inflow of recruits. Any 
remaining need for additional soldiers might be, however, further covered by offering material rewards to 
potential members. When demand for combatants, determined externally by certain characteristics of 
armed conflict (fighting capacity in my model), is high, the degree of insurgents’ access to material 
resources will be crucial for the ability of armed groups to recruit additional adults. In general, therefore, 
the ability of an armed group to provide pecuniary incentives to their personnel should be negatively 
correlated with child soldiering, as there will be a pool of willing adults to join the military organization 
in exchange for cash.  
There is lingering doubt, however, whether some greedy organizations or their greedy leaders and 
commanders would actually want to share the material gains with new incoming fighters. Andvig and 
Gates contemplate that organizations that rely on economic incentives might have, in fact, “more to gain 
financially by employing children.”348 That is because “selective economic incentives are expensive and 
most rebel organizations are poor even when their violence activities are the most individually 
remunerative in the neighborhood. Hence, their leaderships would try to keep the number of members 
who are allowed to share in the net income restricted.”349 Since children, in their view, “are more easily 
kept away from sharing,” they would make better candidates as new recruits for organizations with 
material capacity.   
                                                 
344 Ibid., p. 16. 
345 Ibid., p. 11. 
346 Ibid., p. 11. This notion is paralleled in the Andvig and Gates’ review of the research on child labor, which “in 
general suggests that children have rarely been given responsibility for technically complex and expensive 
equipment.” From these observations they conclude, somewhat arbitrarily, that “there is no reason to believe it will 
be otherwise in child soldiering.” 
347 Ibid., p. 15. 
348 Ibid., p. 10.  
349 Ibid., p. 10. 
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 It is not immediately clear, though, that armed groups with material resources will easily resort to 
recruiting children rather than paying adults. First, the central leadership might still be interested in hiring 
the adult fighters who are arguably more likely to win battles and help achieve the major goals of the 
movement. Second, the rebel leaders might not be operating solely by material cost considerations, as 
they might have other normative constraints such as maintaining the popular support, as I show below in 
the consecutive sections of this chapter. Third, one might still argue that even if an armed group is driven 
solely by the logic of greed, the more material resources are available to the armed group, the lower its 
concerns about sharing the benefits with new incoming fighters might be.  
Consider in this regard the example of the RENAMO armed group in Mozambique, which apparently 
switched from its “extensive use of economic incentives” to forced and child recruitment after its support 
from South Africa disappeared. The infamous recruiter of underage warriors – the LRA group in Northern 
Uganda – was also deprived of material resources.350 In addition, contrary to Andvig and Gates, Beber 
and Blattman postulate that armed groups with material resources might resort to child recruitment and 
forced conscription of adults “only when these resources are insufficient to mobilize a sufficiently large 
rebel force.”351 Even in such a case, as these authors suggest, rebels will not recruit children and adults 
forcibly if the sources of their finance depend on the “goodwill” of domestic or international groups.352 
As such, larger material capacity of an armed group might still be negatively correlated with child 
sold
hostile governments.”354 In the presence of such material resources, it is believed, armed groups are more 
                                                
iering.  
While it might be impossible to assess for the large-N sample whether and how insurgencies 
distributed salaries to their soldiers, there might be indicators that represent the concept of material 
rewards. I therefore introduce a proxy of material capacity that indicates armed groups’ potential to 
compensate their fighters as reflected in the material capability of the movement. The task of this 
operationalization exercise is further reduced to identifying which military organizations are more likely 
to possess financial means in order to be able to consider paying their fighters.353 A study of the World 
Bank on the economics of rebellion identified three major sources of funding widely used by insurgents to 
sustain their operations: “extortion of natural resources, donations from diasporas, and subventions from 
 
350 These examples were cited in Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 10.  
351 Beber and Blattman, “The Industrial Organization of Rebellion,” p. 22.  
352 Ibid., p. 22. 
353 In his work Jeremy Weinstein utilizes such proxy in the large-N empirical test of his argument. Thus, access to 
material resources of a group is used to measure a group’s ability to offer material rewards to its recruits (Jeremy 
Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, p. 306).  
354 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, 2004, p. 565.  
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 likely to form “because it enables rebel leaders to finance recruitment and purchase the military resources 
needed for war.” 355  
There are of course many other non-traditional forms of financing a rebellion, such as looting civilian 
and state property, “taxation of humanitarian assistance, contributions of individuals, kidnapping, asset 
transfers from civilians, landing fees or revenues from portfolio investments.”356 On the one hand, these 
resources are also proclaimed to be “less effective strategies of conflict financing because on their own 
they are unlikely to finance a major armed conflict.”357 On the other hand, however, these types of 
revenue extraction may still be important “because spoilers only need few resources to pay for the 
renewal of a low intensity conflict.”358 Due to the absence of readily available data these potential sources 
of rebel finance will not be included in my statistical testing.359 However, in the case study analyses I do 
review these marginal sources of revenues of military movements. In my statistical analysis, however, I 
examine three sources of rebel funding specified in the World Bank project. Below I outline how I 
operationalize these three types of material resources.  
Natural Resources. The importance of natural resources in conflicts has been analyzed and noted by 
many researchers before and after the World Bank study.360 Although the mechanisms describing how 
exactly the natural resources affect conflict onset or duration still remain largely unexplained, one 
particular causal chain has been well established. This chain leads from extractable resource access to 
financing rebel organizations’ operations and thus facilitating conflict onset and influencing its 
duration.361 The end of the Cold War is often blamed for turning natural resources into an important 
                                                 
355 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” referred to in Jeremy Weinstein, “The Structure of 
Rebel Organizations: Implications for Post-Conflict Reconstruction Conflict,” Dissemination Note No. 4 (Stanford: 
Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, Social Development Department, June 2002), p.1.  
356 Achim Wennmann, “Conflict Financing and the Recurrence of Intra-State Armed Conflict,” Dissertation Thesis 
No. 753 (Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 2007), p. 33. Some of these sources of rebel financing were 
mentioned in Jeremy Weinstein, “The Structure of Rebel Organizations,” p.1. Recent stories of revived piracy in the 
Indian Ocean showed how easily armed individuals from Somalia and other African countries could enrich 
themselves in this way. It is not known yet, however, whether these acts of international crime could become a 
significant source of finance to rebels, as opposed to small criminal gangs. 
357 Wennmann, “Conflict Financing and the Recurrence of Intra-State Armed Conflict,” p. 33. 
358 Ibid., p. 33. 
359 The reason for this is not only the absence of existing datasets on the opportunity to loot experienced by armed 
groups, but also a difficulty of an enterprise to collect such data systematically for my large-N sample.    
360 For a broader overview of this literature see the following studies: Ross, “What Do We Know about Natural 
Resources and Civil War?” and Philippe Le Billon, “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed 
Conflicts,” Political Geography, Issue 20 (2001), pp. 561–84. 
361 For a review and test of five existing causal mechanisms between natural resources and conflict see Michael 
Ross, “A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 9 (2006), pp. 
265–30. Ross also suggests a partial statistical support for the particular causal mechanism linking natural resources 
to financing of rebellion.   
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 source of rebel funding.362 More belligerents were observed “to rely on revenues from commodities such 
as timber, oil, narcotics, or precious minerals” and a number of studies have been conducted on exploring 
this role of natural resources in conflicts.363 There have been two major ways of operationalizing natural 
resources in the literature: an approximation of the share of natural (mineral in this case) resources in the 
country’s GDP and their presence in the country or conflict zone.364 I choose to utilize the second more 
specific indicator rather than a crude amalgamation of the first.  
Since my study focuses on only one role of natural resources – funding rebel operations, including 
their recruitment of fighters – I look only at lootable and obstructable natural resources that have the 
highest revenue generating potential. Lootable resources are ones that are susceptible to easy extraction 
by individuals or small groups “with simple methods” by “unskilled workers” and that can be subject to 
official sale or smuggling by contraband.365 Such commodities as secondary (or alluvial) diamonds and 
other gemstones, narcotics, and timber are widely known as lootable resources.366 Resources are 
obstructable if their “transportation can be easily blocked by a small number of individuals with relatively 
inexpensive weapons.”367 For example, while oil cannot be considered a lootable commodity, as it 
requires enormous effort from a controlling armed group in organizing its extraction, production, and 
transportation, rebels may still profit from this resource by levying taxes on oil producing companies or 
                                                 
362 Le Billon, “Diamond Wars?” p. 345. Michael Ross suggests that there is a strong case study evidence for this 
increasing trend in rebels’ reliance on resource-looting after the Cold War, but empirical studies are yet to find the 
statistical support for such claim (Ross, “What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?” p. 349). 
363 For an overview of the studies that found these resources to play an important role in financing rebel movements 
see Le Billon, “Diamond Wars?” p. 345.  
364 For the full list of measurements used in the armed conflict literature to represent natural resources refer to Table 
1 on page 339 in Ross, “What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?”  
365 This definition is composed of several available in the literature. Most of the existing definitions emphasize the 
ease of extraction of lootable resources, as in the works of Päivi Lujala, “Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: 
Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and The Severity of Armed Civil Conflict,” Working Paper (Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology & Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 
2008), p. 30 and Ross, “What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?” p. 350. Other studies, 
however, also stress the criteria of ease of selling (Halvard Buhaug, Päivi Lujala, “Accounting for Scale: Measuring 
Geography in Quantitative Studies of Civil War,” Political Geography, Issue 24 (2005), pp. 399-418, at p. 407). 
366 These commodities were treated as lootable in the following studies, among others: Ross, “A Closer Look at Oil, 
Diamonds, and Civil War,” p. 294; Lujala, “Deadly Combat over Natural Resources,” p. 30; James Fearon, “Why 
Do Some Civil Wars Last Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Peace Research 41 (2004), pp. 275–303, at p. 284. 
Non-lootable resources include oil, natural gas, and deep-shaft minerals (such as ‘primary’ diamonds) (Ross, “A 
Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War,” p. 294). Bauxite mines are yet another example of deep-shaft 
minerals, which are “more difficult for rebels to exploit” (Buhaug and Lujala, “Accounting for Scale,” p. 407). For a 
discussion on the ease of exploitation of some of the lootable commodities, such as alluvial diamonds, see Le Billon, 
“Diamond Wars?” p. 361: “The opportunities that diamonds (particularly alluvial) provide for combatants in mining 
and marketing are conventionally cited as reasons why diamonds are conflict resources, well-suited, given their 
physical characteristics, to sustain armed conflict. The financial opportunity factor is thus broadly confirmed…” 
367 Ross, “What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?” p. 350. 
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 stealing the product.368 Oil theft, or the so-called “oil bunkering,” as opposed to oil extraction, is also 
proven to offer a viable financial resource for some rebels, as evidence from Nigeria suggests.369    
Diaspora Support. Emigrant communities settled in other countries are known to “feel keenly” about 
insurgencies in their homelands and frequently support them in the form of funding, arms, and even 
recruits.370 Diaspora size and location do seem to matter when it comes to influencing a homeland 
struggle. For example, if a country emerging from civil conflict has an unusually large diaspora in the 
United States, its chances of reverting to conflict are six times higher than in nations with small diaspora 
populations in the United States. Thus, “diasporas appear to make life for those left behind much more 
dangerous in post-conflict situations.”371 Diaspora assistance has been directed at rebels in “every region 
of the globe, except Latin America.”372 It has “proven pivotal in sustaining insurgent campaigns” and at 
times has significantly increased insurgents’ capabilities while enabling them “to withstand government 
counterinsurgency efforts.”373 
Third State Subventions. Unlike diaspora support or other non-state actors’ assistance, “states remain 
among the most important, and most active, supporters of insurgent groups.”374 State assistance was 
proven to help rebel movements sustain their operations and “improve their overall military and political 
effectiveness.”375 It is not restricted to specific countries or ideological goals of rebels and insurgencies in 
Asia, Africa, Europe and the Middle East were all known to benefit from this type of support.376 More 
                                                 
368 Natural resource extraction businesses are, in fact, regarded as indifferent towards the entity they are paying their 
taxes, be it a warlord or a state official, as long as they “sustain access to the resources and protect their 
investments” (Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates, “The Geography of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 39, 
no. 4 (July 2002), pp. 417-433, at p. 419, citing Le Billon, “The Political Ecology of War,” p. 569). 
369 Nils Duquet, “Fuelling Insurgency: Oil Revenues and the Financing of Rebel Groups,” Paper presented at the 
Annual Meetings of the ISA’s 50th Annual Convention, New York, Feb 15, 2009. “‘Bunkering’ is a term used to 
describe the process of filling a ship with oil (or coal). ‘Illegal oil bunkering’ is an euphemism for theft. Theft of 
crude oil, known as illegal oil bunkering, accounts for perhaps 10 percent of Nigeria’s daily production and is a 
highly organized operation” (Human Rights Watch, The Warri Crisis: Fueling Violence, HRW Report, Vol. 15, 
No.18 (A) (November 2003), p. 17).   
370 Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for 
Insurgent Movements (RAND Monograph Report, Prepared for the Office of Transnational Issues, 2001), p. 41. For 
more on diaspora support see Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” and Yossi Shain and 
Martin Sherman, “Dynamics of Disintegration: Diaspora Secession and the Paradox of Nation-States,” Nations and 
Nationalism, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1998, pp. 321-346. 
371 Paul Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2000), p. 6. 
372 Byman et. al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, p. 41. 
373 Ibid., p. 41. 
374 Ibid., p. 9. 
375 Ibid., p. 9. “Although guerrilla groups were rarely able to defeat organized armies on the battlefield, outside state 
support helped movements deprive their government adversaries of quick and easy victories. In many cases, this 
prolonged the conflict and increased the chance of a political settlement more favorable to the insurgents.” 
376 Ibid., p. 17. 
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 often than not, state assistance comes from the neighboring governments “that border the country in 
which a group is fighting.”377 
I propose the following Hypothesis 2: Armed groups with higher material capacity (access to natural 
resources, diaspora support or/and third state support) are less likely to have children in their ranks. 
Demand for Children 
Legitimacy and Insecure Environments. As some examples above demonstrate, demand for 
combatants does not necessarily lead to a decision by an armed group to recruit children. Thus, in the 
situation of shortage of combatants, an armed group might not be able to proceed to conscription or 
enlistment of minors, because there might be a cost associated with such a strategy. This cost can be 
manifested in the withdrawal of civilian support from insurgents relying on local populations for financial 
support, logistics, and recruits. This is because typically a civil society is opposed to the recruitment of 
children for armed conflict. Consider, for example, the results of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) interviews and group discussions regarding the attitudes of people from 12 countries 
towards war-related issues.378 Thus, 93% of all informants who responded to the question about age of 
person’s maturity to be a fighter or soldier suggested that it should be over 18 years old.379  Of particular 
relevance here is an account of a woman from El Salvador who depicts the situation of people’s attitudes 
to child recruitment in the conflict zone:  
“I remember that the soldiers fell all over the youth, and the youth joined up to kill each other. I 
would have preferred for them to be run over and killed by a car than to kill each other. The 
guerrillas, if the mothers didn’t let their sons sign up, they’d kill them at 10 to 12 years old. They 
didn’t consider the young age of the recruits.”380 
 
When, during my informal talks to adult Liberians who did not join the conflict, I asked about the 
normalcy of the child soldier phenomenon, none of the participants of my discussions indicated support 
for such a practice. They were all willing to accept those former children into the community and forget 
the atrocities committed by underage soldiers, but they did not approve of the practice of child 
recruitment, as far as I could tell. Therefore, child recruitment practice might not be favored by civilians 
and even by supporters of rebels. 
At the same time, however, under certain circumstances, voluntary enlistment of children might not 
compromise the legitimacy of an armed group among its popular base. For example, in the situations of 
extreme insecurity in certain conflicts, children might approach military organizations themselves in 
                                                 
377 Ibid., p. 17. 
378 Greenberg Research, Inc., The People on War Report: ICRC Worldwide Consultation on the Rules of War 
(ICRC: Geneva, December 1999). The surveyed countries include Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Georgia/Abkhazia, Israel, the occupied territories and the autonomous territories, Lebanon, 
Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia and South Africa. 
379 Greenberg Research, Inc., The People on War Report, Figure 5, p. 10. 
380 This account was offered in Greenberg Research, Inc., The People on War Report, p. 9.  
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 search of physical protection. The accounts of this mode of enlistment of children prevail in the 
practitioners’ and academic literature. During the conflict in Sierra Leone, for example, children were 
reported to join government and rebel forces because “being under arms was both safer and more 
economically secure than remaining in the unarmed, vulnerable, and economically ruined civilian 
sector.”381 The same defensive logic of physical protection could apply to the Liberian conflict, as two 
thirds of all former child soldiers in my survey who enlisted into armed groups themselves as opposed to 
being abducted reported joining for security and protection reasons, such as fear of alternatives, due to the 
perception that inside the armed group was safer, or for pure defense considerations.382 At the same time, 
enlistment of minors by an armed group under the lack of alternatives for children might not be perceived 
as unacceptable by the population. Therefore, while generally voluntary recruitment of children might not 
be an option to armed groups constrained by concerns about their domestic legitimacy, in the situations of 
extreme insecurity this restriction can be raised and children can be absorbed into the ranks of armed 
movements without any damage to the popular image of the rebels.  
What would exemplify the situations of extreme insecurity during the conflict that would make 
children go and search for armed groups themselves and that would leave rebels exempt from public 
scrutiny while enlisting minors? It is very difficult to imagine a conflict that is safe for a child, but some 
armed struggles, nevertheless, can pose a graver threat to the lives of children and civilian adults than 
others. Studies on violence against civilians typically start with the notion that brutality varies 
significantly across armed conflicts and insurgencies, and that some segments of the population can be 
more spared or protected than others.383 While many vulnerable groups in conflicts can be identified, it is 
ethnicity that often defines the victims of targeted violence and mass killings.384 When, in addition to 
being killed as collateral casualties of ongoing battles, civilians become targets of mass persecution on 
ethnic grounds, then, I argue, conflicts are more likely to generate crowds of children (as well as adults of 
the same ethnic origin) seeking protection in popular armed movements. The latter, under such extreme 
circumstances, might not bear the legitimacy cost for enlisting minors.   
As a general rule, the victims of ethnic persecution would approach armed movements that fight 
against delinquents. For example, recent conflict in Chad had children of the endangered Tama ethnic 
                                                 
381 Rosen, Armies of the Young, p. 85. 
382 My own survey of former child soldiers in Ghana in Winter 2008. Altogether, these children constituted 41% of 
all former child soldiers.  
383 The two most prominent works that established and tested variance in perpetration of violence against civilians 
are those by Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, and Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).   
384 Because literature on violence against civilians has just started to emerge recently, it is not possible to generalize 
yet which groups of population are most victimized in armed conflicts. However, more often than not, it is ethnicity, 
rather than any other identity distinction among civilian groups of population, that becomes the primary target of 
deliberate selective violence. 
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 group joining for protection the armed faction of the United Front for Change (FUC), which militarily 
opposed pro-government Zaghawa militias harassing the Tama people.385 Similar examples can be found 
in the contexts of Burundi and Sierra Leone, among others, where children were enlisting into local 
defense armed groups to protect their communities and themselves from ethnic harassment.386 However, 
there might be exceptions to this trend in some conflict situations where potential protectors may be too 
weak to provide defense or where they can be located in inaccessible areas behind impenetrable rebel 
lines. Under such circumstances, quite paradoxically, children (and even adults) might join the forces of 
attackers to secure their lives by demonstrating their loyalty to the persecuting tribe.387 Nevertheless, I 
would argue that more generally than not would potential victims of ethnic persecution join the armed 
groups that oppose their offenders. Thus, Hypothesis 3 reads as follows: Armed groups that operate in 
conflicts with ethnic persecution are more likely to have children in their ranks. 
Supply of Children 
Access to People. Once an insurgency arrives at a decision to recruit children, it might have to deal 
with the problem of low supply of underage recruits. Whether the areas are depopulated or unwilling 
children hide and try to avoid recruitment, rebels might not see any children around for enlistment or 
conscription. For example, Rachel Brett argues that “Colombia’s extensive internal displacement is fueled 
by many factors including efforts to avoid child recruitment by either side and by children escaping from 
these groups and seeking to avoid re-recruitment.”388 Children and their families who do not flee conflicts 
often invent other means of avoiding abduction of children from their home villages. The most extreme 
example is Northern Uganda with children commuting every night to nearby towns for fear of being 
recruited at home villages.389 Under such circumstances the actual recruitment of children might depend 
on the size of territories to which rebels have access. The larger the size of the territory, the more 
populated is the accessible pool of civilians and, consequently, the higher is the chance that some children 
will be captured on the territories infiltrated by rebels.  
                                                 
385 CSUCS, Child Soldiers, 2008, pp. 92-93, citing HRW, Early to War: Child Soldiers in the Chad Conflict, July 
2007. 
386 This is how Phil Lancaster describes the situation of child enlistment into rebel groups in Burundi: “Children 
sometimes saw themselves as part of an ethnic community driven to fight in self-defence against an army with 
genocidal intentions” (Phil Lancaster, “Categories and Illusions: Child Soldiers in Burundi,” Paper presented at the 
workshop “Building Knowledge about Children in Armed Conflict” in Oslo, Norway, May 2006). Many children 
who fought in Sierra Leonean ethnic militias did that for defensive motives in order to protect their homes and 
villages (Rosen, Armies of the Young, p. 160).  
387 The Liberian conflict can be regarded as one such example. For instance, many children (and adults) of the Krahn 
and Mandingo endangered tribes joined the ranks of both defending (LPC and ULIMOs) and persecuting (NPFL and 
INPFL) armed factions, according to my survey respondents.  
388 Brett, “The Connection between Flight and Child Soldiers,” p. 19. 
389 The plight of Northern Ugandan children is well documented in the documentary Invisible Children. According 
to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, “in July 2003 more than 20,000 child “night commuters” were 
estimated to seek safety each night in Gulu, Pader and Kitgum towns, to reduce the risk of abduction” (CSUCS, 
Child Soldiers, 2005, p. 106). 
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 It is also possible that armed groups with larger territories might have higher mobility and ability to 
be stationed further away from their primary constituency or supportive civilian settlements. This, in turn, 
means that such armed groups might have more freedom in violating certain norms of domestic 
population by recruiting children while being away from the eyes of their supporters and thus avoiding 
reputation losses. The latter point was suggested as a potential prediction of child conscription in the work 
of Beber and Blattman: “as rebel groups move into territory distant in spatial or social terms from their 
support base” there should be a greater likelihood of forced recruitment of children.390  
How to determine if insurgent groups have access to people and territories during armed conflict? If 
the rebels control a large portion of a country, I argue, they would most likely have a better access to 
people living there, including children. Likewise, access to territories in neighboring countries which host 
war refugees, might also offer belligerents an advantage of perfect “fishing grounds” with massive 
numbers of people clustered together in unprotected camps on a small geographical space.391 As children 
flee their homes to avoid abductions, however, they end up in places such as IDP or refugee camps, 
where, ironically, they might not be safer but on the contrary, at larger risk of recruitment. Thus, armed 
groups are known to infiltrate camps and “enlist or seize inhabitants (including children) through the use 
of coercion or propaganda – a phenomenon referred to as “refugee manipulation and militarization.”392 
The UNHCR estimated recently, for example, that approximately 15 percent of refugee crises “foment 
refugee militarization.”393 The following example demonstrates how establishments of Liberian 
insurgents in refugee camps and the factions’ control of the territories at home were going hand in hand 
with child soldier recruitment: “MODEL recruited children from refugee camps in Côte d’Ivoire and 
further swelled their ranks with children as they advanced towards Buchanan, Grand Bassa County, over 
which they took control on 26 July 2003.”394 Therefore, Hypothesis 4 postulates: Armed groups with 
access to larger territories are more likely to recruit children. 
Section 2. Recruitment for Popular and Unpopular Armed Groups 
In the previous section I proposed four key explanations behind insurgencies’ child soldier 
recruitment practice – namely fighting capacity, material capacity, ethnic persecution and territorial 
access. I further argue that the explanatory power of these four factors fundamentally depends on whether 
an armed group is popular among the people or not. Popularity of an armed group is defined as its ability 
                                                 
390 Beber and Blattman, “The Industrial Organization of Rebellion,” p. 22. This prediction, according to Beber and 
Blattman, is also consistent with theoretical propositions of Gates (Scott Gates, “Recruitment and Allegiance: The 
Microfoundations of Rebellion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 2002, pp. 111-130). 
391 For a more detailed elaboration on this issue see Achvarina and Reich, “No Place to Hide,” as well as Chapter 2 
of this dissertation on the literature review. 
392 Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner, “Refugees as Resources in War,” in Stedman and Tanner, Refugee 
Manipulation, p. 4. 
393 Stedman and Tanner, “Refugees as Resources in War,” p. 3. 
394 Amnesty International, The Promises of Peace for 21,000 Child Soldiers, p. 5. 
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 to draw participatory support from a particular segment of the society on the basis of some ideological 
grounds. In other words, expression of participatory support for a group is a signal of the degree of its 
approval by a certain segment of society that shares the real or proclaimed goals of the rebels and is 
willing to fight for them. Defined as such, popular groups are the ones that draw in ideologically 
motivated and willing supporters in large quantities. The opposite of the popular movement is an 
unpopular insurgency, which does not seek or manage to secure considerable approval from the local 
population. As a result, nobody wants to join an unpopular movement voluntarily on ideological grounds. 
It should be noted here that my classification of groups into popular and unpopular ones may seem 
somewhat similar to Jeremy Weinstein’s distinction between groups with social and material 
endowments.395 However, as I show below, a group’s popularity as defined here and Weinstein’s social 
endowments do not represent the same concept, differing along a number of important dimensions. Social 
endowments, according to Weinstein, are used by rebels “to signal support for a cause, make promises of 
future benefits credible, coordinate actions across individuals, and work within social networks that ease 
the process of recruiting members and generating the supplies necessary for war.”396 According to 
Weinstein, as well as other scholars, such a “cohesion (or ‘social capital’)” can be based on ethnic 
identities, for example, or “may also come from other shared identities (religious, cultural, or regional) or 
ideological belief-systems, such as Marxism, Maoism, or capitalism, that bring individuals together and 
harmonize their behavior.”397 Material endowments of armed groups are based on resources that “can be 
generated internally (through the extortion of natural resources, the production of illegal drugs, trade in 
legal goods, or from taxes levied for protection) or solicited externally (from foreign powers, ethnic and 
religious diasporas, or criminal networks).”398  
These motives can all serve as potential ideological grounds on which insurgents mobilize people into 
their ranks. Rebel efforts to capitalize on these different ideologies, as well as the choice of ideologies 
themselves, vary across different contexts. As a result, one might see different degrees of popularity 
exhibited by various insurgencies, while all rely on social endowments. As has been mentioned above, the 
TPLF movement of Ethiopia (1976-91) was regarded as a popular insurgency, while the LRA of Northern 
Uganda was considered very unpopular. Both these examples are particularly interesting, as they show 
how resort to some ideological appeals by armed groups, even despite the strategy’s well-known success 
in mobilizing people in other contexts, might not generate popular support for other movements, as 
demonstrated below. 
                                                 
395 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion; Weinstein, “The Structure of Rebel Organizations.” 
396 Weinstein, “The Structure of Rebel Organizations,” p. 2. . 
397 Ibid., p. 2. As indicated in the introduction of this dissertation, in his book “One for All” Russell Hardin mentions 
the following ideological grounds, among others, which allow mobilization of people for violence: ethnic hatred, 
nationalism, self-defense, self-determination, territorial considerations (Hardin, One for All, pp. 142-155).  
398 Ibid., p. 1.  
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 Consider that upon its formation, the TPLF’s leadership attempted to mobilize people on the 
secession grounds, suggesting independence of the Tuareg people from the Ethiopian nation-state. 
However, “this extreme position was challenged as soon as it emerged and was relinquished straightaway, 
since it had no popular support…”399 An alternative ideological ground had to be found and the TPLF 
switched to class ideologies of radical change, and less extreme forms of self-determination, expressed in 
ethno-nationalist ideologies, in order to mobilize Tigrayans.400 In the context of Uganda, Joseph Kony 
was using religious rhetoric to appeal to the population of Northern Uganda: “According to Kony, he is 
possessed by the Holy Spirit and have received divine orders to replace the Ugandan constitution with the 
Ten Commandments.”401 Unpopularity of the LRA in this regard can be contrasted with a popular support 
for historical Crusades or those terrorist movements which base their ideology on religion.   
There is a number of distinctive features that differentiate my classification into popular and 
unpopular armed groups from Weinstein’s endowments framework. Below I will outline those 
differences, providing further clarification of my concept of armed groups’ popularity. First, Weinstein’s 
definition of social endowments is focused on insurgents’ strategy, as opposed to the end result of it, as 
my conceptualization of popularity does. Thus, my definition of popular groups focuses on the 
establishment of the “cohesion”, not simply an effort to achieve it, which results in the presence of masses 
willing to join rebels. Weinstein’s framework does not make such a distinction because for him what 
matters is the process of recruitment strategy, with the ultimate result being the quality of fighters, not 
their quantity. In my theoretical framework, however, I am interested in potential numbers of willing 
recruits, or, alternatively, in the size of the recruitment pool of voluntary soldiers for an armed group in 
question.  
The size of the potential voluntary recruitment pool should also be distinguished from the concept of 
actual numbers of fighters within the group. The latter represents a different concept of an armed group’s 
strength in terms of rebel numbers and, therefore, does not reflect the scope of people actually joining a 
military organization. The latter is of particular importance as the numbers of recruited soldiers can also 
be driven by material incentives or forced conscription and thus may not represent solely the group’s 
popularity. Enlistment on pecuniary incentives is accounted for in my analysis by inclusion of another 
variable of material capacity. 
The second distinction of my classification of armed groups based on their popularity from 
Weinstein’s framework of endowments is in the role of the material support concept in the delineation of 
                                                 
399 Aregawi Berhe, “The Origins of The Tigray People’s Liberation Front,”  African Affairs (2004), 103/413, 569–
592, p. 591. 
400 Ibid., p. 569. 
401 Lawrence E. Cline, “Spirits and the Cross: Religiously Based Violent Movements in Uganda,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies (2003), 14: 2, pp. 113-130, p. 119. “Beyond this basic goal, the ideology of the LRA can best be 
described as confusing (and possibly confused)” (Ibid., p. 119). 
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 categories in the typology. In Weinstein’s work insurgencies based on social endowments are believed to 
be the ones without access to material resources, and are measured as such in his empirical study.402 
Weinstein does admit that some armed groups might rely on both material and ideational endowments, 
but these cases should be quite rare, according to him, as ideational endowments get overcrowded by 
pecuniary rewards as time goes by.403 Unlike Weinstein, therefore, I assume that popular armed groups 
(that attract personnel on ideational motives) may still have access to material resources and even use 
those resources to compensate some or all of their soldiers. Not surprisingly, when I examined 112 
African armed groups in my sample, about 80% of popular groups actually did have access to some type 
of material resources, which should not be the case if my classification was similar to Weinstein’s theory. 
This is because social and material endowments are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories, as 
suggested in Weinstein’s framework. Out of unpopular groups, which should have been based on material 
resources according to Weinstein, only 50% in my sample actually had material endowments.404  
The underlying logic of my classification between popular and unpopular armed groups is, therefore, 
in rebels’ different ability to attract members for active military campaign. While there might be many 
factors affecting the popularity of an armed group, I operationalize this concept through the group’s 
capacity to mobilize personnel, or, in my particular case, a probability of a potential inflow of 
ideologically motivated adult volunteers. Thus, the determinants of child participation in these two 
distinct popular and unpopular types of movements will be conceptually different. This is because 
incentives and constraints characterizing armed groups that operate in the context of large voluntary 
inflow of both adults and children are dissimilar from the ones of insurgencies that lack adult and child 
volunteers alike. 
I stress that the popularity of an armed movement in itself is not proposed as an explanatory factor 
behind child soldier recruitment. More specifically, I do not suggest the relationship between military 
factions’ popularity and their resort to conscription and enlistment of minors. What I do argue, however, 
is that the nature of insurgencies’ popularity is delineating two distinct contexts where different 
opportunities are affecting rebels’ strategic choices and where different obstacles inhibit the insurgents in 
their resort to forced or voluntary recruitment of children. In a word, the level of group popularity 
signifies which of those different opportunities and costs matter for an armed group in question. 
   
 
                                                 
402 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, p. 306. 
403 Ibid., p. 52. 
404 Interestingly, this latter finding undermines the claim of economic theories of rebellion, according to which 
armed groups that lack both material and ideational endowments have a very low chance for survival or even 
formation. 
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 Figure 2. Model of Prediction of Child Soldier Recruitment by Armed Groups 
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 The importance of armed groups’ popularity for the outcome of child soldier recruitment is 
demonstrated on Figure 2, where I outline schematically how the concept of popularity fits into my 
previous explanatory framework of supply and demand for adult and underage soldiers. In this visual 
representation of the logical path leading from my explanatory factors to the probability of insurgents’ 
child soldier recruitment, P(CS), armed groups’ popularity performs several important functions. First, as 
can be seen from Figure 2, the degree of a group’s popularity (high or low) is pivotal for the supply of 
combatants in general. In the context of externally driven demand for fighters, therefore, popularity helps 
determine if an insurgency will find itself in excess demand or supply situation. Second, group popularity 
further conditions whether its leaders have a strategic option to compensate their fighters directly, 
contingent on the insurgency’s access to material resources. Third, a group’s popularity determines if and 
how the demand for combatants in general will transfer into the demand for child soldiers specifically. 
Fourth, popularity of an armed group might further shape children’s preferences to join the insurgency, 
which in turn influences the availability of minors for enlistment or conscription. Below I review the logic 
behind different effects of my proposed four factors on child soldier recruitment in cases of popular and 
unpopular armed groups. 
Intensity of Armed Struggle. All other things being equal, popular armed groups are more likely to 
meet the demand for combatants than unpopular ones, as more people would join popular insurgencies 
voluntarily. However, even high mobilization of soldiers for popular military organizations might not 
necessarily meet its externally driven demand for fighters. Similarly, while low mobilization of personnel 
for unpopular groups reduces their chances to meet the existing demand for soldiers, sometimes even a 
small number of recruits may suffice to achieve the objectives of the rebels’ military campaign. In 
addition, as I outlined above, the lack of ideational supporters can be compensated by the personnel 
attracted by pecuniary incentives. Still, popular insurgencies might have the advantage of a larger pool of 
readily available adult recruits. Thus, I propose the following Hypothesis 1.1: Armed groups, especially 
unpopular ones, are more likely to recruit children if their fighting capacity is high. 
Material Rewards for Adults to Join. There is a reason to believe that popular and unpopular military 
organizations vary in their constraints to entice adult combatants by financial incentives. In the case of 
popular armed groups, for example, this practice is less likely to establish itself, as insurgents might have 
difficulty to retain both compensated and non-compensated soldiers in their ranks at the same time. This 
is because even most loyal supporters would question their unpaid participation and would demand 
similar payments that the movement’s newcomers are receiving. Yet, to sustain the insurgency entirely 
and solely on material rewards might be an unlikely prospect for a popular armed group organized around 
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 ideational incentives to begin with.405 On the contrary, unpopular groups that do not have an inflow of 
members on ideological motives in the first place, might and most likely will exploit the option of 
introducing material rewards to reach adult fighters who otherwise would not join the rebels. Such a 
provision of pecuniary incentives should be negatively correlated with child soldiering. I propose the 
following Hypothesis 2.1: Unpopular armed groups with higher material capacity (access to natural 
resources, diaspora support or/and third state support) are less likely to have children in their ranks. 
Legitimacy and Insecure Environments. Popularity of an armed group determines whether there is a 
cost associated with rebels’ conscription or enlistment of minors. Forced recruitment of adults or 
recruitment of children by any method for a popular armed group are both deemed to undermine the 
insurgents’ popularity and, as a result, further diminish their existing ability to attract committed 
volunteers. Even voluntary enlistment of children who are quite likely to express a willingness to join a 
popular insurgency might not be greeted with much appreciation from the armed group’s constituency or 
civilian population in general. Contrary to popular military organizations, unpopular armed groups do 
have an opportunity to consider forced recruitment of children, because this practice is quite unlikely to 
undermine their legitimacy, as the popularity of such groups is already low. Therefore, while unpopular 
groups will not hesitate to recruit children, contingent on the demand for them and their abundant supply, 
popular groups are restricted in their choice to enlist minors. However, when the popular armed groups 
operate in the extremely insecure environments, they might have this restriction uplifted by their 
supporters. Therefore, the factor of ethnic persecution that I propose to influence the recruitment of 
children by armed groups, should be prominent only in the case of popular armed groups, not the 
unpopular ones. Thus, Hypothesis 3.1 reads as follows: Popular armed groups that operate in conflicts 
with ethnic persecution are more likely to have children. 
Access to People. In the case of popular armed groups, a certain amount of children will always be 
willing to join either for ideological reasons or feelings of insecurity, as has been discussed above. 
Unpopular groups, on the contrary, would tend to have more difficulty in scooping children who, 
similarly to adults, would not want to join such insurgents. Therefore, access to people should have a 
larger effect on child recruitment in case of unpopular armed groups. Thus, Hypothesis 4.1 postulates: 
Unpopular armed groups with access to larger territories are more likely to recruit children. 
*** 
In sum, in case of popular armed groups the factors from Set A Conditions (Figure 2) prevail in 
explaining the probability of an armed group to recruit child soldiers. More specifically, the factors of 
                                                 
405 Note that Weinstein argues that availability of material resources will crowd out the ideational element as time 
goes by (Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, p. 52). At the same time, Andvig and Gates suggest that this is “unlikely to 
occur” in the situations of excess supply of combatants. In the absence of any formal test for Weinstein’s point, I 
will not consider the potential crowding out of ideational endowments in my model. 
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 ethnic persecution and, less so, fighting capacity are proposed to be the major determinants of child 
recruitment in case of popular armed groups. In case of unpopular movements, however, the factors from 
Set B Conditions will be more important in predicting insurgents’ behavior in relation to child soldiering. 
These factors include fighting capacity, material capacity, and access to people. Therefore, with the likely 
exception of fighting capacity, I should expect that the factors of ethnic persecution, material capacity, 
and access to people have different effect sizes on child soldier recruitment for popular and unpopular 
armed groups.  
Section 3. Alternative Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Child Recruitment 
In this section I review the approaches and predictions of three prominent theoretical studies of the 
child soldier phenomenon. These works model groups’ decisions to recruit children as well as children’s 
decisions to enlist into military organizations. Only one of these papers approached the problem of child 
recruitment by examining the interaction of both armed group’s demand for child combatants and the 
actual supply of children for recruitment in the contexts of both voluntary and forced recruitment.406 The 
other two papers specialized in their focus on voluntary or forced methods of recruitment. They both held 
the demand for combatants as constant and high, and one of them applied a similar restrictive assumption 
of a constant ubiquitous supply of children. Below I offer a detailed discussion of these papers and outline 
how my theoretical approach is different from the ones I describe here.  
1. Market Model of Supply and Demand. Andvig and Gates (2007) suggest that interacting forces of 
supply and demand for combatants create three potential market situations for theorizing about child 
recruitment: 1) pure excess demand (armed groups require more recruits than they can otherwise get); 2) 
pure excess supply (there are plenty of adults and children in the “recruitment area” available for 
enlistment or conscription); 3) equilibrium (“when supply and demand are in balance”).407 In each 
situation different types of factors will be affecting child soldier recruitment by an armed group, also 
depending on the exogenously given forced or voluntary recruitment strategy.   
Andvig and Gates’ approach helps organize our way of thinking about the types of situations armed 
groups find themselves in when they recruit children. At the same time, excess demand or supply market 
situations appear to be an end result of an interplay of a number of factors. Whereas one may be able to 
deduce from the circumstances under which children were recruited whether such an action corresponded 
to excess demand or supply, it would be very hard to measure the resulting degree of excess demand and 
supply and thus make necessary predictions about child recruitment, especially when Andvig and Gates 
                                                 
406 Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict.” There is one more work that theorized about child 
soldiering from both supply and demand perspective, but in the context of one variable of poverty. For a detailed 
discussion on how absolute and relative poverty levels across African regions might potentially affect demand for 
children specifically as well as supply of underage recruits please refer to Achvarina et. al., “Regional Poverty and 
Child Soldier Recruitment.” 
407 Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” pp. 14-16. 
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 remain somewhat unclear about what specific factors affect demand for combatants and supply thereof. 
Thus, due to its intrinsically theoretical nature, Andvig and Gates’ approach is not directly amenable to 
empirical analysis. 
My argument is based on interaction of several key contextual factors and armed group characteristics 
that are directly observable and measurable, and thus allow me to test and support my argument with 
empirical evidence. In my base model of child recruitment explanation (Figure 1) I depart from 
identifying and specifying the factors that drive demand for and supply of combatants, rather than starting 
with the given market combinations of excess demand and excess supply of child soldiers. The popularity 
characteristic of armed groups in my extended model (Figure 2) further classifies the ways in which the 
forces of demand for fighters and supply of children can lead to child soldier recruitment. Besides 
offering a theoretical framework that presents a hierarchical testable argument, there are three other 
advantages of such an approach.  
First, unlike Andvig and Gates’ theoretical classification, my framework permits predictions about 
forced and voluntary recruitment. Thus, the method of recruitment in my model is not an exogenous 
unexplained decision of an armed group, but is rather derived from my extended explanatory framework 
(Figure 2) itself as an outcome of constraints that the armed groups’ characteristic of popularity imposes 
on them.408 Second, my model is operationalizable for empirical testing in the sense that it allows for all 
the child recruitment explanatory factors that I propose to be included into a single empirical model to be 
estimated, which seems to be problematic in the case of Andvig and Gates’ formulation. Third, my 
research design allows me to incorporate norms into my framework as a part of armed groups’ 
characteristics. Specifically, I assume that domestic political legitimacy is embedded in popularity of an 
armed group which in turn is an interactive variable in my extended argument. 
2. Model of forced recruitment. The work by Beber and Blattman (2008) builds on the conclusions of 
a survey-based study of Blattman (2006) which found that rebels of the LRA in Northern Uganda were 
abducting young adolescents for their guerrilla skills perceived as more effective than younger children, 
and their ease of indoctrination and disorientation compared to adults.409 These findings were further cast 
by Beber and Blattman into “a principal-agent model that incorporates punishments, indoctrination, and 
age-specific productivity.”410 This model predicts that forced child recruitment by a rational armed group 
is more likely to occur 1) “when punishment and supervision are cheap”; 2) “when rebel leaders are 
resource constrained” (in terms of both material and social endowments); 3) when “child’s opportunities 
                                                 
408 Unfortunately, my current study does not test the probability of forced or voluntary recruitment of children, as the 
disaggregated data for child recruitment method across African insurgencies is still under compilation for my next 
project. However, even prior to data disaggregation being able to predict forced or voluntary situation of recruitment 
allows us to identify specific factors that will affect child recruitment in these two different situations. 
409 Blattman, “Causes of Child Soldiering”; Beber and Blattman, “The Industrial Organization of Rebellion.” 
410 Beber and Blattman, “The Industrial Organization of Rebellion,” p. 4.  
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 are poor relative to young adults”; and 4) when “indoctrination and disorientation are eased by poor 
information and education.”411  
Overall, the model suggested by Beber and Blattman generates three factors, all of which also appear 
in my explanatory model of child recruitment. First, they have a factor similar to my variable of armed 
group’s popularity. For example, Beber and Blattman refer to the cheap punishment situation as the one 
characterized by “few economic or social penalties” to an armed group for engaging in forced 
recruitment, thus indirectly referring to the concept of popularity, or approval by a certain segment in a 
population, as defined in my explanatory framework.412 In their second proposition they also identify 
armed groups that are constrained in social endowments – unpopular in my definition – as having a 
certain effect on child recruitment. The immediate difference between Beber and Blattman’s and my 
model in regard to this particular factor of insurgents’ popularity lies in its different explanatory power of 
child soldier recruitment. They claim that “rebel groups seeking international support, or local civilian 
loyalty, are unlikely to employ child abduction.”413 My argument, however, does not suggest that it is a 
crucial factor in explaining child soldier recruitment practice across armed groups. In my model, armed 
groups’ popularity enters only as a conditioning variable that determines the magnitude of other variables’ 
effects on the dependent variable of child recruitment. The conditionality, or in other words the 
interactive role, as opposed to crucial importance of armed group’s popularity is reflected in the results of 
my data analysis presented in Chapter 5 on the empirical results. As one particular example of my 
findings, the variable of mobilization capacity that stands for armed group’s popularity in my analysis, in 
itself did not exhibit a statistically significant effect on child soldiering. 
Two other explanatory variables that appear in both Beber and Blattman’s and my explanatory 
frameworks are the factors of material capacity and poverty. For example, as the second proposition of 
Beber and Blattman’s model suggests, armed groups constrained in material resources (and especially the 
ones that are also constrained in social endowments) are more likely to recruit children. Similarly, their 
third and fourth propositions both suggest that poverty should have effect on child soldiering. As Beber 
and Blattman note elsewhere in their paper, even if absolute poverty might not be sufficient to represent 
relative opportunities of adults and children, absolute levels of a country’s economic well-being might be 
a useful predictor of the overall state of education in the country.414 Despite the overlap in regard to these 
                                                 
411 Ibid., p. 4. 
412 Ibid., p. 22. 
413 Ibid., p. 22. 
414 Relative opportunities of children and adults are hard to conceptualize, measure, and test across armed groups in 
a large-N study. In the situations of voluntary recruitment, for example, Andvig and Gates mentioned poor prospects 
of land ownership for children with a potential increase in land scarcity as one source of opportunity inequality 
between adult land owners and children entering the land market (Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for 
Armed Conflict,” p. 9). Loss of traditional access to marriage was also named as a source of grievance held by the 
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 two factors, and the variable of insurgents’ popularity albeit used in different ways, our models stand 
apart in their different specification, focus, and hence different explanatory power of the child recruitment 
phenomenon. Beber and Blatman’s model aims to explain only forced recruitment of rebels, and thus 
cannot address the more general question of why some armed groups recruit children and others do not 
that I pose here.  
To demonstrate the poor explanatory power of Beber and Blattman’s model, I briefly show the 
empirical results of running their model on my dataset of 112 African armed groups. Logistic regression 
on child soldier recruitment dummy variable shows that only the poverty factor has a significant effect, 
with the popularity variable being insignificant, and material capacity having a significant but the 
opposite sign to what Beber and Blattman proposed. The explanatory power statistic of such a model 
(Pseudo R2) is very low (0.08). When I add control variables of conflict intensity, duration and timing, as 
I do in my model later on in this dissertation, all the explanatory factors specified in Beber and Blattman’s 
theory score insignificant. Hence, the factors from their model could not predict (neither individually nor 
cumulatively) the child recruitment practices of 112 African armed groups in my sample. The 
performance of my model, meanwhile, is significantly better, as I show in Chapter 5.  
When the sample of all African armed groups is reduced to the unpopular ones, we would expect 
Beber and Blattman’s model to have a better performance, because it was designed for forced 
recruitment. As such, it should be better applied to groups with low popularity and punishment costs. 
However, even in this case, the model’s poor predictive power does not improve. Thus, in the logistic 
regression on this reduced sample even poverty loses its significance. Alternatively, if in my sample we 
look only at the unpopular armed groups which also happened to have low material capacity, according to 
Beber and Blattman’s model there should be a prevalence of insurgents who recruit children. Contrary to 
this expectation, however, out of 11 of such insurgencies only one armed group happens to be recruiting 
children. Ironically, this armed group is the LRA from Northern Uganda – the outlier in my sample on 
which Beber and Blattman based their theory.  
Below I present a table of these 11 unpopular armed groups with material resource constraints. For 
the purpose of comparison of Beber and Blatman’s model with mine, in the last two columns of the table 
I include two variables from my model, namely fighting capacity and territorial access. These were 
proposed in my explanatory framework to have an effect on child soldier recruitment in the case of 
                                                                                                                                                       
older children and youth in some African countries against the adults (Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for 
Armed Conflict,” p. 11, citing Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest). All these inequalities between adults and 
children are rather difficult to measure across different countries, especially because they vary across regions and 
communities within the countries. As to the forced recruitment situations, which Beber and Blattman claim to 
model, the pre-entry characteristics of children such as their family household poverty levels proved to be non-
deterministic for recruitment, according to the previous study by Blattman (Blattman, “The Causes of Child 
Soldiering,” pp. 2, 14). 
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 unpopular armed groups, besides material capacity. As can be seen from this table, in seven armed 
groups out of ten for which child recruitment was not reported, the fighting capacity that is proposed in 
my explanatory framework to generate the demand for combatants was found to be low. In other words, 
even if armed groups are unpopular with no material support and lack voluntary enlistment of adults, they 
might not necessarily resort to child recruitment practice if their leadership pursues less ambitious goals 
or if these objectives can be reached without the need to recruit additional fighters. The latter could be a 
result of a certain warfare strategy employed by military organizations or simply a consequence of poor 
resistance from the opponent.415 The framework of Beber and Blattman, however, despite its focus on 
modeling armed groups’ decision, omits this important contextual factor of fighting capacity that is 
shown here to generate demand for combatants. Conversely, the demand for soldiers in their study is 
treated as given, with adverse consequences for their model’s predictive power. 
Table 3. Unpopular African Armed Groups without Material Resources 
 
Country Armed Group Formation Dissolution Child Recruitment 
Fighting 
Capacity 
Territorial 
Access 
Ethiopia EPRP 01.01.1977 5.28.1991 0 0 1 
Ethiopia EPDM 01.01.1980 5.28.1991 0 0 0 
Somalia USC 01.01.1989 1.29.1991 0 1 0 
Somalia SSDF 01.01.1980 12.31.1991 0 0 0 
Somalia SPM 01.01.1989 12.31.1991 0 1 0 
Uganda WNBF 05.01.1996 12.31.1996 0 0 1 
Uganda UPDA 04.01.1986 12.31.1990 0 1 0 
Uganda LRA 08.08.2001 07.01.2006 1 1 1 
Uganda UPA 12.03.1987 12.31.1991 0 0 1 
Uganda UDCM/UPDCA 12.31.1990 12.31.1991 0 0 0 
Uganda UPDA 5.30.1989 12.31.1990 0 0 0 
 
Table 3 shows yet another interesting point. Notice that in all three cases of the non-recruiting armed 
groups with high fighting capacity, or with high demand for combatants according to my argument, 
territorial access is low. Thus, territorial access is yet another important explanatory factor that my 
model incorporates, unlike the Beber and Blattman’s. This is because my argument, in contrast to theirs, 
goes beyond the decision of an armed group to recruit children, as I consider that such a verdict does not 
automatically transform itself into practice, as physical capturing of children might further depend on 
other factors. Beber and Blattman assume the supply of children to be constant or in excess and hence 
naturally omit contextual factors such as territorial access.416 This assumption certainly makes sense in 
case of the LRA, on which their inductively driven theory is based. The situation of Northern Uganda was 
quite unusual in the sense that people in the Acholi region did not migrate from the territories of LRA 
                                                 
415 For instance, hit and run tactics of guerrilla war fighting do not require huge armies as the struggles with 
conventional open air battles, and terrorist strikes require even less mobilization of fighters and suicide attackers.  
416 Beber and Blattman, “The Industrial Organization of Rebellion,” p. 9. 
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 operations.417 Meanwhile, such an unrestricted access to civilians in proximity of rebel operations is not 
very common for armed groups in modern conflicts with massive flows of people vacating insecure areas 
as refugees or the internally displaced. Access to children for forcible recruitment may be far from easy 
for groups other than the LRA. Also note in this regard that in the situation of LRA, as Table 3 
demonstrates, the group’s high fighting capacity relative to the government and thus demand for 
combatants is coupled with high access to people (or territories, measured by the index of territorial 
control and access to neighboring countries). My argument controls for the availability of children for 
conscription by introducing the variable of the amount of territory to which an insurgency has access.418  
3. Model of Voluntary Recruitment. The study by Gates (2004) offers yet another principal-agent 
model, this time predicting voluntary as opposed to forced recruitment of children.419 According to this 
model, 1) recruits of a military organization (the agents) when mobilized on a voluntary basis, have to 
receive sufficient utility by joining the organization so that they do not desert (the participation 
constraint); and 2) the leadership (the principal) of an armed group “must be able to find a way to reward 
the soldiers so that they choose to act in a way that will produce the maximum increase of the probability 
of winning (or sustaining a “profitable” conflict) with the lowest financial costs (incentive compatibility 
constraint). Hence the leadership may employ children if they are sufficiently cheap to compensate for 
their (potentially) lower military efficiency.”420 Thus, the model predicts that more children will be 
recruited in the situations of voluntary conscription if 1) “their military efficiency increases relative to 
adults”; 2) “children’s income possibilities outside the organization decline compared to the adults’ 
outside options”; 3) “the relative cost of monitoring children compared to adults decreases.”421  
There are several differences between my model and the framework of Gates (2004). First, his model 
is quite general, which has its appeal and applicability to many voluntary recruitment contexts. At the 
                                                 
417 This was a result of government campaign that put civilians into the so-called internal displacement camps in the 
same region under the alleged protection of an army. While the government forces did not provide safety for the 
ubiquitous abduction attacks of the LRA, they also made people to consider staying in the region rather than 
becoming internally displaced throughout the safe regions in the country. Moving as refugees into Sudan was also 
not an option for citizens of Northern Uganda as the conflict in the Southern Sudan, coupled with the LRA hiding 
bases there, made that region particularly insecure. 
418 Again, a somewhat similar conclusion of Beber and Blattman that “as rebel groups move into territory distant in 
spatial or social terms from their support base, however, we should see a greater likelihood of coercion” makes 
perfect sense but can be constrained in reality by the factors of availability of civilians in those new territories as 
well as the high level of demand for soldiers in the first place, which is not automatic from the fact that a group is 
unpopular and does not possess material resources (Beber and Blattman, “The Industrial Organization of Rebellion,” 
p. 22). 
419 Gates, “Recruiting Child Soldiers.” 
420 Ibid. 
421 Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 9. The third prediction is based on the 
assumption that even in the situations of voluntary recruitment a group will face certain level of desertion. Thus, 
Gates implies that if, for example, “the fighting is moving further away from the soldier’s homestead” children will 
experience lower geographical mobility than adults and thus will require lower cost of supervision than adults. 
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 same time, however, the paper itself does not offer testable operationalizations of many concepts 
employed in the model. For example, it remains unclear in what situations the military efficiency of 
children from the first proposition above will increase relative to adults and, consequently, how to 
measure it. Meanwhile, my model offers an empirical, albeit indirect, test of military efficiency of 
children where it is actually specified. Thus, my measurement of demand for combatants with groups’ 
fighting capacity might, at the same time, express the demand for child soldiers specifically, based on 
their relative military effectiveness in this particular situation. Since fighting capacity increases the 
chances of conventional warfare, not only does it require more personnel but specifically children to 
perform the roles of foot soldiers in which minors might be better than adults.422 What is also important 
here is that I expect this characteristic of military effectiveness of children to matter only in the forced 
recruitment situations, not voluntary ones modeled by Gates. As mentioned above, voluntary recruitment 
of children for the roles associated with high mortality rates seems to be negatively associated with the 
legitimacy of popular groups among their civilian support base. As expected, the variable of fighting 
capacity proved to have larger effect in the case of unpopular armed groups, not popular ones, as I show 
in Chapter 5 on the empirical results. Thus, when the general predictions of Gates’ model actually are 
operationalized in a specific way, it turns out that they may lose their predicted explanatory power 
outlined in his general theoretical model.  
The second difference of my explanatory framework from Gates is that he models voluntary 
recruitment only, which in turn is based on the concept of rewards. Meanwhile, recruitment of children 
can occur in its forced form, upon which prediction two of Gates’ model, as much as it relates to the 
decisions of children, becomes irrelevant. More specifically, relative inequality in adults’ and children’s 
outside possibilities might not matter for forced recruitment, as the study of Blattman demonstrated in the 
case of the LRA.423 In addition, arguably, the relative gap between child and adult outside options may 
get more or less erased following the destruction inflicted by an armed conflict affecting everyone by 
insecurity, devastation, food shortages, and displacement.  
The third prediction of Gates’ model in itself points to the third difference between our models. 
Unlike Gates, in my explanatory framework I do not consider the factor of child monitoring to affect the 
decision of armed groups and thus child recruitment variation. This is because I believe that a cost of 
monitoring does not vary much (if at all) across different contexts. As Blattman’s study demonstrated, the 
monitoring of children is cheaper because they are more easily indoctrinated and disoriented. Meanwhile, 
                                                 
422 High need for children as foot soldiers in conventional battles does not necessarily undermine the need for adults 
as conventional warfare also requires high logistical, communicational, and intelligence skills that only adults may 
perform.     
423 Blattman, “The Causes of Child Soldiering,” pp. 14, 21. For more discussion of this point refer to the section on 
poverty in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
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 the gullibility of children to indoctrination and the price of introducing an ideological propaganda for 
children within armed groups do not necessarily vary across different countries, conflicts, or military 
organizations. Disorientation, however, which I believe to be the only other potential characteristic of 
substance related to monitoring costs, can vary across armed groups, as it is related to the geography of 
insurgent operations. As both Gates and Blattman suggest, the proximity to home while stationed with 
armed groups is positively correlated with the monitoring costs.424 At the same time, in my own survey of 
Liberian former child soldiers I did not identify any absence of knowledge about the location at which 
they were stationed. Similarly, the crucial factor behind their decisions to stay with armed groups had 
nothing to do with disorientation but rather with the absence of a place to return to, as their home villages 
were raided, abandoned, or burnt, and people from there killed or displaced. Therefore, I am not 
convinced that the cost of monitoring children from Gates’ model can be a crucial explanation of the child 
soldier recruitment practice by armed groups.  
Last but not the least, there is yet another important difference between Gates’ and my model. It is the 
issue of constraint that popular armed groups, in particular, have in relation to the cost imposed upon their 
legitimacy as a result of their admission of child volunteers. Thus, all three predictions of Gates’ model in 
my framework are subject to additional conditioning factor of the armed groups’ popularity. I argue that 
an armed group will not resort to enlistment of children, even with all the factors offered by Gates’ model 
being present, if the insurgents’ legitimacy is compromised by recruiting minors. The latter restriction 
should hold universally for popular armed groups, unless children’s absolute (rather than relative) outside 
options are regarded as dire by the public – the situations that are also accounted for in my model by the 
variable of ethnic persecution. While it is unclear whether poverty of a child might justify his or her 
recruitment into an armed group in the eyes of civilian populations, in the context of ongoing ethnic 
cleansing in the country, acceptance of children into armed groups for actual or alleged defense purposes 
might not adversely affect the domestic legitimacy of insurgents.  
*** 
After reviewing these three theoretical papers, the most crucial differences between my explanatory 
framework and their models aimed at explaining child soldier recruitment are summarized below. Unlike 
the model of Andvig and Gates, my argument does not treat the market situations of demand for and 
supply of combatants as given, but rather predicts their outcome. Starting from that point, my model, 
unlike Andvig and Gates’, offers structured and operationalizable propositions amenable to testing and 
empirical verification. It also allows one to predict and specify with the data the situations of forced and 
voluntary recruitment of child soldiers, as opposed to treating them as exogenously given. The most 
important distinction of my model from Beber and Blattman’s is that mine offers a richer specification 
                                                 
424 Beber and Blattman, “The Industrial Organization of Rebellion,” p. 22; Gates, “Recruitment and Allegiance.” 
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 and a much better predictive power. As to the model of voluntary recruitment of minors suggested by 
Gates, its major drawback in comparison to my explanatory framework is in its focus on rewards to 
recruits and benefits for recruiters only and, as a result, the omission of the concept of punishment and 
costs to a military organization incurred by child recruitment practice. Therefore, despite the significant 
contribution of all these highly informative three theoretical papers to our knowledge about child 
recruitment, I believe that my model has a better predictive power in answering the question of why some 
armed groups recruit children whereas others do not. 
Section 4. Alternative Explanations 
Poverty. As has been outlined in detail in Chapter 2 on literature review, poverty should matter for 
both voluntary and forced recruitment of children alike at least to some extent. In the case of voluntary 
enlistment of minors, it acts as a force that determines the value of the outside options for children.425 
Thus, in poorer countries or county regions, child soldiering, similarly to child labor, becomes a more 
viable and profitable option than other alternatives. Poor communities are also less capable to defend 
themselves against forced recruitment due to low military capability, information capacity, mobility, and 
priority of protection by government forces. Hypothesis 5 is, therefore, specified as follows: Armed 
groups operating in poorer regions are more likely to have recruitment of children. 
Time of Conflict. In Chapter 2 on literature review, I showed that the claim about child soldiers being 
unique to new wars of today can easily be refuted with numerous counterexamples. At the same time, it 
does appear that in the past child soldier practice was not as widespread as in the conflicts of today. This 
trend is confirmed in my sample of 112 African insurgencies where a statistically significant difference 
can be discerned between the mean year of conflict onsets for the armed groups that recruited child 
soldiers and those who did not, with the latter having a lower value.426  
Overall, I would argue, the variable of conflict timing does not add anything new to my argument 
from the point of theory. What the time dimension might capture, however, is the corresponding change 
in the values of my predictor variables of child soldiering over time. All four of my independent variables 
(fighting capacity, material capacity, ethnic persecution and territorial access) were found to increase in 
their values over time.427 Therefore, I include the variable of conflict timing into my analysis as a control 
                                                 
425 If measured accordingly, poverty might account for the pre-war levels of education and employment 
opportunities in a country – one of the alternative explanatory factors offered in the literature to affect children’s 
decisions to join. Thus, in richer countries or regions, families can more readily afford education of children and 
enjoy better economic opportunities in terms of employment. 
426 African armed groups recruiting children did seem to appear in newer wars (mean conflict onset year of 1994) 
than non-recruiters (mean conflict onset year of 1991). 
427 For example, the mean value for the variable of fighting capacity for armed groups that operated after 1997 was 
0.49 – an increase by 20% from the mean of 0.41 for groups that ceased to exist prior to 1997. Similarly, the mean 
values of the variable territory control by unpopular groups rose from 0.71 to 0.91. Ethnic persecution values also 
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 variable to account for conflict epoch and avoid the potential endogeneity problem.428 Hypothesis 6: 
More contemporary armed groups are more likely to have recruitment of children. 
Conflict Duration. As I established in Chapter 2 on literature review, there is no apparent theoretical 
or empirical justification for inclusion of this factor into my model. However, there is one methodological 
reason for controlling for this factor in empirical work. It can be argued that some of the variables in my 
argument – namely material capacity and mobilization capacity – are not time-invariant. For example, a 
group’s reliance on pecuniary rewards (at least for those groups that have access to the otherwise fixed 
material endowments) may intensify with time as groups may become more eager to resort to material 
incentives to replenish the diminishing supply of adults. Similarly, the overall popularity of a group, 
expressed as the presence or absence of potential supporters in relatively large numbers, might falter with 
time as the war gets protracted. Therefore, including the variable of conflict duration into the analysis as a 
control for groups’ longevity helps alleviate potential endogeneity problem caused by omitted variable 
bias. Therefore, Hypothesis 7 is stated as follows: Insurgencies that participate in armed struggles for a 
longer time are more likely to recruit children. 
Conflict Intensity. Elsewhere in the text I explained potential methodological flaws of using 
traditional operationalization of conflict intensity based on battle deaths. At the same time, unlike my 
variable of fighting capacity, the battle-related concept is based on direct casualty counting, albeit 
imperfect one. Moreover, a continuous variable of conflict intensity represented by battle deaths was 
found to be a good predictor of regional child soldier recruitment in my previous coauthored work.429 
Therefore, in addition to my own variable of fighting capacity that represents the concept of potential 
severity of armed struggle and battle casualties, I also include into my analysis the control variable of 
conflict intensity which is based on traditional concept of battle deaths. Hypothesis 8 then reads: Armed 
groups engaging in conflicts with higher battle deaths are more likely to resort to child recruitment. 
Orphans. Bearing in mind the mixed evidence for the ‘orphans argument’ suggested in Chapter 2 on 
literature review, I would like to subject this alternative explanation to yet another test. It is difficult to 
obtain direct and precise data on the orphan rates in different 112 African conflict dyads in my sample. 
Therefore, in my large-N analysis I treat orphaning as a special case within the outcomes of ethnic 
persecution in a country. The following example is used to justify this alternative way of looking at 
orphaning when examining cross-group variation in child soldier recruitment. Thus, in the DRC, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
increased in case of popular groups from the mean of 0.24 to 0.48 for pre-1997 and post-1997 groups respectively. 
The variable of material compensation also increased over time, from 0.66 to 0.85. 
428 For further discussion on potential endogeneity problem refer to Chapter 5 of this dissertation.   
429 Achvarina et. al., “Regional Poverty and Child Soldier Recruitment,” pp. 17-18. In this work we also tested 
different specifications of conflict intensity variable by using 1) numbers of battle related deaths and 2) dummies for 
low intensity conflicts (never reaching 1,000 battle deaths in any year) and high intensity conflicts (that reach 1,000 
battle deaths in at least one of the conflict years) using no conflict as a reference category. The results were similar.  
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Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) was reported to train “hundreds of recruits from the Hema and 
Lendu ethnic groups at RCD-ML [Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement] camps in Beni 
and Bunia. Lendu children, often orphaned by interethnic killing, provide easy targets.”430 The incidence 
of orphaning might also be embedded in the control variable of conflict intensity measured in battle-
related deaths, which might reflect the potential scope of orphaning.   
*** 
My explanatory framework, which is based on the interaction of supply and demand factors affecting 
the outcome of insurgents’ decisions and practice with regard to child recruitment, generated the 
following four major propositions: 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Armed groups in conflicts with intense armed struggle are more likely to recruit children; 
2) Insurgencies that offer material rewards to their fighters are less likely to recruit children; 
3) Armed movements operating in extremely insecure environments are more likely to enlist children; 
4) Armed groups with access to larger territories are more likely to recruit children. 
In addition, when structured around the concept of armed groups’ popularity as in the proposed extension, 
this explanatory framework suggests higher relevance of some of these hypotheses for popular and 
unpopular armed groups: 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1) Unpopular groups in conflicts with intense armed struggle are more likely to recruit children; 
2.1) Unpopular groups that offer material rewards to their fighters are less likely to recruit children; 
3.1) Popular groups operating in extremely insecure environments are more likely to enlist children; 
4.1) Unpopular armed groups with access to larger territories are more likely to recruit children. 
The empirical ambiguity or lack of any systematic examination of existing explanations in the 
literature offers some partial theoretical justification for inclusion of several alternative factors into my 
model. Their potential effects on child soldiering are summarized in the following hypotheses:   
 
 
 
 
 
5) Armed groups operating in poorer regions are more likely to have recruitment of children; 
6) More contemporary armed groups are more likely to have recruitment of children; 
7) Rebels that participate in armed struggles for a longer time are more likely to recruit children; 
8) Armed groups engaging in conflicts with higher battle deaths are more likely to recruit children. 
I subject these propositions to a series of quantitative and qualitative tests, which I describe in the 
following chapter on methodology.  
 
430 Amnesty International, “Child Recruitment in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,” April 2001, cited 
in CSUCS, Child Soldiers 1379 Report. 
 Chapter 4: Methodology 
My ‘deductive-nomological’ explanatory model arrives at four potential causes of child soldier 
recruitment by armed groups.431 At the same time, my theoretical framework also outlines causal 
mechanisms, or processes and pathways that link my proposed explanatory factors with the outcome of 
child soldier recruitment.432 This dual nature of my model necessitates a combination of both quantitative 
and qualitative methods in order to offer a comprehensive test of my argument. Causal factors and their 
effects expressed in “the expected value of the change in outcome” are best estimated and verified using 
statistical methods, whereas the validity of causal mechanisms should be assessed by conducting case 
studies.433 For statistical tests and case study analyses I employ methods designed to complement each 
other while offering different dimensions to validation of my model.   
I first conduct large-N analysis based on statistical methods designed to test the existence of additive 
and interactive relationships, as both are proposed in my argument. The effects of my explanatory factors 
are further assessed by calculating marginal effects of variables and their interactions. After applying the 
empirical test to my argument, I proceed to the case study analyses. This sequencing of qualitative 
approach after quantitative test is dictated by the utility of each method. In situations when case study 
analysis is employed for theory testing, as in my dissertation, it is important first to develop a solid 
theoretical justification for causation based on either deductive logic or some existing empirical 
justification.434 By offering both deductive explanatory framework and the supporting large-N test prior to 
the case study analysis I therefore aim to maximize the benefits of the latter method. 
My qualitative test of the argument employs three different case study techniques. I start with 
utilizing a congruence method in conducting a controlled comparative case study analysis of child 
recruitment by the five Liberian armed groups that took part in hostilities of the first Liberian Civil War 
                                                 
431 ‘Deductive-nomological’ type of explanatory framework is defined in Alexander George and Andrew Bennet as 
involving “explanations via reference to law-like statements of regularity” (Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, 
Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science (Cambridge University Press: Massachusetts, 2005), p. 
128).  
432 A concise definition of causal mechanism is offered in Daniel Little: “a series of events, governed by lawlike 
regularities, leading from the explanans to the explanandum” (Daniel Little, Varieties of Social Explanation: An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science (Westview Press, 1991), p. 15). For a slightly more sophisticated 
definition of the concept refer to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies, p. 137.  
433 For a further discussion on comparative advantages of quantitative and qualitative methods refer to George and 
Bennett, Case Studies, pp. 138-139. On utility and necessity of combining quantitative and qualitative research in 
the social science field see, among others, Sidney Tarrow, “Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide” in Henry 
Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp. 171-179. George and Bennett also put emphasis on “combining within-case and 
comparative analysis” as well as “on multi-method research more generally” (George and Bennett, Case Studies, p. 
147, footnote). Likewise, Daniel Little suggests that “in order to distinguish causal from accidental accounts, 
process-tracing should be combined with comparative or statistical study of multiple cases” (Daniel Little, 
Microfoundations, Method, and Causation: On the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1998), pp. 211-213, cited in George and Bennett, Case Studies, p. 147, footnote 47).   
434 George and Bennett, Case Studies, p. 184. 
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 of 1989-1996. I then perform a temporal case study of underage recruitment on one of these Liberian 
groups – the NPFL – and implement process-tracing. To assess the generalizability of my argument, I also 
run a plausibility probe of my explanatory framework on several synthetic case studies outside Africa.  
I proceed with outlining my methodology as follows. I first describe in Section 1 the data and sample 
for my large-N study, as well as offer a justification for choosing the Liberian conflict and its five armed 
groups for a comparative case study. I also describe the survey data that I have compiled and utilized in 
the temporal case study. In Section 2, I show how I measure my dependent, independent, conditioning, 
and control variables for the large-N analysis and case studies. In Section 3, I introduce the statistical 
methods which I choose for the large-N analysis. Section 4 describes the three case study approaches I 
employ along with the methods of controlled comparison, congruence, temporal examination and process-
tracing.  
Section 1. Data and Samples for Analyses 
Data and Sample for Large-N Cross-Sectional Analysis 
I conduct statistical analysis on the new dataset that I compiled myself for the purposes of this 
dissertation. My sample consists of 111 African insurgency movements that took part in armed struggle 
against their governments and were active some time between 1980 and the present. The unit of 
observation in my dataset is a conflict dyad between a government and a rebel group.435 The dyads were 
taken from the Non-State Actor Dataset (hereafter referred as the NSA Dataset) – the supplement to the 
Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset.436 The NSA Dataset features major characteristics of armed groups in 
conflict dyads between specific state and each insurgency group that challenged it between 1945 and 
2003. I reduced the NSA Dataset to African dyads only and then excluded all the dyads that ceased to 
exist prior to 1980, as reporting on child soldiers before that time was problematic to obtain.437 I also 
removed all coup d’etats as I do not examine this type of armed violence in relation to child soldiering.438 
Three major conflict types remaining in my sample are secessionist, ethnic and civil war.  
Cases for Case Study Analysis 
Selection of the Liberian Conflict for the Case Study Analysis. For my case study analysis I chose to 
examine in detail the first civil war in Liberia (1989-1996) and armed factions that took part in it. This 
particular Liberian armed struggle can be viewed as a representative case of modern African wars for 
several reasons. First, it lasted for seven years – a conflict duration that approximates the mean (7.1 years) 
                                                 
435 Note that the unit of analysis in my study is a rebel group. 
436 David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “The NSA Project: A Non-State Actor Supplement to the 
Uppsala Armed Conflict Data.” This dataset was provided to me as a courtesy and good will of Kristian and David, 
for which I am eternally grateful. For more information about the dataset please contact its authors.  
437 There were only nine pre-1980 African conflict dyads recorded in the original dataset and they were deleted from 
the sample.  
438 I excluded 23 coup d’etats – four that occurred prior to 1980 and 19 that took place afterwards.  
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 and the median (7.0 years) of other 27 sub-Saharan civil wars that occurred between 1960 and 1999.439 
Second, the intensity of this Liberian conflict approximates the average of all other conflicts in my 
sample. With the values of 1 for ‘minor conflict’ and 2 for a ‘full scale war’ assigned to each year in 
conflict dyads of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database, the Liberian war on average had the 
intensity of 1.29, with some years being more severe than others.440 This is just slightly lower than the 
conflict intensity average of 1.34 for all the conflicts in my large-N dataset. Third, the Liberian conflict 
type was recorded both in Uppsala/PRIO Dataset and the NSA Database as a civil strife as opposed to 
secessionist movement or ethnic struggle.441 Correspondingly, 48% of all world conflicts and 64% of all 
sub-Saharan conflicts between 1945 and 1999 were civil wars.442 Fourth, poverty level in Liberia prior to 
the conflict was recorded to be below the mean of all African countries where armed violence occurred – 
that is where 67% of all conflict dyads in my sample fell.443 Thus, with its values of conflict duration, 
intensity, type, as well as country’s economic well-being, Liberia’s first civil war is closely comparable 
with an average African conflict. 
Selection of Five Armed Groups in Liberia for the Case Study Analysis. In my first case study 
analysis I compare and contrast five Liberian armed groups that took part in hostilities during the first 
Liberian civil war of 1989-1996. These armed groups are: NPFL, INPFL, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, and 
LPC.444 Why is it appropriate to select these five factions as comparative cases to test my argument and 
demonstrate the causal mechanisms behind it? There are at least two reasons for this. First, all five 
                                                 
439 The mean and the median were calculated using James Fearon’s replication dataset that was employed in his 
seminal work “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 
(2004): 275-301. The mean of 7.1 years was obtained after I deleted two outliers in the selected sub-sample of Sub-
Saharan civil wars – those were extremely long-lasting civil strife conflicts that protracted for 35 and 25 years 
respectively. In the sample without these two outliers the shortest conflict lasted one year and the longest one 20 
years. The mean calculated for the sample with all observations, including outliers, was 8.6 years.   
440 The calculation procedure for the conflict intensity index is described in this dissertation in Chapter 4 on 
methodology.  
441 These two datasets offer somewhat similar and yet distinct conflict typologies based on the concept of armed 
struggle purpose. Thus, the Uppsala/PRIO dataset classifies all conflict dyads into three categories depending on the 
type of incompatibility between the actors in the dyad: over ‘territory’, ‘government’, or ‘government and territory’. 
The NSA Dataset reflects more on the goals of armed groups and as such distinguishes between the ‘ethnic’, 
‘secessionist’, ‘civil war’, and ‘coup d’état’ types of conflicts. Unlike in the Uppsala/PRIO dataset, these categories 
of the NSA Dataset are not mutually exclusive and “individual conflicts may be assigned more than one of these 
categories” (Cunningham and Gleditsch, “The NSA Project,” p. 2). 
442 These percentages are coming from the summary statistics of the James Fearon’s replication dataset mentioned 
above (James Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last Much Longer than Others?”). According to Fearon, civil 
wars in his sample include only those cases where the aims of rebels were not ambiguous or mixed with other 
motifs, which means that in reality there were probably more civil wars than admitted by him for methodological 
clarity.  
443 On the measurement of poverty in my data sample refer to the section on operationalization of variables in 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
444 This list does not include marginal factions that were participating in the Liberian conflict for a short period of 
time with low membership and for which most of the data on my variables were extremely difficult to find. Such 
factions include LDF (Lofa Defense Force), NDF (Nimba Defense Force), and the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC), a breakaway faction from the NPFL. 
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 Liberian armed groups resemble the representative characteristics of other insurgencies in my large-N 
sample and, therefore, cannot be considered as outliers or too unique in type and character. Second, they 
share similarities among themselves on many attributes but the factors of interest – both dependent and 
independent variables – which makes their comparison with one another as case study observations 
justifiable and purposeful. 
There are many similarities between the five Liberian armed groups and other African insurgencies. 
First, all five Liberian factions emerged between the years 1989-1993, and ceased to exist in 1996 (at 
least until the reappearance of some in 1997). Meanwhile, the average date of African insurgency 
formation in my dataset is 1992, and the sample’s average for the date of groups’ dissolution is 1997, 
which makes Liberian rebels representative of the rest of the sample. Second, the mean rebel estimate for 
the five Liberian factions was not far from the mean of 10,660 fighters in my sample of 111 African 
insurgencies. The five Liberian groups varied in their size from 3,500 to 15,000 combatants, with the 
values of 4,000, 8,000 and 9,000 in between.445 Thus, in terms of group size the Liberian factions also do 
not constitute outliers in the sample of other insurgencies. The third very important similarity between the 
Liberian factions and other African insurgencies is in the goals of their military campaigns.446 Ultimately, 
rebels in the first Liberian Civil War all fought for power representation and control over the country’s 
natural resources, such as diamonds, iron, timber, and rubber. They all attempted to change the present 
ruling status quo, albeit with different ideas about new distribution of political stakes.447 Meanwhile, 
                                                 
445 These numbers represent the averages of low and high rebel estimates found in the following sources: 
Cunningham and Gleditsch, “The NSA Project”; David Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President: How 
Charles Taylor Won the 1997 Liberian Elections,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 37 (3), 1999, pp. 431-455; 
Andrew Young, “Costly Discrimination and Ethnic Conflict: The Case of the Liberian Civil Wars,” Working Paper, 
2008, p. 24). 
446 In general, it is difficult to identify the primary objectives of armed groups in militarized struggles, because 
proclaimed goals are not necessarily the ones that the groups’ leadership pursues. The following extract from 
Andvig and Gates elaborates on this point: “The general problem is that professed motivations (and alleged 
motivations) do not necessarily coincide with “real” or ultimate motivations. This is a hermeneutic problem. Can we 
ever know whether politics or religion provides the fundamental motivation for groups in Chechnya or in the Middle 
East? Equally difficult is deciding whether money or politics provide the fundamental motivation for other groups, 
which finance their operations through lootable resources such as opium, cocaine or diamonds. Also difficult to 
determine is whether professed goals are for a broad public who are not members of the military group or for the 
group members themselves. As in other contexts, the actors may have good reasons for trying to misrepresent their 
goals (and those of their adversaries). Religion may be a pretext for politics, and politics a pretext for money” 
(Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 10). 
447 For example, the leader of the NPFL, Charles Taylor, fought for the country’s center and his presidential control 
of it from the very beginning of the Liberian conflict. All other factions, with or without presidential ambitions, 
constantly in and out of alliances with one another as time went on, were fighting for establishing themselves in the 
new state administration, whether or not that meant ousting Charles Taylor from the power he strived for. This quest 
for control over sectors of the country’s administration was not based solely on ideological grounds, if at all. The 
presidency or a post in the government was just the ultimate expression of “warlordism” in the context of the 
Liberian war, in which every armed group grasped control over commercial operations in diamonds, timber or 
rubber. Positioning themselves in the government administration meant for armed factions acquiring “political 
means to secure their interests that so far they secured using military channels” (Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 
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 military organizations participating in the armed struggle for the state power, unlike secessionist or ethnic 
movements, constitute about 70% of all African insurgencies in my sample. 
One of the advantages of comparing armed groups within the same armed struggle, as opposed to 
different conflicts, is that all militarized contestants share the same structural characteristics of the 
country and conflict. In this way, there is more control over external factors achieved in the comparative 
case study analysis.448 For example, country poverty levels, culture and demographic characteristics are 
equal for all factions operating in the same conflict. These contextual variables may exhibit some regional 
variation, but unlike for armed groups from different conflicts, these regional deviations are kept within 
some bounded limits often determined by the general country values for the factors in question.449 While 
the groups varied in the number and severity of armed events they participated in, it is the overall conflict 
intensity measured in battle deaths and representing country’s devastation level that imposed the same 
consequences on all the factions. For example, as people were dying or fleeing from intense fighting, all 
five Liberian armed groups had similar shortages in manpower availability. Similarly, the country’s 
overall destruction level generated more or less identical situation of food scarcity and collapse of basic 
infrastructure for all participants to the conflict. Other features are also controlled for by comparing 
groups from the same conflict. For instance, the fact that the five Liberian armed groups were active 
during the time span of 1989-1996, in the post-Cold War era, accounts for any major shifts related to 
differences in time epochs and makes the factions directly comparable to each other in the temporal sense. 
Survey Data and Interviews for Case Studies and Micro-Level Analysis 
My case study analysis utilizes the data from the survey which I conducted in Ghana in 2008 on 
former Liberians residing in the Buduburam refugee camp.450 First, on the basis of this survey data I 
construct a longitudinal continuous measure of my dependent variable of child soldiering for a temporal 
case study. More specifically, I count the number of former child soldiers from my survey who were 
recruited into the NPFL faction for every year of the first Liberian conflict from 1989 to 1996. This 
variation in numbers of children conscripted or enlisted each year allows me to juxtapose the levels of 
these values with the relative values of my proposed independent variables, most of which I record from 
analysis of secondary sources. Second, in my cross-case comparison attempt, based on the data from the 
                                                                                                                                                       
106-107). Therefore, when gathered in Monrovia in 1995 they all disregarded the ceasefire and clashed for 
simultaneous presidency rallying and division of government posts.  
448 The issue of selection of case studies for the structured controlled comparison is discussed further in this chapter 
in the relevant section on the case study methodology.   
449 For example, poverty in Liberia’s capital region and the country outskirts differed significantly, as in most of the 
world countries. As I mention later in the text, poverty in Liberia “has predominantly been a rural and peri-urban 
phenomenon” (Francis W. Nyepon, “Liberia: The Nucleus to Reducing Poverty,” The Perspective, Atlanta, Georgia, 
Sept 6, 2007, http://www.liberiaitech.com/theperspective/2007/0906200703.html). Similarly, ethnic persecution was 
more prominent in some provinces but not others. 
450 The Buduburam Refugee Camp is located about 35 kilometers west from the capital of Ghana – Accra, in the 
Awutu-Effutu (Afutu)-Senya district of the Central region. 
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 surveys and interviews with former child and adult members of these factions, I establish a specific 
variance of child recruitment across five Liberian armed groups. 
Sample Selection. The Buduburam refugee camp represents a unique place for conducting surveys of 
Liberian citizens as it embodies the diversity of the country’s population by hosting a mix of people who 
were affected by the civil war to a various degree in terms of time spent in the Liberian conflict and 
severity of experiences they went through. The 41,000 residents of the camp started arriving to refuge in 
relatively equal waves since 1990 from all geographic regions of Liberia of different ethnic heritage and 
cultures.451 In the camp, I targeted three populations of Liberians for the survey and interviews: people 
who participated in armed conflict as children; people who did not end up with rebels while in Liberia 
during the war at young age under 18 years old; and people who served with belligerents in adulthood.  
To find my informants I used a version of the “snowball” sampling.452 I first established contact with 
three organizations representing former child soldiers and war-affected youth in the camp. I made an 
announcement about the survey to the leaders of the organizations as well as to their members during 
several meetings held by one of the organizations. The leadership of all three organizations also asked 
their members and acquaintances. After the first people were surveyed and interviewed, they were also 
asked by me and enumerators to send over other former child soldiers or non-conscripted youth that they 
might know. The leadership of the organizations, the enumerators and informants themselves were all 
requested to bring people who participated with Liberian armed factions at a young age.453 However, to 
reduce any misunderstanding or potential deceit on the part of enumerators regarding the respondents’ 
actual participation in armed groups, the former were also instructed to interview non-conscripted youth 
and adult soldiers if for some reason they had no luck in locating former child soldiers that day.454 I also 
                                                 
451 Camp population size comes from a 2005 record of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2005, p. 345). The demographic diversity of the camp was the feature that camp 
residents and management sounded particularly proud about during my conversations with them. They also 
mentioned it as a proof that Liberians can live together in peace.  
452 Snowball sampling was used as a name for the so-called “chain-referral sampling methods that were first 
introduced by Coleman (1958).” “The basic idea behind these methods is that respondents are selected not from a 
sampling frame,” or “a list of all members in the population,” “but from the friendship network of existing members 
of the sample.” “The sampling process begins when the researchers select a small number of seeds who are the first 
people to participate in the study. These seeds then recruit others to participate in the study. This process of existing 
sample members recruiting future sample members continues until the desired sample size is reached. Experience 
with chain-referral methods has shown them to be effective at penetrating hidden populations” (Matthew J. Salganik 
and Douglas D. Heckathorn, “Sampling and Estimation in Hidden Populations Using Respondent-Driven 
Sampling,” Sociological Methodology, 2004, Vol. 34(1), pp. 193–239, at p. 196). 
453 It was not difficult for them to find former child soldiers whom they knew, especially in the initial stage of the 
survey. 
454 Before going into the field to survey informants after each meeting with me (typically at least once a day), they 
were supplied with two types of questionnaire forms – one for child soldiers and one for non-conscripted youth. I 
also employed other means to prevent potential cheating and falsification of the data. For example, I obliged the 
enumerators to bring all the informants to me after the completion of their survey and I went over most crucial 
questions on the questionnaire with each of them. By doing this I attempted to check if the person provided the same 
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 identified some of the informants through meeting and talking to random people on the camp on the daily 
basis. 
Potential Selection Bias. There are at least three potential problems with the selection of my sample, 
all related to its limited randomization. First, it might be argued that the residents of the camp outside 
Liberia can not truly represent the Liberian population if, for some reason, they exhibit a certain 
characteristic that made them or allowed them to leave the country during the war. However, as I show 
above, due to extreme diversity of its residents, the Buduburam refugee camp can be, in fact, even more 
representative of Liberian population than the residents in Liberia itself who might not necessarily have 
stayed in the country during the war and returned there from refuge in other countries but Ghana. Second, 
to ensure the randomness of the sample, ideally one would conduct a household survey covering 
uniformly the whole camp in order to identify the informants without any potential selection bias within 
the camp.455 Unfortunately, such an initiative was beyond the limits of this study. I undertook the feasible 
randomization measures given my constraints. Thus, as mentioned above, I tried to diversify the sources 
of informant identification as much as possible. Also, in the surveys I included a question that inquired 
about the tentative location of the informants’ residence (one of the 10 zones in the camp) to make sure 
that none of the areas of the camp was overrepresented in the sample. Third, as any other sample of 
former combatants, my sample of former child soldiers is indeed nonrandom by its nature, because it does 
not include those potential respondents who died during the war.  
Data. Altogether, my survey project covered about 310 informants who were caught in Liberia’s civil 
wars of 1989-1996 and 1997-2002. With the primary research focus on former child soldiers, I collected 
and conducted 202 surveys of children associated with armed forces, as well as 56 surveys of non-
conscripted youth and 53 surveys of adult ex-combatants for control samples. 37 of 202 former child 
soldiers in my sample participated in more than one armed group or more than once in the same military 
organization before reaching 18 years of age. There were only 18 (or 8%) girl child soldiers in my 
sample.456 The informants served as child soldiers predominantly in the NPFL armed faction, as opposed 
to other Liberian rebel groups.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
answers that were recorded by the enumerator and that the information on the filled questionnaire forms was not 
falsified. Such practice helped verify if the person could have been dishonest about his/her participation in the armed 
group. In addition, I needed to talk briefly to all the informants in order to identify the most critical and diverse 
group of candidates for my later in-depth interviews with some of them. 
455 Researchers pointed out that “the promise of chain-referral methods was tempered by the difficulty of making 
statistical inferences from this type of sample” (Salganik and Heckathorn, “Sampling and Estimation in Hidden 
Populations Using Respondent-Driven Sampling,” p. 196). 
456 This does not represent the nature of girl recruitment in Liberia but rather my choice not to include girl soldiers 
into the survey for ethical and other considerations. 
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 Section 2. Measurement of Concepts 
Table 4 below summarizes the concepts proposed in my explanatory framework, as well as their 
operationalization, described in Chapter 3 on the explanatory framework, and measurement, which I will 
outline in greater detail in this section. 
 
Table 4. Operationalization and Measurement of Concepts Used in the Argument 
 
 Large-N Analysis Case Study Analysis 
Concept Operationalization Measurement  Index %* Operationalization Measurement Index
Group’s child 
recruitment Child recruitment 
Instance of 
recruitment 0; 1 56/44 Child recruitment 
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Material 
rewards Material capacity 
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T t 
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0; 1 
0; 1 
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62/33
45/51
47/65
Material rewards 
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reported type loot 
Access to
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  0; 1; 26/55Territorial Access Territory control;    Presence abroad 2 /19 
Access to people & 
Size of territory 
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h
scaleterritories 
 populatio
nder control at 
ome & abroad
#-s & 
Group Mobilization 
capacity 
Size of mobilizable 55/45 Mobilization 
Ethnic & low; 
med;popularity constituency 
low; 
high capacity revolutionary mobilization high
* lumn repo ti he c esp ng in  larg
The Dependent Variable of Child Soldier Recruitment 
resent tment rm introduce the dependent 
variable of child recruitment. In my large-N analysis, a binary index that takes th  a , 
e of such, 
d recruitment behavior of every insurgency in 
my
 This co rts on the distribu on of the data for t orr ondi dices in my e-N sample. 
To rep  the concept of child soldier recrui  by a ed groups I 
 it is e values of 1 nd 0
representing the fact of child recruitment practice employed by an armed group and the absenc
respectively. I compiled these data by examining the chil
 dataset of 111 African conflict dyads. To code the child recruitment variable, I utilized information 
from secondary sources such as: 1) reports of IOs and NGOs that specialize in monitoring and reporting 
child recruitment around the world; 2) existing academic and practitioner studies (including surveys) of 
child soldiers in certain countries; 3) assessments of fieldworkers and reporters/journalists who worked 
closely with specific armed groups or whom I corresponded with regarding their potential witnessing of 
child soldiers in rebel ranks. Altogether, out of 111 insurgency dyads in my sample, 49 (or 44%) armed 
groups were coded as recruiting child soldiers at some point of their existence, whereas 62 (or 56%) were 
not found to be engaging in such a practice. 
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 Several potential concerns might arise in connection to this operationalization of my dependent 
variable. First, the data on child recruitment instances do not distinguish between the age of recruits, as 
long as they are under 18 years old. Meanwhile, this benchmark of 18 years old used in my and other 
existing definitions of a child soldier as an age of adulthood has been subject to debate. The point is often 
mad
ak down the data on 
chil
                                                
e by observers and academics concerned that this number is driven by international conventions 
based on western norms about childhood and does not translate well to the context of Africa where, 
according to some, the age of adulthood is often reached much earlier, with some countries specifying it 
as low as 15 years old.457 While I agree that there are cultural differences in defining who is a child, I 
nevertheless use the 18 year old benchmark in my work because the data on child soldier recruitment 
have been collected and coded by IOs and NGOs on the basis of this age criteria.458  
The second possible problem relates to the treatment of child soldiers as a homogenous entity, 
without distinguishing between combat and logistical tasks of underage recruits.459 The practitioners’ 
definition of a child soldier does draw a distinction between these roles, but in data collection and 
reporting IOs and NGOs merge these categories together.460 Some survey studies bre
d soldiers by roles performed in armed groups, age of recruitment and other characteristics, but there 
have not been many such projects to construct a meaningful disaggregated variable for a cross-sectional 
sample of 111 insurgencies. 
The third potential concern with my dependent variable operationalization relates to the fact that in 
measuring child recruitment I do not make a distinction between voluntary and forced enrollment 
 
457 Thus, Andvig and Gates on purpose avoid any age restriction in their definition of a child soldier: “From a 
comparative perspective, defining a child to be a person below 15 years makes better sense. We have much 
sympathy for Shepler (2004) and other social anthropologists who insist that childhood is a social construct, and 
should be defined differently in different societies. Persons in their early 30s may then become children for some 
purposes” (Andvig and Gates, “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict,” p. 2).  
458 More specifically, fieldworkers operate with the following working definition of a child soldier: “any child – boy 
or girl – under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any 
capacity, including, but not limited to, cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups other than 
family members” (UNICEF, “Fact Sheet,” URL: ttp://www.unicef.org/protection/childsoldiers.pdf, p. 4).  
459 This distinction may be critical only for purely demand-driven propositions in my argument. One such demand-
driven factor is armed struggle intensity that creates pressure on armed groups to recruit more combatants to 
substitute for casualties and succeed in the intensified attacks. Another demand-driven explanation in my argument 
is related to material rewards and compensations to adult soldiers and might not be that sensitive to the roles of child 
soldiers. There are two supply-based explanations that determine the outcome of child recruitment in my argument, 
namely situations of extreme insecurity that make children approach armed groups and groups’ access to people and 
territories that ensures the supply of unwilling children. These supply-based explanations deal with the question of 
vulnerability of certain children for recruitment and, as such, might not be sensitive to the role distribution of 
children within armed groups. 
460 Consider the following broad spectrum of roles of child soldiers from the CSUCS definition mentioned above 
elsewhere in the text: “Child soldiers perform a range of tasks including: participation in combat, laying mines and 
explosives; scouting, spying, acting as decoys, couriers or guards; training, drill or other preparations; logistics and 
support functions, portering, cooking and domestic labour. Child soldiers may also be subjected to sexual slavery or 
other forms of sexual abuse” (CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report, 2008, p. 411). 
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 methods, again due to data limitations. It is not possible to distinguish between forced or voluntary 
recruitment for all armed groups in my sample at this stage of the analysis. The situation gets even more 
com
eliminary 
evid
to 
adu
                                                
plicated for a systematic data compilation as armed groups frequently utilize both methods of 
recruitment or their mix, depending on the context. Thus, in the absence of extensive surveys, it is simply 
not clear what type of child recruitment was prevalent in the strategy of most armed groups.      
The fourth issue regarding my dependent variable is its inability to offer a time dimension, as it does 
not distinguish between child recruitment at different stages of conflict. Meanwhile, the resort to this 
practice is sometimes argued to occur only at a certain stage of armed conflict – namely, towards the end 
of armed struggle, as described in Chapter 2 on literature review.461 However, without some pr
ence-based prominent pattern in time of child recruitment across different conflicts, I do not 
anticipate any adverse effects of a potential bias for my large-N analysis in the absence of time series 
data. I agree nevertheless that it is advisable to take the notion of timing into account and enrich the 
analysis by adding a time dimension to it. I therefore include the control variable of conflict duration into 
my large-N analysis to test the logic that longer conflicts will feature more child soldiers. I also analyze 
the temporal development of child recruitment in one of my case studies, where I trace yearly changes in 
the dependent variable of child recruitment for one Liberian faction – the NPFL – from 1989 to 1996.  
Similarly, in the cross-group comparative case study I allow the variable of child recruitment to vary.  
Instead of the binary index employed in my large-N analysis, I introduce the measure which is based on 
three categories of the scope of child recruitment: ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’. I set the value of ‘low’ to 
the armed groups for which child recruitment was reported to be somewhere around 30% relative 
lts. ‘Medium’ child recruitment is assigned to factions with around 50% of children in their ranks. 
Groups with over 80% of their soldiers being underage are marked by the value of ‘high’. Out of the five 
Liberian factions in my comparative case study none was abstaining from child recruitment practice. The 
information on the scope of the child recruitment in different Liberian armed groups was taken from my 
interviews with former Liberian child soldiers whom I asked to comment on the distribution of adults and 
children in their units.462 Respondents’ answers were then carefully analyzed and complemented with the 
knowledge about organization of Liberian factions in terms of their units and battalions’ structure and 
mission, to account for potential overrepresentation of child soldier ratios in the whole group derived 
from the information about units that were made primarily of children. 
 
 
461 For a broader discussion of this point refer to this dissertation’s Chapter 2 on literature review. 
462 Many former child soldiers could provide information on the size of their units, subunits, or groups with which 
they were associated. For small groups of 10 to 30 people they were able to give approximate numbers of underage 
recruits relative to adults. For larger units of which their groups were a part, they were asked to draw the 
approximate distribution of children and adults, as well as girls and women.  
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 Independent Variables 
Fighting Capacity. For my large-N analysis I borrowed the data on armed groups’ fighting capacity 
from the NSA Dataset and recoded it to have the values of ‘low’ and ‘high’.463 The distribution of 
ghting capacity shows a large variation across my sample of armed groups, with 53 (or 55%) of them 
nd 43 (or 45%) the value ‘high’. In my case study analysis I construct the 
mea
ling such commodities as cocaine, precious gems, or opium.465 Second, I incorporate 
the 
oil has been identified in Buhaug et. al.’s dataset as the natural resource 
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having the value ‘low’ a
sures of fighting capacity in all Liberian factions by reviewing the victories and losses of armed 
groups, as well as tracing their decisions to attack the capital. In my assessment I rely primarily on the 
ACLED Dataset, as well as on secondary sources such as newspaper articles and ethnographic or 
historical accounts of the Liberian conflict.464 
Material Capacity. Below I outline how I measure three major types of material resources available 
to armed groups. I base my measurement of natural resource access on the data from two studies. First, I 
utilize Fearon’s data compiled for 128 civil wars globally which measure if rebels rely on income from 
production or smugg
data from Buhaug et. al.’s study, which measure the presence of oil, gemstones, and narcotics in 
conflict regions of war-torn countries.466 Combining the information from both studies I examine three 
types of lootable and obstructable natural resources: gemstones, narcotics, and oil.467 The data from 
Fearon and Buhaug et. al. could not be applied to my sample without some revision, modification, and 
additions, as outlined below.468  
First, while Fearon’s data did measure the actual reliance of rebels on natural resources, Buhaug et. 
al.’s dataset only recorded the presence or absence of natural resources in a country or conflict zone. As 
such, the latter data do not reflect whether a specific armed group actually had access to the commodities 
in question. For instance, while 
 
463 In the original NSA Dataset this variable takes the following values: ‘low’, ‘moderate’, and ‘high’. I merged 
categories of ‘moderate’ and ‘high’ into one category of ‘high’ due to lack of observations in the original ‘high’ 
category (only five in my sample).  
464 For more information on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) that records instances of 
rebel participation in battles see Raleigh and Hegre, “Introducing ACLED,” 2005. 
465 Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last Much Longer than Others?” p. 284.   
466 Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, Päivi Lujala, Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict, 
Unpublished Manuscript, 2009. 
467 After performing an extensive search in the literature, I could not find any other rebel movements but the ones in 
Nigeria which would use “oil bunkering” to sustain their operations. For my dataset I compiled two measures on 
rebel access to lootable natural resources – one that includes access to oil revenues and one that does not. I ran my 
statistical tests on the models with each of these measurement variants of natural resource variable and results were 
the same. 
468 Among other things, the two datasets differed in terms of whether they coded or not the presence of gemstones 
and narcotics in the same conflicts. In such instances I relied on Buhaug et. al.’s dataset because it was more recent 
and thus could have accounted for more information. Also, unlike Fearon, Buhaug et. al. included oil commodity in 
their definition of lootable resources. At the same time, Buhaug et. al.’s data did not cover all of the countries that 
my sample was based on, with Fearon’s data being more inclusive. 
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 pres
ighboring countries. Consider, for example, that the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces 
(AD
                                                
ent within the conflict zone in Angola, it does not mean that the Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) or FLEC armed group could exploit this hydrocarbon commodity for profit.469 While 
the motivations of an insurgency movement for control of natural resources are assumed, it might be 
challenging for rebels to capture or establish themselves permanently in commodity extraction areas, due 
to the extensive military protection of the latter by the government and other actors and sometimes by 
inconvenient geographic location of such sites.470 Therefore, I made further effort to identify if armed 
groups in the countries or conflict zones with lootable natural resources actually had access to them.471 To 
obtain this information, I analyzed secondary sources and documents written on financing rebel 
movements.472 
The second alteration to the Buhaug et. al.’s datasets I had to make related to the geographic limit of 
their data to a conflict country or a conflict zone within national borders. At the same time, it is common 
for armed groups, especially in the internationalized civil wars, to rely on the extraction of natural 
resources in ne
F) were known to rely widely “on income-generating activities in the eastern DRC, such as the 
 
469 I could not identify any report suggesting that UNITA or FLEC were relying on oil production revenues. 
Similarly, they were not found to be levying taxes on oil production or stealing the commodity for sale. Here is what 
Achim Wennmann wrote on UNITA’s non-reliance on oil: “Oil production and export could be isolated from 
attacks during the civil war; except in late 1992, when UNITA attacked an on-shore oil installation” (Wennmann, 
“Conflict Financing and the Recurrence of Intra-State Armed Conflict,” pp. 164-165, citing Duncan Clark, 
“Petroleum Prospects and Political Power” in Jackie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, eds., Angola’s War Economy: 
The Role of Oil and Diamonds (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), pp.195-218).  
470 Consider, for example, a case of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) which was not able to 
access the alluvial diamonds buried under the sands of the southern coastline of Namibia. “Not only had previous 
German colonial authorities addressed this lootability problem by defining the area as a strictly enforced Sperrgebiet 
(forbidden zone) in the wake of its genocide of the Herero, but the open terrain of the deserted coast also offered no 
cover to a guerrilla force. As put by a former SWAPO fighter, now Director of Mines, ‘We could not have operated 
there. The South Africans would have simply bombed us’” (Le Billon, “Diamond Wars?” p. 360, from the interview 
with Kennedy Hamutenya, Namibian Ministry of Mines and Energy, April 2002). 
471 Contrary to my suspicion, however, this exercise confirmed that almost no insurgency from Fearon’s and Buhaug 
et. al.’s dyads with natural resource presence happened not to have access to these commodities to finance its 
operations. What I did find different, however, is that some of the belligerents from these two datasets’ dyads coded 
with the lack of resources were actually profiting from natural commodities. For example, Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) and Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) of Algeria appeared in Buhaug et. al.’s dataset in the same dyad coded as 
having no natural resources in the conflict zone. Meanwhile, I found GIA to be reported to have access to drug 
trafficking, while FIS was not claimed to rely on any type of natural resources or contraband. The same discrepancy 
was found in the Fearon’s data for other insurgencies in Somalia, Chad, and Uganda among others. 
472 The major sources I relied on came from the organizations and research projects that kept track of non-state 
armed movements. Such entities include but are not limited to: 1) Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Database, 
Uppsala University; URL: www.ucdp.uu.se/database; 2) “Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups: Legal and 
Policy Responses,” Database, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva and the 
Programme on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) at Harvard University; 3) Paramilitary Groups 
Database, Global Security Project, URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/index.html; 4) Armed 
Conflict Report 2008, Project Ploughshares, URL: http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-
TitlePage.html.  
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 lucrative exploitation and trafficking of minerals.”473 However, in Buhaug et. al.’s dataset this armed 
group is coded as operating in the conflict zone without natural resources. In my sample, I accounted for 
cases such as the ADF by analyzing, again, secondary sources that report on rebel funding capabilities.   
As a third change to the original data from both Fearon and Buhaug et. al., I added information for 
several missing dyads and actors that were not reflected in their datasets but present in my sample. For 
example, my sample had eight conflict dyads for Uganda with seven different actors, while Fearon’s had 
onl
tional rebel constituency supports a rebel movement.”475 My index of diaspora 
sup
c, or financial.477 Ninety two percent of all instances of foreign 
gov
                                                
y two dyads for this country, with two specified actors.474  
Ultimately, 47 armed groups in my sample (or 42%) were recorded as not having access to natural 
resources, whereas 65 (or 58%) insurgencies relied on production and trafficking of lootable and 
obstructable resources.  
To measure the second type of rebel financing – donations from diaspora communities and 
individuals – I borrow the data collected by the NSA Dataset for one of its variables which “indicates the 
extent to which a transna
port is assigned the values of 0 – ‘no support’ and 1 – ‘tacit or explicit support’.476 Out of all African 
armed groups in my sample, 61 (or 66%) were found to have no diaspora support, whereas 32 (or 34%) 
received this type of assistance.  
The data for third states’ support to rebel groups in my sample also come from the NSA Dataset, 
which recorded whether insurgents were recipients of any of the three types of foreign government 
assistance: militarily, diplomati
ernment assistance to the African armed groups in my sample came in the form of military supplies 
and troops.478 Meanwhile, to represent my variable of material capacity in some meaningful way, I am 
most interested in monetary, or financial, supplies from the third states. However, any other type of 
military support might also alleviate the groups’ burden of purchasing arms and ammunition and instead 
release financial resources to redistribute them among fighters in the form of salaries.479 I therefore 
proceed with measuring third state support with the data that capture primarily military type of assistance. 
The indicator of the third state support takes the values of 0 – ‘no support’ and 1 – ‘alleged or explicit 
 
473 “Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups Project,” op. cit.  
 strife with the following armed factions: WNBF, 
riable comes from my correspondence with Kristian Gleditsch, one of the NSA Project’s 
original NSA Dataset this variable takes the following values: ‘no transactions recorded’, ‘tacit’, ‘explicit’, 
 the NSA Project. 
or this variable. 
474 Ugandan government in my dataset was recorded to have a civil
UPDA, UPA, UDCM/UPDCA, a faction of the UPDA, ADF, and LRA (with the latter coded as two separate entries 
in two different conflict dyads). Fearon’s two dyads include government contestation with the ‘NRA, etc.’ and the 
‘LRA, West Nile, etc.’  
475 Description of this va
authors. 
476 In the 
or ‘not known’. I recoded this variable into a binary indicator of support.  
477 From my correspondence with Kristian Gleditsch, one of the authors of
478 About 5% of armed groups had diplomatic support, and only 3% had the actual funding.  
479 Since I am making this assumption, I will be careful in interpreting the results of my test f
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 support’.480 Among insurgencies in my sample, 45 (or 47%) had no support from other governments, and 
51 (or 53%) received some third state assistance.481  
It is worth noting that the literature on natural resources and conflict has identified the link between 
the presence of oil and other mineral commodities in a country and foreign states’ support to its civil 
wars.482 This is “because mineral wealth either increases the benefits of intervention (e.g. the Liberian 
lead
sating their fighters from all the material 
reso
y argument because 
ofte
distinct from other civil wars with competing agendas, as “for any given rule, there are ambiguous or 
                                                
er Charles Taylor’s 1991 support for the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone) or reduces its 
cost (e.g. the Rwandan government’s ‘self-financing’ incursion into the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
1998).”483 However, in my sample, the correlation coefficient between the variables of natural resource 
access and the third state support was found to be low (0.172). 
In the case study analyses I go beyond examination of the three major sources of rebel funding and 
review other potential ways of financing military movements. What the case study analysis also allows 
me to do is to specify how exactly armed groups were compen
urces they had access to, if at all. In collecting these data I rely on the information from the surveys of 
other scholars and my own, as well as ethnographic studies on the Liberian conflict.  
Extreme Insecurity. How to measure whether an armed struggle in a country involved ethnic 
persecution or not? Many armed conflict datasets offer a variable of conflict type where one of the 
categories is ‘ethnic war’.484 However, I could not utilize the existing data to test m
n intrastate wars with ethnic persecution present were not coded as ‘ethnic war’ in those datasets. This 
happens for several methodological reasons. First, the definition of ‘ethnic conflict’ in the existing 
datasets presupposes a criterion of militarized organization of factions based on ethnicity. For example, 
Fearon defines as ‘ethnic’ all civil wars “in which the fighting was in the name of or carried out primarily 
by groups organized along ethnic lines.”485 Meanwhile, conflicts with ethnic persecution do not 
necessarily face a militarization of the victimized group.  
The second concern about the existing data is related to the haziness in coding ethnic civil wars as 
 
f troops 
hat Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?” p. 344. 
esources, third states assist other 
 
 the world James Fearon codes for ‘ethnic wars’ (Fearon, “Why 
8. 
480 In the original NSA Dataset this variable had four categories: ‘no support’, ‘alleged/widely acknowledged 
support’, ‘explicit/formal support’, and ‘not known’. I recoded this variable into a binary indicator.  
481 Eight out of the 51 groups with foreign state support in my sample had this assistance in the form o
provision. 
482 Ross, “W
483 Ibid., p. 344. For the same reasons of profiting from the beneficiary’s natural r
governments, rather than rebels. For example, see how the regimes of Zimbabwe and Angola “helped themselves to
the Congo’s considerable diamond wealth” while assisting Kabila in stabilizing Congo (Byman et. al., Trends in 
Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, p. 19). 
484 For instance, in his list of 128 civil wars around
Do Some Civil Wars Last Much Longer than Others?”). The NSA Project also marks ‘ethnic war’ as one of the 
categories of conflict type (Cunningham and Gleditsch, “The NSA Project”). 
485 Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last Much Longer than Others?” p. 28
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 hard-to-code cases (e.g. the wars in Guatemala, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone).”486 It must be for this 
reason that the Liberian conflict dyads of the Doe government with the NPFL and the ULIMO-J/K are all 
cod
r published 
sou
n facilitated the insecurity of children to the 
exte
groups’ territorial control within the country, taken as such from the NSA Dataset. The index takes the 
ed as ‘civil war’, not ‘ethnic conflict’, in the NSA Dataset.487 While it is true that all Liberian factions 
had a goal of overthrowing the existing government or each other, they also engaged in the extensive 
ethnic persecution of the ‘enemy’ tribes – a practice not captured in the existing datasets.488   
Facing these two important limitations of the existing data on ethnic conflict, for my large-N analysis 
I compiled the dummy variable of ethnic persecution myself. Regardless of the conflict type measure in 
other datasets (civil war, secessionist, or ethnic), for each conflict dyad in my sample I recorded instances 
of ethnic persecution in the country during that time reported in the media or any othe
rces.489 In other words, for each armed group in my sample this variable indicates whether the dyad’s 
armed faction participated in the conflict that involved the purposeful killing of people from certain ethnic 
group(s) in the society by any party to the conflict, be it government or various rebel forces. Thus, 78 
insurgent groups in my sample (or 70%) were operating in the environments free of deliberate ethnic 
killing, whereas 34 armed groups (or 30%) participated in conflicts with an ethnic persecution 
component. For comparison note that only 19 conflict dyads (or 18%) in my sample were coded as ‘ethnic 
war’ according to the definition used in the NSA Dataset.  
Since all five Liberian factions in my case study were operating in the same conflict, there is no 
difference in the cross-country levels of the variable of ethnic persecution. However, the qualitative 
research design allows me to disaggregate this variable and examine in detail which ethnic tribes were 
particularly endangered and whether such a dire situatio
nt that the latter would seek protection by joining armed groups. In addition, I examine the geography 
of armed groups’ military operations and determine if victimized tribes had access to them or, 
alternatively, if groups accessed the endangered populations. 
Territorial Access. To measure the territorial access of rebel groups for my large-N sample, I create a 
cumulative indicator that sums up the values of two indices. The first index is a binary measure of armed 
                                                 
486 Ibid., p. 287. 
487 Cunningham and Gleditsch, “The NSA Project.” 
488 Cunningham and Gleditsch pointed at this specific nature of the conflict type variable by admitting that this 
variable “is not based on a mutually exclusive typology” and allowing a conflict dyad to be coded with multiple 
categories representing different conflict types. At the same time, Liberian conflict, like some others in their 
database, were not assigned the value of ‘ethnic war’ when other agendas were seemingly more prevalent during the 
armed struggle (Cunningham and Gleditsch, “The NSA Project Codebook,” p. 2). 
489 To code the variable of ethnic persecution I used he following secondary sources, among others: 1) The 
Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project Database (University of Maryland, Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management); 2) African Studies Center Database, University of Pennsylvania; 3) Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program, UCDP Database, Uppsala University; 4) African News Bulletin (ANB-BIA) Database.  
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 values of 0 and 1 to represent the absence or presence of territory under rebels’ control.490 64 (or 68%) of 
observations in my sample had no territorial control in a country and 30 (or 32%) did have control over 
som
r rebel control lead to easier access to 
peo
 record the degree of people’s ideational support for an 
 the movements. By definition, the assessment of the 
                                                
e territory. To the index of internal territorial control within country’s borders I add values of the 
presence abroad index which reflects if armed groups had access to neighboring countries. The latter 
index is intended to capture the effect of refugee militarization and mobilization mentioned above. The 
data for this index were also taken from the NSA Dataset and recoded to have two values of 0 and 1 to 
describe whether armed groups have established presence in other states.491 There were altogether 39 
groups (or 41%) without presence abroad, and 55 (or 58%) with some or extensive incidence in other 
states. The ultimate values of the cumulative variable of territorial access were distributed as follows: 24 
rebel groups (or 26%) had no territory under their control (the value of 0), 50 (or 55%) had some 
territorial presence either at home or abroad (the value of 1), and 17 insurgent organizations (or 19%) 
established themselves both at home and abroad (the value of 2). 
My case study analysis uses a more specific measure of the territorial access. I first look at the actual 
number of counties that each armed group captured from the opponent at different stages of war and also 
evaluate if rebels had established their presence in the refugee camps abroad. By further analyzing the 
demographic situation in the counties within Liberia, as well as in the refugee camps outside its borders, I 
then attempt to avoid the assumption that larger territories unde
ple by insurgents. Thus, in my case study analysis, I put an emphasis on determining what the actual 
pool of available populations was for recruitment in the territories under the groups’ control. To test the 
logic of the territorial argument in the case study analysis I therefore look at both – accessibility of 
territories and availability of manpower there.  
Conditioning Variable of Group Popularity 
The data to measure the mobilization capacity variable were taken from the NSA Dataset described 
above that coded the levels of mobilization capacity of different insurgencies. The NSA Dataset recorded 
what outside observers assessed or believed a movements’ capacity to mobilize popular support was. The 
intent of the coders of the NSA dataset was to
armed group, mostly at the initial stages of
 
490 Initially, the NSA Dataset had this variable as categorical, with the third category besides 0 and 1 being ‘unclear’. 
I substituted the ‘unclear’ observations (3 out of 97) in my sample with ‘missing values’. To assess this variable, the 
Cunningham and Gleditsch’ project “used historical sources and case histories to look for evidence that an insurgent 
group controlled territory in the country in civil war” (Cunningham and Gleditsch, “The NSA Project Codebook,” p. 
7). 
491 The original NSA Dataset had four values of ‘no presence’, ‘alleged/widely acknowledged presence’, 
‘explicit/known presence’, and ‘not known’. I merged the two categories of ‘alleged/widely acknowledged presence’ 
and ‘explicit/known presence’ into one category of 1 (present). The two values of ‘not known’ were coded as 
missing ones. 
119 
 pop
d struggle, such an 
asse
as rated as having ‘low’ 
mob
ularity that represents potential numbers for recruitment on ideological motives does not consider the 
actual recruitment, be it forced conscription or recruitment for pecuniary incentives.  
After examining the codebooks of the NSA project for the variable of mobilization capacity, I found 
an overwhelming consistency of the coding procedures with the initial intent of the NSA project leaders. 
Thus, the following features prevailed in the notes of coders: 1) when popularity of a group was 
established, in the majority of cases it was recorded for early stages of the conflict; 2) in a small amount 
of cases where popularity of the movement was recorded at the end of the arme
ssment was made on the basis of people’s election preferences; 3) for armed groups with low 
mobilization capacity the coders reported no instances of popular support at any stage of the conflict; 4) 
for ethnic movements with low mobilization capacity the popularity was often assessed on the basis of the 
size of the ethnic group in question. All these features suggest no obvious methodological problems with 
this measurement of the mobilization capacity and it can be used in my analysis. 
Rebel groups differ in their ability to mobilize popular support. The following examples demonstrate 
such a variation as well as shed more light on the creation of the mobilization capacity variable. The 
Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) was coded in the NSA Dataset as having high mobilization capacity 
“because it was fighting for greater autonomy for Albanians in Serbia and was based in a region that was 
90% Albanian.”492 By contrast, the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) in Ethiopia w
ilization capacity because the Afar people were a small minority within Ethiopia.493 The variable of 
mobilization capacity in the NSA Dataset does not only capture ethnic grievances, but also “measures 
variation in, for example, the ability of guerrilla organizations to mobilize popular support against the 
government.”494 Variation in groups’ mobilization capacity is reflected in my ultimate African 
insurgencies’ sample, where out of 94 armed groups for which the data were available, 52 (or 55%) had 
‘low’ mobilization capacity, whereas 42 (45%) had ‘high’. The NSA’s categories of ‘low’, ‘moderate’ 
and ‘high’ mobilization capacity I recoded in my sample with two categories of ‘low’ and ‘high’.495 
 In the case study analyses I use a slightly more nuanced ordinal measure of popularity that takes the 
values of ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’, unlike the binary index coded for the large-N study.496 In my 
                                                 
492 Cunningham and Gleditsch, “The NSA Project,” p. 6. 
493 Ibid., p. 6. 
494 Ibid., p. 6. Conceptual clarification of this variable comes from my correspondence (from January 3, 2009) with 
Kristian Gleditsch, one of the founders of the NSA Project. 
495 The variable’s initial values of ‘low’, ‘moderate’ and ‘high’ I recoded into ‘low’ and ‘high’ in my sample, where 
 was assigned to both categories of ‘moderate’ and ‘high’ 
data due to a very small number of observations in the latter category. Out of 94 observations for 
d 
‘low’ was taken as such from the NSA Dataset, and ‘high’
of the original 
which the values on the mobilization capacity variable were recorded in my sample, there were only five with the 
original value ‘high’ from the initial dataset. 
496 Albeit minor on the first sight, this more nuanced categorization can actually account for more variation in the 
analysis. For example, the mobilization capacity of the NPFL group is defined as ‘medium’ in my large-N dataset, 
whereas the ULIMO-J and the INPFL both had ‘low’ ability to mobilize their members. However, a more detaile
120 
 qua
y large-N sample the hypothesis about effects of poverty on the 
 supply of children for armed groups, I construct a continuous measure of poverty by 
assi
ot exhibit any regional variation. Thus, poverty in 
Lib
Time of Conflict. In the large-N sample I measure the timing of conflict by introducing a binary index 
e 
   
litative assessment of the ability of the Liberian groups to mobilize personnel, I evaluate two 
prominent types of ideological support and mobilization – ethnic and revolutionary. Ethnic mobilization 
in the Liberian context was occurring when the leaders of some armed groups appealed to ethnic 
differences in the population and played the ethnic card in the rally for supporters. Revolutionary 
mobilization was characterized by some factional leaders’ call for political change, followed by the rise of 
‘revolutionary spirit’ in some parts of the country. By using ethnographic works on the Liberian conflict, I 
evaluate both mobilization strategies of insurgents as well as popular attitudes towards the factions and 
the scope of supportive responses. 
Control Variables 
Poverty. In order to test on m
voluntary and forced
gning to each government-insurgency dyad the country-level poverty value. I take a logarithm of 
average real GDP per capita in constant prices (chain series) taken from Penn World Tables for all the 
years of conflict in each dyad.497 Because wealth in general deteriorates during the conflict, I take the 
average of poverty levels during the conflict, as opposed to looking at pre-war or post-war values. The 
log-poverty in my sample varies from 5.14 to 8.93.498  
In my case study of the five Liberian armed groups country poverty levels are equivalent. This does 
not mean, however, that wealth and deprivation did n
eria “has predominantly been a rural and peri-urban phenomenon, having its roots in policy and 
institutional failure due to corruption, cronyism and mismanagement, which caused over 85% of 
Liberians to have no access to basic healthcare, sanitation, safe drinking water, and hygiene...”499 
Conducting a focused comparison of five armed groups within one country provides me with the 
opportunity to construct alternative regional level measures of poverty for testing its explanatory power 
behind child soldier recruitment.500  
of conflict ending before 1997, which indicates if a conflict terminated prior to 1997. I chose 1997 as th
                                                                                                                                                    
 
World 
39. 
analysis of case studies revealed that mobilization capacity of the ULIMO-J and the INPFL, in fact, was different. 
While mobilization of both groups was lower than the one in the NPFL – the fact accounted for in the cross-groups 
sample – it also varied between the two groups, with the ULIMO-J having a higher score. The latter feature, 
meanwhile, is not accounted for in a more generalized categorization of a large-N dataset, but was captured in the 
case study analysis, which allowed to perform a more informed comparison of Liberian armed groups.  
497 The data on real GDP per capita in constant prices (chain series) are provided in the World Penn Tables and has
units of 1$ in 2000 constant prices. For more description of this measurement and data refer to the Penn 
Tables’ Appendix at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/Documentation/append61.pdf, p. 11. 
498 The variance of poverty levels across different conflict dyads of the same country exhibits the maximum of 1.
499 Nyepon, “Liberia: The Nucleus to Reducing Poverty.” 
500 Regional poverty within Liberia was assessed by using the pre-war data of Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS). 
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 benchmark year because it represents the mean of conflict ending years among the groups in my sample. I 
utilize the year of conflict termination, as opposed to conflict onset, because the former allows accounting 
for 
r length of fighting. The five Liberian armed groups in my case study did not 
exh
intensity index, I took 
the 
 
                                           
conflicts that started a long time ago but persisted all the way until the present. The data indicating 
when the dyadic conflict between an insurgent group and its major opponent ended were taken from the 
NSA Dataset.501 54 armed groups in my sample (or 48%) ceased their military activities prior to 1997, 
whereas 58 (or 52%) continued or initiated armed struggle after that year. In my case study, time of 
conflict is automatically controlled for as all five Liberian factions were operating in the same time span 
between 1989 and 1996.   
Conflict Duration. The variable of conflict duration is measured in the number of years for which a 
conflict dyad between a certain armed group and the government existed. This measure was taken from 
the NSA Dataset. Conflict duration in my sample varied from several months to 21 years, with the data 
skewed towards the shorte
ibit much variation in their longevity, surviving for two to six years altogether.  
Conflict Intensity. For my large-N sample I compiled a binary measure of conflict intensity using the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.502 Conflict intensity variable in this dataset is coded with two 
categories: 1 – for minor intensity reflected in 25 to 999 battle-related deaths in a given year; and 2 – for 
wars with “at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.”503 To construct the 
average of the yearly conflict intensity measures from UCDP/PRIO, dividing the sum of yearly 
conflict intensities by the number of conflict years. The conflict intensity variable in my sample takes 
values between zero and one, with the mean being 0.34. In my case study analysis, I measure conflict 
intensity for five armed groups in a slightly different way. There I employ data from the Armed Conflict 
Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) that records instances of rebel participation in battles.504 I compare 
Liberian factions across their rate of battle participation averaged by the number of years they existed.  
 
 
 
 
 
      
501 To code this variable, Cunningham and Gleditsch’ project used the data from the Uppsala Dataset and Gates and 
Strand (2005), as well as case histories (Cunningham and Gleditsch, “The NSA Project Codebook,” p. 8). 
502 Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand, “Armed 
Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 39(5), pp. 615–637, 2002.   
503 “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2008,” 
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/1664678440/Codebook.pdf, p. 7.  
504 Raleigh and Hegre, “Introducing ACLED,” 2005. 
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 Section 3. Large-N Analysis 
Multiple Logistic Regression. To assess how well my independent variables predict the occurrence of 
the binary dependent variable of child recruitment I use the multiple logistic regression. The base model I 
estimate is specified below:505 
    
Multiple Logistic Regression wi rgument, however, goes beyond 
exp
 pacity and territorial access) on the dummy dependent variable of child 
ruitment at various levels of the conditioning variable of mobilization capacity. S
that
m
ti  models has the following 
form:510  
                                                
εββββββββ ++++++++= 97)( 76543210* EndPovTerrMatEthFightMobcsp                      (Model 1)
th Interaction Terms. My a
loring the relationships between additive explanatory variables and child soldering.506 More 
specifically, I need to estimate the effect of several independent variables (namely fighting capacity, 
ethnic persecution, material ca
rec ince I hypothesize 
 a group’s fighting capacity, territorial access and material capacity should have larger impact on 
child soldier recruitment if the group is unpopular, I need to estimate and compare the effects of these 
three independent variables on the dependent variable at low levels of mobilization capacity. Similarly, I 
need to analyze if ethnic persecution has more significant proposed effect on child soldier recruitment 
when mobilization capacity is high.  
The proper way of estimating the effects of one variable on another at various levels of a third 
variable is to include the interaction term into a regression.507 My second model therefore contains several 
interaction terms and the equation I am estimating is formulated as follows:508 
ββ
ββββββββ
+×+
×+×++++++=
MMatMob
EthMobFightMobTerrMatEthFightMobcsp
98
76543210
*)(
εββββ +++++× IntDurEndPovTerrob 13121110 97
 
 
As an attempt to address a potential multicollinearity proble  in Model 2, I also run its variants with only 
one interaction term at a time.509 A common specification of these alterna ve
                    (Model 2)
 
505 In the equation Mob stands for the variable of mobilization capacity, Fight for fighting capac
persecution, Mat for material capacity, Terr for territorial access, Pov for poverty, End97 for conflict ending prior 
 – that is, the effect of these independent variables on the dependent variable is constant regardless of the 
unction of z” and thus represents 
action when controlled 
ed 
ity, Eth for ethnic 
to 1997.   
506 In a regression [that is linear in parameters] the relationship between two independent variables can be described 
as additive
value of each other (Cindy Kam and Franzese, Robert, Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in 
Regression Analysis, The University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2007, p. 20). 
507 While “the simple linear-additive multiple-regression model estimates a single, constant effect of x on y, 
controlling for z,” “the linear-interactive model estimates the effect of x on y as a f
the technique that fits my theoretical modeling (Kam and Franzese, Modeling and Interpreting Interactive 
Hypotheses in Regression Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), p. 20). 
508 In this equation Dur stands for control variable of conflict duration, and Int for conflict intensity. 
509 On the one hand, this model type does not contain the information on the effect of the inter
for all others proposed in the explanatory framework. On the other hand, exclusion of all but one propos
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In addition, I also estimate all of the above models without the interactions’ constitutive variable of 
mobilizati
                    (Model 3)
on capacity. The literature on interactions is divided in terms of advisability of inclusion of 
individual constitutive variables of interaction terms into the model.511 While some texts in statistics on 
teraction terms advocate for inclusion of the constitutive variable, even if it 
sign
le of all armed groups, is in avoiding 
potential multicollinearity in the full interactive model. A disadvantage of the sample splitting approach, 
            
in does not turn out 
ificant, others suggest that its inclusion should be strictly motivated by theory since there is no 
statistical reason to include it into the model.512 My explanatory framework does not offer any theoretical 
support for inclusion of the variable of mobilization capacity on its own into the model, as there is no 
reason to expect that mobilization capacity in itself should have effect on child soldering. Also, as I show 
below in the empirical chapter, the constituent term of mobilization capacity exhibits very high 
collinearity with its interaction terms as it enters them multiplicatively, and its inclusion would 
complicate inference on the remaining coefficients of interest.513  
Split Samples. As yet another check of the presence of interactive relationships in my argument, I run 
again logistic regression estimation of Model 1, but this time on the two split sub-samples of popular and 
unpopular armed groups. The biggest advantage of splitting the sample into popular and unpopular 
insurgencies, instead of estimating interaction terms on the samp
                                                                                                                                           
interactions allows seeing if the effect of the interaction term in question does not lose its significance, suggesting 
that it was not mistakenly appearing in the full model due to potential multicollinearity problem. Even though in my 
base model the independent variables are not correlated among themselves (as the correlation matrix in Table 4 of 
Chapter 5 demonstrates), some correlations occur between interaction terms and their constituent variables (the base 
variables out of which the product of interaction term is composed), as well as among interaction terms themselves. 
This is not surprising as including an interaction (which is a product term) in a general linear model often “can 
drastically increase the level of collinearity” (Regina Branton, “Statistical Interaction in Multiple Regression,” On-
line Manual, http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~branton/interaction/faqfund.htm). This effect of multicollinearity in 
interactive models arises because the product term of an interaction “is an exact nonlinear function of the constituent 
variables” and, therefore, “correlations of the constituent variables with the product term are usually high” (Branton, 
“Statistical Interaction in Multiple Regression”). This is exactly what is happening in my model. In Chapter 5 on the 
empirical results I also compare VIF and tolerance (1/VIF) statistics across the models. 
510 Var in this equation stands for any of the four variables of fighting capacity (Fight), ethnic persecution (Eth), 
material capacity (Mat), and territorial access (Terr). 
511 Constitutive variable refers to either of the two variables in the interaction term. For example, in the interaction 
term Mob*Terr one constitutive variable is mobilization capacity (Mob) and another one is territorial access (Terr).  
512 For the view advocating for inclusion of the constitutive variable into a regression analysis see Thomas Brambor, 
William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses,” Political 
Analysis 2006 14(1), pp. 63-82. These authors provide an overview of the mathematical effect from excluding 
constituent variables from the regression. For the opposite opinion refer to Kam and Franzese, Modeling and 
Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis, pp. 99-102. More specifically, they state: “While the 
rule of including x and z if including xz may be quite reasonable […] and is often practically advisable, it is neither 
logically not statistically strictly necessary” (p. 99).  
513 For a discussion on this multicollinearity issue please refer to Chapter 5 on the empirical results and previous 
footnote 250. 
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 however, is in its inability to “determine whether any differences in estimated effects across sub-samples 
are statistically significant.”514 In addition, split samples contain fewer observations and thus might 
potentially reduce the explanatory power of the model.515 
β-coefficients. In the presence of an interaction the influence of a constituent variable enters through 
more than one independent variable in the regression – first the constituent variable itself and second the 
interactive term. Thus, theβ -coefficient of the constitutive variable does not represent “a constant effect 
of the independent variable on the dependent variable.”516 At the same time, the β-coefficient on the 
interaction term and its p-value do tell us whether the constituent variable interacts with the term 
sign
o
ictors in my model.517 Since the β-
coe
                                                
ificantly and what the size of the partial effect of this interaction is. In other words, the β-coefficients 
of constituent variables and their p-values inform us about the size and significance of the partial effects 
of these variables on child s ldiering at zero value of mobilization capacity, when controlling for all other 
variables and their interactions. Despite the somewhat limited use of β-coefficients in interpreting 
multiple logistic regressions with interactive effects, generating and reporting β-coefficients is still 
important as it helps assess whether my proposed theoretical model is significant, whether my predictors 
are meaningful, and whether proposed interactive relationships exist.  
Marginal Effects. Because in a nonlinear model such as the logistic regression, the β-coefficients do 
not have the same interpretation as in the linear regression model (see the Technical Appendix for further 
details), one cannot use them to interpret the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable. 
Therefore, in order to offer the numerical assessment of the effect of my independent variables on the 
dependent variable I calculate and present the marginal effects of pred
fficients and the marginal effects represent two different quantities, and are calculated in a different 
way, their pattern of significance may differ. Thus, for example, one can obtain a statistically insignificant 
β-coefficient on a certain variable, while the marginal effect of that variable may in fact not be 
statistically significant. 
 
514 In other words, by splitting the sample we may not “as easily determine the (conditional) effects of the variable 
being treated as the moderating variable as one can in the pooling strategy” (Kam and Franzese, Modeling and 
e me 
is. Therefore, I focus on the full-sample 
 
Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis, p. 104). 
515 These important disadvantages, especially the first one, of the sample splitting in regression analysis preclud
from using such approach as the main method in my statistical analys
approach and reserve the sub-sample estimation for sensitivity and robustness checks of the main model. Such 
strategy was also recommended in the Kam and Franzese, Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in
Regression Analysis, p. 105. 
516 Regina Branton, “Statistical Interaction in Multiple Regression.” Thus, the value of 5β , for example, for the 
ritorial access in Model 1 ter represents only a part of the effect of territorial access on pendent variable of 
ild soldiering, when mobilization capacity equals zero. The remaining part of the eff  (when mobilization 
capacity equals one) acts via the interaction term. 
517 Due to the nonlinear functional form of the logistic regression, the marginal effect in a logistic regression is a 
function of several of its β-coefficients (see the Tec
 the de
ch ect
hnical Appendix for further details). 
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 In the context of my model, the marginal effect of the constituent variables on the dependent variable 
of child soldiering measures the change in the probability of child recruitment resulting from the increase 
of the variable of interest from its low to high value for a representative armed group.518 To calculate 
marginal effects, I take the difference between the probability of child soldiering evaluated at two 
different levels of the variable of interest while keeping other explanatory variables constant at their 
means.519 The following formula is used to calculate marginal effects (ME): 
)|()|()( minmax kkkkk xxcspxxcspxME =−==  
where 
*)...exp(1
*)...exp(
*)|(
11110
11110
xxx
xxxxxcsp
kk
kkk
k ββββ k
ββββ
+++++
++++==
−−
−−  
with x* taking the values of 0 and 1 for dummy variables and min and max for categorical and continuous 
variables. The calculated number represents the change in the probability o child soldiering resulting 
e increase of the variable of interest from its low value to high.520  
Section 4. Case Studies Analysis 
To perform a qualitative test of my argument I utilize three different case study methods – a focused 
tion of my argument on the five 
Liberian armed groups that took pa of 1989-1996. More specifically, I 
per
f 
from th
structured cross-case comparison, a within-case study, and two plausibility probes. I outline all three 
approaches below. 
Cross-case comparison. My first case study analysis involves explora
rt in the country’s first Civil War 
form a structured focused comparison of these five factions. It is focused because “it deals selectively 
with only certain aspects of historical case” and structured because it employs “standardized, general 
                                                 
518 This holds irrespective whether the β-coefficients are stated in their level values or as odds ratios. However, the 
β-coefficients serve as the input into calculating the marginal effects of independent variables in the logistic 
regression with interaction terms. 
519 Unlike in the multiple linear regression, where effects are constant, in the multiple logistic regression the formula 
for the marginal effect of an independent variable is a function of model variables. Therefore, to compute the 
marginal effect of a variable of interest, one needs to specify a value for all these variables in the marginal effects 
formula. Typically, a value that is in some sense representative of the sample is chosen. In my case I use means for 
dummy and continuous variables computed on the two samples that correspond to low and high mobilization 
capacity, because I calculate marginal effects separately for popular and unpopular groups using the β-coefficients 
from the pooled sample. Even though a mean value for dummy variables does not have a direct interpretation, this is 
not the object to be interpreted. Such value merely positions the system at its numerical averages to avoid the effects 
of extremes entering the calculation of the marginal effects on the variable of interest which changes along its 
natural scale from 0 to 1.   
520 Several β-coefficients enter into the calculation of a single marginal effect. Thus, it can happen that a marginal 
effect may not be significant even if the β-coefficients used in the calculation of that marginal effect are significant, 
as may occur for example when the relevant β-coefficients have opposite signs. 
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 que
ied to my work, in the detailed analysis of the five Liberian armed groups I first sort the factions 
into  in 
each ng 
cap  fighting capacity, material capacity 
and
                                                
stions” to collect comparable data for assessment across cases.521 To conduct a systematic analysis of 
the comparable data I then rely on the congruence method as a form of controlled comparison approach 
which is compatible with examination across cases.522 The mechanics of congruence method are outlined 
below:  
“The analyst first ascertains the value of the independent variable in the case at hand and then 
asks what prediction or expectation about the outcome of the dependent variable should follow 
from the theory. If the outcome of the case is consistent with the theory prediction, the analyst 
can entertain the possibility that a causal relationship may exist.”523  
 
Appl
 popular and unpopular movements. Then, after systematic data collection for the five factions,
 of these two categories of group types I identify the levels of the independent variables of fighti
city and ethnic persecution for popular groups, and variables ofa
 territorial access for the unpopular ones. The factions in the two categories exhibited considerable 
differences in the levels of the corresponding independent variables, which allowed making certain 
predictions about different outcomes of child soldier recruitment. I then compare the predicted values of 
the dependent variables that are driven by the values of two different sets of independent variables in 
cases of popular and unpopular groups with the existing levels of child soldier recruitment in each case of 
the five Liberian factions. Similarly to statistical tests, the primary role of the congruence method is to 
assess the explanatory power of the proposed theory.524 However, unlike the large-N analysis, the 
congruence method employed in qualitative research offers a more nuanced way of testing, verification, 
and refinement of my argument, as it operates on a more specific level of analysis with less abstract 
measures of the concepts. 
The congruence method, however, comes with the caveat that “the finding of mere consistency 
between a theory’s predictions and case outcomes may not be significant.”525 I attempt to mitigate this 
 
521 Alexander George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in 
Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, (New York: Free Press, 
1979), pp. 61-62. 
522 For conceptualization of congruence method as a form of controlled comparison approach see George and 
Bennett, Case Studies, p. 183. The compatibility of the congruence method with cross-case analysis is outlined in 
Alexander George’s earlier work: “Depending on how the congruence method is employed, then, it is compatible 
with either within-case and across-case methods of causal inference and can serve to bridge them” (Alexander 
George, “The Role of the Congruence Method for Case Study Research,” Working Paper (MacArthur Program on 
Case Studies, 1997)). 
523 George and Bennett, Case Studies, p. 181. 
 then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in 
se 
nnett, Case Studies, p. 181. 
524 “…the investigator begins with a theory and
a particular case. The theory posits a relation between variance in the independent variable and variance in the 
dependent variable; it can be deductive if takes the form of an empirical generalization” (George and Bennett, Ca
Studies, p. 181). 
525 George and Be
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 potential limitation of the method by following the advice offered in the literature.526 First, I provide in 
my explanatory framework “a plausible or convincing argument that the deductive theory … being 
emp
f the 
dep
e causal chain and causal mechanism 
– b
                                                
loyed is powerful…” and offer the large-N test to verify my propositions.527 Second, following a 
focused structured comparison of five armed groups utilizing congruence method I employ yet another 
case study research method of process-tracing for one Liberian armed faction. By making use of this 
method, I attempt to identify a causal path (the causal chain) that depicts how my independent variables 
lead to the outcome of the dependent variable.528 The method of process-tracing is described below. 
Within-case analysis. The second case study I conduct is a temporal examination of one Liberian 
insurgent group. Here I test my argument on yet another level of analysis. More specifically, I identify 
and establish the variance in the values of child soldier recruitment by the NPFL rebel group at different 
time conjunctures of yearly data. I then explore if and how the temporal changes in the outcome o
endent variable are caused by my predictors of underage recruitment. By analyzing a single country 
diachronically I therefore achieve higher comparability of cases.529  
Unlike merely testing potential presence of causal effects in large-N study, in cross-group case studies 
and to some extent in within-case temporal analysis, the method of process-tracing allows to evaluate the 
actual validity and existence of proposed or assumed causal mechanisms and paths.530 More specifically, 
this method “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – th
etween an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”531 The 
fundamental conceptual difference of process-tracing from statistical analysis or controlled comparison 
method across or within cases is its focus on “sequential processes within a particular historical case, not 
on correlation of data across cases.”532 “In process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival 
documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory 
 
526 On two suggestions of George and Bennett about how to deal with the potential problem of “unjustified, 
questionable imputation of a causal relationship on the basis of mere consistency” see George and Bennett, Case 
ds examining one particular case diachronically in order to “maximize comparability” – a 
r solution to the control problem than comparison of two or more 
ijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 
d intervening variables and implications that should be true in a case if a 
 of 
nett, 
Studies, pp. 183-184. 
527 George and Bennett, Case Studies, p. 184. 
528 Ibid., p. 183. 
529 Lijphart recommen
strategy that he claims “generally offers a bette
[cases]” (Arend L
65 (3), 1971, pp. 682–693, at p. 689, cited in George and Bennett, Case Studies, p. 166). 
530 The necessity and desirability of process-tracing have been identified in many social science methodology 
studies. For some examples refer to George and Bennett, Case Studies, p. 147 and Sidney Tarrow, “Bridging the 
Quantitative-Qualitative Divide,” p. 173. 
531 George and Bennett, Case Studies, p. 206. According to its proponents, “process-tracing is one means of 
attempting to get closer to the mechanisms of microfoundations behind observed phenomena. Process-tracing 
attempts to empirically establish the posite
particular explanation of that case is true. Theories or models of causal mechanisms must undergird each step
hypothesized causal process for that process to constitute a historical explanation of the case” (George and Ben
Case Studies, p. 147). 
532 George and Bennett, Case Studies, p. 13. 
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 the capital, I go beyond this important link between child recruitment and fighting 
cap
s of 
two
hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables 
in that case.”533  
Applied to my case study of the Liberia’s NPFL armed group, besides connecting the independent 
variables with the dependent variable of child recruitment, I attempt to trace their sequential relationship. 
For example, after establishing that spikes of child soldier recruitment occurred during the years of the 
NPFL attacks on
acity variables and try to verify whether children were recruited specifically for these battles for 
Monrovia or in the aftermath as a result of access to highly populated recruitment grounds. Similarly, I try 
to analyze if the geographic prevalence of child recruitment in Monrovia was a result of increased 
fighting severity and high demand for combat soldiers or if it was due to some other factors related to 
characteristics of the place. I base the process-tracing analysis primarily on my own survey and interview 
data, but also utilize information from the ethnographic accounts of others on the conflict in Liberia.  
Plausibility probe. After identifying in the quantitative and qualitative analysis that my argument has 
a significant explanatory power in the African context, I attempt to explore if my testable propositions can 
be generalized to all insurgencies in the world. In the absence of a readily available large-N sample with 
the necessary data on armed groups from other continents but Africa, I conduct additional case studie
 Asian and Latin American insurgencies. With the explorative research objective in mind, I perform a 
case study analysis of a plausibility probe type.534 This particular method exhibits a preliminary 
exploration of “relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and 
laborious testing is warranted.”535 In the plausibility probe, I again employ the congruence method that is 
compatible with this type of case study analysis as well.536 However, since the primary goal of this 
exercise is not a rigid theory testing or theory building but rather a weaker endeavor that alternates 
between the two, I do not perform a focused structured comparison across cases. Rather, I explore in each 
individual case whether my explanatory framework maintains its power in terms of correlation between 
preliminary values of my predicted variables and the dependent variable of child soldiering.     
                                                 
533 Ibid., p. 6. 
534 This type of case study analysis is among five or six other types designed for different objectives in theory 
building and theory testing. For the list of other commonly acknowledged types identified by Arend Lijphart and 
Harry Eckstein in the early 1970s and for another offered by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, see George 
and Bennett, Case Studies, pp. 74-75. 
535 George and Bennett, Case Studies, p. 75. 
536 Ibid., p. 182. 
 Chapter 5: Empirical Results 
In this chapter I first present in Section 1 the results of logistic regressions which I ran for the base 
model of child soldier recruitment (Model 1 specification in Chapter 4 on methodology) for the sample of 
112 African armed groups. I estimated different versions of my model with three alternative measures of 
the material capacity variable. I evaluate how well the empirical results from my large-N analysis support 
my four explanatory factors specified in Hypotheses 1-4. I then estimate the extended model variants with 
interaction terms (Models 2 and 3 specifications in Chapter 4 on methodology). I compare the outcomes 
of the different specifications of the base and the extended models and show how they confirm the 
desirability of including interaction terms, as proposed in my extended explanatory framework.  
I examine the findings from my analysis of the extended models in order to determine whether the 
predictor variables have different explanatory power in the case of popular and unpopular insurgencies. In 
evaluating the results of logistic regressions I interpret both β-coefficients and the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables. I also compare the outcomes of logistic regressions with interaction terms on the 
full sample of all 112 African armed groups with those without interaction terms on the two split samples 
of popular and unpopular military organizations.  
In Section 2, I offer a discussion of results where I comment on the factors that did not behave exactly 
as predicted in my explanatory framework. In Section 3, I further elaborate on the degree of the potential 
endogeneity problem caused by reverse causality and omitted variables. I show the preventative measures 
I undertook to mitigate this risk. I conclude this chapter with a summary of findings. 
Section 1. Models Specification and Results  
Table 5. Summary Statistics for all Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Proposed Factors:      
Child Soldiering 111 0.441 0.498 0 1 
Mobilization Capacity 94 0.446 0.499 0 1 
Fighting Capacity 97 0.443 0.499 0 1 
Material Capacity      
Index 112 1.330 0.894 0 3 
Diaspora Money 95 0.347 0.478 0 1 
Third State Support 96 0.53 0.501 0 1 
Natural Resources Control 112 0.580 0.495 0 1 
Ethnic Persecution 112 0.303 0.461 0 1 
Territorial Access 91 0.923 0.670 0 2 
Control Variables:      
Poverty 102 6.923 0.718 5.139 8.934 
EndBefore1997 112 0.482 0.501 0 1 
Conflict Duration 111 5.045 5.167 0 21 
Conflict Intensity 87 1.341 0.398 1 2 
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e Model 
Specification. The summary statistics for all variables used in my empirical analyses are presented in 
Table 5. Table 6 contains results of the logistic regressions on Models 1-4. These models were designed 
to test my four explanatory factors, as well as control variables, without distinguishing between the two 
different types of popular and unpopular insurgencies. As can be seen from Table 6, Models 1-4 do not 
show any obvious signs of misspecification: the predicted values squared (_hatsq) of the linktest in 
STATA are not significant.537 This is not surprising as almost all predictors from my argument, except 
material capacity, score significantly. Models 1-4 fit the data well with the log likelihood chi-sq
wing that the models are overall statistically significant, with both Pearson’s and Hosmer and 
Lemeshow’s goodness of fit statistics being insignificant.538 The Pseudo R2 values are relatively high, 
which also suggests a good model fit.  
Results. Overall, results from Models 1-4 confirm all but one (Hypothesis 2) of my Hypotheses 1, 3, 
and 4. Thus, rebels’ fighting capacity, ethnic persecution in a conflict, as well as insurgents’ territorial 
access and control all positively affect the probab
able of material capacity proved to be insignificant, suggesting no support for my argument about 
rebels’ propensity to refrain from child recruitment if they can compensate otherwise unwilling adults to 
join the ranks of insurgency. Nonetheless, in Models 1.1, 1.2 and 2 the coefficients, albeit insignificant, 
have a negative sign as postulated.  
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 Table 6. Logistic Regressions of Child Recruitment without Interaction Terms 
 1.1 1.2 2 3 4 
 2.010*** 1.608*** 1.635** 1.744*** 1.564** Fighting Capacity
 
 
   1.754 
 
Eth
.57) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.51) 
710 0.465 0.439 0.442 0.419 
 
En
0.484     
[0.05; 4.43]     
Cons 1.204 3.418 3.724 3.845 3.914 
 (4.09) (3.41) (3.39) (3.52) (3.55 
N 70 83 80 83 83 
     (0.73) (0.61) (0.66) (0.63) (0.61) 
7.463 4.993 5.129 5.720 4.778 
 [1.78; 31.21] [1.51; 16.50] [1.41; 18.70] [1.66; 19.66] [1.45; 15.79] 
Material Capacity               Index -0.071 -0.038    
 (0.46) (0.39)    
 0.931 0.963    
 [1.38; 2.29] [0.45; 2.07]    
Diaspora Money   0.307   
   (0.69)   
   1.359   
   [0.35; 5.26]   
Third State Support    -1.102  
    (0.74)  
    0.332  
    [0.08; 1.42]  
Natural Resource Access      0.562 
     (0.61) 
  
    [0.53; 5.80]  
nic Persecution 2.005** 1.571** 1.333* 1.887*** 1.509** 
 (0.86) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (0.66) 
 7.426 4.811 3.792 6.600 4.522 
 [1.38; 40.07] [1.20; 19.35] [0.94; 15.25] [1.64; 26.54] [1.24; 16.49] 
Territorial Access 1.965** 1.618*** 1.530*** 2.105*** 1.472*** 
 (0.83) (0.58) (0.50) (0.65) (0.53) 
 7.135 5.043 4.618 8.207 4.358 
 [1.40; 36.30] [1.62; 15.72] [1.73; 12.30] [2.30; 29.34] [1.54; 12.31] 
Controls:      
Poverty (log) -0.343 -0.765 -0.824* -0.816 -0.869* 
 (0
 0.
[0.23; 2.17] [0.18; 1.22] [0.17; 1.15] [0.17; 1.18] [0.15; 1.14] 
d Before 1997 -2.286*** -2.036*** -1.937*** -2.453*** -1.92*** 
 (0.83) (0.70) (0.66) (0.77) (0.67) 
 0.102 0.131 0.144 0.086 0.147 
 [0.02; 0.52] [0.03; 0.51] [0.04; 0.53] [0.02; 0.39] [0.04; 0.55] 
Conflict Duration -0.049     
 (0.08)     
 0.952     
 [0.81; 1.11]     
Conflict Intensity -0.726     
 (1.13)     
 
 
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.35 
_hatsq in linktest 0.862 0.892 0.930 0.844 0.877 
Log likelh (Prob>chi2=0) -30 -37 -36 -37 
Goodness-of-fit test, p-value      
Hosmer-Lemeshow  0.012 0.613 0.086 0.565 0.736 
Pearson  0.735 0.498 0.463 0.573 0.553 
-37 
Max VIF 1.80 1.90 1.41 1.66 1.36 
Min tolerance (1/VIF) 0.91 0.53 0.71 0.61 0.74 
AIC 78.89 88.56 87.73 86.18 87.72 
Note: Logistic regression coefficients are marked with * when significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and below are odds ratios and their 95% confidence intervals (in square brackets). 
132 
 Models with I
. Table 7 summ e results of logistic ons for 5-8, wh ude 
all interactions proposed in m ed expl  frame nd whic different tive 
mea a . T ffe good support for m s, 
w th some degree of variation. Th  variable y argument are significant in most of the models, 
suggesting that the predictors included into m ecificat n are meaningful. Almost none of the 
control variables in Mode ignificantly nd hence I ded two of them – conflict duration 
and conflict intensity – from the equations, as my th oretical did not offer a strong justification 
for their inclusion in the first place. Elimination of ese two cont l variables e analysis increased 
the number of observations from 69 to 80 and hence reduced t tio of explanatory 
variable  Results from Model 5.2 demonstrate that the exclusion of insignificant 
controls of conflict duration and ict intensity does not change the sign icance patte  key 
v lds virtually eq  good fit for 539 6-8 in re 
variants of Model 5.2 with altern measure aterial c y variabl ilarly to Model 5.2, 
insignificant controls were als fro -8  the nts o 
substantial difference in estimated parameters between the mod h and wi ontrols.540
Large coefficients and stan on en bil city .2 
suggest that this term might lticollin ith its tive var as it enters them 
m ltiplicatively.541 This is indeed confirmed by arge cor n coeffic etween m tion 
c bilization*figh  mo ethn ob teria d 
mobilization*territory (0.78). Therefore, for com n purpos so ran M *-8* as v   
                                        
nteraction Terms  
Specification arizes th regressi  Models ich incl
y extend anatory work a h use alterna
sures of the material cap city variable he results o r relatively y hypothese
i e key s in m
y model sp io
l 5.1 scored s  a  exclu
e framework 
th ro from th
 he relatively large ra
s to the sample size.
confl if rn of
ariables and yie uivalent ness of the model. Models  aTable 7 
ative s of m apacit e. Sim
o excluded m Models 6 , after I ran ir full varia and found n
els wit thout c  
dard errors  the constitu t term of mo ization capa  in Model 5
be mu ear w interac iables 
u  the l relatio ients b obiliza
apacity and mo ti ,ng (0.58) bilization* i  mc (0.53), il aization*m l an (0.80), 
pariso es I al odels 5 ersions
         
5  5.2, predicted v uared (_hat  of the linkte n STATA are t significant wi  
somewhat similar p-values of 0.591 a 3. Pseudo R in Model 5.2 lowered from Mo .1’s 0.57 to 0 3, but 
t ange could be attributed to th f the sam le size from 69 o 80. There is n  indication that Model 
5 orse than Model monly us est of mode it, Hosmer and eshow’s goo ess-of-
f and, has insignifi alues in bot  Models, but is igher in Model 5.2 (0.666 instead f 
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Interaction in Multiple Regression”). This is exactly what is happening in my model. In the results section I also 
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 Table 7. Logistic Regressions of Child Recruitment with Interaction Terms 
 
Mo
5.1 5.2 6 7 8 
bilization Capacity 6.824** 3.406* 1.326 3.339* 6.218** 
 (3.21) (2.01) (2.25) (1.92) (2.64) 
 919.656 30.144 3.766 28.191 501.699 
 [1.70; 496K] [0.59; 1.5K] [0.05; 309.82] [0.65; 1.2K] [2.84; 88K] 
Fighting Capacity 4.632*** 2.793*** 3.403** 2.815*** 3.444** 
 (1.74) (1.07) (1.35) (1.06) (1.35) 
 102.719 16.330 30.054 16.693 31.312 
 [3.39; 3.1K] [2.01; 132.98] [2.13; 423.69] [2.09; 133.30] [2.22; 441.42] 
Material Capacity          Index -0.884 -0.314    
 (1.03) (0.74)    
 0.413 0.731    
 [0.05; 3.11] [0.17; 3.12]    
               Diaspora Money   -3.173**   
   (1.50)   
   0.042   
   [0.00; 0.79]   
           Third State Support    -1.01  
    (1.12)  
    0.364  
    [0.04; 3.27]  
   Natural Resource Access      2.904** 
     (1.31) 
     18.247 
     [1.40; 237.84]  
Ethnic Persecution -0.842 0.382 0.303 0.530 -0.511 
 (1.79) (1.18) (1.44) (1.10) (1
 0.431 1.465 1.354 1.699 0
.20) 
.600 
 
[0.00; 4.35] [0.01; 2.57] [0.01; 17.44] [0.01; 3.60] [0.00; 2.01] 
 
 7.169***   
  1298.545   
 
(1.53) (1.47) (1.69) 
[0.01; 14.39] [0.15; 14.80] [0.08; 22.77] [0.20; 14.67] [0.06; 6.30] 
Territorial Access  5.912*** 3.409*** 3.946*** 3.622*** 3.485** 
 (2.10) (1.29) (1.46) (1.31) (1.57) 
 369.444 30.235 51.728 37.412 32.622 
 [6.03; 22.6K] [2.41; 378.95] [2.96; 904.70] [2.87; 487.65] [1.50; 707.83] 
Interactions:      
Mobilization*Fighting -2.782 -1.976 -0.787 -1.678 -2.712 
 (2.17) (1.49) (1.86) (1.51) (1.74) 
 0.062 0.139 0.455 0.187 0.066 
 
Mobilization*Ethnic 4.312* 2.136 0.671 2.248 3.255*
 (2.38) (1.70) (1.93) (1.62) (1.75) 
 74.590 8.466 1.956 9.469 25.920 
 [0.70; 7.9K] [0.30; 236.99] [0.04; 85.95] [0.40; 226.60] [0.84; 800.31] 
Mobilization*Material      
                 Mobilization*Index -0.331 0.010    
 1.28 (0.91)    
 0.718 1.010    
 [0.06; 8.83] [0.17; 6.01]    
      Mobilization*Diaspora  
   (2.39)   
 
   [12; 140.5K]   
           Mobilization*3rdState    -0.501  
    (1.53)  
    0.606  
    [0.03; 12.16] 
    Mobilization*Resources     -4.137** 
     (1.68) 
     0.016 
     [0.00; 0.43] 
Mobilization*Territory -4.984** -2.799** -3.175** -2.554* -2.989* 
 (2.00) (1.41) 
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  0.050 
[0.0  [0.0 97] [0.00 .84] [0.00; 1.39] [0.00; 1.38] 
-  
 
 
 
Conflict 0.835 
 (1.77) 
 2.305 
 [0.07; 4.01] 
Co -5.370 2.308 7.838 2.726 1.858 
 (7.36) (4.36) (5.43) (4.44) (4.71) 
N 69 80 77 80 80 
0.007 0.061 0.042 0.078 
 0; 0.35] 0; 0. ; 0
Controls: 
overty (log) 
     
P -0.071 -0.864 1.668** -0.936 -1.165* 
 (0.81) (0.59) (0.75) (0.60) (0.60) 
 0.931 
[  
0.421 
[  
0.189 
[0 ]
0.392 
[  
0.312 
[0 ]  
nd Before 1997 
0.19; 4.56]
-3.345** 
0.13; 1.34]
-1.694** 
.04; 0.82
-2.550** 
0.12; 1.27]
-2.003** 
.10; 1.01
-1.618* E
 (1.37) (0.84) (1.02) (0.87) (0.85) 
 0.035 
[0. 2] 
0.184 
[0. 5] 
0.078 
[0.01; 0.58] 
0.135 
[0.02; 0.74] 
0.198 
[0.04; 1.05]  
onflict Duration 
00; 0.5 04; 0.9
C
 
-0.137     
(0.11)     
0.872 
[0.70; 1.08] 
    
     
Intensity     
    
    
 7     
ns 
Pse 0.57 0.43 0.53 0.45 0.50 
ha 0.591 0.333 0.371 0.434 0.938 
og likelh (Prob>chi2=0) -20 -31 -24 -30 -27 
oodness-of-fit test, p-val 
emeshow  
Pearson  
ax VIF 
in tolerance (1/VIF) 
udo R2 
tsq in linktest _
L
G      
Hosmer-L 0.557 0.666 0.814 0.606 0.983 
0.842 0.477 0.774 0.693 0.859 
M 9.81 7.44 8.02 6.44 6.19 
M 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.16 
78 9 AIC 69.05 86.26 72.66 84.13 .13/83.9
Note: Logistic regression coefficients are marked with * when significant  ** significa ; *** sign . 
reported in paren d below a atios and th confidence intervals (in square brackets).  
at 10%; nt at 5% ificant at 1%
Standard errors are theses, an re odds r eir 95% 
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 of Models 5-8 which exclude the constitutive variable o ilization ty (Table A in the 
542 The literature on interactions is divided in terms of advisability of inclusion of individual 
constitutive variables of interaction terms.543 While some works in statistics on ction term cate 
for inclusion of the constitu e in sis, even if it does not turn out significant, others 
s inclusion sho trictly d by t ce ther statistica  to 
i clude such a variable into 544 anator cal 
s sion of the variable of mobilization capacity on its own into the analysis, as mobilization 
capacity in itself by its definitio uld have no effect on child soldering. 
 in the exploratory Models 5*-8* appears only as a cond ng 
factor for other independent variables, and thus enters the models as one of the constituent variables in the 
interaction terms only. I do include separately e regressi  other con t variable enter 
interaction terms with mobilization capacity. Even if the coefficients on these variables are insignificant, 
i tant to keep such variables in the m along with  interaction s, because their own 
e es of mobilization capacity are propo to influenc ild soldieri n my 
a
pected, Models 5*-8* (Table A in the Appendices) have lower  ower 
t han Models 5-8 in Table  terms of s icance of f  the res
5*, 7* and 8*, in line with my argument. Second, the variable of ethnic persecution in the case of popular 
armed groups gained significance in Model 7*, also offering more support to my argument. Overall, 
Models 5*-8* are relatively well specified with a good fit.  
Comparison of Models 1-4 without interaction terms (Table 6) and Models 5-8 with interaction terms 
(Table 7) suggests that the latter are indeed better specified, as proposed in my extended explanatory 
framework differentiating between popular and unpopular armed groups. Although Models 1-4 seem to fit 
the data, they do so not as well as Models 5-8. For example, in Models 1-4 both Pearson’s and Hosmer 
                                                
f mob capaci
Appendices).
 intera s advo
tive variabl to the analy
uggest that its u  sld be  m teotiva heor iny s e   is no l n reaso
n  the model.  M ply ex y work doframe es not offer any titheore
upport for inclu
n sho
Therefore, mobilization capacity itioni
 into th ons all stituen s that 
t is impor odel  their  term
ffects at certain valu sed e ch ng i
rgument. 
As ex   statisticsVIF a lnd 
olerance statistics t 7. In ignif actors ults obtained 
from Models 5*-8* exhibited two different patterns when compared to the findings from Models 5-8. 
First, the partial effect of territorial access at high mobilization rates did not score significantly in Models 
 
542 The exclusion of this variable implies that the model is restricted to a common intercept for the variables that 
interact with mobilization capacity. The theoretical reasons behind such exclusion are outlined in Chapter 4 on 
methodology.  
543 Constitutive variable refers to either of the two variables in the interaction term. For example, in the interaction 
term Mob*Terr one constitutive variable is mobilization capacity (Mob) and another one is territorial access (Terr).  
544 For the view advocating for inclusion of the constitutive variable into a regression analysis see Thomas Brambor, 
William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses,” Political 
Analysis 2006 14(1), pp. 63-82. These authors provide an overview of the mathematical effect from excluding 
constituent variables from the regression. For the opposite opinion refer to Kam and Franzese, Modeling and 
Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis, pp. 99-102. More specifically, they state: “While the 
rule of including x and z if including xz may be quite reasonable […] and is often practically advisable, it is neither 
logically not statistically strictly necessary” (p. 99).  
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 and Lemeshow’s goodness of fit p-values have lower levels than in Models 5-8. In addition, the Hosmer 
and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test in Model 2 has a significant p-value of 0.086 at 90% confidence 
level, indicating a mild fit problem. Even more obvious is the difference in the Pseudo R2 values between 
the models with and without interactions, with the latter having much lower levels, suggesting a worse 
model fit. Therefore, it can be concluded that although Models 1-4 do not suffer from serious 
misspecification problems, they perform worse in terms of fit than their alternative full Models 5-8 with 
interaction terms included. As expected, this comparison demonstrates that inclusion of interaction terms 
into the equation generates better models of prediction of child soldier recruitment practice, as my 
exte
terms (Table 7). Second, I elaborate on the significance of marginal effects of four predictors 
and
at this factor has an effect on child soldiering 
in u
However, the marginal effects of fighting capacity for popular armed groups are insignificant, pointing at 
 is 
rated by the results of regressions on the split samples: β-coefficients of fighting capacity 
nded explanatory theory postulates. Hence, differentiation between popular and unpopular armed 
groups in predicting the practice of rebel child recruitment practice is justified empirically. 
Results. Below I evaluate the extent to which empirical estimation of the models with interaction 
terms supports my extended theoretical framework which differentiates between factor effects for popular 
and unpopular armed groups. For this purpose, I examine the following three types of findings. First, I 
interpret the significance and signs of β-coefficients from logistic regressions of Models 5.2-8 with 
interaction 
 controls (Table 8). Third, I comment on the results of logistic regressions of Models 2-4 from Table 7 
when performed on two split datasets of popular and unpopular armed groups (Tables 9-11), as opposed 
to the full sample of all 112 African insurgencies. In addition to the examination of individual variables’ 
effects, I also evaluate their relative strength in explaining child soldier recruitment by comparing the 
magnitude of marginal effects in Table 8. 
In all four regressions of Models 5.2-8 (Table 7), the constitutive variable of fighting capacity turned 
out to have significant positive β-coefficients suggesting th
npopular armed groups. This finding is confirmed by positive significant marginal effects of fighting 
capacity when mobilization capacity is low (Table 8). The absence of significance of β-coefficients in the 
interaction terms and the change of their sign into negative in Models 5.2-8 (Table 7) cannot confirm a 
significant difference in the effect of fighting capacity for popular groups relative to the unpopular ones. 
the absence of any influence of fighting capacity on child soldiering for popular groups. This finding
further corrobo
for armed groups with high mobilization also turned out insignificant. All these results largely support my 
Hypothesis 1.1 that armed groups, especially unpopular ones, are more likely to recruit children if they 
operate in conflicts with intense armed struggle. 
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 Table 8. Marginal Effects of Predictor Variables 
 
 1 U 1 P 2 U 2 P 3 U 3 P 4 U 4 P 
Fighting Capacity 0.554* 0.194   0.573* 0.574* 0.553* 0.274   0.602* 0.177 
         
Material Capacity         
                             Index -0.179 -0.216       
         
Diaspora Money    -0.380* 0.726*     
         
Third State Support     -0.186 -0.344   
         
Natural Resources         0.438* -0.290 
         
Ethnic Persecution 0.078 0.520* 0.047 0.237 0.108 0.568*  -0.075   0.555* 
         
Territorial Access 0.933* 0.291   0.952* 0.366 0.945* 0.488   0.927* 0.240 
         
Controls:         
Poverty        -0.233 -0.290 -0.329* -0.531* -0.246 -0.317 -0.252 -0.339 
 -0.297 -0.500* -0.323 -0.392* 
End Before 1997 -0.338* -0.393* -0.410* -0.563* -0.392* -0.459* -0.272 -0.311 
                     -0.383* -0.509* -0.442* -0.348* 
 
Note: 1) The marginal effects are marked with * when significant at 5%. 2) Models 1-4 U refer to logistic 
regressions on the whole sample of popular and unpopular armed groups but for which marginal effects were 
calculated only for unpopular insurgencies. Similarly, marginal effects in Models 1-4 P were calculated for popular 
armed groups.  3) These marginal effects were calculated while keeping all the variables at their mean, including 
binary variables. The effects for dummy variables were estimated for the change in the relevant variable from its 
minimum to maximum value. For the continuous variable of poverty marginal effects were estimated for the change 
from one standard deviation below the mean to
continuous variables were computed on the two
 one standard deviation above the mean. Means for dummy and 
 samples that correspond to low and high mobilization capacity. 4) 
For 
unpo
poverty and conflict timing variables I also calculated their marginal effects in the sample of all popular and 
pular armed groups.  In this case, the means for dummy and continuous variables were computed on one 
sample for both popular and unpopular insurgencies. 
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 Table 9. L  Samples 
(Material Capacity Measured with Diaspora Money) 
A s np pu
ighting Capacity 1.63 ** 2.821 2.557 
ogistic Regressions of Child Recruitment on Split
 
 ll group U opular Po lar 
F 5 ** 
 (0. .34) (1.71) 
5.129 16.79  12.897 
[1.41; 8.70] [1.21; 23 15] .45; 368. ] 
Materi          (Diaspo  Mon -3.291  5.591** 
 (0. .53) (2.56) 
 1.359 0. 268.003 
 [0.35; .26] [0.00; 0. 5] .77; 40.4 ] 
Ethni 1.3 * 1.01 .72
(0. .38) (1.62) 
2 5.5
[0.94; 5.25] [0.18; 41 4] .23; 133. ] 
1  .69 .02
(0. .75) (1.27) 
4.618 108.8 0.973 
 .53 8; 1
Controls:    
-0 .32
9) ) 
 0.439 0.894 0.036 
 0.69] 
66) (1
 4
  1 2. [0 19
al Capacity                ra ey) 0.307 **
69) (1
037 
 5 7 [1 K
c Persecution 33 7 1 0 
 71) (1
 3.792 .765 85 
  1 .3 [0 65
Territorial Access .530*** 4 0*** -0 7 
 50) (1
 53 
 [1.73; 12.30] [3 ; 3.3K] [0.0 1.73] 
Poverty (log) -0.824* .112 -3 4** 
 (0.4 (1.08 (1.51) 
 [0.17; 1.15] [0.11; 7.42] [0.00;
End Before 1997 -1.937*** -2.349* -2.153 
 (0.66) (1.29) (1.92) 
 0.144 0.095 0.116 
 [0.04; 0.53] [0.01; 1.20] [0.00; 5.00] 
Cons 3.724 -3.397 20.95** 
 (3.39) (8.08) (10.60) 
N 80 47 30 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.60 0.51 
_hatsq in linktest 0.930 0.986 0.792 
Log likelh (Prob>chi2=0) -37 -12 -10 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit test, p-value 0.082 0.837 0.747 
Pearson Goodness-of-fit test, p-value  0.463 0.956 0.726 
Max VIF 1.41 1.15 2.28 
Min tolerance (1/VIF) 0.71 0.87 0.45 
AIC 87.73 38.41 33.82 
Note: Logistic regression coefficients are marked with * when significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and below are odds ratios with their 95% confidence intervals (in square brackets). 
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 Table 10. Logistic Regressions of Child Recruitment on Split Samples 
(Material Capacity Measured with Third State Support) 
 
 All groups Unpopular Popular 
Fighting Capacity 1.744*** 2.664** 0.720 
 (0.63) (1.10) (1.09) 
 5.720 14.354 2.054 
 [1.66; 19.66] [1.66; 123.97] [0.24; 17.40] 
Material Capacity                   (Third State Support) -1.102 -1.097 -1.184 
 (0.74) (1.23) (1.17) 
 0.332 0.334 0.306 
 [0.08; 1.42] [0.03; 3.72] [0.03; 3.03] 
Ethnic Persecution 1  2  .887*** 0.572 .964**
 (0.71) (1.15) (1.32) 
 6.600 1.772 19.375 
 [1.64; 26.54] [0.19; 16.88] [1.46; 257.55] 
Territorial Access 2.105*** 3.997*** 0.512 
 (0.65) (1.45) (0.97) 
 8.207 54.435 1.669 
 [2.30; 29.34] [3.17; 933.56] [0.25; 11.17] 
Controls:    
Poverty (log) -0.816 -0.3619 -1.427* 
 (0.50) (1.01) (0.80) 
 0.442 0.696 0.240 
 [0.17; 1.18] [0.10; 5.04] [0.05; 1.15] 
End Before 1997 -2.453*** -2.295** -1.205 
 (0.77) (1.27) (1.23) 
 0.086 0.101 0.300 
 [0.02; 0.39] [0.01; 1.21] [0.03; 3.34] 
Cons 3.845 -1.337 9.792 
 (3.52) (7.44) (6.02) 
N 83 49 31 
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.53 0.34 
_hatsq in linktest 0.844 0.390 0.502 
Log likelh (Prob>chi2=0) -36 -15 -14 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit test, p-value 0.565 0.741 0.541 
Pearson Goodness-of-fit test, p-value  0.573 0.659 0.407 
Max VIF 1.66 1.69 1.94 
Min tolerance (1/VIF) 0.61 0.59 0.52 
AIC 86.18 44.89 41.77 
Note: Logistic regression coefficients are marked with * when significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and below are odds ratios with their 95% confidence intervals (in square brackets). 
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 Table 11. Logistic Regressions of Child Recruitment on Split Samples 
(M ) aterial Capacity Measured with Natural Resource Access
 
 All groups Unpopular Popular 
Fighting Capacity 1.564** 3.260** 0.519 
 (0.61) (1.35) (1.07) 
 4.778 26.050 1.680 
 [1.45; 15.79] [1.85; 367.23] [0.21; 13.68] 
Material Capacity           (Natural Resource Access) 0.562 2.763** -1.128 
 (0.61) (1.34) (1.07) 
 1.754 15.847 0.324 
 [0.53; 5.80] [  1.15; 219.07] [0.04; 2.64] 
Ethnic Persecution 1.509** -0.316 2.952** 
 (0.66) (1.22) (1.34) 
 4.522 0.729 19.144 
 [1.24; 16.49] [0.07; 7.97] [1.38; 264.65] 
Territorial Access 1.472*** 3.711** 0.264 
 (0.53) (1.63) (0.87) 
 4.358 40.895 1.302 
 [1.54; 12.31] [1.68; 998.05] [0.24; 7.16] 
Controls:    
Poverty (log) -0.869* -0.762 -1.495* 
 (0.51) (0.89) (0.83) 
 0.419 0.467 0.224 
 [0.15; 1.14] [0.08; 2.67] [0.04; 1.14] 
End Before 1997 -1.92*** -1.778 -1.279 
 (0.67) (1.16) (1.24) 
 0.147 0.169 0.278 
 [0.04; 0.55] [0.02; 1.64] [0.02; 3.16] 
Cons 3.914 -0.945 10.52* 
 (3.55 (6.62) (6.22) 
N 83 49 31 
Pseudo R2 0.35 59 0.34 
_hatsq in linktest 0.877 0.723 0.442 
Log likelh (Prob>chi2=0) -37 -13 -14 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit test, p-value 0.736 0.997 0.640 
Pearson Goodness-of-fit test, p-value  0.553 0.950 0.327 
Max VIF 1.36 1.77 1.44 
Min tolerance (1/VIF) 0.74 0.57 0.69 
AIC 87.72 39.92 41.67 
Note: Logistic regression coefficients are marked with * when significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and below are odds ratios with their 95% confidence intervals (in square brackets). 
 
The results of empirical analysis show that the effect of the material capacity variable differs 
depending on its measurement. More specifically, when represented by a cumulative index of all three 
types of material support that rebels might receive, or by the index of third state support alone, material 
capacity proved to be only a weak predictor of child soldiering. Thus, in this case for both popular and 
unpopular armed groups the β-coefficients (Table 7) and the marginal effects (Table 8) of material 
capacity are insignificant, and so are β-coefficients for the third state support index in the regressions on 
split datasets in Table 10. Altogether, the results for the index measure of material capacity offer no 
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 support to my Hypothesis 2.1 which specifies that unpopular armed groups offering material rewards to 
their members are
When measured by diaspora support or access to source  the res ined 
f tell a different story. When mobilization capacity is oefficient terial 
capacity measured by diaspora support in Model 6 (T ) scored s tly and ne . The 
s  for roup β-coefficient from 
the split sample analysis (Table 9) both support this finding. The β-coefficient on the inte term 
mobilization*diaspora (Table 7) was also significant,  cha nitud ct. 
Moreover, the sign of the coefficient appeared positive. The large positive and significant ma ffect 
and β-coefficient from split sample analysis of mat  measured in diaspora support 
match the above result. All these findings suggest that diaspora funding has the opposite effect on child 
soldiering for popular and unpopular armed groups. In the case of unpopul  
diaspora support reduces the probability of child sold y Hypothesis 2.1
 less likely to have children in their ranks.  
 natural re s, however, ults obta
rom my analysis l -cow, β of ma
able 7 ignifican gative
ignificant negative marginal effect of the variable  un r gpopula s (Table 8) and 
r  action
suggesting a nge in the mag e of the effe
rginal e
erial capacity both 
ar insurgencies, the increase in
iering, thus offering support to m . 
I  popular groups, however, the presence ora money itively associated with 
recruitment of minors – an outcome that my explanatory ork has not anticipated. 
As further evidenced in Table 7, β-coefficients fo apaci  by ac ral 
resources are also significant for low and high mobilization capacity, but with the opposite  
mobilization capacity is low, β-coefficient of natural resource access  (Tabl as 
significant and positive, and so did the marginal effect (T ) and split s -coefficient (Table 11) 
of this variable for unpopular groups. β-coefficient of the interaction term bilization*resources was 
also significant but negative, suggesting a change in the tude of the of material capacity at 
h ty relative to low. The negative al effect (Table 8) and split sample β-
c  in esources
m , though.545 Overall, these results suggest that access to natural resources is 
positively associated with child soldiering in the case of unpopular group  finding do  fully 
n the case of of diasp  is pos
framew
r material c ty measured cess to natu
signs. When
in Model 8 e 7) scored 
able 8 ample β
 mo
 magni  effect 
igh mobilization capaci  margin
oefficient (Table 11) of material capacity measured access to r  were not significant for high 
obilization capacity
s. This es not
agree with the proposition in my argument. Hence, my Hypothesis 2.1 may not hold if the material 
ompensation to the armed group members comes from natural resource revenues. In case of popular 
gro
c
ups, however, access to natural resources is likely to have no effect on child soldiering, as proposed in 
my argument.  
When mobilization capacity is low, β-coefficients of ethnic persecution are insignificant in all the 
models. They gain significance on interaction terms of mobilization capacity with ethnic persecution, 
                                                 
545 This insignificance occurs because β-coefficients on natural resource access in Model 8 (Table 7) and its 
interaction term with mobilization capacity have opposite signs, which results in canceling out of the partial effect of 
material capacity when mobilization is high.  
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 however, in one out of four models (Model 8 in Table 7), suggesting the possibility of a difference in the 
effect of ethnic persecution (i.e. the presence of the effect) in the case of popular armed groups.546 Indeed, 
when mobilization is high, the marginal effects of ethnic persecution are significant and positive in all but 
one model (Table 8).547 When mobilization is low, the marginal effects of ethnic persecution are not 
significant. The results of the regressions on the split samples (Tables 9-11) largely support this pattern by 
exhibiting significant β-coefficients of ethnic persecution for popular armed groups in two out of three 
models (Tables 10 and 11), and insignificant β-coefficients for unpopular groups in all the models.548 
Overall, these results provide support for my Hypothesis 3.1: popular armed groups that operate in 
conflicts with ethnic persecution are more likely to have children. 
In all interactive models in Table 7, β-coefficients of the constituent variable territorial access scored 
positive and significant, which indicates that territorial access has a positive and significant effect on 
child soldering when mobilization capacity is low. This outcome is confirmed by significant, positive and 
very large marginal effects (Table 8) and split sample β-coefficients (Tables 9-11) of territorial access for 
low mobilization. β-coefficients of the interaction term mobilization*territory (Table 7) scored 
significantly in all four interactive models of interest (Models 5.2-8), implying a change in the effect of 
the variable of territorial access on child soldiering for the high value of mobilization capacity.549 The 
marginal effects of territorial access and split sample β-coefficients for popular armed groups all score 
insignificantly with predominantly positive signs.550 All these results suggest that the factor of territorial 
access might not have an effect on child soldiering in the case of popular armed groups, as predicted. 
Overall, the findings support my Hypothesis 4.1 stating that unpopular armed groups with access to 
larger territories are more likely to recruit children.  
β-coefficients for the poverty variable were negative and significant in two (Models 6 and 8) out of 
four models in Table 7.551 The marginal effects of poverty were also found to be negative and significant 
in two out of four models (Models 2 and 4 in Table 8). When calculated separately for low and high 
                                                 
546 Ethnic persecution also turned out significant in Model 5.1, a version of Model 5.2 with all control variables, 
as well as Model 7* which excludes the interaction’s constitutive term of mobilization capacity. 
547 Insignificance of the marginal effect of ethnic persecution in Model 2 in Table 8 can be a result of collinearity 
between ethnic persecution and material capacity measured in diaspora support – the link that I comment on below 
in the discussion of results. 
548 Similarly to the insignificance of the marginal effects, the insignificance of β-coefficients of ethnic persecution 
for 
cap
specifications (Models 5*, 7* and 8*) for popular armed groups. 
550 The only negative sign was observed in split sample analysis on Model 6 with diaspora money measure for 
popular armed groups in Tables 7 and 9 can be a result of collinearity between ethnic persecution and material 
acity measured in diaspora support – the link that I discuss below in this section in the discussion of results.  
549 In the exploratory Models 5*-8* (Table A in the Appendices) without the interaction’s constitutive term of 
mobilization capacity the variable of territorial access scored insignificant in three out of four model 
material capacity (Table 9). 
551 Note, however, that this effect disappears when these Models are run with control variables of conflict 
duration and conflict intensity. 
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 mobilization capacity, the marginal effects of poverty turned out significant only in one model out of four 
models for both popular and unpopular armed groups, suggesting a potentially similar effect (when 
present) of this factor for low and high mobilization capacity. The analysis on split samples, however, 
showed that β-coefficients of poverty were significant in all three models and for popular groups only 
(Tables 9-11).552 Overall, Hypothesis 5 received a rather weak and inconsistent support by the data.  
The control variable of conflict timing proved to be significant in all regression models in Table 7, 
and its marginal effects were also found to be significant for all the models (Table 8). It is interesting to 
note, though, that β-coefficients for conflict timing proved to be insignificant in regressions on the sub-
sample of popular armed groups, suggesting that child soldiers’ increasing appearance in newer wars is 
not straightforward. Rather, it appears as conditional on a type of actors involved in conflict. More 
specifically, recent wars that involve unpopular armed movements are more likely to have child 
soldiers.553 Hypothesis 6, therefore, was largely supported by the data. β-coefficients on the control 
variables of conflict duration and conflict intensity exhibited non-significant results (Table 7).554 Thus, 
Hypotheses 7 and 8 were not supported by the data. 
The Relative Size of Predictors’ Strength  
After evaluating which factors are affecting the probability of child recruitment, I also explore if 
some of them turn out to be stronger predictors than others.555 The marginal effects of variables in Models 
1-4 (Table 8) suggest that the strongest predictor of child soldiering for unpopular groups is territorial 
access. Unpopular groups that have access to large areas of territory are up to 90% more likely to recruit 
children than unpopular groups without territorial access. The two factors that follow in the order of 
importance for unpopular groups are fighting capacity and material capacity. An increase of an unpopular 
gro
effect of poverty is significant in one model specification, the country wealth decreases the propensity of 
g, 
 
up’s fighting capacity from low to high boosts its propensity to recruit children by about 50%. The 
material capacity variable seems to be the weakest from the proposed factors: when a group is unpopular, 
its ability to compensate its fighters decreases its propensity to recruit children by about 40%. When the 
an unpopular armed group to recruit children by about 30%. 
In the case of popular groups, ethnic persecution seems to have the largest effect on child soldierin
increasing its probability by about 50%. Only in one model specification, in which material capacity is
                                                 
552 This result is discussed in more detail further below in this chapter.  
553 This result is discussed in more detail further below in this chapter.  
554 Control variables were not included into Models 6-8, the results of which are shown in Table 7. Ho
regressions on the Models 6-8 with these controls as well, and the
wever, I ran 
 results were not different, except for the fact that 
t them.  
 compare 
effects. 
poverty was not significant in the fuller version of Models 6 and 8. Hence, models with these two controls 
performed worse than the ones withou
555 Since all of my independent variables except poverty are dummy or categorical variables, I can directly
the magnitude of their marginal 
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 measured by diaspora support, an increase of a popular group’s fighting capacity from low to high was 
found to raise insurgents’ propensity to recruit children significantly by about 60%. Similarly, the 
marginal effect of material capacity in case of popular groups proved to be significant only in the case of 
diaspora support, but with a high degree of approximately 70% increase in child soldier probability. 
However, as I discuss below, this effect could have been inflated by a high collinearity between ethnic 
pers
presence of material capacity’s influence on the 
he popularity levels of insurgencies are taken into account. 
The
port and when the latter scored significantly, 
ethn
variable of ethnic persecution with material capacity measured in diaspora support money. A theoretical 
in the literature. As one study on rebel 
l insurgencies relative to ideological 
ecution and diaspora support. Poverty increased the probability of child enlistment by 50% in one 
model specification only. Finally, all insurgent groups (popular and unpopular) that participated in older 
conflicts that finished before 1997 were about 40% less likely to have child soldiers.  
Section 2. Discussion of Results 
Overall, the outcomes of my large-N statistical analysis support my argument. However, some 
findings deviate to a certain extent from the proposed hypotheses and as such deserve further discussion. 
Perhaps the most interesting are the outcomes concerning the material capacity. The absence of an effect 
of this variable on child soldiering when I did not distinguish between different popularity levels of 
armed groups in my analysis contrasts with the 
dependent variable when the differences in t
 fact that for two types of popular and unpopular armed groups the cumulative index of all measures 
of material capacity has no effect on child soldiering (unlike diaspora support money and access to 
natural resources) suggests that the type of material support matters for child recruitment, and that 
different mechanisms might be at work for each of them, as I discuss below.  
The finding about diaspora support’s potential positive association with child soldiering in the case 
of popular movements appeared surprising at first. On the one hand, I proposed that additional revenue of 
unpopular armed groups should increase the probability of insurgency to pay and attract adult soldiers 
who would not join unpopular movements. On the other hand, for popular movements my extended 
theoretical framework did not postulate any influence of the group’s material capacity. An explanation for 
this unanticipated result may follow from the mechanics of the logistic regression. Note that when models 
which I was estimating included the measure of diaspora sup
ic persecution lost the significance of its β-coefficients and marginal effects, compared to the models 
that used other measures of material capacity.556 This outcome may result from collinearity of the 
argument for such a potential correlation can indeed be found 
fi
                                                
nancing suggests, “the increasing number of ethnic or communa
 
556 Hereby by considering models which include the measure of diaspora support I refer to Model 6 in Table 7; 
 variable did.  
Model 2 in Table 8; and Models 2 and 3 in Table 9. Note that when in Model 2 in Table 6 diaspora support did not 
score significantly, the ethnic persecution
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 conflicts increases the relative prevalence of diaspora support.”557 This is precisely why Latin American 
military organizations are believed not to receive much of diaspora support – that is because ethnic 
insurgencies “in general are rare” on the continent.558  
The correlation coefficient between ethnic persecution and material capacity measured in diaspora 
money is, in fact, rather high for Model 6 in Table 7 and Model 2 in Table 8 (0.41). When estimated on a 
smaller split samples of popular movements, for example, as opposed to the original dataset of 112 
African insurgent episodes, the correlation coefficient becomes even higher (0.53). However, the 
correlation coefficient between the two variables drops to an acceptable level of 0.35 for Model 2 in Table 
6, where the ratio of the number of bles is the highest.559 Interestingly, 
in t
 direct funding, this concept 
cou
                                                
observations to the number of varia
his particular model ethnic persecution retains the significance of its β-coefficient, whereas material 
capacity measured in diaspora support does not. Therefore, I believe that the unexpected effect of 
diaspora support money on child soldiering for popular armed groups occurs due to the collinearity of this 
measurement of material capacity with ethnic persecution variable and, as such, should be either 
disregarded or interpreted with caution. 
Another interesting finding worth noting among the results was that the material capacity variable 
measured in the third state support did not yield any significant effect on child soldiering. The 
assumptions which I made regarding this particular measure in Chapter 4 on methodology, however, 
could potentially explain this lack of significance. More specifically, I assumed that despite the fact that 
states’ support comes mainly in the form of military assistance, as opposed to
ld still be used to represent armed groups’ material capacity. This is because insurgencies after 
receiving a third state’s military and logistical assistance might be relieved from the burden of purchasing 
arms and ammunition on the competitive basis from international markets. Instead, they could redistribute 
these saved financial resources to group members in the form of salaries. It is possible that this 
assumption might not hold for all insurgencies, especially if we imagine an armed group which has no 
other access to material resources but the third state support. In a sense, the third state support measure is 
probably the least precise indication of the actual financial solvency of a military organization, compared 
to the index of access to the easily cashed natural resources or diaspora’s direct monetary assistance. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the sign of all insignificant β-coefficients (Tables 7 and 10) and 
marginal effects (Table 8) of the third state support was negative, indicating the proposed direction in the 
otherwise insignificant relationship. 
 
557 Byman et. al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, p. 42. 
558 Ibid., p. 41. 
559 The correlation coefficient between 0.4 and 0.6 is usually regarded as the benchmark value above which 
multicollinearity can pose a problem.  
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 More controversial are the results of the material capacity variable when measured by access to 
natural resources. In the case of unpopular armed groups, for which pecuniary rewards were proposed to 
have a negative effect on child soldiering, material capacity had significant and positive β-coefficients 
(Ta
s on the wide-spread private profiteering and trust and discipline 
with
ble 7 and 11) and marginal effects (Table 8), suggesting that insurgents’ access to natural resources 
might actually lead to underage recruitment. The positive direction of this relationship has not been 
postulated in my hypothesis. Closer examination reveals a potential explanation though. It is possible that 
besides generating revenue to armed groups, access to natural resources also cultivates personal greed 
within military organizations. Unlike in the case of diaspora money which ends up in the hands of the 
highest leadership of the rebel movement, revenue generated from diamond mining or drug production is 
less prone to hierarchical control. Any low-ranking commander may have access to production, 
supervision, transportation or looting of natural resources, and thus profit from the commodity in question 
either openly or clandestinely. The logic of this argument is reflected to some extent in existing literature 
on conflict and armed movements. Thus, previous studies have noted the negative impact of rebels’ 
access to revenues from natural resource
in the insurgency.560 There are two underlying mechanisms behind this relationship.  
In his book Jeremy Weinstein, while unpacking his overall argument about violence against civilians 
during the war, postulates that armed groups with access to natural resources (resource-based 
organizations) end up having greedy profiteers (attract opportunists) who care about short-term benefits, 
not the overall purpose of the organization.561 Similarly to Weinstein, I also find it plausible that armed 
groups having access to natural resources will attract greedy personnel who would become interested in 
immediate personal gain more than the ultimate common goal of the military organization. Unlike 
Weinstein, however, I assume that such a pursuit will occur only in unpopular resource-based 
organizations, and not in the popular ones. Meanwhile, as my data demonstrates, there is no correlation 
between popularity and material capacity (measured by all four different indicators in my analysis). 
Second, as also argued by Weinstein, establishing military discipline and institutional checks and 
balances within armed groups not based on ideational endowments is difficult.562 On the contrary, more 
ideational (or popular) armed groups are more likely to be able to institutionalize the checks and balances 
on the behavior and, as a result, the long-term commitment of their fighters.563 Although in my argument 
resource-based and ideational-based armed groups are mot mutually exclusive, I also assume that 
                                                 
560 These works focused mostly on diamonds and include United Nations (UN), Report of the Panel of Experts 
Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone (New 
York: United Nations, 2000); Le Billon, “The Political Ecology of War”; David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in 
nd Wars?” p. 362. 
side Rebellion, pp. 139, 171. 
Sierra Leone (Oxford, U.K.: James Currey, 2005), cited in Le Billon, “Diamo
561 Weinstein, In
562 Ibid., p. 139.  
563 Ibid., p. 139. 
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 unp
y can be easily 
man
opular insurgencies are harder to discipline.564 Consider, for instance, how in Angola and Sierra 
Leone uncommitted “government troops have abandoned their military duty to search for diamonds, with 
individual soldiers or officers leaving their posts after a significant finding, or trading with the enemy.”565 
In sharp contrast, the Angolan UNITA, which is recorded as a popular armed group in my sample, 
avoided the problem of profiteering among local commanders “by prohibiting its soldiers from 
participating in mining and employing mostly Congolese diggers and foreign buyers.”566 The above belief 
is also supported by the data in my sample that shows a statistically significant difference between 
popularity of a group and the strength of its center, measured as a categorical index of the extent to which 
the top leadership of the movement can control its troops and thus discipline within the organization.567 
It follows from the above discussion, I argue, that recruitment of low ranking personnel for unpopular 
armed groups might conform to the same profiteering logic whereby enriching commanders might not be 
willing to share their personal revenues with any additional new fighters required to achieve the overall 
goals of the group. In other words, local commanders might not want any lower ranking personnel to 
report or join their clandestine monetary operations. In this case, I would argue, children could become 
the best candidates to fill in the lower ranking positions in the army: unlike adults, the
ipulated to obedience and loyalty without pay. Therefore, without the need to share their personal 
revenues, as opposed to the organizational resources that are boosted from diaspora money or other 
financial transactions to the central leadership, the local commanders can avail themselves of cheap and 
loyal underage personnel of child soldiers.568  
                                                 
564 Unpopular groups in my argument – the ones that do not attract personnel on ideational grounds – resemble 
military organizations organized around ideational endowments from Weinstein’s argument. However, in 
Weinstein’s book these insurgencies are believed to be the ones without access to material resources, and are 
measured as such in his empirical study. Unlike Weinstein, however, I assume that military organizations based 
on ideational endowments may still have access to material resources, and, therefore, I use other criteria than 
access to material resources to distinguish between ideational and non-ideational armed groups (in my case 
pop
565 Le Billon, “
m
control would be the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in Mexico, where Subcommander Marcos was at 
the top of a clear chain of command in a well-organized group. An example of a group with low control of its forces 
 
civilian violence. 
een different types of material resources the insurgencies relied on.  
ata demonstrated, the type of material resources rebels depend on does matter, at least for the 
) recruitment. 
ular and unpopular ones). 
Diamond Wars?” p. 362, citing his interview with diamond buyer in Angola, July 2001 and Keen, 
Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. 
566 Le Billon, “Diamond Wars?” p. 362, Filip De Boeck, “Garimpeiro Worlds: Digging, Dying and “Hunting” for 
Diamonds in Angola,” Review of African Political Economy 28 (90), 2001, pp. 549–62. 
567 Reported p-value of the chi-square coefficient is 0.017. The data to measure the strength of the central leadership 
were taken form the NSA Project Dataset. “This variable gives a categorical indicator, easured as “high, moderate, 
or low” of the strength of the leadership’s control over its forces. An example of a group with a high degree of 
is the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which did have a central
command organizational structure, but was beset by constant fractionalization and leadership disputes” 
(Cunningham and Gleditsch, “The NSA Project,” pp. 5-6.) 
568 Here is where my argument turned to be largely different from the Weinstein’s explanation of 
Like Weinstein, I first did not distinguish betw
However, as the d
patterns of (child
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 The same logic should not apply to the popular armed groups, however. Since recruitment of adults 
into such movements draws on their popularity, resort to child recruitment might be non-strategic, as it 
undermines the support of the domestic population and thus mass voluntary mobilization of adults. 
Moreover, with higher control exhibited by the central leadership of popular groups over their soldiers, 
the normative standard not to recruit children for war can actually be upheld through the ability to 
monitor and regulate the behavior of the lower-ranking commanders and soldiers. This argument is 
supported by the data, which shows no significant β-coefficient (Table 11) or marginal effect (Table 8) 
for access to natural resources when mobilization is high. Significance of the negative β-coefficient on 
the interaction term mobilization*resources in Model 8 of Table 7 represents the changes from the 
pos
persecution, may represent a legitimate reason for armed 
groups to accept children without jeopardizing the popularity of the movement, if the population regards 
e war, 
nic 
 
ight appear in greater proportions in new wars only under a certain 
d 
 that 
itive effect of natural resource access with the increase in groups’ mobilization capacity to its 
insignificance. Thus, the logic behind recruiting children of unpopular groups with access to natural 
resources does not apply to popular armed movements.    
Additional empirical findings revealed further trends which were also not proposed in my explanatory 
framework. For example, poverty, albeit only in a small number of model specifications (Models 6 and 8 
in Table 7), was found to affect child soldiering. This result is not particularly perplexing, because the 
relationship is not too strong and because, although it was not proposed as a key factor in my theory, there 
has been some theoretical justification offered for this variable in the literature. There may be an intuitive 
explanation for an occasional effect of poverty in some models for both popular and unpopular 
insurgencies. Thus, poverty, similar to ethnic 
soldiering as a better option relative to the dire deprivation a child is facing otherwise. Similarly, as I 
suggested elsewhere, poor communities might have lower capacity to defend themselves during th
and, as such, poverty can facilitate the entry of children into armed groups in the situations of eth
persecution for both popular and unpopular armed groups.  
The control variable of conflict timing was also observed to exhibit an interesting behavior. The
results suggested that child soldiers m
condition – that is if the armed movements are unpopular. This result might reflect what I have argue
earlier in Chapter 3 on the explanatory framework when questioning the ability of conflict timing in itself 
to explain child soldiering. Thus, I mentioned that the time of conflict is important only to the extent
the values of all four independent variables in my argument change over time.569 More specifically, the 
                                                 
569 For example, the mean value for the variable of fighting capacity for armed groups that operated after 1997 was 
0.49 – an increase of 20% from the mean of 0.41 for groups that ceased to exist prior to 1997. Similarly, the mean 
values of the variable territorial access by unpopular groups rose from 0.71 to 0.91. Ethnic persecution values al
increased in case of popular gro
so 
ups from the mean of 0.24 to 0.48 for pre-1997 and post-1997 groups respectively. 
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 valu
matic: 1) omitted variable bias and 2) reverse 
cau
es of the variables of fighting capacity, material capacity, ethnic persecution and territorial access, 
all proposed in my argument to explain the recruitment of children into unpopular armed groups, 
increased with time. Meanwhile, the variable of poverty, which turned out to be a strong predictor of child 
soldiering in the case of popular armed groups, did not exhibit any correlation with time. This may 
explain the difference in the degree of the conflict timing variable’s explanatory power for popular and 
unpopular armed groups.  
Section 3. Methodological Caveat 
Endogeneity. For practically any quantitative research project on non-experimental data in the social 
sciences it is difficult to avoid a potential endogeneity problem. Endogeneity generally refers to a situation 
when some variables are determined by other variables in the system.570 However, endogeneity may or 
may not pose a problem in any given study. Statisticians identify two major sources of endogeneity that 
might make interpretation of the regression results proble
sality.571 Omitted variable bias in regression coefficients occurs due to an exclusion from the model of 
a variable which is correlated with one of the independent variables in the system and the dependent 
variable, “so that after fitting the model […] there is still a relationship with this other variable and the 
residuals.”572 Arguably, this is the most common occurrence of the endogeneity problem in the 
quantitative studies.573 Reverse causality refers to the situation whereby the dependent variable (DV) 
“might exert a causal effect” on the independent variable (IV), “in addition to (or instead of) the effect of” 
the IV on the DV.574 This is what political scientists most often refer to as the endogeneity problem.575  
                                                                                                                                                 
The variable of material compensation also increased over time, from 0.66 to 0.85, although this trend should have 
been correlated with lower levels of child soldiers. 
570 Aaron Gullickson, Section “Addressing ‘Endogeneity’” in Lecture Outline for Sociology G4075: Introduction to 
Social Data Analysis II, URL: http://www.uoregon.edu/~aarong/te
571 Gullickson, “Addressing ‘Endogeneity’.” A third source of end
aching/G4075_Outline/node9.html 
ogeneity might include mismeasurement of the 
inde
Caus
ng
with Microsoft Excel (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), URL: 
http://www3.wabash.edu/econometrics/EconometricsBook/chap18.htm). 
573 Gullickson, “Addressing ‘Endogeneity’.”  
pendent variable (Gary Kleck, Tomislav Kovandzic, Mark E Schaffer, “Gun Prevalence, Homicide Rates and 
ality: A GMM Approach to Endogeneity Bias,” CEPR Discussion Paper No.5357, 2005, URL: 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/5357.html). Since satisfactory remedies for this source of endogeneity are 
virtually non-existent, I take the data available as given and do not discuss this potential source further. 
572 Gullickson, “Addressing ‘Endogeneity’.” “The term omitted variable refers to any variable not included as an 
independent variable in the regression that might influence the dependent variable… So long as the omitted 
variables are uncorrelated with the included independent variables, OLS regression will produce unbiased 
estimates… When omitted variables are in fact correlated with the included independent variables… OLS regression 
generally produces biased and inconsistent estimates, which accounts for the name omitted variable bias” (Humberto 
Barreto, Frank Howland, Chapter 18 in online manual of Introductory Econometrics: Usi  Monte Carlo Simulation 
574 Bryan Dowd, Robert Town, Does X Really Causes Y? (Academy Health, Changes in Health Care Financing and 
Organization, 2002), p.3. 
575 In political science endogeneity “means that the values our explanatory variables take on are sometimes a 
consequence, rather than a cause, of our dependent variable” (Gary King, Robert Keohane, Sidney Verba, Designing 
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 Presence of endogeneity can lead to a bias on estimated coefficients in a regression and might 
therefore result in unreliable inference. The following statement stresses the importance of addressing the 
issue of endogeneity in statistical analysis: “The problem of endogeneity is a real one and it behooves us 
to take a look at some of the ways in which people (partially) address it. The bottom line is that no 
method can perfectly recover causality from observational data, but in certain cases we can effectively 
reduce the range of plausible counter-stories.”576  
A widely used method for ad y either omitted variables or reverse 
cau
at 
endogeneity might plausibly affect in this way only the fighting capacity variable. Thus, one might 
suggest that presence of children in rebel ranks can increase (if children provide necessary numbers or 
 
ed 
al 
oups’ 
ng 
access, 
                                    
dressing endogeneity when caused b
sality is the Instrumental Variables approach.577 This approach uses a so-called instrument which is a 
variable that itself does not belong to the explanatory equation but is correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variables of the model being estimated. At the same time, the instrument must not be 
correlated with the error term of the regression so that the instrument itself does not suffer from the 
endogeneity problem. In other words, the instrument serves as an intermediary variable in the regression. 
It first acts as a dependent variable, extracting the exogenous variation from the endogenous explanatory 
variable, and then effectively becomes a substitute for the endogenous explanatory variable, conveying 
only the exogenous information. The instrument thus parses away the endogenous part of the explanatory 
variable in question. The resulting coefficient estimates have the same desirable large sample properties 
as the ones obtained from a regression with fully exogenous explanatory variables.578  
Reverse Causality. It could be argued that in my model specification there are independent variables 
that could be endogenous by reverse causality to the dependent variable of child soldering. I argue th
necessary quality of good foot soldiers) or, equally, decrease (if children cannot perform the combat roles
as well as adults) the ability of an armed group to challenge its opponent militarily.  
One might argue that recruitment of children might also boost mobilization capacity of an arm
group. However, recall that the measurement of this variable represents potential rather than the actu
numbers of people mobilized and, therefore, stands for the size of the group constituency, not the gr
579strength.  Defined as such, this measure, I argue, does not pose an endogeneity problem. The remaini
three variables from my argument, namely ethnic persecution, material capacity and territorial 
can be safely regarded as exogenous, since these variables cannot be plausibly caused by child soldiering 
itself. To address endogeneity caused by reverse causality, I verify the assumed direction of the 
                                                                                                             
w Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
g ‘Endogeneity’.” 
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, Ne
1994), p. 185). 
576 Ibid., p. 185. 
577 Gullickson, “Addressin
578 Judea Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
579 From my correspondence with Kristian Gleditsch, one of the leaders of the NSA project (January 3, 2009).  
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 rela
some of the variation in both my explanatory variables 
and
ough the included 
exp
e arms procurement 
vari
tionship in my temporal qualitative analysis of the NPFL armed group case study based on the survey 
analysis and interviews which showed that changes in my explanatory variable of fighting capacity 
precede corresponding changes in child soldiering.  
Omitted Variable Bias. In my model specification I included all the variables that I deemed to be 
important for explaining child soldiering according to my theoretical argument. Nonetheless, it may be 
possible that some unobserved factor could affect 
 the explained one. Similarly to the reverse causality case, the fighting capacity variable appears to be 
the most susceptible to the influence of such a factor. At the same time, it is hard to identify other 
potential unspecified factors that may affect both decision making regarding the child soldier recruitment 
outcome and my remaining independent variables. Any potential causes of the structural factor of ethnic 
persecution and the variable of territorial access should be among the features of conflict dynamics. 
However, no such potential feature appears sufficiently influential for child soldier recruitment beyond 
the already specified factor of group’s fighting capacity and controls of conflict duration, conflict timing 
and conflict intensity. The material capacity variable when measured as access to natural resources should 
be completely exogenous and dictated mostly by the geography of violence. Material support for armed 
groups in the form of diaspora or third state assistance is also hardly conceivable to be affected by some 
omitted variable that also directly causes child soldiering beyond its influence thr
lanatory variables.     
To double-check that such a potential omitted variable does not cause a problem of endogeneity, I ran 
an instrumental variable regression, instrumenting for fighting capacity, arguably with the strongest 
potential for departure from the exogeneity. The instrumental variable is the categorical index of group’s 
arms procurement capacity, defined as the ability of insurgents (relative to the government) to obtain 
weapons.580 The data for this variable was taken from the NSA Project Dataset. Th
able in this case meets the requirement for a suitable instrument, being a variable that itself does not 
belong to the explanatory equation but is correlated with the potentially endogenous explanatory variable. 
First, it is theoretically plausible that fighting capacity of a group is determined by its ability to procure 
arms, which is confirmed by the correlation of these two variables (the correlation coefficient is 0.82). 
Second, I believe that arms procurement capability is not caused by any omitted variable that also 
determines the child recruitment but is not present in my model.  
                                                 
580 Armed groups vary in their ability to procure arms. “An example of an insurgent with high arms procurement 
 to the government, is a military faction in Argentina which overthrew the government in a coup 
s with a lesser ability to procure arms such as Bougainville 
r on 
capacity, relative
d’etat. Meanwhile, there are many rebel group
Revolutionary Army (BRA) in Papua New Guinea, whose main access to arms are weapons that are still leftove
the island from World War II” (Cunningham and Gleditsch, “The NSA Project Codebook,” pp. 6-7). 
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 Table 12 contrasts the results of regular regressions without instruments on Model 1 (Table 6) and 
Model 5.2 (Table 7) with their counterparts containing instrumental variable of arms procurement. The 
estimated coefficients are very similar in both cases and the pattern of significance does not change with 
the use of the instrument, except on one exogenous variable, suggesting that endogeneity does not pose a 
concern.581 This is confirmed by the Wald test of exogeneity where null cannot be rejected at 5% level of 
significance.582 I also ran regressions with the same instrumental variable of arms procurement on 
Models 6-8 from Table 7, featuring alternative measures of material capacity variable, with the same 
conclusion.583 
                                                 
581 The change occurs from non-significant to significant at 10% for the interaction term of mobilization*ethnic. 
Both constituent variables of the interaction term are argued to be exogenous and hence this change is not relevant 
for assessing a potential endogeneity problem.  
582 The null hypothesis of the Wald test of exogeneity is that the suspect independent variable (fighting capacity in 
my case) is exogenous, conditional on the choice of the instrumental variable (arms procurement in my case). 
Failure to reject the null means that endogeneity does not pose a problem for the independent variable in question 
(Jeffrey Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 
2002), pp. 472-477).   
583 I obtained very similar coefficients from regressions with and without the instrumental variable. Models 6 (with 
diaspora money) had the same pattern of significance. Model 7 (with third state support measure) had the variable 
l 
g a 
of poverty to acquire significance as its p-value changed from 0.103 to 0.082. In Model 8 the variable of territoria
access lost its significance (p-value changed from 0.073 to 0.108). However, the three measures of the material 
capacity variable involved were argued to be exogenous and hence such change is not relevant for assessin
potential endogeneity problem. The Wald test of exogeneity did not reject the null of exogenous fighting capacity in 
all the Models 6-8 (p-values of 0.689**, 0.921**, and 0.521**).   
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 Table 12. Probit584 Regressions with and without Instrumental Variable (IV)  
of Arms Procurement 
(Material Capacity Measured with Cumulative Index) 
 
 1 1 with IV 5.2  5.2 with IV 
Mobilization Capacity   2.005* 2.298* 
   (1.17) (1.27) 
Fighting Capacity         0.964***         1.240*** 1.673*** 1.704** 
 (1.23) (0.41) (0.61) (0.72) 
Material Capacity                 (Index) -0.015 -0.084 -0.165 -0.203 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.43) (0.45) 
Ethnic Persecution      0.933**       1.093** 0.167 0.169 
 (1.39) (0.44) (0.69) (0.70) 
Territorial Access         0.968***         0.890*** 2.024*** 1.984** 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.72) (0.79) 
Interactions:     
Mobilization*Fighting   -1.168 -1.102 
   (0.85) (1.01) 
Mobilization*Ethnic   1.333 1.703 
   (0.99) (1.13) 
Mobilization*Material          (Index)   -0.042 0.028 
   (0.54) (0.57) 
Mobilization*Territory   -1.632** -1.909** 
   (0.79) (0.87) 
Controls:     
Poverty (log) -0.430 -0.386 -0.464 -0.531 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.35) 
End Before 1997        -1.205***       -1.214*** -0.988** -1.041** 
 (0.40) (0.41) (0.47) (0.51) 
Cons   1.849  1.627 1.046 1.612 
 (1.98) (2.05) (2.37) (2.64) 
N 83 77 80 76 
Pseudo R2 0.35  0.43  
Wald test of exogeneity (p-value)  0.234***  0.971** 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
                                                 
584 The STATA command ivprobit was used in running the instrumental variable regression and the results were 
compared to the regular regression obtained by using the probit command. The reason for using probit instead of 
logit is that STATA does not implement instrumental variable technique for logistic regression which would be 
complicated since the maximum-likelihood estimation there cannot rely on simplifications obtained by using 
multivariate normality of residuals as in the probit case. Since logit and probit coefficients are equivalent up to a 
multiplicative constant, the conclusions regarding endogeneity are the same in both cases (STATA online forum). 
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 Section 4. Explaining Outliers 
Although the data e
are nevertheless several armed groups in my sample 
their organizational or contextual charac
vidence described in this chapter provides overall support to my hypotheses, there 
ho either recruited or did not recruit children while 
teristics suggested otherwise. Such armed groups do 
to the general pattern of my theoretical framework and can be thus called outliers. A closer e tion 
of these c mportant for theory eory the cau ild soldie ere 
i at cou e influence ck of fit: m g, estima hild 
s  instances may not or insurg oups migh  had 
v ependent variables hard nd he precisel lso 
possible that the mechanisms I have described as generating child recruitment practice by  are 
present in these conflicts and among the groups but are spurr  by another f ndependent variable). 
I s can open up new questions for exploration. 
 detected in Figure 1 which shows the deviance 
residual for different insurgencies in my dataset plotted against the child sold y variable. The 
d sures the disagreement between the maxima of the observed and the fitted 
log likelihood functions.585  The regression used for this analysis was run on a summary of 
Models 6-8 in my analysis with two measures of material capacity variable in  into its specification: 
diaspora support and natural resources. I he outliers from odel version because it accounts 
for the findings of my analysis which revealed significance of the material capacity variable when 
measured by diaspora support and 
tural resou as opposed ird 
ndex of all 
three measures of material capacity.  
Observations (armed groups in my 
sample) with deviance residuals smaller 
or larger than 2, corresponding 
approximately to the 2.5th and 97.5th 
quantiles of the Normal distribution, are 
usually considered as outliers.586 This 
implies that the probability of their 
w
not conform 
xamina
ases is i  testing and th  bu on ilding ses of ch ring. Th
s a number of potential reasons th ld hav d the la iscodin tes of c
oldier recruitment  accurately reflect the reality ent gr t have
alues on the ind  which were  to observe a nce code y. It is a
 rebels
ed actor (i
n this way, anomalie
The degree to which the lack of fit occurs can be
iering dumm
eviance residual mea
 version 
cluded
examine t  this m
na rc , es  to the th
Figure 1. Outliers in Model Fit 
state support or a cumulative i
                                                 
585 There is a preference in the literature for the use of deviance residuals over Pearson residuals because the former 
is closer to be Normally distributed than the latter (C. Cohen, C. Cohen, S. G. West, L. S. Aiken (2003) Applied 
Multiple Regression / Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, Routledge Academic, p. 514). 
586 UCLA Academic Technology Services, Lesson 3, “Logistic Regression Diagnostics,” URL: 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/logistic/chapter3/statalog3.htm 
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 occurrence is considered unlikely crepancy.587 Figure 1 reveals two 
outl
capacity and poverty. The value of the 
ethn
more closely th  mentioned in C
poverty in my large-N analysis, which utilizes the nationa
Unfortunately, this is the only available data on poverty record
that, the weak prediction of poverty factor (albeit identified as uld 
have been a result of such ecological fallacy problem, when pov
opposed to regional, local or even individual level. It is possible
used, the effect of poverty on child recruitment into popular ins
than suggested in my large-N study. So, how did poverty m
recruitment of children? 
While the national levels of poverty in Ethiopia suggested lo
being in my sample, the regional distribution of poverty also
major area of mobilization for the TPLF, were also severely affected by deprivation relative to other 
to be caused by a statistical dis
iers: TPLF armed group of Ethiopia (1976-91) with observation number 56, and the SPLM/SSIM 
faction of Sudan (1991-97) with observation label 101. In this section I attempt to shed light on the 
possible additional factors that could explain the anomalous behavior of these two armed groups with 
respect to child soldier recruitment beyond the factors captured in my explanatory framework above. 
The TPLF in Ethiopia (1976-91) 
The extreme observation 57 stands for the Ethiopian Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The 
TPLF is coded in my dataset as a popular armed group, with low fighting capacity and no material 
support, operating in a conflict without ethnic persecution, and with territorial control and established 
presence in and outside of the country. According to my theoretical argument, the child soldier 
recruitment of a popular armed faction, such as the TPLF, should be predicted primarily by the factors of 
ethnic persecution variable, and less so by the variables of fighting 
ic persecution variable in my dataset suggests a low probability for child recruitment to occur. Low 
fighting capacity also suggests a low demand for fighters in general. However, the factor of poverty was 
exhibiting a higher level of deprivation than the average in my sample, thus revealing the possibility of 
enlistment of children from poorer families.588 With two out of three explanatory variables suggesting a 
low recruitment of children, the observed value on the dependent variable of child soldiering, 
nevertheless, indicated the presence of children within the TPLF ranks.   
How could the instances of child recruitment be explained for this group? I will start by examining 
hapter 4 on methodology, the measure of 
l values of the GDP, is rather crude. 
ed in the midst of armed struggle. Saying 
an effect) in my statistical analysis co
e influence of poverty. As I have
erty was measure at the national, as 
 that if the latter type of measurement was 
urgencies could have been much stronger 
atter, if at all, in the case of the TPLF 
wer than average levels of material well-
 indicated that the people of Tigray, the 
                                                 
587 Ibid. 
588 Measured by taking a logarithm of average national real GDP per capita in constant prices (chain series) in the 
le average was midst of the conflict, this indicator of poverty for Ethiopia dataset scored 6.16, whereas the samp
6.92. 
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 regions of the country.589 To begin with, the Tigray region was identified among the only two (out of 20) 
rural sites in the four major regions of Ethiopia which were “suffering famine deaths in 1973,” three years 
prior to the formation of the armed movement.590 Moreover, the same study uncovered that Tigray, while 
being affected in 1973 by famine, “continued to be so for some time.”591 Thus, the poverty factor could 
have played a prominent role in mobilization of impoverished children into the ranks of the TPLF.  
A closer look at the children profiles within the group could shed additional light on both poverty and 
som
 that girl children who ended up 
wit
e other potential factors affecting enlistment of minors. The review of my coding books for the TPLF 
faction demonstrates that child recruitment was recorded as positive primarily on the basis of sources 
which identified and explored the phenomenon of girl soldiers within this armed group. I could not 
identify a report which would specifically mention the recruitment of boy soldiers by the TPLF. Because 
in this study I adopted the definition of a child soldier that does not distinguish between gender, the 
presence of girl soldiers in the ranks of the TPFL resulted in the coding of the child recruitment variable 
with the value of 1. Thus, one study based on the interviews with a non-random sample of 11 demobilized 
TPFL’s women fighters revealed that all of them were recruited while being under 18 years old: 
“The average age of recruitment of the 11 female participants in this study to the fighters was 12.68 
years, while the youngest was five years old and the eldest was 17. Therefore, all entered as minors, 
and would officially be considered as ‘child soldiers’ at recruitment under official definitions used 
today.”592 
 
Meanwhile, what was probably happening in the case of the TPLF is
h the forces were not a targeted group in the insurgency recruitment strategy. The presence of girls in 
this particular case is linked to yet a very special characteristic of the TPLF armed group which made it 
very attractive and popular for the Ethiopean women in the Tygrain region. Apparently, the TPLF ended 
up with many volunteering fighters, including girls and possibly boys, “through the establishment of 
social services, such as health and education.”593 Based on a socialist, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the 
movement “developed strong grassroots support throughout Tigray as a result of community 
development, an emphasis on collective action, liberation education and mobilisation of a strong Tigrean 
                                                 
589 TPLF was formed around 1975, in Eritrea’s province of Tigray, as an opposition movement to the ruling 
Mengistu’s Derg military di
Fighters, Demobilisation and Rein
ctatorship in Ethiopia (Angela Veale, “From Child Soldier to Ex-Fighter: Female 
tegration in Ethiopia,” Institute of Strategic Studies, Monograph 85, April 2003, 
p. 1
590
592 Angela Veale, “From Child Soldier to Ex-Fighter: Female Fighters, Demobilisation and Reintegration in 
” Institute of Strategic Studies, Monograph 85, April 2003, p. 26 
n 
ww.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/African_Security_Review_children_in_conflicts_2003_.pdf  
5). 
 The following study reported these findings: Alula Pankhurst and Philippa Bevan, “Hunger, Poverty and 
‘Famine’ in Ethiopia: Some Evidence from Twenty Rural Sites in Amhara, Tigray, Oromiya and SNNP Regions,” 
URL: http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC16584.pdf , p. 7. 
591 Ibid., p. 8. 
Ethiopia,
593 Angela McIntyre, “Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment: the Youth Factor in Africa’s Armed Conflicts,” Africa
Security Review, Vol 12, No 2, 2003, URL: 
http://w
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 identity.”594 In the areas under its control, the movement established a counter-government “that sought to 
address gender equality through legal reforms in the areas of marriage, divorce, education and land 
reform.”595 As to the girls, some of them were reported “to join the movement as a way of escaping early 
marriages.”596 On the basis of 1993 demobilization statistics, the TPLF and the EPLF (Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front) armed groups were reported to be cumulatively composed of approximately a third of 
fem
e case of 
the 
the 
prog ortunately, such detailed coding falls outside the scope of this project, but will be 
ev
address such social problems. In a sense, the popularity of an armed group itself can result from the 
dibility 
n 
 of children (albeit I suspect a minority) to join popular insurgencies even in the case of low 
ale fighters.597 The group’s provision of social services was probably the primary reason for why, 
according to one study, 65% of women wanted to stay in the army after the end of hostilities.598 
Because in my coding I did not restrict the recruitment of children to boys only, and, in fact, 
extrapolated the presence of boys in the group from the enlistment of girls, it is possible that the value of 
my dependent variable of child recruitment is somewhat overstated. In other words, the value of ‘1’ can 
be said to be too high for the actual child soldier recruitment situation exhibited by the TPLF. On the 
other hand, the variable could not be coded as ‘0’ in the presence of girl soldiers in the insurgency’s 
ranks. In a sense, the TPLF did not pursue a direct child recruitment strategy, but ended up having girl 
soldiers as a result of particular inadequate state social policies towards equality of women. Th
TPLF thus indicates a need to develop a more nuanced coding of the dependent variable to account for 
cases when armed groups end up with having children without any specifically developed recruitment 
rams. Unf
d eloped in my future research.  
Overall, the exploration of the TPLF outlier case suggests that the group’s behavior does fit my 
general theory. When examined separately, this case emphasizes the point that the ethnic persecution 
variable and, more specifically, defense motives, might not be the only push factors that drive some 
children into popular armed groups. As the TPLF example demonstrates, poverty in combination with 
other factors can play a significant role. There might be a constellation of extreme impoverishment (such 
as deadly famine), misguided state policies (such as severe inequality among Tygrain women in the north 
of the country condoned or instigated by the existing government) and the ability of an armed group to 
situations described above. It is the strong commitment of the TPLF to women’s issues and cre
that could have made the group popular in the first place. As such, therefore, we should expect a certai
number
                                                 
594 Angela Veale, “From Child Soldier to Ex-Fighter: Female Fighters, Demobilisation and Reintegration in 
itute of Strategic Studies, Monograph 85, April 2003, p. 15. 
ving the Warm House: the Impact of Demobilisation in Eritrea,” in K. 
Ethiopia,” Inst
595 Angela McIntyre, “Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment,” p. 5. 
596 Ibid., p. 5. 
597 Angela Veale, “From Child Soldier to Ex-Fighter,” p. 16. 
598 E. M. Bruchhaus and A. Mehreteab, “Lea
Kingma (ed.), Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa (Macmillan Press, London, 2000). 
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 demand for combatants. Again, disintegration of the dependent variable of child soldiering into ‘minor’, 
‘medium’, and ‘significant’, or a similar more nuanced scale than the current binary indicator variable, 
can be helpful in testing the robustness of my findings.  
The SSIM/SSIA Faction of Sudan (1991-97) 
The outlier observation 101 represents the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army 
(SSIM/SSIA). The SSIM/SSIA is coded in my dataset as unpopular, with low fighting capacity, no ethnic 
cleansing, with contraband support, and with some territorial control (1 out of 2). According to my 
theo
ectly, and only one variable of fighting capacity which does not. 
The
leader, Riek Machar, was a former member of the SPLM (1985-2005) insurgency led by John Garang.599 
 from 
                                   
retical argument, the child soldier recruitment of such an unpopular faction should be predicted by the 
variables of fighting capacity, material capacity, as well as territorial control. The low value of fighting 
capacity variable suggests low demand for additional recruits, including children. At the same time, the 
presence of a contraband resource, such as oil, on the SSIM/SSIA territory of operation could have 
generated the appeal within the group leadership to recruit minors, as I argued in this work. Therefore, the 
demand for children generated through the mechanism of contraband resources, as opposed to fighting 
capacity, could have explained the occurrence of children in the ranks of the SSIM/SSIA. Furthermore, 
the control over large swaths of territories by the faction could have facilitated access to children.  
These circumstances suggest that the SSIM/SSIA case does not directly contradict my theoretical 
explanation. There are two out of three explanatory variables from my argument which predict the 
outcome of child soldiering corr
refore, it is the relative importance of these three factors that might not reflect the characteristics of 
this case accurately when estimated from the full sample. Specifically, the role of fighting capacity 
appears to be stronger than in other cases. Therefore, the case of SSIM/SSIA is fitted as an outlier due to 
an atypical value of just one out three independent variables. Thus, the demand for additional soldiers 
from fighting capacity leads to child recruitment more intensively than the one generated by access to 
resources. In other words, access to resources may determine only the quality of recruits, children or 
adults, as opposed to their quantity. If there is no demand for soldiers altogether, there will be no children 
in the ranks of organization even with the access to natural resources. 
There might be another potential explanation of the non-conforming behavior of the SSIM/SSIA. 
This explanation relates to the fact that SSIM/SSIA faction was a splinter group, as opposed to being 
independently formed, of another prominent armed movement from the Southern Sudan. The SSIM/SSIA 
“Following an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1991 where he attempted to wrest control of the SPLM
              
s and Analysis, A project of the UN Office for the 599 IRIN, “Sudan: A Future without War?” Humanitarian New
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, available at: 
http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=22&ReportId=64284 
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 John Garang, Machar broke away from the SPLM to form the South Sudanese Independence Movement 
(SSIM) from 1991 to 1997...”600 As a splinter group of the SPLM, the SSIM/SSIA ranks could have more 
or less resembled the structure of the former, as Riek Machar took his loyal fighters with him. Meanwhile, 
ne that recruited child soldiers.   
The
ent of 
min
the Movement for Democracy and 
Dev
                                                
the SPLM faction is recorded in my dataset as o
 CSNPD of Chad (1992-94) 
The observation with the identification number 27 in Figure 1 may not strictly speaking be considered 
an outlier since its deviance residual is less than 2 in absolute value, but it is closest to this benchmark 
among the observations with negative deviance residuals. As such, it deserves closer scrutiny. This 
observation is the National Revival Committee for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD) of Chad. The CSNPD 
is coded as unpopular in my dataset, with high fighting capacity and material support from contraband, 
operating in a conflict without ethnic persecution, and with territorial control and presence in and outside 
of the country. According to my theoretical argument, the child soldier recruitment of such unpopular 
armed movement should be predicted primarily by the fighting and material capacity, as well as the 
territorial control variables. The values of these three factors in my dataset suggest a very high 
probability for child recruitment to occur. Nevertheless, I could not find any reports on recruitm
ors by the CSNPD.  
It is my suspicion that due to the CSNDP’s exceptionally short existence (3 years below the average 7 
year duration of armed incompatibilities in my sample) the group received unusually low coverage and 
attention from the media and humanitarian agencies. Therefore, my coding of the absence of child 
soldiering might simply reflect the gap in our information about this particular armed faction. While the 
short life span of the CSNDP could affect data collection in this particular case, duration of conflict in 
general does not seem to affect my data sample. Thus, armed groups in existence for three or fewer years 
in my dataset had almost the same probability of having children in their ranks (mean of 0.42) as armed 
groups operating for longer times (mean of 0.46). 
This lack of information in general on the CSNPD might also be explained by the fact that this armed 
group represents just one of the many armed rebel forces (including 
elopment (MDD), Chadian national Front (FNT) and the Western Armed Forces, (FAO)) with whom 
the Chadian government clashed in early 1990s near Lake Chad and in southern regions of the country.601 
The CSNPD could have been lost to the media and observers attention as one of plenty militarized 
political actors in Chad. Consider, for example, that during the peaceful discussions about creation of a 
pluralist democratic regime at that time, over 750 political actors, including representatives from the 
 
+and+Human+Rights 
u/faculty/rwinslow/africa/chad.html 
600 “Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights,” URL: 
http://everything2.com/title/Sudan%252C+Oil%252C
601 International Criminology Project, “Chad,” URL: http://www-rohan.sdsu.ed
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 CSNPD and other armed opposition groups, participated in the talks.602 This extreme fragmentation of 
political actors in Chad could have explained the non-existence of reports on child soldiering as a poor 
data collection on the armed group.  
*** 
Overall, the examination of the three outliers demonstrated several major points. First, it suggested 
that
ing units was technically predicted by the characteristics of the SSIM/SSIA’s 
pred
d to include the measure of gender inequality. Second, 
I m
such type of factions.   
 specific manifestations of poverty, or rather impoverishment, in the TPLF case taking the form of 
severe gender inequalities in Ethiopia in late 1970s, could potentially explain the occurrence of child 
soldiers, especially girl soldiers. Second, analysis of the SSIM/SSIA armed faction in Sudan, on the one 
hand, confirmed the relative importance of the factors in my model. Thus, recording of the SSIM/SSIA 
faction as an outlier despite the fact that two out of three independent variables predicted the outcome 
correctly suggests the role of fighting capacity in my model appears to be stronger than that of material 
capacity and territorial control. On the other hand, the inability of my theory in explaining this case could 
have been attributed to the fact that the SSIM/SSIA was a splinter faction of the SPLM armed group, 
which recruited child soldiers with this particular outcome predicted well by my theory. Therefore, while 
the characteristics of the SSIM/SSIA became different form the SPLM, the initial presence of children in 
the ranks of the dissent
ecessor. The examination of the third outlier, the CSNPD of Chad, pointed at the likelihood of 
inadequate data collection on that armed group, which was both short-lived and blended among many 
other military actors in the country at the same time, leading to a poor coverage of this group by the 
media and observers.  
Therefore, the occurrence of these outliers in my statistical analysis does not suggest any serious 
flaws in my theory. My examination of the three non-conforming cases, however, reveals several useful 
insights for my theoretical framework and compilation of the dataset. First, it suggested that the variable 
of poverty and its operationalization can be adjuste
ight alter the emphasis of the fighting capacity variable in my argument as the strongest predictor of 
child soldiering. Third, with respect to the dataset, the outliers suggested the importance of identifying the 
cases such as the SSIM/SSIA which can be splinter groups, as opposed to the independent factions, with 
different group characteristics than their predecessors but inheriting child soldiers which were recruited 
by the original faction. Also, as the case of the CSNPD revealed, the dataset should be screened for the 
presence of similar armed groups with short duration and multiple military competitors, for which the 
seeming non-existence of child soldiers could have been simply attributed to a lack of information for 
                                                 
602 Ibid. 
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s were found to be more likely to recruit children if rebels operated 
in conflicts with intense battles (possess high figh apacity in my operationalization) (Hypothesis 1). 
Thi
 effects of my control variables of conflict duration and conflict intensity on child 
sold
iaspora support mattered only for unpopular groups, ethnic persecution affected 
child soldier recruitment in the case of popular insurgencies, as predicted. 
Summary 
The empirical results from the conducted large-N analysis support my argument, fully confirming 
Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4. Armed group
ting c
s relationship was found to be stronger for unpopular rebels (Hypothesis 1.1). Results also showed that 
armed groups engaged more intensively in child recruitment practice if they operated in conflicts 
characterized by extremely insecure conditions (situations of ethnic persecution in my operationalization) 
(Hypothesis 3), with this effect being larger for popular insurgencies (Hypothesis 3.1). The large-N 
analysis findings also corroborate my proposition that armed groups with access to larger territories are 
more likely to recruit children (Hypothesis 4), especially if rebels’ popularity is low (Hypothesis 4.1).  
In my explanatory framework, I suggested that armed groups offering material rewards to their 
members were less likely to have children in their ranks (Hypothesis 2), especially for unpopular 
belligerents (Hypothesis 2.1). This conjecture was only partially supported by the data. Only the increase 
in diaspora support as one of the three potential funding sources of rebel organizations was found to 
reduce the probability of child recruitment, and only for unpopular armed groups, as predicted. When 
measured by the cumulative index of all three types of material support that unpopular rebels might 
receive, or by the index of third state support alone, the factor of material capacity proved to be a weak 
predictor of child soldiering. If measured as access to natural resources, however, the material capacity 
showed the reverse relationship with the dependent variable, compared to what I hypothesized.  
As anticipated, the
iering were found to be insignificant. Poverty was estimated as significant only in a small number of 
model specifications, with relatively weak predictive power, as expected. The effect of conflict timing 
turned out largely significant but smaller than for all other variables in my model. The results also 
suggested that conflict timing could be more important in the case of unpopular armed groups.  
In sum, the empirical tests of my hypotheses revealed that three factors from my argument had the 
strongest effect on the probability of armed groups to recruit child soldiers: groups’ fighting capacity, 
ethnic persecution in the country, and groups’ territorial access. Although insurgents’ material capacity 
was also found to affect child recruitment, it did so to a lesser extent and only when measured in diaspora 
support. Moreover, the findings also demonstrated that all of these factors had different effect magnitude 
and presence for popular and unpopular armed movements, confirming the behavioral patterns proposed 
in my extended argument. More specifically, while fighting capacity, territorial access and material 
capacity measured in d
 Chapter 6: Case Study I 
onitoring 
Gro
as formed 
by 
In this chapter I conduct a cross-group comparative case study of five armed groups from the First 
Liberian Civil War of 1989-96. In Section 1, I offer a brief description of the Liberian conflict and 
introduce its major militarized actors. In Section 2, using the data from my interviews with former child 
soldiers, I establish the difference in child soldier recruitment rates by the five Liberian factions. Then, in 
Section 3, I assess the values of the four explanatory factors proposed in my argument to affect the levels 
of child recruitment practice. I conclude with juxtaposing the predicted values of my dependent variable, 
based on the values of independent variables, with the actual values of child recruitment practices of the 
five Liberian armed groups, and comment on the strength of my argument.  
Section 1. Liberian Conflict and its Five Non-State Actors 
The first Liberian conflict started with the incursion of one of the armed factions, the NPFL (National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia), into the country from Ivory Coast in December 1989.603 The goal of the group 
was to overthrow the ruling regime of President Doe. With about 200 international revolutionary fighters 
under the command of Charles Taylor, the insurgents attacked the government forces in the Nimba 
County, where rebels established their first military base and obtained support from people of the 
oppressed tribes. The NPFL forces managed to push the government troops all the way to the capital city 
of Monrovia while at the same time capturing most of the Liberian territory. The first battle for the capital 
in the summer of 1990 was unsuccessful for the NPFL, as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) intervened by dispatching the peacekeeping force of Ecomog (ECOWAS M
up) to Liberia, preventing Charles Taylor from capturing Monrovia. From that time on until 1996 the 
conflict took the form of intermittent but severe armed struggle. Interrupted only temporarily by over 16 
signed but short-lasting peace agreements, the fighting went on between the NPFL and the government 
forces supported by Ecomog as well as among other factions which soared in numbers during the war.604  
Another Liberian faction, the INPFL (Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia), w
Prince Johnson, who had initially been a member of Taylor’s forces but broke away from the NPFL in 
                                                 
603 This description of the Liberian First Civil War is based on numerous sources. For more information on the 
conflict and its military actors mentioned in this section refer to the following sources, among others: Duyvesteyn, 
Clausewitz and African War, Chapter 2, “Case Study I: Liberia, 1989-97,” pp. 20-36; George Klay Kieh, The First 
Liberian Civil War: The Crises of Underdevelopment, Society and Politics in Africa, Vol. 17 (New York: Peter 
Lang Publishing, 2008), pp. 154-156; and “Liberia – First Civil War – 1989-1996,” Global Security Database, URL: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liberia-1989.htm. For more detailed accounts of the armed 
struggle in Liberia in 1989-96 see also Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional 
Security in West Africa (The Project of the International Peace Academy, 2002); G
Heart of Darkness, Accounts of Liberia’s Civil War and Its Destabilizing Effects in
abriel Williams, Liberia: The 
 West Africa (Trafford 
Publishing, 2002); Huband, The Liberian Civil War; Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy. 
604 For the details on peace accords during the first Liberian conflict see Kieh, The First Liberian Civil War, p. 156. 
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 1990 by taking “the best-trained” fighter orces marched to Monrovia in early 
199
besmen.608 This armed group 
was called Ulimo (Un cted in its name, the 
stat
s with him.605 Johnson’s f
0 before Taylor’s troops in an attempt to oust the Doe regime. After its offensive against the AFL 
troops in Monrovia was unsuccessful, the INPFL cooperated with Ecomog in its new pursuit of 
prohibiting Taylor from taking over the capital. Johnson’s troops were estimated at about 4,000 
combatants.606 After capturing and killing President Doe on September 9, 1990, the INPFL forces 
remained largely inactive: they were contained to their Caldwell base in Monrovia on the orders and 
supervision of Ecomog until the INPFL’s complete dissolution in October 1992.607 
In October 1990, the third faction started forming in Sierra Leonean refugee camps where former 
Krahn and Mandingo politicians and soldiers were recruiting among their tri
ited Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy). As refle
ed goal of Ulimo was “the liberation of Liberian territory from Taylor’s hold.”609 In this effort it was 
supported by Sierra Leone and Guinea.610 In late 1991 the group started incursions from north-west and 
south-west into Liberia and by August 1992 this military offensive “escalated into serious inter-factional 
armed conflict.”611 It was the Ulimo insurgency with its several thousand men that in 1992 helped 
Ecomog “stop the takeover of Monrovia” by the NPFL.612 In March 1994, Ulimo split into two sub-
factions: Ulimo-K and Ulimo-J. The fighting was now continuing between the rival Ulimo-s, as well as 
between them and the NPFL.   
The Ulimo-K faction was headed by Alhaji Kromah and consisted mainly of Mandingo people of 
Guinean Malinke origin. By late 1996, the group had about 9,000 fighters.613 Ulimo-K was regarded as a 
                                                 
605 Duyvesteyn, Clausewitz and African War, p. 26; “Liberia – First Civil War – 1989-1996,” Global Security 
Database. Officially, Johnson declared the independence of his faction in the address to the international media in 
July 1990 (Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 84). However, unofficially the armed group was acting independently of 
Taylor since February 1990, when it marched to Monrovia unilaterally, apparently without Taylor’s order. 
606 T
in th
cited in Paul Collier, “Demobilization and Insecurity: A Study in the Economic of Transition from War to Peace,” 
Journal of International Development, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1994), p. 348.   
607 Kieh, The First Liberian Civil War, p. 147;  “Liberia – First Civil War – 1989-1996,” Global Security Database. 
608 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 89. 
ogie 
ropa 
f 
uggested 
um of 12,000 soldiers was said to 
he figure of 4,000 stands for the average between the minimum of 2,200 and maximum of 6,000 fighters cited 
e literature for the INPFL strength. The minimum of 2,200 combatants is in itself the average of the 400-4,000 
range offered in the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset: Gleditsch, et. al., “Armed Conflict 1946–2001.” The 
maximum benchmark of 6,000 soldiers comes from the estimates of the Liberian combatants broken by factions and 
609 Duyvesteyn, Clausewitz and African War, p. 26, citing Dirk van den Boom, Bürgerkrieg in Liberia: Chronol
– Protagonisten – Prognose, Studien zur Politicwissenschaft, Band 80 (Münster: Lit Verlaf, 1993), p. 48. 
610 Ibid., p. 26. 
611 “Liberia” in Africa South of the Sahara 2004, Regional Surveys of the World (Taylor and Francis Group, Eu
Publications, 2004, 33rd edition), p. 603. 
612 “Liberia – First Civil War – 1989-1996,” Global Security Database. For the size of the group refer to 
Duyvesteyn, Clausewitz and African War, p. 26. 
613 This figure stands for the average of the following estimates which I found in the literature. The lower range o
5,000-6,000 was offered in Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 134; a somewhat higher estimate of 6,800 was s
in Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 449; and yet the maxim
reflect the situation in Liberia by Collier, “Demobilization and Insecurity,” p. 348. 
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 “second-rate” player in the Liberian war compared to the NPFL, but at the same time the armed group 
managed to challenge Taylor’s forces and their territorial control in the north-east of the country.614 The 
Ulimo-J faction consisted of mainly Krahn members under the leadership of Roosevelt Johnson.615 With 
about 6,000 fighters in its ranks, it took hold of some Liberian territories in the north-western part of the 
country.616 During its existence, Ulimo-J engaged in armed struggle for state power with the NPFL, and 
for its immediate commercial interests in diamond mining against the rival faction of Ulimo-K as well as 
the Ecomog forces.  
The LPC group formed in 1991 but launched as an “armed faction,” and allegedly as a proxy for the 
AFL, only in May 1993, as it was drawing its support from “veterans of Doe’s old Special Anti-Terrorist 
Unit.”617 Estimated to have about 3,500 combatants, the LPC “made substantial gains from the NPFL in 
south eastern Liberia, vying for control of commercial operations in timber and rubber.”618 The three 
factions – Ulimo-K, Ulimo-J, and the LPC – albeit acting on their own, were by 1994 challenging the 
exclusive control over Liberia by the NPFL forces.  
In August 1996, after the last and most intense fighting in the capital between all the factions and 
government forces supported by Ecomog, the final cease-fire was brokered between the warring 
factions.619 The NPFL turned out the strongest and the longest-lived faction in this Liberian conflict and 
came out of the war victorious when Charles Taylor won the 1997 elections and became the president of 
Lib
The conservative estimate of the death toll was set at about 150,000-200,000 of the total pre-war 
ured, 
d 
ees and 
eria – a goal that he had been trying to achieve by military and diplomatic means from 1989.  
The war had devastating consequences for the country and was branded as “a descent into hell.”620 
population of 2.5 million.621 “An estimated 50,000 children were killed; many more were inj
orphaned, or abandoned,” with approximately 100 “underfunded” orphanages operating in and aroun
Monrovia after the war.622 More than half of the country’s population was displaced as refug
                                                 
614 Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 453. 
615 “Liberia – First Civil War – 1989-1996,” Global Security Database. 
616 I found three different estimates for the group’s strength in the literature. One source put the number at 3,800 
ditsch, et. al., “Armed Conflict 1946–2001”); and yet third study suggested 
onciliation Resources Database, URL: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/profiles.php. For 
ask of Anarchy, p. 100, who suggests that figure to be 4,650, following 
al Security Database. 
(Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 453, citing the figures form the DDR programs); another 
one specified the number of 7,776 (Gle
the estimate at 8,000 combatants. Therefore, I cite here the middle range number of these three estimates.  
617 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 100. 
618 “Liberia,” C
the estimates of the LPC size refer to Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 449, who sets the 
number at about 2,500, and Ellis, The M
Collier, “Demobilization and Insecurity,” p. 348. 
619 “Liberia – First Civil War – 1989-1996,” Glob
620 Tom Kuhlman, “Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: a Case Study of Liberian Refugees In Côte 
d’Ivoire,” UNHCR Report, EPAU/2002/07, July 2002, p. 9. 
621 Ibid., p. 9.  
622 “Liberia – First Civil War – 1989-1996,” Global Security Database. 
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 IDPs, with the latter amassing in at least 38 camps in the country in 1997.623 The entire country was in 
ruins after destruction and widespread looting. Consider the degree of devastation of the “already 
underdeveloped infrastructure”: “the national hydro plant and water purification systems were destroyed”; 
“the electric poles were stripped of the copper wire and destroyed in some cases”; “bridges were blown 
up as part of some of the groups’ fighting tactics”; public and private buildings, including health facilities, 
were shattered; the roads became even “more impassable.”624 The economic sector of the country was 
barely existent: “all economic production in various sectors… ceased”; cultivation of different crops 
dro
l. Many reporters and monitoring organizations were 
ama
s or 
cumulatively exhibit a somewhat similar trend. The number of children under 18 years old involved in the 
628 That constitutes about 30% to 40% of all 
pped by a proportion ranging from 50% to 80%; and “there was massive capital flight.”625 It was no 
surprise that peace in Liberia, so devastated economically and socially, was short-lived before the second 
war sparked in 1999. 
Section 2. Dependent Variable: Child Recruitment Practices of Five Liberian Factions 
All the parties to the Liberian First Civil War (1989-96) recruited children and the overall scope of 
child soldiering in that armed struggle was substantia
zed to see vast numbers of children among rebels. Accounts similar to the following from Amnesty 
International abide in the practitioner literature:  
“All parties to the Liberian conflict have abducted children, both girls and boys and some as 
young as seven years, and forced them to fight, carry ammunition, prepare food or carry out other 
tasks. Girls have been raped and forced to provide sexual services. Older girls have been actively 
engaged in fighting, while younger ones have provided domestic services as cooks or cleaner
carried arms and ammunition. Many child soldiers have been given drugs and alcohol to induce 
aggression and inhibit fear. With little or no military training, they have been sent directly to the 
front line where many have been killed or wounded. Those resisting recruitment or refusing to 
comply with their commanders’ orders risked being beaten or killed.”626  
 
Agencies found it difficult to claim any specific number of child soldiers in the first Liberian war.627 
However, there were many estimates, offered by different sources and in different contexts, which 
first Liberian war, was roughly estimated at 15,000-20,000.
                                                 
623 Ibid. 
624 Kieh, The First Liberian Civil War, pp. 158-59. 
625 Ibid., p. 158. 
626 Amnesty International, “The Promises of Peace for 21,000 Child Soldiers.” Analogous descriptions can be found 
rogram in 1994 and a comprehensive one in 1996-1997, more 
rs should be interpreted with caution as 
 the 
of 15,000 stands specifically for children under 18 years old and was cited by the Human Rights 
rt, February 2004, Vol. 16, No. 2 (A), p. 1. 
in reports issued by the UNICEF, HRW or their overarching CSUCS organization. 
627 During the conflict in 1994 the Human Rights Watch reported:  “No one knows the exact number of children who 
have been used in the civil war in Liberia; even the total number of fighters used by all factions is unknown” (HRW, 
Easy Prey, pp. 2-3). After a brief demobilization p
estimates on child and adult combatants surfaced. However, these numbe
demobilization programs do not necessarily reflect recruitment trends. For an example of such discrepancy see
discussion of the Liberian DDR program in footnote 583. 
628 The number 
Watch, How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia, HRW Repo
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 47,000 combatants as of 1997.629 This child soldier rate, calculated after examining absolute numbers of 
child and adult combatants, appears to be slightly higher than the estimates in the range of 18% and 30% 
offered by different agencies.630 Thus, the reported percentages vary from 18% to 40%. The overall 
estimate of participating minors represented 3% of the Liberian pre-war child population, according to 
one source.631 The DDR statistics suggest that 60% of former child soldiers who went through 
demobilization were active combatants. Two percent of these were reported to be female.632 Most child 
soldiers “spent an average of four or more years with a warring faction.”633 Child soldier experiences can 
be reconstructed from the following DDR data distribution: “some 51% shot an average of ten people, 
11% engaged in rape, 17% inflicted torture and 3.2% practiced cannibalism.”634 
While the scope of Liberian child soldiering, reflected in the above numbers, percentages, and 
accoun inors 
acro
                                                                                    
ts is indeed striking, taken at the country level it obscures the variation in the recruitment of m
ss armed groups. Meanwhile, military factions in the First Liberian Civil War differed considerably in 
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rang d in the UN Consolidated 
Interagency Appeal in November 1993 and was considered by other observes to be too high to reflect the reality 
(HR
afte  
t h
Thus, a 30% figure appears in the Human Rights Watch’s report of 1994 on the participation of children in the 
Liberian conflict. In this document, the HRW refers to the estimates of another organization: “UNICEF estimates 
0 of the fighters, or 10 percent, are children under fifteen. In general, most observers agree that all the 
ome estimate that another 20 percent of the fighters are between 
 and seventeen” (HRW, Easy Prey, pp. 2-3).  
nd that “according to UN 
 
, cited in Ismail, “Liberia’s Child Combatants,” p. 125. 
figure of 20,000 also appears in some reports: “Over 20,000 child combatants were involved in the 1989–97 
rian civil war…” (Olawale Ismail, “Liberia’s Child Combatants: Paying the Price of Neglect,” Conflict, Security 
evelopment, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 2002, p. 125. 
he figure of 47,000 combatants represents the average of low (33,000) and high (60,000) estimates for the 
bers of Liberian fighters which different sources identified for the country’s first civil war. The lowest estima
3,000 combatants was offered by the UN as a result of its Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in 1996 (U
nty-second Progressive Report of the Secretary-General of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia, S/1997/237, 
ch 1997, URL: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomilFT.htm). Human Rights Watch cited th
e of 40,000-60,000 combatants and noted that its higher bound of 60,000 was cite
W, Easy Prey, p. 2.). Similar figure of 60,000 was reported in Mats Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilization 
r Civil War, Adelphi Paper No. 303 (London: IISS and Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 43. The total number
of fighters demobilized in Liberia between November 22, 1996 and February 9, 1997 was reported to be between 
20,332 and 21,315 (UN, Twenty-second Progressive Report of the Secretary-General of the UN Observer Mission in 
Liberia). 
630 Observers, who were witnessing the Liberian conflict’s development, and organizations, estimating the dire 
situation of the armed struggle in the country in 1994, tend to repor igher percentages of children in armed groups. 
that 6,00
factions are made up largely of very young people; s
the ages of fifteen
 The lower bound of 18% in the cited child soldiers range reflects the estimates offered after the UN 
demobilization programs in Liberia conducted in 1997. For example, one source fou
figures, by 9 February 1997, 24,500 of fighters had been disarmed and demobilized. These included 4,306 child 
fighters [or 18% - the author’s comment] and 250 adult female fighters” (UN, Twenty-second Progressive Report of 
the Secretary-General of the UNOMIL).  
631 Ismail, “Liberia’s Child Combatants, p. 125. 
632 David Kelly, The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Liberia, 1994–1997: The
Process and Lessons Learned (New York: UNICEF, 1998)
633 Ibid., p. 125. 
634 Ibid., p. 125. 
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 their practice of child recruitment, as my field research demonstrated.635 Table 13 below summarizes my 
estimates of percentages of child soldiers relative to adults in five Liberian armed factions.  
 
Table 13. Child Soldiers in Armed Groups of the First Liberian Civil War (1989-1996) 
 
Armed 
Faction 
Ratio of Children 
to Adults in Units 
Ratio of Children to 
Adults in Battalions 
Ratio of Children to 
Adults in Brigades 
Child 
Recruitment 
NPFL 60-100% 60% {50%} HIGH 
LPC 66-90%  50% HIGH 
Ulimo-K 50%-66%  {40%} MEDIUM HIGH 
Ulimo-J 50%  30% MEDIUM LOW 
INPFL <50% “generally older men” {<30%} LOW 
Note: The percentages in brackets are the extrapolated ratios.636 
 
These ranges were calculated on the basis of the data from my own interviews with former Liberian child 
soldiers. More specifically, my informants were asked to comment on the relative numbers of child 
ot 
d or 
 the 
e 
 
 the 
ot 
tioned on the group’s base in Gbarnga, where 
 was 
soldiers and adult combatants in the military division they served in. For those informants who were n
good with numbers I gave an option to draw the shares of children and adults on pie charts or bars. 
Therefore, the percentages used in this section were derived from the absolute numbers provide
reflected in the visual representation of informants’ drawings.637  
I also checked for potential discrepancies in these figures against a number of secondary sources to 
the best of my effort, as this information is extremely hard to find – indeed virtually non-existent in
literature. While almost no study mentioned any numeric data on the scope of child recruitment for fiv
Liberian armed groups examined here, some provided relevant information which could be used in
combination with my data, obtained during the interviews, to construct a more or less reliable albeit 
approximate child to adult ratios. The outcome should be viewed as a valuable contribution to
knowledge about different armed groups in Liberian conflict and their child recruitment practices.    
The percentage of child soldiers in certain units, where my informants served as combatants, may n
reflect the percentage in an armed group as a whole. For example, the NPFL’s infamous Small Boys Unit 
(SBU) consisted of almost 100% of children. It was sta
children recruited elsewhere were often delivered for training and redistribution. Since the SBU
                                                 
635 According to my knowledge, there is no existing study that identified different child recruitment practices across 
y’s first civil war.  
fering percentages. Therefore, in the majority of cases I did not attempt to ask largely uneducated 
 suggest the percentages of children relative to adults. 
Liberian armed groups participating in the countr
636 For description on how they were determined refer to the material of this chapter below. 
637 As expected, I found upon several experiments that my informants were dealing better with numbers and 
drawings than of
Liberian youth to
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 designed specifically for underage combatants, it is possible that former child soldiers who commented on 
the numbers of children in their units were referring to smaller divisions of the SBU. Therefore, this 
information may not be representative of the average rate of child recruitment for the NPFL group 
ove ll. nal 
str  th oup a sy ree diffe ision 
le e lio
e Liber s in my analysis resembled the militar hy of the NPFL, which, in 
turn ted its organizational system from the y.638 The whole group was subdivi  four 
b ch con ur battalions. The ions were, in tu osed of ‘
forces, mentioned ab four infantry battalions of the N  each assig  
gr brigade esides on rigade included artillery, marine, and special 
 
ad many other units which 
most likely
 
brigade level 
ra To address this issue, in my assessment of child soldier ratios I account for the organizatio
ucture of
vels of arm
e Liberian armed gr
d forces: units, batta
s and analyze the dat
ns, and brigades.  
stematically across th rent div
All fiv ian faction y hierarc
, adop  U.S. Arm ded into
rigades, ea sisting of fo  battal rn, comp units’.639 The SBU 
ove, constituted PFL, ned to one of the
oup’s four s. 640 B e SBU battalion, each b
security forces battalions. My interviewees commented on the distribution of children and adults at
various levels of the groups’ structure: some of them attested to their units’ composition, while others had 
knowledge of battalions’ or even brigades’ age distribution.  
With units aggregating to battalions and these in turn adding up to brigades, the actual scope of child 
recruitment in a group would most closely approximate the ratio of children to adults at the level of 
brigades. This is because my data covered only some units of each of the five Liberian groups. 
Meanwhile, besides the units for which the data was provided, the groups h
 had lower child to adult ratios, as they were not represented in my survey data. Thus, as the 
NPFL example demonstrates, the SBU battalions were the only ones made primarily of children, with 
other three battalions (artillery, marine, and special security forces) also having children but to a smaller 
degree, according to my survey.  
Therefore, reconstructing the data on groups’ child to adults ratios on the basis of my data, I would 
expect a decreasing percentages with aggregation at higher levels of the organizational hierarchy, with 
highest ratios in the lowest division (a unit), and the lowest at the level of ‘brigades’. While data at the
is indeed more indicative of the group’s overall child recruitment practice, unfortunately, it 
was not available for all armed groups in my case study. This is where knowledge about the composition 
                                                 
638 The following information is based on my interview with a former NPFL soldier who was serving in the 
statistical office of the NPFL (Ghana, winter 2008). 
639 In the U.S. Army the ‘unit’ level is represented by several divisions, such as platoons, squads, and companies. 
These were not a part of the NPFL’s and other Liberian groups’ structure, as none of my informants mentioned such 
e structure should be called ‘Forces’, out of 
as the ‘Small Boys 
fourth 
tical office of the NPFL.    
break-down.   
640 The word ‘Unit’ in the SBU acronym is, technically, incorrect. Th
which four NPFL’s battalions were made. Sometimes in the literature the SBU is mentioned 
Battalion’, but often mistakenly so as the authors of reports refer to all children in the NPFL, rather than one 
of all ‘Small Boys Forces’ in the group, for which the word ‘battalion’ should stand for.  I clarified this confusion 
with the former NPFL soldier, mentioned above, who served in the statis
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 of units and battalions, as opposed to brigades, becomes useful, as it allows comparison or systematic 
extrapolation of child soldier ratios across Liberian armed groups when contrasted on the same 
organizational level. 
The information I obtained during my surveys, and in greater detail during the interviews with former 
Liberian child soldiers, confirmed that all other four armed factions besides the NPFL were also 
structured around units, battalions, and brigades. Moreover, similar to the NPFL, other Liberian factions 
had
 of armed struggle. The following account is 
just
ithout thinking.”642 
                                                
 units designed specifically for child soldiers. For instance, the Special Forces of the INPFL were 
reported to recruit more children than any other of its units.641 The LPC apparently had its own SBU, 
matching not only the NPFL’s structure but even specific names of divisions. This similarity of military 
organization of different Liberian factions justifies comparison of their child soldier ratios across one 
another. In what follows I comment on child recruitment of each armed group involved in the First 
Liberian Civil War. 
The NPFL armed group resorted to massive recruitment of children from the initial stage of its 
existence and engaged in the practice throughout the duration
 one example among many in the literature remarking on the group’s child recruitment:  
“When Taylor attacked, and gained ground and support in Nimba in 1989 and 1990, he 
immediately developed a useful and innovative tactic that eventually came to symbolize the 
depravity of the war for many observers: the NPFL’s Small Boys Unit. Taylor consciously 
recruited young boys to form special units of intensely loyal rebels, unburdened by the 
independence of thought or moral restraint of adulthood – a prepubescent Liberian rebel version 
of the cult of personality. The small boys, who uniformly refer to Taylor as “our father,” 
participated in all aspects of rebel conduct, including serving in front line combat operations, 
atrocities against civilian populations, and even rape. UNOMIL’s Chief Operating Officer told 
Africa Watch, “It’s a children’s war. Kids get promoted in rank for committing an atrocity; they 
can cut off someone’s head w
 
The number of child soldiers in the NPFL appears to be staggering.643 Consider, for example, the 
following testimony of a man who lived in a suburb of Monrovia and whose house was attacked by the 
armed group in July 1990: “about 70 per cent of the rebels were all teenagers ranging from, say, twelve to 
seventeen years.”644 This witness account matches the information provided by the NPFL child 
participants whom I interviewed. The minimum ratio of children to adults mentioned by informants for 
 
s, Civil War in Liberia, and Evil Triumphant,” Human Rights 
a 
hat due to the vast numbers of children in the NPFL ranks Charles Taylor’s group and its child 
e NPFL. 
641 From my interview with an NPFL combatant in Ghana, winter 2008. 
642 Kenneth Cain, “The Rape of Dinah: Human Right
Quarterly, Vol. 21, Issue 2, 1999, pp. 265-307, at pp. 278-279, citing HRW, Easy Prey, and Stephen Ellis, “Liberi
1989-94: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence,” African Affairs, Vol. 94, Issue 165, 1995. 
643 It is possible t
recruitment practices became so widely known around the world. 
644 Ellis, Mask of Anarchy, p. 113, citing Leonard Brehun, Liberia: The War of Horror (Adwinsa Publications: 
Accra, 1991), p. 45. It is possible that this witness has encountered a group from the Small Boys Unit, which by 
definition consisted primarily of underage fighters. However, as I show further, from my interviews with former 
Liberian child soldiers I concluded that this account might well represent the situation in any unit of th
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 NPFL units – the lowest division in the group’s structure – was 66% (or two thirds), and the maximum 
reached 100%.645 Another ratio cited by my interviewees was 70%, and in their verbal assessments some 
informants mentioned “more children than adults” in their units. Ratios of children to adults for several 
NP
ruitment variable for Taylor’s faction is therefore assigned the value of ‘high’.  
hat 18% was 
“the te 
the is 
is e al 
sec he 
dem he 
actu y 
surv DR program. Indeed, the 1997 program was limited 
and far fro
FL battalions, except the SBU with 100%, were reported to be over 60%.  
No NPFL informant was in a position to comment on the numbers of child soldiers in the brigades to 
which their divisions used to belong. However, since the SBU battalions were the primary and the only 
infantry divisions of the NPFL, it can be estimated that their forces were disproportionately 
overrepresented in each of the faction’s four brigades, compared to other three battalions. Thus, the NPFL 
brigades, consisting of the SBU battalions with close to 100% child to adults ratio, and of three other 
battalions (artillery, marine, and special security forces), which also used children to a considerable 
degree according to my survey, could altogether make more than a half of all children in the ranks of the 
NPFL. The child rec
It is noteworthy that demobilization programs conducted in Liberia in 1997 recorded only 18% of 
child soldiers in the NPFL. However, closer analysis of the Liberian conflict casts serious doubts on such 
a small percentage of children in the faction’s ranks. For instance, Olawale Ismail stated t
 fewest number of child soldiers” demobilized under the Liberian DDR program in 1996-1997 despi
fact that the NPFL had “the largest number of child combatants in its ranks.”646 According to him, th
xplained by the fact that most members of the NPFL “have been reassigned to internal and extern
urity units” of the new government army of Charles Taylor in 1997 and thus did not go through t
obilization process.647 Another reason to doubt that such a low demobilization rate could indicate t
al rates of the NPFL child soldiers is the fact that out of over 200 former Liberian child soldiers in m
ey, only one person reported taking part in any D
m representative to generate any reliable figures on distribution of combatants or child soldiers 
across armed groups.648  
                                                 
645 For the information on how the percentages were assigned by me on the basis of the data provided by informants 
refer back to pp. 144 45 of this chapter. Here the ratio 66%, for example, stands for the unit with 75 people in it, of 
which approximately 50 were reported by the informant to be under 18 and about 25 over 18 years old.   
646 Ismail, “Liberia’s Child Combatants,” 
-1
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713411970~db=all~tab=issueslist~branches=2-v2 p. 132. 
b=all~tab=issueslist~branches=2-v2 p. 
ressive Report of the 
 in 
ousands of youth did not participate in the 
n (of 
ds 
 
647 Ibid.,http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713411970~d
132. 
648 Consider that the disarmament and demobilization program in Liberia lasted only three months as it was 
launched on November 22, 1996 and terminated on February 9, 1997 (UN, Twenty-second Prog
Secretary-General of the UNOMIL). Ilene Cohn offers a useful insight on how demobilization program in Liberia
1996-97 missed a large proportion of youth: “Hundreds, perhaps th
demobilization, possibly detained by their commanders or even by communities that reportedly captured childre
other tribes) during the fighting and kept them as forced labour. As for those youth enticed to demobilize, many 
were excluded from protective services due to their age at the moment of demobilization. In fact there are thousan
who entered the conflict as youth and spent their adolescence in the factions only to reach peace as adults, never
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 Another rampant recruiter of children was the LPC faction of George Boley. According to one (non-
representative) survey of demobilized youth by the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office 
(UNHACO) in 1996, 37% of the demobilized combatants from the LPC were children.649 My informants 
reported the range of 66% (or two thirds) for the units other than SBUs, where the rate was indeed higher 
and
orted 
betw
ed groups (namely, the NPFL, the LPC and Ulimo-K) as recruiters of child 
 reached 90%. Yet another unit of the LPC called the ‘Alligator Group’, according to my informants, 
was made primarily for child soldiers and had between 75% and 86% of children relative to adults.650 One 
informant reported on the composition of his LPC brigade as being split in half between children and 
adults.651 With overwhelming number of children relative to adults in some LPC units, as well as up to 
50% of minors reported for the group’s highest military division – a ‘brigade’ – the insurgency’s child 
recruitment practice can be assessed at a ‘high’ level, similar to the NPFL. 
Recruitment of children by the Ulimo-K faction was milder than one by the NPFL or the LPC, but 
still a considerable one, as the following numerical representations demonstrate. My informants rep
een 50% and 66% of children in some units with one former child soldier mentioning that there were 
“more children than adults” in his unit. The data for ratios of children to adults in battalions or brigades of 
Ulimo-K were, unfortunately, not available. However, one might extrapolate percentages smaller than the 
ones reported for the group’s units. Note that if the NPFL and the LPC were said to have about 50% of 
children in their brigades, while amassing at least 80% of children at the ‘unit’ levels of divisions. 
Therefore, it might be conjectured that, since Ulimo-K had a reported unit range of about 60% of 
children, the ratio of minors to adults in the group’s brigades (and therefore the faction as a whole) could 
be around 40%. Overall, the data point at a lesser but still prominent trend of child recruitment for the 
Ulimo-K group relative to the NPFL or the LPC. On the basis of the available information, I assigned for 
Ulimo-K the value of ‘moderate high’ on the dependent variable of child recruitment.  
In its report on Liberian Human Rights Practices during 1995, the U.S. Department of State 
mentioned only three arm
                                                                                                                                                       
again to be “of concern” as child soldiers and yet having no childhood identity apart from war monger and war 
 numerical extent of this group of young men (they could number as high 
t to 
y support at all in the process. These unprotected youth received a package of vegetable oil and 
ble 
victim. The UNHACO statistics reflect the
as 10,000–15,000), but we may never know how they have been affected and how they are managing to readap
civilian life. Others were under eighteen but failed to identify themselves as in need of family tracing, a prerequisite 
to qualify for an
bulgur wheat (described by faction leader Roosevelt Johnson, now Minister of Rural Development, as “some edi
fat and half a bag of bulgur wheat”) and many had nowhere to go or no way to reach their destination” (Ilene Cohn, 
“The Protection of Child Soldiers during the Liberian Peace Process,” The International Journal of Children’s 
Rights, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 1998, pp. 179–220, at pp. 196-197). 
649 Cohn, “The Protection of Child Soldiers during the Liberian Peace Process,” p. 196. 
650 Three of my informants reported to serve in this unit and one of them specifically characterized it as being 
composed of child soldiers. 
651 The reported division was called ‘Jungle Cat Brigade’.  
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 sold
e “generally older men with 
exte
material capacity, 
ethn
which I identified for the five armed groups in Section 2. The qualitative information compiled in my 
analysis and presented below to identify the values for the four independent variables is summarized in 
 
 
iers.652 While the absence of the INPFL on this list might be due to the group’s dissolution in 1992, 
the lack of any reference to Ulimo-J might corroborate the findings from my interviews, which suggest 
that this group was not a significant recruiter of children. Informants in my sample reported 50% or fewer 
children in two of the faction’s units, and only a 30% ratio in two of its brigades. As these percentages 
exceed the ones I identify further down in the text for the INPFL armed group, in relative terms Ulimo-J’s 
overall child recruitment practice is assigned the value of ‘medium low’.  
The INPFL armed faction was another moderate recruiter of child soldiers. The group’s units, where 
my informants served, were reported to have less than 50% of children. With this count, at the level of 
brigades the INPFL could have less than 30% of children. According to one ethnographic account of the 
Liberian conflict, many of Prince Johnson’s INPFL Special Forces wer
nsive military experience.”653 Meanwhile, as one of my informants indicated, the Special Forces 
represented the INPFL’s major battle unit and therefore must have absorbed more children than other 
divisions, such as the Guard Unit or the Battalion Unit.654 Thus it appears that at their battalion level the 
Special Forces of the INPFL had more adults than children in their ranks. Overall, although Prince 
Johnson’s group did have some children in its ranks, there were fewer of them than adults. Therefore, the 
value of the child soldiering variable in the case of the INPFL is designated as ‘low’. 
Section 3. Independent Variables: Do Armed Groups Differ in their Crucial Characteristics? 
 As described in Chapter 4 on methodology, the congruence method that I am employing in 
conducting my cross-case comparison of five Liberian armed factions is performed in three stages: 1) I 
identify the values of my independent variables; 2) I predict the outcome of the dependent variable on the 
basis of these values; and 3) I compare the actual outcomes of the case with the predicted values. More 
specifically, I examine across all five armed groups the values of fighting capacity, 
ic persecution, and territorial access. I then use this information to generate predicted rates of 
factions’ child soldier recruitment. Next, I compare these with the actual levels of children to adults, 
Tables A1, A2, A3 and A4 in the Appendices.  
Fighting Capacity 
The fighting capacity variable in my argument represents the demand for fighters, as I hypothesize
that the ability to challenge the government increases the goals and ambitions of armed groups. The
                                                 
652 U.S. Department of State, Liberia Human Rights Practices, 1995, March 1996, URL: 
tml (last accessed on 
y, p. 113. 
na, winter 2008. 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_africa/Liberia.h
November 17, 2008). 
653 Ellis, The Mask of Anarch
654 From my interview with an INPFL ex-combatant in Gha
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 leaders of military effective factions, according to a stylized fact from my argument, often decide to make 
an attempt to overtake the capital or seriously challenge their opponent elsewhere. The NPFL faction 
from my case study clearly exhibited a higher level of fighting capacity relative to its major adversary – 
the government forces of the AFL, as well as to all other Liberian factions. According to Ellis, “the 
biggest and most powerful faction by most standards was the NPFL.”655 At the beginning of the conflict 
the NPFL overtook almost all Liberian territory in a very short period of time. The group’s achievement 
cou
 afford to lie on 
 Second, substantial AFL casualties scared many of its 
to tribal politics within the forces and, ultimately, increased desertion rates, as the 
foll
ld be contributed primarily to the striking inability of the AFL to suppress the rebel insurgency in the 
countryside, rather than to any extraordinary fighting skills of the NPFL fighters. In fact, unlike some 
other groups in the Liberian conflict, Taylor’s forces did not have many professional soldiers in their 
ranks.656 Despite this, however, “things were going badly for the AFL at the battlefront in Nimba County” 
in 1990 and most of the AFL soldiers sent to the countryside perished or deserted in fear.657 The 
ineffectiveness of the government forces could be attributed to the fact that the AFL soldiers were “unable 
to distinguish the NPFL guerrillas among a generally hostile population,” and, hence, “could make no 
headway, even with help from US military advisors.”658 AFL’s helplessness in fighting the NPFL in the 
Nimba County is well summarized in the following account: 
“It wasn’t the culture of Doe’s soldiers to fight in the bush, and neither could they
the ground in a fighting position as this would soil their uniforms. They would rather wait for the 
rebels on the highway where no mud would make their boots dirty than pursue them in the bush. 
Rain too was their enemy. They always ensured they drove to the heart of the battlefield, a 
practice which accounted for their constant destruction in truck-loads by the rebels. Not one 
soldier would survive the ambush to relay the story at the barracks. Yet their colleagues would be 
seen decorated with magazines, holding their M16 rifles and looking more intimidating than actor 
Rambo in the way they bluffed round Monrovia as if they were going for a walkover with the 
rebels.”659  
 
These losses of the first AFL army units dispatched to the Nimba County undermined the 
government’s fighting capacity even further, as the initial failure to suppress the rebellion had two 
consequences. First, the AFL had to recruit more soldiers from both its reserves and general population in 
Monrovia. Witnesses noted that “young recruits were haphazardly trained and dispatched to the warfront 
to fight a war they were least equipped for.”660
fighters, which led 
owing account elaborates:  
                                                 
655 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 135. 
656 As I discuss below in the relevant sub-section, the INPFL, the LPC and Ulimo-J, for instance, had former 
narchy, p. 78. 
professional army soldiers in their ranks.  
657 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 77; Ogunleye, Behind Rebel Line, p.17.  
658 Ellis, The Mask of A
659 Ogunleye, Behind Rebel Line, p. 17. 
660 Ibid., p. 30. 
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 “In the early days, men of all tribes were sent to the warfront, but when the death toll began to 
soar, Doe devised a strategy of preserving soldiers of his own Krahn tribe by sending only men of 
other ethnic groups to the battlefield. While Krahn soldiers remained secure in Monrovia, many 
soldiers of other tribes died in large numbers in the hands of the rebels. This caused a lot of 
resentment in the army. The result was mass defection and desertion, which explained why the 
remnants of Doe’s forces, the AFL, were mostly of Krahn tribe.”661   
 
Since the core Krahn soldiers in the AFL were also the most trained ones, soldiers who were sent to the 
battlefront were probably the ones with the least military experience. Moreover, they were the ones with 
the weakest allegiance to the Krahn and Mandingo tribes, and thus could have no reservations to defect to 
the NPFL.662 Assisted by the internal problems within the AFL army, that undermined its own potential 
capability to challenge the rebels, the NPFL, with its superior guerrilla tactics, was clearly outperforming 
the conventional government army in the countryside.663 This allowed the group to take over most of the 
Liberian territory during the first several months of the conflict.  
It was this stunning victory in the Nimba County followed by driving the government forces out of 
other Liberian territories that intensified the NPFL’s determination to achieve its goal – overthrowing the 
Doe government in Monrovia. Ultimately, Taylor’s forces lost all three major battles for the capital that 
they ke 
Mo g, 
this ct 
mil ng 
the  to 
the FL 
arm  herefore assessed as ‘high’ in my analysis. According to my argument, the level of child 
sold
 initiated, thus unable to defeat the government completely.664 But the failure of the NPFL to overta
nrovia at the end should not be a part of my assessment of the group’s fighting capacity. If anythin
 loss can be treated as an unfortunate outcome of the faction’s ability to face its opponent in a dire
itary confrontation. What is more important, though, is that all three times, I argue, before stormi
capital, Charles Taylor and his military command held a belief that their fighting capacity relative
government was sufficiently strong to win the Monrovia battles. The fighting capacity of the NP
ed g oup is tr
ier recruitment in Taylor’s group is then predicted to be ‘high’.  
                                                 
661 Ibid., p. 31. 
662 As I elaborate at length later in this chapter, Krahn and Mandingo were targeted by the NPFL for persecution.  
663 It should not be implied that the AFL was a badly trained army. As Ellis correctly notices, the AFL was “an 
infinitely more experienced fighting unit than the NPFL” and it had modern weapons “in contrast to the ancient and 
poorly-maintained Beretta machine-guns which many NPFL fighters had received from old Libyan arsenals” in the 
initial stages of the conflict (Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 116, 118). However, whereas experience and weapon 
arsenals of the AFL were indeed crucial in determining its military capacity, these virtues were probably more 
suitable for the conventional war a
terrain. Meanwhile, the fact that th
s opposed to guerrilla fighting in the bushes of the Nimba County and other rural 
e NPFL was not engaging in conventional battles at that stage of the conflict but 
rather embarked on guerrilla struggle is widely admitted in the literature (for an example see Ogunleye, Behind 
Rebel Line, p. 133). To stress its difference from the conventional army, for example, the group introduced specific 
r instance, Ellis refers to rebel’s strange image, that included wigs, nick-
er 
nd live drab-clad soldiers of Doe’s army” (Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 
mple, could be cited as the utmost 
duct of war. 
he armed contestations for the capital in July 1990, Operation Octopus in 
, and the 7-week long April 6 War that started in April 1996. 
‘dress code’ and behavior in its units. Fo
names, cars with mottos on them, as “a technique used by Liberians preparing for traditional forms of war rath
than attempting to imitate the US-trained a
115). As to the behavior within the ranks of the group, cannibalism, for exa
expression of the non-conventional con
664 The three major battles I refer to are t
November 1992
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 The LPC faction also proved to be a strong armed group in terms of its ability to create a significa
llenge to its major opponent – the NPFL. Right after its launch at the end of 1993, by attacking t
ls, the George Boley’s armed group gained from Taylor’s forces a large portion of Liberi
itories, and put up a staunch resistance in defensive battles against the NPFL fighters.
nt 
cha he 
rebe an 
terr gh 
fighting capacity of the LPC can be explained by several factors. First, the group increased its fighting 
e Charles Taylor – an achievement that 
oth
Ulimo-K was one of the serious military actors in the First Liberian Civil War, it can be 
n 
 
665 The hi
capacity relative to the NPFL by undermining the latter with its infamous but effective ‘scorched earth’ 
(or ‘wasteland’) policy. The Boley’s group displaced civilians from the territories captured from Taylor’s 
forces to the zones of its control and then burned the villages and destroyed the infrastructure of potential 
NPFL supporters.666 Second, at least in the initial stages of its existence, the LPC was supported by 
Ecomog and the AFL.667  
Overall, I argue, the value of the fighting capacity variable for the LPC relative to its major opponent, 
the NPFL, was ‘high’. It was sufficient to substantially challeng
er factions did not attain. It was this initial success on the battlefront that made LPC’s commanders 
aim for more victories. Unlike the NPFL, the LPC did not have to fight for the capital to get to power. On 
the contrary, it represented the capital’s government while fighting a proxy war in alliance with the AFL 
and Ecomog. What constituted the LPC’s highest goal was, if not to crush the NPFL completely, then at 
least push Taylor’s forces from as much territory as possible. In future peace talks this would secure for 
the LPC a stronger negotiating position weighted against the relative amount of territory under the 
faction’s military control. The high fighting capacity of the LPC allowed it to pursue this goal to the 
extent that by 1995 its leader George Boley was competing for presidency along with Charles Taylor in 
the political arena of Monrovia.668 To achieve this indeed required more soldiers for capturing and 
defending as much territory from the NPFL as possible. Therefore, boosting its forces could be a likely 
reason for resorting to higher child soldier recruitment by the LPC.  
Although 
ar
before the split of Ulimo into two sub-factions in 1994, the still united group was unable to offer a serious
                                                
gued that the faction did not match the high fighting capacity of the NPFL and the LPC. First, eve
 
665 For example, one of my respondents commented on how the group sustained numerous attacks and defensive
armed clashes with Taylor’s forces between the Bong and Grand Bassa Counties (From my interview with a former 
LPC child soldier (Ghana, winter 2008)).  
666 “The Liberian Democratic Future Speaks on Issues of the Day,” The Perspective, April 9, 1998; “Liberia,” 
Conciliation Resources Database. This type of strategy was quite famous in many African conflicts. For example, in 
Burundian war the government displaced Hutu civilians and put them into IDP camps guarded by the state arm
soldiers in order to cut any civilian support to Hutu re
 
y 
bels – be it food supplies or the flow of recruits.   
667 Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 453; Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 102.  
668 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 107. 
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 cha
velope politics” and represented a widespread practice in the Liberian conflict, 
whe
 military presence in Gbarnga again. 
                                                
llenge to Taylor’s forces.669 Second, Ulimo-K did not achieve many military victories over its major 
opponent of the NPFL in direct military confrontation. Two of the primary Ulimo-K’s territorial gains – 
the upper Lofa County and parts of the Bong County – were both controversial. The faction’s leader, 
Alhaji Kromah, with his Mandingo tribe wing, successfully entered into Liberia from Sierra Leone in 
August 1992, prior to the split of Ulimo. There were two remarkable facets about that military operation, 
however. First, it was reported that Kromah’s wing of Ulimo had support of Ecomog commanders. For 
comparison, the group’s earlier failure to defeat Taylor in May and June of 1992 could be attributed to a 
lack of Ecomog’s assistance.670 Second, the victory in August was due to treachery, with Ecomog officers 
being reported “to bribe some of Taylor’s commanders” to allow Ulimo fighters through enemy lines.671 
This tactic was called “en
reby commanders of different armed groups received money (presumably, in an envelope) from their 
group’s opponents to “lose” certain strategic military targets.  
In September 1994, Ulimo-K successfully overtook Taylor’s stronghold at the Gbarnga base. 
However, similar to Kromah’s entry into Liberia in 1992, this military offensive was also a part of an 
operation supported by Ecomog, this time combined with the anti-NPFL coalition forces. The latter 
alliance was formed by 1994 under the LPC leader George Boley and composed of the LPC itself, the 
Lofa Defense Forces (LDF), and the Central Revolutionary Council of the NPFL (NPFL-CRC).672 The 
success of ULIMO-K in the operation to overtake Gbarnga was not attributed to the enhanced support of 
the coalition forces, however. Time and again, envelope politics interfered with the military standoff. This 
time Ecomog and the coalition bribed the NPFL’s prominent General Nixon Gaye as well as General 
Cassius Jacobs in charge of defending Gbarnga.673 This event was nicknamed “Operation Envelope” 
among the NPFL fighters.674 Shortly after Ulimo-K and coalition forces ‘conquered’ the NPFL’s base, 
Taylor’s forces recaptured it and in December 1994 established their
Since the NPFL was not the only armed group where commanders took bribes, as the examples below 
demonstrate, insurgents’ ultimate gains and losses can be attributed to their actual fighting strength. For 
 
669 As one of my informants put it, “Taylor had advantage over Ulimo” (from my interview with a former Ulimo 
child soldier).  
670 For the Ecomog’s support to the Ulimo-K faction see Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 98. Armed events between 
Ulimo and the NPFL in the upper Lofa County in May and June of 1992 are coded in the ACLED database as not 
he Mask of Anarchy, p. 98). 
e 
e NPFL for 
. 117. 
resulting in any territorial transfers from the NPFL to Ulimo-K.  
671 After this incident Taylor purged his ranks which led to the disappearance of a number of high-ranking NPFL 
officers “in a wave of executions” (Ellis, T
672 The NPFL-CRC was yet another armed faction in the Liberian conflict, a small-sized one that broke from th
NPFL in about 1994 (Major I.A. Nass, A Study in Internal Conflicts: The Liberian Crisis and The West African 
Peace Initiative (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd, 2000), pp. 115-116). 
673 Like many other NPFL generals who mutinied against Taylor, Gaye and Jacobs were “executed by th
treason” (Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 142).   
674 Nass, A Study in Internal Conflicts, p
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 instance, in the above example of the Gbarnga overtake by Ulimo-K and the coalition forces, it took the 
NPFL only two months to retake the base. Ironically enough, however, this recapture was also attributed 
to the envelope politics, this time in reverse. Apparently, the “NPFL leadership settled up the ULIMO-K 
leadership with money to facilitate the recapture of Gbarnga.”675 With the counter-bribing effect, what 
remains important for assessing groups’ fighting capacity is the outcome of the actual power struggle. As 
to the Gbarnga base, for example, there were no other military attempts from Ulimo-K and the coalition 
forces to capture it as they retreated, leaving the base under the NPFL’s control until the end of the war. 
The known examples of direct military confrontation between the opponents without any apparent 
envelope politics involved could be more indicative of the armed groups’ fighting capacity. Thus, for 
Ulimo-K such a situation did not occur until 1995, one year after its split from Ulimo, when it engaged in 
battles with the NPFL for the Lofa County. Ulimo-K lost all of these armed contests.676 This evidence 
points to the fact that Ulimo-K must have had a lower fighting capacity than the NPFL. There might be 
sev
 
Leo
                                                
eral reasons for Kromah’s group military ineffectiveness. First, the faction was organized around the 
core of Liberian politicians and businessmen, not army personnel, as in the case of the LPC armed group, 
for instance, which could actually withstand the direct armed confrontation with the NPFL.677 Second, 
and probably more importantly, Ulimo-K’s fighting capacity could be undermined by its constant armed 
struggle with another opponent – Ulimo-J. This contest effectively created the second war theater for 
Kromah’s forces. 
Although it is clear that Ulimo-K’s fighting capacity was lower than the one of the NPFL and the 
LPC, it is also seen from the evidence above that the group possessed enough capability to at least engage 
its opponents in armed struggle, albeit without winning. This military capability of Ulimo-K could be 
explained, for example, by its ample supply of arms compared to all other factions. The group was said to 
be “exceptionally well provided with arms and ammunition, probably due to its proximity to the Sierra
nean and Guinean border and its excellent relations with the Guinean army.”678 During the 1996-97 
disarmament program, Ulimo-K “surrendered no fewer than 800,000 rounds of ammunition, more than all 
 
 the Lofa County between Ulimo-K and the NPFL started in February 1995 and continued 
’s split left with Roosevelt Johnson’s faction of 
t 
 is because prior to the split the Krahn wing 
l 
Defense in Liberia 
oming from Sierra Leone and possibly Guinea (Ellis, The Mask of 
675 Ibid., p. 117. 
676 The battles in
throughout June 1995, with all strategic points, such as Belleyellah, Gelahun, Zorzor, Kolahun and Voinjama being 
retaken by the NPFL immediately after their brief transfer to Ulimo-K (ACLED database). 
677 Most of the trained military personnel of Ulimo after the group
Ulimo-J, and not with Kromah’s Ulimo-K. Those were hundreds of trained Doe soldiers that made Ulimo a “poten
military force” at earlier times (Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 96). This
of Ulimo mobilized a lot of AFL veterans in Sierra Leonean refugee camps (Ibid., p. 95). Consider also a higher 
military experience of the leadership of Ulimo-K’s predecessor, the LUDF organization, whose founder, Genera
Albert Karpeh, used to be a US-trained special forces training officer and a former minister of 
(For more details on this see Section 1 of Chapter 7 of this dissertation and Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 94).   
678 The major arms supplies for the group were c
Anarchy, p. 96). 
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 the other factions put together.”679 In the absence of existing professional personnel, the group made an 
effort to cultivate some. Thus, Ulimo-K’s new recruits were trained for no less than three months in at 
least four camps, including the one in Kanka, Guinea, presumably enjoying some expertise from Guinean 
soldiers.680 For comparison purposes, note that most of the former NPFL child soldiers from my survey 
reported two weeks as the average length of their training. 
Overall, despite its lower fighting capacity relative to the NPFL, its major opponent, Ulimo-K had the 
ability to establish and defend itself in the Lofa County for three years. After all, Ulimo-K was regarded 
as a
ity of the Ulimo-J group was most likely lower than the one of Ulimo-K. Formed 
aro
 legitimate player in the war, albeit “second-rate” compared to the NPFL.681 It was probably this 
initial military success of Kromah’s faction in the Lofa County that made him risk striving for a much 
bigger goal – overtaking Taylor’s central military base at Gbarnga. Thus, Ulimo-K was able to challenge 
the NPFL, albeit marginally and mostly on the periphery. This challenge could not be compared to the 
one as strong as presented, for example, by the LPC to Taylor’s fighters. Also, it was not enough to aspire 
to overtake the capital or gain a military establishment there to prevent Taylor’s forces from winning 
Monrovia. But the group’s current level of fighting capacity eventually put Kromah, a valid political 
player, in control of the financial sector of the interim Liberian government in 1995, in accordance with 
the Abuja peace agreement.682 Overall, I would argue, Ulimo-K’s fighting capacity can be regarded as 
‘medium high’ and the child soldiering variable should be evaluated at about the ‘medium high’ level. 
Fighting capac
und the core fighters who used to be AFL soldiers in the Doe government and trained in Guinea with 
the help of the Guinean Army, Ulimo-J could have viably challenged Taylor’s forces. However, apart 
from its battles with Ulimo-K and ability to win one county from it, Ulimo-J was not found to engage in 
any significant battles with any other factions in the Liberian war. Although Roosevelt Johnson’s group 
was able to contest its rival faction of Ulimo-K in the groups’ internal fight for control over natural 
resources, it was not in a position to attack the NPFL for territorial gains. It is also unclear if Ulimo-J 
participated in any defensive battles against Taylor’s forces in order to protect its control of commercially 
                                                 
679 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 135. The following accounts also describe the Ulimo-K’s ability to procure arms: 
“Indeed, it was widely perceived that, along with Taylor, Kromah had maintained stockpiles of weapons and an 
s 
rol. 
 of Anarchy, p. 107. 
army in waiting, especially in mineral-rich areas contested with Ulimo-J. In February, Ecomog had found three 
truckloads of weapons at Kromah’s base in Monrovia and placed him temporarily under house arrest (Africa 
Confidential, 28 March 1997). As late as May 1997, a large arms cache was uncovered in former Ulimo-K territory 
(Agence France Presse, 22 May 1997)” (Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 444). 
680 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 98. Three other camps were within Liberia and were located at the faction’s base
in Kolahun, Voinjama, and Lofa Bridge. These bases were established by the Ulimo group, but after its split they 
were most likely inherited by Ulimo-K, not Ulimo-J, as they fell into the geographic areas of the Ulimo-K’s cont
681 Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” pp. 450-451. 
682 Ellis, The Mask
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 lucrative territories.683 It is known that at some point Ulimo-J took over Kakata town, Margibi County, 
but the NPFL reestablished its positions there in 1996.684  
Overall, I estimate the fighting capacity of Ulimo-J at ‘medium low’ level. It is this military inability 
to engage the NPFL fighters directly that could attenuate the ambitions of Ulimo-J in the Liberian 
conflict, in which the group devoted all its military strength and attention to the defense of its highly 
lim
ld 
hav
Technically, the INPFL fulfilled all the goals on its proclaimed agenda – it captured and executed 
President Doe and prevented the NPFL from entering the capital. Unlike Taylor, Prince Johnson has 
ited but extremely profitable territories from the rival Ulimo-K. It was the immediate profiteering from 
the Cape Mount and Bomi diamond mines that must have become a priority on the Ulimo-J’s agenda, 
rather than a long-term strategy of challenging Charles Taylor militarily to ensure the group’s access to 
political control of the resources it captured in war. When the group assisted the coalition forces in the 
barracks of the Barclay Training Center in Monrovia during the April 6 War, it was doing it as a deal with 
Ecomog in order to gain semi-official permission not to abandon its diamond mines.685 Within the 
auspices of peace agreement, and as ordered by Ecomog, Ulimo-J was supposed to leave the mines and 
disarm. With ‘medium low’ level of Ulimo-J’s fighting capacity, I would expect a mild demand by the 
faction for additional combatants and ‘medium low’ child soldier rates, as a result.  
The fighting capacity of the INPFL armed group against its major opponent of the AFL in the capital 
could be assessed as rather low. It is true that this faction strongly challenged the government forces in 
Monrovia in 1990. Thus, it can be argued that if it was not for the Ecomog intervention, the INPFL wou
e been able to overtake the Presidential Mansion. However, as in the case of the NPFL, the INPFL’s 
fighting capacity was insufficient to challenge the AFL after the latter was supported by Ecomog. After 
its short and almost successful advance to the capital in 1990, the INPFL’s fighting capacity dropped as 
the strength of the AFL increased disproportionately with the reinforcement by the Ecomog contingent of 
3,500 professional troops who arrived to Monrovia on August 24, 1990.686  
The INPFL was also not capable of challenging the NPFL forces on its own and was acting mainly as 
a supplement to the AFL/Ecomog forces later in the war. The group sided with Ecomog to prevent the 
NPFL from taking over Monrovia and since then was contained to the Caldwell base in the capital. 
                                                 
683 The ACLED database lists only one armed event between the NPFL and Ulimo-J – a skirmish in Kakata in
just before the April 6 War.  
684 UN Security Council, Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Obs
 1996, 
erver 
 
ncreased to 6,000 troops by the end of 1990 
Mission in Liberia, 1 April 1996, S/1996/232, URL: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6aed128.html. 
685 It was also indeed a defensive strategy against the unexpected attack of combined forces of Taylor and Ulimo-K
at that time on Ulimo-J’s political leadership stationed in Monrovia.   
686 Nass, A Study in Internal Conflicts, p. 68. The strength of Ecomog i
(Ibid., p. 69).  
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 never expressed publicly his desire to pave the way to presiding in the new government.687 This low goal 
of the group, reflected in its ‘low’ level of fighting capacity, did not demand the INPFL to reinforce or 
mob
planatory framework 
to n
 in such a practice.  
Liberian warlord of any substance had alliances with foreign businessmen and at least one foreign 
government.”688 At the same time, however, I also found that Liberian factions all differed in the type and 
atants 
ership 
ilize significant numbers of infantry. Therefore, the probability of child soldier recruitment by the 
INPFL faction should be low.     
What the example of the INPFL also suggests is that territorial control should not necessarily 
correlate with fighting capacity. Although the INPFL initially had high fighting capacity, this ability did 
not transform into the groups’ strategy of acquiring territory. Instead, the forces were moving quickly 
from the Nimba County to the capital all the way across Liberia to perform a surgical strike on Monrovia. 
Ultimately, the amount of territory controlled by an armed group depends on the military strategy of its 
leadership who may prefer to control less as opposed to more land and people. In addition, as the previous 
examples of Ulimo-K and envelope politics demonstrated, there are other ways to gain territories from the 
opponent besides engaging in a direct military struggle.  
Material Capacity  
The ability of an armed group to compensate its soldiers was proposed in my ex
egatively affect the probability of an armed group to recruit children. Arguably, adults react to 
economic incentives and reduce the chances of the rebels’ need to resort to child recruitment. The factor 
of material capacity had mixed support in my large-N analysis, when measured with diaspora support, 
third state assistance, and access to natural resources. The inconclusiveness of these results could have 
been attributed to at least two factors. First, the three different measures of the material capacity variable 
employed in the large-N analysis did not account for an important way of soldier compensation in some 
wars – looting of public and private goods and property. In the case study, however, I do analyze the 
difference across Liberian armed groups in allowing their soldiers to engage
Second, the measurement of material capacity in my statistical test was based on the assumption that 
armed groups possessing material resources will automatically redistribute at least some of them to 
reward recruits. As my case study analysis demonstrates, this is not necessarily the case. More 
specifically, all Liberian armed groups in my study were found to have some means of generating 
financial resources, as summarized in the following account: “From beginning to end of the war, each 
form of actual provision for recruits: some were known to share the gains from trade in natural resources 
with their foot soldiers; other ones kept their fighters exclusively on loot; yet others paid their comb
cash salaries. Thus, in the case study analysis I relax the assumption behind groups’ lead
                                                 
687 In that fight the INPFL ended up siding with the AFL/Ecomog forces. 
688 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 164. 
181 
 willingness to share their resources with recruits. As a result, in my qualitative analysis I employ a more 
direct measure of armed groups’ material capacity expressed in their exhibited practice of paying and 
compensating the fighters, rather than their hypothetical ability to do so. This is just another example of 
how the case study analysis allows going beyond approximations and offering more specific details, here 
on t
ierra Leone and Guinea.690 With time, the NPFL 
tainable” sources of income.  
gether, in 
199
he sources from which the groups obtained their material capabilities, if any, and on how exactly they 
were compensating the fighters, if at all.  
From 1990, after establishing its control in most of Liberia but Monrovia, the NPFL was enjoying the 
profits from the country’s vast natural resource wealth. The group started with engaging in somewhat 
small financial operations, such as selling equipment from the German-owned mining company at Bong 
Mines site, which Taylor’s forces captured in 1990.689 On a somewhat larger scale, by late 1990, NPFL 
fighters in Lofa County towns fully controlled the barter trade of consumer goods from Liberia for 
diamonds, gold and agricultural products coming from S
resorted to “more sus
Upon creation of the so-called ‘Greater Liberia’, Taylor appointed former Doe government personnel 
to establish relationship and trading networks with foreign businesses, companies and individuals. As a 
result, the group penetrated the logging industry with former international agents helping Taylor organize 
the concessions in 1990.691 In 1991, the French imports of raw logs from Liberia, with almost all logging 
areas being under the NPFL control, reached 94.4 million cubic meters.692 Trade and concessions in other 
industrial commodities also picked up speed. For example, the NPFL deals with foreign businesses in the 
iron mining sector in the Nimba County generated significant levies for the faction.693 Its stakes in the 
rubber production at the Firestone Plantation also brought substantial revenues for the group.694 At some 
point of its existence the NPFL enjoyed access to Sierra Leonean diamond fields as well.695 Alto
1 the IMF estimated the aggregate figure for exports from Liberia to reach $557 million, which is 
higher than the $410 million in the pre-war year of 1989.696   
While compensating its high ranking commanders from natural resource profits, the NPFL did not 
pay its foot soldiers down the group’s hierarchy chain. One of my informants mentioned that only the 
Special Forces elite troops of the armed group “had the money”:  
                                                 
689 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 95. The following discussion of the 
NPFL’s material capacity is largely based on this book’s intricate analysis of financial means of African rebels. 
690 Ibid., p. 97. 
691 Ibid., p. 95.  
692 Ibid., p. 97. For more detailed description of revenues extracted by the NPFL from logging concessions see Reno, 
Warlord Politics and African States, pp. 96-97. 
693 Ibid., p. 100. 
694 Ibid., p. 100. 
tates., p. 97. 
695 Ibid., p. 98; Kieh, The First Liberian Civil War, p. 158. 
696 Reno, Warlord Politics and African S
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 “NPFL had Special Forces too. Private could not go close. Cannot eat there where they eat. But 
not on the frontline. Those Special Forces had money, enjoyed themselves.”697  
 
Not only did the NPFL abstain from paying its soldiers, sometimes commanders did not even feed 
combatants. Similarly to the restricted hierarchical distribution of natural resource profits, the scarce food 
was also carefully allocated, as the following account suggests:  
“In Nimba with Delta Force there was less food. And it went only to bigger people. And there 
, for instance, reported widespread looting and human 
righ
c
 the higher ranking personnel. As I show in 
the discussion below, com
were more people to provide food for. Delta Force food was not enough. Only to bigger men, not 
you.”698  
 
Another former child soldier, whom I interviewed and who participated in both the First and Second 
Liberian Civil Wars, attested to the absence of compensation practices by the NPFL to its forces in the 
first conflict as opposed to the introduction of salary payments to soldiers in the second one.699       
 Devoid of direct material rewards to its soldiers, the NPFL group not only allowed but sometimes 
even encouraged its new recruits to loot. Many IOs
ts abuses by Taylor’s fighters.700 Consider how the faction’s ethnic mobilization campaign in the 
Nimba County was concurrently organized around looting opportunities:  
“Many of those joining NPFL were seemed more intent on looting than on confronting the AFL 
soldiers or on slaughtering their supposed enemies, and many Mandingo people were probably 
killed at least as much because of their status as shopkeepers and traders as on account of any 
political errors they were deemed to have made.” “Their attackers acquired so much booty from 
those victims that some people thought it obvious that ‘their motive was not liberating the people 
but looting their properties by use of the gun’.”701  
 
Looting by the NPFL forces was occurring during the battles for Monrovia in 1990, 1992, and 1996.702 
While some Taylor’s fighters retired from the war materially enriched, not all soldiers su ceeded in 
obtaining the booty, and those who actually did, usually had to give it to their commanders.703 Overall, 
while not paying its soldiers, the NPFL allowed some to benefit from looting, but in many cases, 
however, the stolen goods were confiscated from soldiers by
pared to all other armed groups in my case study, with a possible exception of 
                                                 
697 From my interviews with former child soldiers in Ghana, winter 2008. Commandos of the NPFL’s Special 
Forces, to whom my informant refers to, were actually the ones who oversaw the group’s commercial operations 
(Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, p. 95). 
 
ylor’s soldiers represented the official government forces of GoL (Government of Liberia) under his 
as such, they received salaries as any other state army.   
o. 3,  May 17, 1994. 
 of Anarchy, pp. 79, 114.  
e relevant sub-section of my temporal case study in 
698 From my interviews with former child soldiers in Ghana, winter 2008. 
699 From my interviews with former child soldiers in Ghana, winter 2008. During the Second Liberian Civil War
(1999-2003) Ta
presidency and, 
700 For one source refer to Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Abuses by the Liberian Peace Council and the Need 
for International Oversight, HRW Report, Vol. 6, N
701 Ellis, The Mask
702 Ibid., p. 124. 
703 For a more detailed discussion of this tendency refer to th
Chapter 7 of this dissertation.  
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 the try 
who erefore, the value of the 
s, gold and rubber.704 As early as 1993, 
less er 
plan of 
accu ulation, in this case a rubber plantation, to cultivate a support of fighters.”706 As of 1995, the LPC 
ce of other compensations 
from ed 
goo or, 
it is er 
low their commanders, as NPFL fighters were obliged 
estimated at ‘medium’. These values predict ‘medium’ scope of child recruitment for the group. 
LPC, Taylor’s faction offered the worst material ‘package’ to potential new recruits in the coun
would be willing to join a military organization for pecuniary rewards. Th 
material capacity variable for the NPFL can be estimated as ‘low’, which, in turn, predicts high rate of 
children in the ranks of the group.   
The LPC armed group had access to trade in logs, diamond
 than a year after its existence, it captured the Liberian Agriculture Company’s profitable rubb
tation outside of the Buchanan port.705 The group was reported to “use access to means 
m
possessed gold deposits in Ivory Coast where it had a military base.707 The group also exercised control 
over timber production and exportation, with the latter facilitated by doing business with Ecomog, “which 
controlled the main ports.”708  
Similar to the NPFL, the LPC developed and used its commercial operations’ network to generate its 
financial means. Whether the gains from its resources were actually used to compensate the group’s 
fighters remains questionable. There is no indication that the LPC paid its soldiers directly.709 Moreover, 
the accounts of massive looting by the faction’s foot soldiers suggest the absen
 the group’s trade networks’ benefits.710 In 1995, LPC fighters were reported to sell Liberian loot
ds in Ivory Coast for rice, soap and fuel.711 While the group was indeed caught in its looting behavi
 very hard to assess whether the practice was restricted to some fighters or units only and wheth
-ranking soldiers had to submit the stolen items to 
to do. There are accounts that the group provided food both to its fighters and their families, as one 
former LPC child soldier indicated in my interview.712  
Overall, it can be concluded with relative certainty that the LPC armed group did not provide a viable 
material compensation in terms of cash payments to its foot soldiers. However, it is possible, albeit not 
definitively established, that its soldiers, even the low-ranking ones, could enjoy the benefits of looting. 
With certain data limitations the level of the material capacity variable in the case of the LPC can be 
                                                 
704 Ibid., p. 102.  
705 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, p. 105. The profits of the company must have been high as the export 
ically mentioned that there were no monetary payments in his unit. 
ts of the LPC soldiers’ looting practices see “Liberia,” Conciliation Resources Database. 
erian child soldiers in Ghana, Winter 2008. 
was flourishing. Consider, for example, that between September 1994 and February 1995 there were nineteen 
shipments of rubber recorded from Monrovia’s Freeport (Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 167). 
706 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, p. 105.  
707 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 179. 
708 Ibid., p. 104. 
709 One LPC child soldier in my survey specif
710 For the accoun
711 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 179. 
712 From my interviews with former Lib
184 
 The Ulimo-K faction also had access to some concessions and loot. Unlike the LPC, however, the 
group did not have to rely on Ecomog for exportation means as it “was trading directly across the 
northern border with Guinean officers.”713 It was the Krahn military wing of Ulimo before its split that 
had successfully negotiated diamond deals with international merchants. It is unknown whether Allhaji 
Kro
ma and Kpelle tribes, who expelled Mandingo from the county during the 
init
ation of soldiers in case of Ulimo-K did occur in 
the 
hould be 
expected to be at the ‘medium’ range as well. 
mah managed to get hold of at least a part of this profitable trade or not.714 I also could not verify if 
Ulimo-K profited from its control of timber resources in the upper Lofa County.715 But it is well known 
that “the faction had its own immigration and customs services through which it controlled travelers’ 
movements and levied taxes on traders.”716 
It has been well documented that Ulimo-K was the most astute of all Liberian factions in terms of 
looting.717 After taking control of the upper Lofa County, the group was involved in extensive plundering 
of the property of the local Lo
ial stages of the conflict.718 The purpose of Ulimo-K’s return to the Lofa County, in fact, was to take 
back what belonged to the Mandingo people prior to the war and was taken away during the NPFL’s 
arrival to Lofa back in 1990.719 One extreme example of such ubiquitous looting is a systematic pillaging 
by Ulimo-K fighters of the sacred groves of the Poro society in the Lofa County, where soldiers stole 
masks and other religious objects of the Loma and Kpelle people to sell them on the international antique 
markets through Guinean dealers.720 
Overall, it can be argued that material compensation to adult soldiers in Ulimo-K was established. It 
came primarily in the form of a wide-scale looting of civilians. Unlike in the case of the NPFL and 
possibly the LPC, however, Ulimo-K soldiers were allowed to possess and sell their own booty without 
passing it up the chain of command. Thus, the compens
form of widely distributed access-to-all loot, which means that those who joined had a chance to 
benefit significantly. The variable of the material capacity in the case of Ulimo-K is assigned the value of 
‘medium’. While this level in relative terms is higher than the ‘low’ one for the NPFL, it is still lower 
than the values that I establish for two other Liberian armed groups, as shown below. The child 
recruitment practice in Kromah’s faction, according to the material capacity explanatory factor, s
                                                 
713 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 104. 
714 For plans within the Mandingo wing of Ulimo to access diamond trade refer to Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 97.  
romah’s wing of the Ulimo faction entered Liberia from 
y, p. 98).  
 of Anarchy, p. 134. 
715 That control was established in August 1992, when K
Sierra Leone (Ellis, The Mask of Anarch
716 Ellis, The Mask
717 Ibid., p. 134. 
718 Ibid., p. 134. 
719 Ibid., p. 134. 
720 Ibid., p. 128. 
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 Unlike in Ulimo-K, the Ulimo-J soldiers were not permitted to plunder. In fact, the armed group’s 
leadership was punishing its members for looting civilians. As a viable financial option to looting, 
however, Ulimo-J introduced cash payments to its fighters.721 The group did have plenty of financial 
means to support this practice. First, it was aided by Ecomog with arms, ammunition, intelligence, and 
transport, among other military assistance, which alleviated the group’s costs necessitated otherwise by 
arms purchases and logistics.722 Second, the Roosevelt Johnson’s faction of Ulimo-J “became involved 
ine mining operations in mineral-rich Bomi County, the site of most of Liberia’s diamond production.”723 
The compensation practice of Ulimo-J was noted in the literature, as the following account demonstrates: 
“As
nterviewed, recalled similar practice, albeit intermittent one, in their 
uni
ia.727 This food currency, meanwhile, must have been 
                                                
 with Taylor’s NPFL, local commanders distributed opportunities to mine alluvial diamonds and gold 
to maintain control over fighters… ULIMO-J fighters and commanders also profited from a transit trade 
in diamonds from illicit operations in Sierra Leone.”724 It is possible that the practice of Ulimo-J 
commanders to pay their soldiers did not last throughout the war, however. For instance, one former child 
soldier, recruited for the group in 1995, reported during my interviews that he was compensated $50 per 
month about 3-4 times before payments ceased and the soldiers in his unit were allowed to loot. Indeed, 
this does not necessarily mean that adult salaries were also cut off as time went on. In itself, though, the 
practice of Ulimo-J to pay its fighters, even children, is quite remarkable, as none of the former child 
soldiers from other groups, whom I i
ts. Overall, the material capability of Ulimo-J can be assessed as ‘high’, and its practice of paying 
soldiers was outstanding compared to other Liberian factions. Following my argument, we should expect 
‘low’ level of child soldiering variable in this case.  
The only possible match to Ulimo-J in its compensation to foot soldiers was the INPFL – yet another 
extraordinary group in this regard. The INPFL also prohibited looting and pillaging civilians, and was 
known for its implementation and enforcement of a very strict discipline code for combatants.725 It is not 
certain whether INPFL soldiers got their salaries in cash, although it is a possibility. It has been 
established, however, that both children and adults alike were fed by the group at the base and even given 
food supplies to take home to their families.726 These food supplies were coming primarily from the 
INPFL’s control of the Freeport in Monrov
 
721 Some former Ulimo-J combatants attested to this practice during my interviews with them in Ghana, in winter 
erely punished by a special unit of the faction (The Military Police 
onitor and regulate the behavior of its fighters (from my interview with a member of the INPFL’s 
nit; Ghana, winter 2008). 
view with a former INPFL soldier, Ghana, winter 2008. 
view with a former Liberian child soldier in Ghana, winter 2008.  
2008. 
722 Herbert Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 141. 
723 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, p. 105. 
724 Ibid., p. 105. 
725 Looting was explicitly prohibited and sev
Unit) created to m
Military Police U
726 From my inter
727 From my inter
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 imm
ad a motive for seeking protection within a military 
org
execution while committing other brutalities in a region which the Krahn-dominated military regarded as 
ensely valuable at those times in the capital, where food shortages were extreme.728 According to one 
of my respondents, money was meaningless in Monrovia in those days, loosing its value against the only 
precious commodity at that time – rice. For example, a bag of rice in Monrovia in early 1990s cost about 
$100, according to my interviewee.729  
Under such circumstances, food, as opposed to money compensations, could have, in fact, attracted to 
the faction a bigger pool of adults seeking survival from hunger in exchange for their military services.730 
As one of my informants commented on the voluntary nature of recruitment for the INPFL armed group 
in Monrovia in 1990, there was no need to conscript people forcibly as lots of them joined willingly 
because of hunger and disease, which prevailed before relief came with Ecomog.731 Therefore, the factor 
of material capacity and, more specifically, the ability to compensate soldiers by the INPFL can be 
assigned a ‘high’ value. My argument predicts a ‘low’ level of child recruitment for such a group. 
Ethnic Persecution 
My argument suggests that armed groups involved in conflicts with ethnic killings are more prone to 
recruiting children. This is because minors are believed to side with both perpetrators and defenders either 
to avoid violence against themselves and their families, or as a result of being orphaned by the ethnic 
cleansing in the country. In my cross-group case study, all five Liberian armed groups were operating in 
the same conflict, implying no difference in their county levels of the ethnic persecution variable – the 
measurement that I employed in the large-N analysis. Therefore, in this qualitative analysis, I further 
disaggregate the concept of ethnic persecution and examine if a particular faction had access to people of 
the ‘endangered’ tribes whose children could have h
anization. More specifically, I identify and then examine the regions, where groups operated, for 
ethnic demographics and severe tribal tensions. This allows me to assess systematically the relative 
chances of each of the five Liberian armed groups to encounter desperate children.   
In the early stages of its existence, the NPFL armed group attracted large numbers of supporters from 
the Gio tribe – mainly victims of the Doe government’s indiscriminate violent counter-insurgency 
campaign in the Nimba County. After the NPFL’s first attack in the Nimba County, the AFL soldiers 
responded by detaining suspects there, “which in practice meant singling out young Gio men for arrest or 
                                                 
728 When Ecomog first arrived to Monrovia in August 1990, apparently many people of the capital were starving 
roops establish feeding centers around the city (Nass, A Study in Internal Conflicts, p. 68). 
 still a useful currency and food was available for purchase unlike in 
trolled by armed factions, not civilians. 
which made the t
729 From my interview with an NPFL ex-combatant in Ghana, winter 2008. 
730 It should be noted here that the situation in the countryside, where some people were still growing crops, was 
different. The money in the countryside was
Monrovia, where the only source of edible supplies was in the Freeport con
731 From my interview with a former INPFL child soldier (Ghana, winter 2008). 
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 enemy territory.”732 When government soldiers were dispatched into the Nimba County, some people of 
the Gio and related Mano tribes ran into the bush to hide or fled to Guinea, while others chose to join the 
rebels to protect themselves and avenge the deaths of their relatives.  
Another indirect example of people joining Taylor’s proxy group for defense purposes against ethnic 
pers
n more 
as built on igniting ethnic tensions between Gio and Mano tribes on the one side, 
and
uses and started 
ecution refers to the Loma and Kpelle people from the upper Lofa County. When in 1993 Mandingo 
fighters from Ulimo-K entered the Lofa County, from which they were expelled at the beginning of the 
conflict in 1990, in revenge they were conducting misdeeds to the Lofa and Kpelle dwellers of the region. 
To defend themselves, the latter were joining en masse both the NPFL and its proxy group – the LDF.733  
 While some tribes were joining the NPFL to protect themselves against government persecution 
policies, Taylor’s forces had probably the worst accounts out of all Liberian groups in terms of their 
genocidal behavior during the conflict. The group’s initial mobilization campaign, as described i
detail in Chapter 7, w
 Krahn and Mandingo on the other.734 “Taylor’s fighters, despite having an appalling record, aimed 
much of their violence in the early days against Krahn, Mandingos and suspected Doe supporters, groups 
that had not endeared themselves in recent times to the rest of the population.”735  
 No region was spared, but the massive purges occurred mainly in the places of predominant residence 
of the Krahn and Mandingo tribes. For instance, Mandingo of the Nimba and Lofa Counties experienced a 
massive purging campaign.736 Some of them managed to escape to Guinea or, less so, to Sierra Leone, but 
others had to encounter the perpetrators. For example, the Mandingo people who managed to run from the 
Nimba villages of Kahnplay, Bahn and Butuo reported as early as January 1990 that many of their 
tribesmen died at the hands of Taylor’s rebels in gruesome scenes of violence much like the one in the 
following account of a surviving victim:  
“They [Taylor’s people] came at nine in the morning. They surrounded the ho
shooting at everything. Then they began burning our homes. They used gas to set fire to the 
thatch, and when we could no longer stand the heat inside we had to go out into the street. And as 
we left our homes the rebels fell upon us. I saw five, maybe six bodies. My neighbors. They had 
their throats cut. And then we ran. We all ran. Everybody was running.”737 
 
                                                 
732 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 77-78. For a larger discussion of this event refer to Section 1 of Chapter 7, which 
elaborates on the mobilization of Gio and Mano people for the NPFL faction.  
733 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 105. For more information on the LDF faction and historical grievances of Loma 
and Kpelle people against the Mandingo tribe refer to Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 128-129. Also, see more 
information on this incident in the text below dedicated to the ethnic persecution variable in the context of the 
zed 
 
Ulimo-K armed group. 
734 Later on, as the NPFL went on to most of the Liberian territory from the Nimba County, the group mobili
other tribes as well to fight against the Krahn and Mandingos.   
735 Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 447. 
736 Lofa was home to most of the Liberian Mandingos, who were believed to migrate at some point in history from
neighboring Guinea and who still had roots and connections in that country. 
737 Huband, The Liberian Civil War, p. 12. 
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 Many of the “most egregious” NPFL offenses also took place in Grand Gedeh County, “where Gio and 
Mano NPFL fighters exacted revenge against their Krahn ethnic rivals.”738 Another highlight in the black 
list of Taylor’s fighters and their misdeeds rests on the atrocities against both Krahn and Mandingo 
pop
 
g by the AFL, whereas 
e children who joined the group voluntarily. 
he 
terr eh 
Cou rst 
atro t flee the country or hide in 
the forest in an attempt to save their lives.742 While some Krahn and Mandingo children were joining the 
ulations in Monrovia. Most of the victims from the capital were killed at the infamous NPFL 
checkpoints while attempting to escape the country to neighboring Sierra Leone.739  
Krahn and Mandingo, although the first targets of the NPFL’s searches for “enemies,” were not the 
only victimized tribes. In the Grand Gedeh County and elsewhere, the Grebo and Sapo ethnic groups were 
also often killed for mere resemblance of their tribal language to the related Krahn dialect, as poorly
educated rebels could not distinguish the difference.740 In the Nimba County, many Vai and Mende 
people were often mistaken for Mandingo and killed simply because they were also Muslims.741  
With its control of at least half of Liberia at different times, Taylor’s group was present in most 
regions where people were victims of genocidal practices of the AFL, Ulimo-K, or, more frequently, the 
NPFL itself. Therefore, the NPFL had the best chance out of all Liberian factions to be the last resort to 
those endangered tribes whose only way to survive besides fleeing the country was to join the group. The 
tribes of Gio and Mano could thus defend themselves against indiscriminate killin
Loma and Kpelle in Lofa could have been spared of the pillaging and terror campaigns of Ulimo-K. 
Besides these ‘endangered’ tribes, other ethnic groups, by joining the NPFL, also could assure their 
physical survival in the conflict where searching for enemy could have been misguided from its original 
tribal lines. Therefore, the value of the ethnic persecution variable in the case of the NPFL is estimated at 
‘high’ level, and the rate of child enlistment in such a group should also be ‘high’. In fact, according to 
my survey, the ratio of all NPFL children who joined for the reasons of protection was rather high at 
about 34% of all children and 71% of thos
Reasons of protection from ethnic violence could have been relevant to some children found in t
itories under LPC control. For example, the Boley’s faction took over the area of the Grand Ged
nty from the NPFL in 1994. This was the county where Taylor’s fighters committed the wo
ities against the Krahn tribe, persecuting all those who did not manage o c
                                                 
738 U.S. Department of State, “Liberia Human Rights Practices, 1995.”  
739 This type of checkpoints was established on all major roads across the country, and not only in Monrovia (El
The Mask of Anarchy, p. 116). There were over twenty of such checkpoints along the 70km road between Monr
and Kakata (Ogunleye, Be
lis, 
ovia 
hind Rebel Line, p. 85). 
Leone and Ivory Coast through non-captured 
 
Indeed, the biggest of the 
of many in the forest from hunger and diseases. One of the participants 
740 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 114.  
741 Ibid., p. 114. 
742 Massive numbers of Krahn from Grand Gedeh flew to Sierra 
Liberian territory. Some of my interviewees, who were hiding in the forests of Grand Gedeh, provided the stories of
barely sustainable living in the bush along with their entire pre-war communities. 
hardships reported was starvation and dying 
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 NPFL prior to the LPC’s arrival, afterwards they had a chance to side with the group that was actually 
fighting for their tribal power and privileges. Thus, 50% of the former LPC child soldiers in my survey 
reported joining for defensive reasons – higher than the 34% of those from the NPFL faction.743 Overall, I 
would argue, the LPC’s access to endangered tribes was ‘high’. From this value and with the known high 
percentage of children who reported joining the group for defense, we should indeed expect a high ratio 
of c
the Lofa 
Cou
alated into ethnic 
killi
Lofa County had an option to defend themselves by joining their own faction of the LDF, rather than 
                                                           
hildren to adults in the LPC.  
The spread of geographical presence of Ulimo-K included Guinean territories outside of Liberia and 
the upper Lofa with Cape Mount Counties within the country. It can be argued that both adults and 
children in Guinean refugee camps were protected against ethnic persecution raging in the midst of the 
conflict in Liberia. It is true that Mandingo in Guinea wanted to make their way back into 
nty, from which they were fleeing after the NPFL took over. However, that alone does not constitute 
a security motive for children to join a rebel movement, according to my definition and measure of the 
ethnic persecution variable. If anything, the potential mobilization of children in refugee camps, albeit 
along the ethnic lines, was based on ideological reasons or material benefits. The Cape Mount County did 
not host Krahn or Mandingo (it was a home to the Gola, Kpelle and Vai ethnic groups), so there was no 
widespread ethnic persecution by the NPFL in that county. Similarly, after killing or chasing away all 
Mandingo from the upper Lofa County, the NPFL was not targeting the remaining tribes there – mostly 
Loma and Kpelle. Therefore, there was no obvious reason for the adults and children of those counties to 
join Ulimo-K for defense.  
At the same time, however, in both the Lofa and Cape Mount Counties, where Ulimo-K operated, the 
group itself was abusing civilians. While it is most likely that the maltreatment in the Cape Mount County 
was primarily in the form of looting civilians, in the Lofa County violence also esc
ngs. According to Williams, “upon capturing Lofa from the NPFL, ULIMO-K’s Muslim militiamen 
went on a killing spree, particularly targeting Christians.”744 However, this spark of violence in the Lofa 
County “led to the emergence” of yet another armed faction in the Liberian conflict – the LDF – which 
functioned primarily as a defense militia with the proclaimed goal “to liberate Lofa from all marauding 
armed gangs and protect life and property of Liberia.”745 In other words, the non-Muslim tribes of the 
                                                                                            
 of the former LPC and NPFL child soldiers in my sample 
 the group’s political goals” (From my survey of former Liberian 
ana, winter 2008). Unfortunately, systematic comparison of the reasons provided by children to 
y 
of such events challenged me during our casual chat over the pizza and Pepsi one day in Accra, Ghana, in February 
2008, if I could survive without food and water for two weeks like he did once during those times.   
743 For comparison purposes note that 11% and 8%
reported joining because they “supported
combatants in Gh
explain their recruitment was not possible across other armed groups due to a small number of observations in m
sample of child soldiers in the INPFL, Ulimo-J and Ulimo-K armed groups.   
744 Williams, Liberia, pp. 182-83.  
745 Ibid., p. 183. 
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 siding with perpetrators in exchange for protection. The abused population could have also joined the 
NPFL armed group, which was stationed nearby and did not harass the non-Mandingo tribes of the Lofa.  
Overall, it can be concluded that in the case of Ulimo-K, children in both refugee camps and 
territories under the group’s control were either not facing ethnic cleansing or had alternative options to 
protect themselves, such as joining their own ethnic defense militia. Therefore, the ethnic persecution 
variable in the case of Ulimo-K is assigned the value of ‘low’. According to my argument, one should 
also
tion, and thus the group’s value on the variable of ethnic persecution can be 
assi
 expect a ‘low’ level of child soldier recruitment for this group.  
The Ulimo-J faction got organized and mobilized mainly in the refugee camps of Sierra Leone and 
Guinea, with the support of Krahn and Mandingo refugees. While these two tribes were the ones 
endangered by the NPFL in Liberia from the war onset, they did not face imminent danger of ethnic 
persecution and were protected from tribal violence in the refugee environment.746 The refugees joined 
Ulimo-J as they wanted to go back to Liberia and regain what was taken away from them by the NPFL – 
land, power, and property. If anything, mobilization of people was more ideological rather than fear-
based. Similarly, while in Liberia, Ulimo-J operated in the lower Lofa County and the Cape Mount 
County where civilians were not persecuted on ethnic grounds by the NPFL, as these regions did not host 
the Krahn or Mandingo tribes or Doe government officials.747 Ulimo-J was also present in the Bomi 
County, a home to the Dei and Gola tribes, not an ethnic target of Ulimo-J or the NPFL.748 Therefore, it 
might be claimed that people in the territories where Ulimo-J operated did not face imminent danger of 
ethnic or any other persecu
gned as ‘low’.749 This, in turn, makes the expected degree of child recruitment for the group ‘low’.  
As a splinter group from the NPFL, the INPFL inherited both its predecessor’s objective to oust the 
ruling regime of President Doe and Taylor militiamen’s strategy of achieving it by executing members of 
the dominating tribe. On its march from the Nimba County to Monrovia, the INPFL was arbitrarily killing 
Krahn and people associated in any way with the Doe army.750 However, Krahn dwellers of Greater 
Monrovia could protect themselves from such practices by siding with the AFL army of their own 
ethnicity or relocating to areas where Ecomog troops were stationed. One informant from my survey, for 
instance, who was of Kpelle tribal origin, complained that the “AFL was protecting only Krahn in 
                                                 
746 I could not locate any accounts on the incidents of ethnic violence in refugee camps of Guinea or Sierra Leone. 
y 
ldiers reported such practice by the INPFL in the Caldwell area of Monrovia and 
mp near the capital (From my interviews in Ghana, winter 2008). 
747 Lower Lofa was home to the Gbandi, Kissi and Mende tribes, whereas Cape Mount County hosted primaril
Gola and Vai (Liberia: Cultural and Spiritual Landscape, map). 
748 Liberia: Cultural and Spiritual Landscape, map. 
749 In fact, civilians in those counties were enjoying some sort of modus vivendi with the rebels (Ellis, The Mask of 
Anarchy, p. 143). 
750 In my interviews former child so
in Fendell IDP ca
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 Monrovia” in 1990.751 He happened to live amongst Krahn in one area of the capital and said that at some 
point the AFL took the entire community “to the barrack,” supposedly for protection purposes.752 Later in 
the 
d “moderate, smooth relations” with 
Mo
manpower in them – to assess the level of the territorial access variable and thus the probability of child 
recruitment by armed groups. 
conflict, the same informant moved “for food and protection” to the Freeport area with extensive 
Ecomog presence.753 While the Krahn people had no reasons for joining the INPFL armed group in the 
presence of more viable defense options in the capital, other tribes in Monrovia were not facing any 
ethnic targeting that could make the INPFL a better defendant than the AFL or Ecomog. Prince Johnson’s 
group itself was reported to be “nice” to people in the capital and ha
nrovian civilians.754 For instance, it was observed that the INPFL was “sharing” food with civilians 
and the latter “provided shelter” for the group’s soldiers.755 Overall, the ethnic persecution variable in the 
case of the INPFL is assigned the value of ‘low’, thus necessitating an expectation of ‘low’ child to adult 
ratios in the faction.  
Territorial Access 
The territorial access factor was the strongest predictor of child soldier recruitment by armed groups 
in my statistical analysis. My argument implies that the amount of territory under a group’s control 
signifies the level of its access to potential child recruits. In my large-N study the territorial access was a 
categorical variable with the value of 0 for no territorial access or control, the value of 1 for territorial 
control in the home country or access to refugee camps abroad, and the value of 2 for both. My case study 
analysis allows me to disaggregate this level of measurement into a more specific one, as I explore, for 
instance, the number of Liberian counties or refugee hosting countries abroad that each group had access 
to at different stages of war.  
In my explanatory framework it was assumed that larger territorial possessions of armed groups 
increase their chances to encounter towns and villages inhabited with people where children can be found. 
However, this assumption may or may not hold in reality. Thus, it is possible that by gaining access to a 
certain territory, an armed group finds itself in a depopulated terrain due to either low population density 
or conflict-inflicted migration flows. In order to subject the logic of the territorial access argument to 
empirical testing one would have to verify such an assumption – precisely what the case study allows me 
to do. Thus, in my qualitative analysis I look at both – accessibility of territories and availability of 
                                                 
751 From my interviews with Liberians in Ghana, winter 2008. 
752 Ibid.  
753 Ibid. 
754 From two accounts during my interviews with Liberians in Ghana, winter 2008. 
755 From one account during my interviews with Liberians in Ghana, winter 2008. 
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 The territorial control argument and its mechanism linking child recruitment to groups’ access to 
people, including children, are especially important in the context of the Liberian conflict, which was 
associated with massive displacement of people and depopulation of whole regions. Throughout the 1989-
96 war, there were about 700,000 to 800,000 of Liberian refugees dwelling abroad.756 The numbers of 
IDPs varied from 600,000 to one million.757 These figures are staggering. Essentially, from half to three 
quarters of Liberian pre-war population of 2.6 million was displaced internally or as refugees throughout 
the war.758 In fact, Liberia ranked “as the second largest generator of African refugees after Mozambique” 
and was “believed to have the highest number of refugees per capita in the world.”759 The following 
accounts of a British journalist visiting the Nimba County in January 1990 set the above figures into 
perspective against the reality:   
“…we headed to where the rebels were, past villages deserted by all but the few goats or chickens 
ble among upturned pots and into huts whose doors had been torn from their 
 Refugee Survey, much of the Liberian territory was “under-populated” 
thro
left behind to am
hinges.”760  
“We drove fast, through villages either empty or occasionally inhabited by a few women and 
young children.”761 
 
These accounts refer to the Nimba County where civilians were fleeing from both rebel fighters and the 
AFL forces, in fear of intimidating behavior of soldiers.762 The region’s villages and towns located along 
the major roads to Monrovia were abandoned ahead of the advances of Taylor’s fighters, upon radio 
instructions of the Doe government.763 At the same time, places like Saniquellie in Nimba were deserted 
because of fear of the army soldiers, not the rebels.764  
According to the World
ughout the war, and people who have not left the country were clustered in the two largest cities – 
                                                 
756 The years of 1990 and 1994 featured higher numbers, whereas the years of 1991, 1992 and 1993 probably had a 
lower estimate (Veronica Nmoma, “The Civil War and the Refugee Crisis in Liberia,” The Journal of Conflict 
Studies, Vol. XVII, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 101-125, at p. 110). 
757 “As of December 1992, the number of Liberians internally displaced totaled some 600,000” (Nmoma, “The Civil 
War and the Refugee Crisis in Liberia,” p. 114). Around one million Liberians were recorded to be displaced in 
1994 and 1995. 
758  “Before the later part of 1991, about half of the country’s inhabitants had fled to neighboring states or were 
internally displaced” (Nmoma, “The Civil War and the Refugee Crisis in Liberia,” p. 110). By the middle of 1994, 
“75 percent of the Liberian people were uprooted from their homes” (Nmoma, “The Civil War and the Refugee 
Crisis in Liberia,” p. 116). 2.6 million figure comes from Scott, “Liberia,” in Cohen and Deng, eds., The Forsaken 
People, p. 113.  
759 Nmoma, “The Civil War and the Refugee Crisis in Liberia,” p. 110. 
760 Huband, The Liberian Civil War, p. 9.  
761 Ibid., p. 71. 
f NPFL atrocities, were gathering around 
nt soldiers’ military installations, Gio and Mano were fleeing the AFL violent acts into the bush and across 
r to Guinea (Ibid., p. 12).  
inea. 
762 Whereas Mandingo dwellers of the Nimba County, fearful o
governme
the borde
763 Huband, The Liberian Civil War. 
764 Ibid., p. 12. Most of the town’s ten thousand residents ran into the bush or to Gu
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 Mo
mportant to assess if armed groups had access to the capital and if they 
cou ng 
abo he 
gro es 
exa u s’ control of sparsely populated territories of the Liberian interior, I also assess 
ated to be around 761,000 people.769 Calling it a 
‘Gr
Liberia, a country within a country, was recognized by many business actors across the world, if not 
officially by the international diplomatic community.  
r 
nrovia and Buchanan – with only a quarter-million to a half-million living in the rest of the country.765 
It is those 250,000-500,000 people that had to be contested between armed groups as a recruitment pool 
within Liberia. Under such circumstances of immense manpower shortage in the country, the amount of 
physical territory controlled by a faction seeking recruits should be either extremely important, in the 
cases where there are people to be found, or inconsequential, in the cases where most people fled the area.  
What also matters in the case of a vastly depopulated country, such as Liberia during the war, is the 
access of armed groups to the populations of IDPs and refugees, who are more likely to be located outside 
of the territories controlled by insurgents. With more than a million of Liberian civilians – that being over 
55% of all people remaining in the country – living in the Greater Monrovia security zone under 
Ecomog’s protection, it is also i
ld recruit there.766 Ability of armed groups to access crowded and unprotected refugee camps, hosti
ut 800,000 Liberians, is also important to examine in this context.767 Therefore, in my analysis of t
ups’ territory control I identify the actual pool of available populations in those territories. Besid
ining armed gro pm
whether the factions had access to refugee and IDP camps, noting the scope of those camps’ dwellers. 
The NPFL was known to have the largest territorial access among all five Liberian factions. By 
March 1990 the armed group controlled up to 90% of Liberian territory with the established presence in 
12 out of 13 Liberian counties until 1993-94.768 The population of those territories under NPFL control, 
after migration and death toll during the war, was estim
eater Liberia’, Charles Taylor established his control there through military and administrative 
apparatus which included the introduction of a separate governing system and currency. The Greater 
Later on during the war NPFL’s control over its territories was challenged by other factions. Fo
instance, in 1994, the NPFL was deprived of the Lofa and part of the Bong Counties which fell to Ulimo-
                                                 
765 “Liberia 1996,” Country Report in World Refugee Survey, URL: http://www.refugees.org. 
re-
, 
.  
f protection of refugee camps with Liberian citizens during the first Liberian war refer to Achvarina 
iews suggested, neither of the Liberian 
 protect refugees as continuation of the conflict in Liberia suited their 
s well. At the same time, however, access of Liberian armed groups to refugee camps was highly 
n of the United Nations (FAO), “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to 
7, URL: http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/w3902e/w3902e00.htm. The figure of 
766 The one million figure comes from HRW, “Liberia,” in HRW, World Report, 1995, p. 114. With the overall p
war population in Liberia estimated at 2.6 million (Scott, “Liberia,” in Cohen, and Deng, eds., The Forsaken People
p. 113) and the 800,000 Liberians who escaped abroad as refugees by 1994 (HRW, “Liberia,” in HRW, World 
Report, 1995, p. 114), it is conceivable that more than 55% of Liberians who stayed in the country fled to Monrovia
767 For the lack o
and Reich, “No Place to Hide.” As one of the informants from my interv
neighboring states was particularly eager to
regional interest
segregated with different factions operating in different host countries.  
768 Kieh, The First Liberian Civil War, p. 154. 
769 Food and Agriculture Organizatio
Liberia,” FAO Report, 3 January 199
761,000 was cited in this source for June 1996, prior to the war termination.  
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 K; of the Cape Mount and the Bomi Counties which Ulimo-J annexed; and Grand Bassa, part of Grand 
Gedeh, part of Maryland, part of Grand Kru, River Cess, and Sinoe which the NPFL lost to the LPC. 
Nevertheless, despite these considerable losses by 1994, the NPFL remained in control of six counties (or 
portions of their territories) until the end of the conflict – still more territories than other factions had.770  
The NPFL forces could also have access to some refugees in the neighboring countries. For example, 
at th
 if 
terr
 1996, thus controlling the same scope of territory 
as t
e beginning of the insurgency in the Nimba County many of its residents escaped to Ivory Coast and 
Guinea. The population of these refugees at the beginning of 1990 reached 120,000.771 Meanwhile, from 
the accounts of my interviewees it is known that the NPFL rebels walked across the border to the refugee 
settlements in Ivory Coast to convince people to return to Nimba.772 Guinea and Sierra Leone, which 
hosted Liberian refugees, were probably less accessible to the rebels, at least from mid-1992, when Ulimo 
took over the control of the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone, and after 1994, when Ulimo-K was 
operating on the territory between Liberia and Guinea.773  
Overall, with some degree of access to refugees abroad and with the overwhelming control of the 
Liberian territories, with possible access to about 900,000 people, the NPFL armed group indeed can be 
assigned as having the value of ‘high’ on the territorial access variable. There is no doubt that
itorial control is a significant predictor of child soldier recruitment, then in the case of Taylor’s armed 
faction the practice indeed should have established itself at a high rate and most likely to a larger degree 
than in any other group. It is evident from my survey that recruitment of children by the NPFL originated 
in 11 out of 13 counties that the group controlled.  
By 1993, only a year after its formation, the LPC faction claimed to control six Liberian counties – 
Sinoe, Grand Bassa, River Cess, and parts of Grand Gedeh, Grand Kru and Maryland.774 These territories 
covered the entire southern part of the country and half of Liberian land altogether.775 The LPC managed 
to occupy them consistently until the end of the war in
he NPFL did between 1994 and 1996.776 Ulimo-K and Ulimo-J controlled only four counties in the 
north altogether.777 The INPFL faction had ceased to exist by that time. 
                                                 
770 Those territories included Nimba County, part of Bong, part of Maryland, part of Grand Kru, part of Margibi, and
part of Grand Gedeh. The LPC was the only faction that also controlled six counties, but never more than that.  
771 Nmoma, “The Civil War and the Refugee Crisis in Liberia,” p. 107. 
772 From my interview with a witness of the Liberian First Civil War (Ghana, winter 2008).  
 
 
 all Liberian faction from the first civil war 
nd parts of Bong. 
773 For more details on this refer to the relevant part of this section on the Ulimo-K armed group. 
774 HRW, Human Rights Abuses by the Liberian Peace Council and the Need for International Oversight. It is 
possible that the group controlled only parts of Grand Gedeh, Maryland and Grand Kru, without being able to take
all the territories of those counties from the NPFL. (The  information on Liberian armed groups’ territorial control 
was compiled by me from variety of sources. The table with such data on
is provided in the Appendices). 
775 Please refer to the political map of Liberia in the Appendices.  
776 The NPFL held only Nimba, Bong, and parts of Maryland, Grand Kru, Margibi, and Grand Gedeh.  
777 The four counties that Ulimo-s controlled were Lofa, Cape Mount, Bomi a
195 
 Prior to the war, six of the southern counties under the LPC control hosted about one fifth of all the 
Liberian population, or approximately 500,000.778 During the war, however, these territories were largely 
abandoned, with their cumulative population in mid-1996 being about 200,000, according to the United 
Nations.779 The biggest pool of civilians in the southern territories under the LPC control was in the city 
of B
ribes were forced by the faction to leave from 
thes
obilized.785 It is estimated that between 190,000 and 
235
uchanan, the second largest recipient of IDPs in Liberia during the first war. In June 1996 Buchanan 
held over 68,000 people only in designated shelters.780 The population of the Grand Bassa County, where 
Buchanan is located, was recorded in 1996 at approximately 120,000 people, mainly located in the 
provincial capital.781  
Meanwhile, the populations of Sinoe, Grand Gedeh, River Cess, Grand Kru, and Maryland were 
much smaller: 35,000; 10,000; 15,000; 10,000; and 15,000, respectively.782 Depopulation of these five 
counties was first attributed to large migrational flows of people in response to the NPFL anti-Krahn 
campaign. Then, after the LPC’s arrival, the non-Krahn t
e southern territories “into the key points held by Ecomog” – in this case primarily Buchanan city 
where the LPC had a base.783 With internal access to about 200,000 people, the Boley’s group could reach 
11% of all Liberian population during the war, or 25% of those civilians who lived elsewhere in the 
country but the capital of Monrovia.784 Therefore, access to civilians by the LPC faction on Liberian soil 
was substantial, both in absolute terms and relative to other armed groups.  
Besides widespread access to civilians within the country, the LPC could also enter Liberian refugee 
camps in Ivory Coast, where fighters rested and m
,000 of Liberians from the four southern counties of Grand Gedeh, Maryland, Grand Kru and Sinoe 
were residing in Ivory Coast at various stages of the war.786 Interestingly, the LPC’s strong control of the 
                                                 
778 FAO, “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Liberia.” 
779 Ibid. 
780 DHACVA, Liberia: Humanitarian Situation eport, 97/0240, 3 July 1997, Period Covered: 30 June 1997, No. 
77, URL: http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian/hsr/97a/0062.html. 
R
.ca/Tex e=nmoma.html. On how the LPC 
advanced in Liberia from its Buchanan base see Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 102. 
781 FAO, “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Liberia.” 
his 
NPFL of its civilian support, whenever it 
ed in the capital. 
 the Bong and Nimba Counties rather than form the south, which would put an 
t 190,000-235,000 (for distribution of Liberian 
ituations,” p. 
http://www.lib.unb ts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=SPR97/articles/&filenam
782 Ibid. 
783 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 102. While moving people into its major stronghold places, the LPC pursued t
‘scorched earth’ policy in order to empty the countryside and deprive the 
penetrated to the remote areas of the LPC’s control. 
784 Neither of the groups, except the INPFL which was contained to the Caldwell base, was station
785 For more detailed description of these incidents refer to the section on mobilization in Chapter 7. 
786 Altogether, Ivory Coast hosted from 250,000 to 300,000 Liberian refugees at any given time during the first 
Liberian conflict (Nmoma, “The Civil War and the Refugee Crisis in Liberia,” pp. 115, 110  
http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=SPR97/articles/&filename=nmoma.html). However, about 
25% of these refugees were from
estimate for southern Liberians in the camps of Ivory Coast at abou
refugees in Ivory Coast in 1997 by county of origin see Kuhlman, “Responding to Protracted Refugee S
13). 
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 Gra
ontrolling six Liberian counties, most of which were depopulated, the LPC ruled in 
Buc
s were the counties of Grand 
Kru
along the country’s border with Sierra Leone. After the Ulimo split, Ulimo-K inherited the bases in 
s there. Besides this, the group permanently 
o 
pper Lofa hosting roughly a 
ime, the Guinean refugee camps, in which 
 
limo-K could have access to about 300,000 people on the 
 
nd Bassa County, on the one hand, allowed the group to have convenient access to the congregated 
people it forced out of the remaining five counties into the proximity of Buchanan, under its exclusive 
possession. On the other hand, control of the remaining five counties, albeit depopulated, allowed the 
LPC access to Ivory Coast all the way from the base in Buchanan through its own territories. In Ivory 
Coast, meanwhile, the group could benefit from the presence of an abundant refugee population. This 
example of the LPC group reveals one of the mechanisms behind the territorial control argument: an 
armed faction with larger access to physical land has more chances to reach to a larger number of people. 
 In sum, besides c
hanan, which was the primary host of IDPs, and had access to refugee camps in Ivory Coast. Overall, 
the group could possibly reach about 500,000 civilians, both in Liberia and abroad in Ivory Coast. 
Therefore, I argue that LPC’s access to territories and people was ‘medium high’ and therefore the 
group’s propensity to recruit children should be also ‘medium high’. According to my survey, children 
were recruited in three out of the six provinces under the LPC control – those being Grand Bassa, Sinoe, 
and Grand Gedeh – and from the refugee camps in Ivory Coast. This distribution reflects the demographic 
characteristics of the LPC territories. Grand Bassa and Sinoe were the first and second largest populated 
counties of the total six with the LPC control, with about 120,000 people living in Grand Bassa in 1996 
and 35,000 residing in Sinoe.787 Grand Gedeh was largely depopulated a
, Maryland and Rivercess.  
Before the formation of Ulimo’s splinter groups Ulimo-K and Ulimo-J, the faction took over western 
and north-western Liberian territories, including the Lofa and Cape Mount Counties. Thus, from mid-
1992 until the Liberian elections in 1997, Ulimo and its subsequent sub-factions controlled the territories 
Guinea and access to its supporters within the refugee camp
controlled and operated only in the upper Lofa County. Ulimo-K attacked the Bong County trying t
overtake the NPFL’s base at Gbarnga, but the area remained mostly under the control of Taylor’s forces.  
In mid-1996, Lofa’s overall population was estimated at 126,000, with u
half of this amount – approximately 60,000. At the same t
Ulimo-K had its unofficial regroupment bases, contained probably a good portion of all 300,000-400,000
Liberian refugees in that country.788 Overall, U
Liberian and Guinean territories under its control.  This is a significant amount of people789  spread over a
                                                 
787 FAO, “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Liberia.” 
788 The numbers of Liberian refugees to Guinea varied from 325,000 in 1991 to 400,000 in 1995 (Nmoma, “The 
Civil War and the Refugee Crisis in Liberia,” pp. 110, 117).  
789 It is known, for instance, that all of the 100,000 Mandingo people who fled Liberia to Guinea self-settled among 
their kin in towns and cities of that country as opposed to living in the refugee camps. For the numbers and ways of 
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 limited geographical space, considering that Ulimo-K itself consisted of only about 9,000 fighters.790 
With large absolute numbers of accessible people, but their lower figures relative to the NPFL or LPC, 
the value of the territorial access variable for Ulimo-K is assigned to be ‘medium’. This, in turn, predicts 
a ‘medium’ level of child soldiering variable.  
In 1994, the Ulimo-J faction established itself firmly in the Bomi County, with its base in 
Tubmanburg. It also controlled parts of the Grand Cape Mount County and lower Lofa, and had sparse 
presence in the Margibi County.791 With access to about 100,000-150,000 people in these counties and to 
the 
e Ecomog deployment in the city in August 1990 and until the INPFL’s 
diss
 
Sierra Leonean border with about 15,000 Liberian refugees residing there by 1996, as well as part of 
Guinean 300,000-400,000 refugees prior to Ulimo split, the group had a viable source of civilian pool 
within reach, in case of higher recruitment needs.792 In relative terms, however, it had by far the lowest 
degree of access to people compared to the NPFL or the LPC. Therefore, the territorial access variable 
for Ulimo-J can be assigned the value of ‘medium’, and so is the prediction on the value of the child 
soldiering variable.  
The INPFL had the least territorial possessions in the Liberian conflict. After performing an expedite 
launch from the Nimba County to Monrovia city in early 1990, Prince Johnson pooled all of his fighters 
towards the capital, which the group never controlled. For a short period of time during the summer of 
1990, upon its arrival to Monrovia, the INPFL ruled over the city’s northern and western parts.793 
However, shortly after th
olution in 1992, the armed faction was confined within the capital to a small district of Caldwell.794 
With IDPs, the Greater Monrovia security zone was estimated to host more than a million people during 
the first Liberian war – that being more than a half of all Liberians who remained in the country during 
the war.795 And yet, as I argue below, despite the group’s proximity to large numbers of civilians, it is 
very unlikely that the INPFL had unfettered access to these potential recruits.  
Whether the INPFL could actually reach civilians in Monrovia depends on how strictly the faction 
followed Ecomog orders to contain its fighters to the Caldwell base and on the degree of feasibility of the
                                                                                                                                                       
settling of Mandingo refugees from Liberia in Guinea see Wim Van Damme, “How Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
Refugees Settled in the Forest Region of Guinea (1990-96), Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1999, p. 42. 
790 See Section 1 of this chapter.  
791 The Bomi, Cape Mount and Margibi Counties, as well as Monrovia, were cited as territories of the Ulimo-J’s 
presence in Scott, “Liberia,” p. 111. However, in Monrovia the group, or rather its leadership, was present during a 
very short period of time, during the peace treaty, and when all other factions were there. 
792 The number of Liberian refugees residing in Sierra Leone comes from “Liberia 1996,” Country Report in World 
Refugee Survey. 
val 
on June, 1994, URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
793 Duyvesteyn, Clausewitz and African War, p. 29. 
794 Seck Alioune, “United Nations Human and Financial Resources for Peacekeeping in Africa,” Thesis, Na
Postgraduate School, Montrey, California, defended 
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA284140&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, p. 18.  
795 Refer to footnote 700 on p. 171 of this chapter.  
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 INPFL fighters’ free movement within the city. It is widely reported that the INPF faction largely 
cooperated with the Ecomog forces whom it greeted at the Freeport immediately upon their arrival to 
Monrovia.796 Besides, it is quite likely that it would be difficult for the INPFL soldiers to violate the terms 
of containment openly, as Ecomog and the AFL had checkpoints established throughout Monrovia.797  
as were considered safer than others.”799 Although the INPFL ceased to exist for 
yea
e assigned a value of ‘low’ 
whi
Even if the INPFL soldiers operated under cover on the premises of the whole of Monrovia, it is quite 
unlikely that they could have forcibly mobilized civilians and children in such a way. First, forced 
recruitment would be hard to conceal in the presence of the AFL and Ecomog soldiers in Monrovia. 
Second, the level of civilian protection in Monrovia was reasonable, if not in absolute terms, then at least 
relative to the rest of the country.798 Displaced people lived in designated places and shelters, which were 
easy to guard. Monrovians themselves often abandoned their houses and clustered around the areas with 
AFL/Ecomog presence, including in and around IDP settlements, especially when security in the city 
deteriorated. For example, during the summer of 1990 in Monrovia “people had resorted to staying 
together as some are
rs prior to 1996, the following account from that later stage of the war shows that people did regard 
the military installations of Ecomog, the AFL and other parties to the conflict as more secure points 
during the violent times in Monrovia: 
“Renewed violence in April [1996] pushed an estimated 300,000 persons from their homes in 
Monrovia and devastated the morale of many Liberians. Families fled to Monrovia’s schools, 
warehouses, dilapidated government buildings, and to private homes in safer parts of the city. Up 
to 20,000 fled to a Monrovia military base that subsequently came under attack. Another 20,000 
took refuge in the U.S. embassy’s residential compound.”800 
 
Therefore, I would argue that the INPFL did not have unrestricted access to Monrovian civilians as 
potential recruits, despite the fact that the faction was located so close to this massive hub of people.801 
Therefore, in the case of the INPFL, the access to territories and people can b
ch in turn predicts, according to my argument, low levels of child soldiering within the group. It also 
                                                 
796 Nass, A Study in Internal Conflicts, p. 68. 
797 It is possible, though, that the INPFL fighters could have moved around the city in disguise – a tactic that they 
used against AFL soldiers during the armed struggle in Monrovia in the beginning of the conflict before the 
 
ue to the presence of Ecomog fighters in Monrovia since August 1990 throughout 
uce 
f 
,” Country Report in World Refugee Survey.  
l point. Using territorial access as a proxy for child availability 
se civilians if it lacks control of the 
Ecomog’s arrival. For one such example consider how the group’s fighters used AFL uniforms to capture some of
the government soldiers’ heavy weapons and refer to Ogunleye, Behind Rebel Line, p. 19. 
798 This protection was achieved d
the war. As one source noticed, “Although Ecomog never had explicit humanitarian objectives, it did red
hostilities and atrocities, and by establishing order in greater Monrovia it set up a safe haven for thousands o
displaced Liberians” (HRW, “Liberia,” p. 105). 
799 Ogunleye, Behind Rebel Line, p. 69. 
800 “Liberia 1996
801 This example demonstrates yet another theoretica
can sometimes outperform the very concept of the presence of civilian population near an armed group. As it can be 
seen from the INPFL example, proximity to a large number of civilians, and children as a result, does not 
necessarily lead to their recruitment, as a group might still have no access to tho
very territory where they reside.  
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 suggests that the existing recruitment by the faction of children and adults alike, if performed in disguise, 
should have been voluntary. Since the INPFL operated under the close supervision of Ecomog, it would 
have been difficult to smuggle people through the ubiquitous checkpoints prevalent in the capital. The 
voluntary form of child recruitment for the INPFL is confirmed in the accounts of my interviewees.   
*** 
In the above case study analysis I compiled and provided qualitative information to assess the values 
of my independent variables for the five Liberian armed groups. Now I proceed to compare and contrast 
these values in terms of their prediction of child soldier recruitment. The results of this comparison are 
summarized in Table 14 below. The table includes four columns for all independent variables in my 
argument. Each cell of these four columns contains both the values of the relevant explanatory factor and 
below it in curly braces the predicted value for the dependent variable of child soldiering based on the 
single value above it. Table 14 also contains a column of predicted child soldier recruitment levels by all 
five armed groups based on the identified values of the predictive factors. The last column of Table 14 
provides the groups’ ratios of children to adults found in the data from my fieldwork. As can be seen from 
the table, the values of the four proposed independent variables predict the categorical values of the 
dependent variable of child soldier recruitment rather well.  
Li
A
F  (People) Predicted 
  
Actual 
Table 14. Factors Determining Child Soldier Recruitment by Armed Groups 
 
berian 
rmed 
action 
1. Fight  
Capacity 
(Intensity) 
2. Material 
Capacity 
(Rewards) 
3. Ethnic 
Killings 
(Defense) 
4.Territorial 
Access 
Child  
Soldier 
Child  
Soldier
NPFL High {HIGH}* 
Low 
{HIGH} 
High  
{HIGH} 
High 
{HIGH} HIGH HIGH  
LPC High {HIGH} 
Medium 
{MEDIUM} 
High  
{HIGH} 
Medium High 
{MEDIUM HIGH} HIGH HIGH  
Ulimo-K Medium High {MEDIUM HIGH} 
Medium 
{MEDIUM} 
Low 
{LOW} 
Medium 
{MEDIUM} 
MEDIUM 
(High) 
MEDIUM 
HIGH  
Ulimo-J Medium Low High } 
Low 
{LOW} 
Medium 
{MEDIUM} 
(Medium) 
LOW 
MEDIUM 
LOW   {MEDIUM LOW} {LOW
INPFL Low {LOW} 
High 
{LOW} 
 
Low 
{LOW} 
 
Low 
{LOW} LOW LOW  
* In curly brackets {} I report the predicted value for child soldier recruitment from one specific value of the 
independent variable reflected in each cell. Column 6 stands for the overall predicted value for child soldier practice 
based on the analysis of all four predictive values from each explanatory factor.   
 
The NPFL and the LPC factions fall into the high range on the predicted dependent variable by their 
 
 
corresponding independent variables, according to my argument. In both cases the prediction is quite
accurate, with the actual values of the dependent variable (presented in the last column) matching the
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hich 
the actual values of my dependent as well as some riables could be disaggregated to the 4-
tier 
ld soldiers should be established as ‘medium 
low’, which w  evaluate 
this difference in the relative importance of four independent variables in my argument, as specified by 
the groups ffer f popula is p nalyz  of the ning variable 
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pr at h t tr ss all oups y followed by 
th a lude t cros comp tud su  
explanatory framework to a high degree
predictive patterns (presented in the second from the right column). In the case of the INPFL, the most 
moderate child recruiter out of all five factions, the actual value also closely follows the predictive one.  
As to Ulimo-K and Ulimo-J, their predicted values overall reflect the actual situation well, but the 
precision of such forecasting is not absolute. This effect could occur due to the nature of my data in w
 independent va
scale of ‘low’, ‘medium low’, ‘medium high’ and ‘high’. This, however, was not the case for two 
independent variables of material capacity and ethnic persecution, the values of which could be assessed 
only at the 3-tier (‘low’, ‘medium’, and ‘high’) or 2-tier (‘low’ and ‘high’) levels, respectively. Therefore, 
in the case of Ulimo-K, for example, the potential values of ‘medium high’ on the material capacity and 
ethnic persecution variables could not be distinguished at the current level of their measurement. 
Similarly, the ‘medium low’ level for the same variables in the case of Ulimo-J was also more nuanced to 
be identified by their simpler measurement grid.  
The precision of the prediction in case of Ulimo-K and Ulimo-J might also depend on the relative 
power of the four explanatory factors in my argument. For example, if the factors of fighting capacity, 
material capacity and territorial control were more important in the case of the Ulimo-J faction than the 
value of ethnic persecution, then the predictive value on chi
ould exactly match the actual value of the dependent variable. In the next chapter I
’ di ent level o rity. For th
xtended exp
urpose I a e esthe valu  conditio
mobiliza apacity from atory fram .  
Althou  somewha t at this p to determ h absolute on whe the actu
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tterns. The 
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Chapter 7: Case Studies II 
Extended Cross-case Comparison. In my extended argument I proposed that the four predictive 
fact
the dependent variable from a restricted number of my 
exp
rs of underage recruitment. For this 
purp
fects can be linked to the changing trend in the NPFL’s child 
recruitment. I conclude with the summary of results from the case study analysis.  
As has been outlined in Chapter 4 on methodology, by analyzing a single country diachronically I 
therefore achieve higher comparability of cases, as the values of all my independent variables are 
observed in one armed group across time. An important benefit of such a comparison in the temporal case 
study is that it allows me to perform a process-tracing analysis. Thus, I strive to establish a causal chain 
of mechanisms leading from the changed values of my proposed explanatory factors to the changed 
values of the dependent variable. In other words, besides assessing correlations I attempt to provide 
evidence to demonstrate that my proposed explanations lead to their effects.  
ors of child recruitment practice by armed groups should have different explanatory power depending 
on whether insurgents are popular or not among the people. More specifically, I suggested that in the case 
of popular armed groups the child recruitment practice should be primarily determined by the fighting 
capacity and ethnic persecution variables. For unpopular armed groups I postulated a larger effect of the 
fighting capacity, material capacity, and territorial access factors. These two extended propositions were 
confirmed by my large-N analysis. Hereby, as an extension of Case Study I in Chapter 6, I attempt to 
verify if the distinction between popular and unpopular rebels also affects the role of my explanatory 
factors in the comparative study of five Liberian armed groups. In Section 1 of this chapter I determine 
the level of mobilization capacity of these five factions. Then, depending on whether groups’ mobilization 
capacity is high or low, I predict their values on 
lanatory factors. These predicted values are then compared with the actual child soldier practice rates 
established for the cross-group comparative Case Study I in Chapter 6. I conclude with a discussion of the 
relative power of my four predictive factors in case of popular and unpopular armed groups.  
Temporal Case Study. The second case study in this chapter is a temporal one, whereby I examine 
the child recruitment practice by one Liberian armed faction – the NPFL – over time. More specifically, I 
identify the absolute numbers of children in my survey sample who reported being recruited by the group 
in individual years between 1989 and 1996. I then explore if and how the temporal changes in the 
outcome of the dependent variable are caused by my predictive facto
ose, I first identify NPFL’s temporal variations in the independent variables of fighting capacity, 
material capacity, ethnic persecution and territorial access. I then analyze if and how these factors can be 
linked to the changes in the dependent variable. Their relative explanatory power is then discussed in the 
context of changing NPFL’s popularity, established by tracing the temporal variance of the mobilization 
capacity variable. I also examine change over time in the control variables of conflict duration, conflict 
intensity, and orphaning, to see if their ef
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Section 1. Extended Comparative Cross-Case Study 
Var
itics. On the 
one
 
its c
iance in the Conditioning Factor of Mobilization Capacity 
In this section, I offer a detailed evaluation of how Liberian groups in my case study mobilized 
people for their movements. By examining all five groups simultaneously, I establish the differences in 
their popularity. In my case study analysis the armed factions’ popularity, represented in their capacity to 
mobilize people for the movement, as well as by expressed public attitudes towards the insurgents, has a 
more nuanced ordinal measure of ‘low’, ‘medium low’, ‘medium high’ and ‘high’, as opposed to the 
binary index utilized for my large-N tests.802 Recall that the mobilization capacity variable in my study 
does not represent the strength of the armed group expressed in its ultimate size measured in numbers of 
combatants. Rather, it stands for the concept of popularity of a group on ideological and non-pecuniary 
incentives.803 In my case study analysis two prominent types of ideological mobilization surfaced: ethnic 
and revolutionary.  
I refer to mobilization as ethnic if I found evidence that the leaders of Liberian armed factions 
appealed to tribal differences among the people in the country and played the ethnic card to rally 
supporters. Ethnic mobilization in Liberia represented a mix of national and local tribal pol
 hand, the pre-war national government and state army were composed primarily of the non-prevalent 
Krahn tribe and, as such, were not representative of the country which had 15 other ethnic groups, some 
of them larger than Krahn. On the other hand, the local geography spurred historical rivalries among a 
number of tribes whose unsettled grievances intertwined into mobilization politics of most of the five 
armed factions. As Ellis notes, in the First Liberian Civil War, “in most circumstances this mobilization 
of ethnic identity was more rhetoric than reality, as every faction included substantial numbers of fighters 
of diverse ethnic origin, and ethnic allegiance became really important only when a local grievance, 
rooted in local history and land disputes, became caught up with national factional activity.”804  
Revolutionary mobilization in my case study occurred when some factional leaders, mostly of the 
NPFL and its INPFL splinter group, appealed to their constituencies for a political change in the country. 
This strategy represented a powerful mechanism for mobilizing masses in the context of the First Liberian 
Civil War. While Ernesto Che Guevara did denounce the revolutionary spirit among African insurgents,
ultivation in masses during mobilization campaigns of African rebel leaders might not be obsolete, as 
                                                 
802 Ability of the NPFL to mobilize people was defined as ‘medium’ in my large-N dataset. Ulimo-J and the INPFL 
were both assigned the ‘low’ value. However, a closer look in my detailed case study analysis suggests that 
mobilization capacity of Ulimo-J and the INPFL was, in fact, different. While mobilization of both groups was 
lower than the one of the NPFL – a fact accounted for in the cross-group dataset – it also differed between the two 
groups, which was not accounted for by a more general categorization of the variable employed in the large-N study. 
803 The scope of people joining an armed group for financial reasons is determined in my analysis by another 
variable of material capacity.  
804 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 105. Ellis also notes that “in general, ethnic appeals by faction leaders were most 
successful where circumstances were obliging ordinary civilians to seek military protection.” 
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the Liberian example d haracter the ideational 
rmed groups in Liberia excelled in the 
pop
st the Krahn government of President Doe. The Nimba County, a home to Gio and 
Ma
romah, to 
the 
emonstrates.805 While most likely not matching in c
movements in Latin America in the times of Che Guevara, some a
ulist rhetorical revolutionary appeals to people. Also, the disciplinary codes and practices of some 
Liberian factions in this regard also stand apart from the most common images of overwhelming brutality 
and violence of the Liberian conflict. 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 
The NPFL armed group began its initial campaign of mobilizing people on ideological grounds very 
successfully. When the group’s leader Charles Taylor first entered Liberia in December 1989 from Ivory 
Coast with a handful of international revolutionary soldiers, he quickly obtained voluntary support from 
many citizens of the Nimba County. This NPFL mobilization success came as a result of the group 
leaders’ ability to play the ethnic card in raising the impoverished and abused tribal groups of Gio and 
Mano to fight again
no, was chosen strategically by the NPFL as the first point of entry into Liberia and a platform for 
launching further attacks. This is because the region “had been the epicenter of opposition to the Doe 
government since the early 1980s, originally because Doe’s main rival in those days, Thomas 
Quiwonkpa, was a son of Nimba.”806  
While discontent in the Nimba County with the exclusion of Gio and Mano from state power and 
allocation of resources was at a boiling point, and the sympathy for the rebellion cause was evident, the 
ignition spark for massive mobilization was yet to come. The Doe government had planted the seeds by 
its own miscalculated policy in the region. After the first news of insurgency in the north-east of the 
country reached the capital, the administration ordered detentions of Gio and Mano suspects in Monrovia 
and Nimba and urged Liberian citizens “to take up their bows, arrows, machetes and local guns and jump 
into the bush in search of the rebels.”807 A call by the information minister at that time, Alhaji K
Mandingo people suggesting that they should pick up arms to defend and finance the government 
                                                 
805 This example refers to Guevara’s travel with 100 Cuban fighters to eastern Congo in 1965 to help organize and 
fight the rebel movement against Western Imperialism in Africa (This example is taken from Weinstein, Inside 
Rebellion, p. 33). Apparently, Guevara went on this mission while seeking a potential for ideational movement. 
However, his effort “to mold Congolese fighters in the image of Cuban revolutionaries was a disaster” and he 
” rather 
ry 
p. 113. 
“departed after less than a year” (Ibid., p. 33). Guevara explained this unsuccessful attempt by the failure of the 
rebellion “to select “revolutionaries” to fight,” which ultimately led to the combatants’ “drinking and looting
than facing “the risky proposition of launching guerrilla attack” (Ibid., pp. 33-34). As he recalled: “It was a lotte
whether or not you would find [among the recruits] any revolutionaries…. They had a very high opinion of 
themselves, a very highly developed concept of the personal obligation to take care of cadres [themselves] and the 
idea that the revolution owed them a lot” (Ibid., pp. 33-34). 
806 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, 
807 Ogunleye, Behind Rebel Line, p. 18. For more details on the events occurring in Liberian conflict during this 
stage of conflict refer to Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 434.  
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“may also have worked to Taylor’s advantage.”808 Partially due to this proclamation, the Mandingo ethnic 
group, renowned for its business and trade occupations, quickly became a lucrative ‘enemy tribe’ target 
for the NPFL fighters.  
All this helped Taylor, “an Americo-Liberian with little connection to the hinterland,”809 to use the 
ethnic appeal in intensifying mobilization of people for his movement. Here is how it worked in practice, 
m the Nimba County to the country’s capital of Monrovia, other 
trib
survey of Liberian ex-combatants.  The same study also revealed that the Bassa tribe was also 
overrepresented in Taylor’s forces.816 
according to Ellis:  
“NPFL messengers traveled through the rural areas announcing that the NPFL was coming, and 
that its enemies were Krahn and Mandingo and supporters of the government. Hatred for the Doe 
government and those associated with it ran so deep in Nimba County that all the NPFL guerrillas 
had to do was distribute arms… ‘As the NPFL came in’, Charles Taylor recalled, ‘we didn’t even 
have to act. People came to us and said: “Give me a gun. How can I kill the man who killed my 
mother?”810  
 
In other words, “Gio citizens of Nimba in particular were joining the NPFL in large numbers” at first to 
attack local Krahn, “whom they regarded […] as collectively responsible for the brutality of Doe,” and 
then local Mandingo, who were “profiting from Doe’s rule” and “acquiring land in Nimba, where they 
were not considered to have hereditary rights.”811   
As Taylor’s fighters marched fro
es also sided with the armed group. For instance, in the Grand Gedeh County, where the NPFL first 
arrived in 1990, people of the Grebo tribe were reported to be joining the rebel organization “because they 
had long resented the fact that the government of the County was dominated by Krahn.”812 To seek 
popular support from Gola – a large ethnic group in Liberia – Taylor changed his middle name in 1991 
from Macarthur to Ghankay to proclaim himself as Gola.813 The Kpelle tribe was also said to support 
Taylor during the war.814 Current studies disagree on whether the motives of Kpelle were based on 
historical ethnic grievances with Mandingo or antagonism towards Krahn. In any case, the NPFL was 
found to have disproportionately higher number of Kpelle soldiers in its ranks, according to one recent 
815
                                                 
808 Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 434. 
809 Ibid., p. 434. 
810 For more details on this see Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 78-79. 
811 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 78. 
812 Ibid., p. 129. 
813 Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 446; Ogunleye, Behind Rebel Line, p. 21. The pre-war 
population of the Gola tribe in Liberia was 118,000, which made it the eighth largest ethnic group in the country 
he country). 
d Prospects 
(out of the 15 existing ethnic groups in t
814 Kuhlman, “Responding To Protracted Refugee Situations,” p. 9.  
815 Morten Bøås and Anne Hatløy, “‘Getting In, Getting Out ’: Militia Membership An
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Besides Gio, Mano, Kpelle, and Bassa, other tribal groups were reported to mobilize for the NPFL 
eagerly on the basis of their own historical ideological rivalries. The siding of Kru with the NPFL in the 
Sinoe County was related to the mobilization in that region of their rival Sapo ethnic group for the rival 
LPC
came NPFL supporters after the LPC invaded their County of Sinoe in 1994 and after 
the ru 
sett ile 
acti ibe 
join in 
time of armed hostilities during the First Liberian Civil War, and one of them was mobilizing for the 
o , the NPFL leadership used yet another classical 
revo
 faction in 1993-94.817 While the literature on the Liberian conflict supports this fact, the existing 
studies disagree about which tribe took arms first to fight against the other. The Perspective, for instance, 
suggests that Kru be
group’s soldiers, primarily of the Sapo ethnic origin, were using wasteland tactics against the K
lements.818 However, in Ellis’s opinion, Sapo were joining the LPC in 1993 in response to host
ons of the Kru people who enlisted in the NPFL prior to the LPC’s arrival.819 No matter which tr
ed respective military organization first, it is clear that both sided with opposing factions at a certa
NPFL – the armed group in question. The Loma people also ended up siding indirectly with the NPFL 
when in 1994 they organized the LDF militia to defend themselves and fight against Mandingo of Ulimo-
K armed group.820 
In addition to its ethnic appeals to pe ple
lutionary mobilization method when it made an ideological call for overthrowing the corrupt 
government of Doe. To highlight this point, Taylor made his fighters call themselves “freedom fighters.” 
For some people, therefore, irrespective of their tribal origin, the movement appeared revolutionary and 
was popular on such grounds as well. Consider the following account of one former Liberian child soldier 
who commented on the NPFL arrival to the town of Bong Mines: “In 1989 I heard of the NPFL as 
“freedom fighters,” but did not know the true reason; some people greeted them from distance.”821 The 
                                                                                                                                                       
For Re-Integration In Post-War Liberia,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 46, 1 (2008), pp. 33–55, p. 41. Bøås 
and Hatløy suggest that the motifs of Kpelle were based on historical ethnic grievances with the Mandingo tribe, 
whereas Kuhlman claims that it was due to
816 Bøås and Hatløy, “‘Getting In, Getti g 
 the former’s antagonism towards Krahn.  
n Out ’,” p. 41. There is no explanation that I could find for why the Bassa 
tribe was joining or was conscripted by the NPFL en masse. 
817 “The Liberian Democratic Future Speaks on Issues of the Day,” The Perspective; and Ellis, The Mask of 
Anarchy, p. 129.  
818 “The Liberian Democratic Future Speaks on Issues of the Day,” The Perspective. Whereas the primary goal of 
to deprive the NPFL faction of its supportive 
annot be concluded that it were the Kru people who supported Taylor prior to 1994. 
is also provide different dates of the LPC’s 
ng 1994 and 1993, respectively. 
ils refer to the section on ethnic persecution of the previous Chapter 6 and to the text on Ulimo-K’s 
e 
ce], the latter drawing its support largely from Loma and 
the LPC’s earth scorching policy in the south of the country was 
civilian base, it c
819 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 129. The Perspective and Stephen Ell
arrival to the Sinoe County – these bei
820 For more deta
mobilization in this section. In short, “older differences between the local Kpelle and Loma farmers and the 
Mandingo whom they perceived as interpopers on their territory became institutionalized in the contest between th
Mandingo-run Ulimo-K and the LDF [Lofa Defense For
Kpelle refugees in Guinea” (Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 105). 
821 From my interview with a former Liberian child soldier (Ghana, winter 2008).  
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revo
ather quickly, though. The first unsuccessful battle of Monrovia in the summer of 1990 
resu
daily basis and risking their lives while fighting in the heavy battles for Monrovia against the cumulative 
forces of the AFL, the INPFL, and Ecomog.  
s, 
ba 
INPFL 
imed 
lutionary feelings among Monrovian residents towards the NPFL, fighting for the capital in the 
summer of 1990, were also evident at that time, as the following witness account suggests:  
“Amidst such heavy bombardments, most residents did not see Taylor as a threat, rather as a 
Messiah coming to liberate them from Doe’s reign of terror. General opinion then was highly in 
favour of Taylor, with exception of those of Krahn and Mandingo tribes. The youths were 
anxiously waiting for their areas to fall to the rebels so that they could take up arms and be 
counted as part of the popular revolution. Those who did not succeed in crossing to the rebel side, 
the so-called “Liberated Zone,” waited patiently in their house hoping that one day the rebels 
would over-run them.”822  
As one of my interviewees put it, he liked Taylor because the latter “wanted to change the country by 
developing it and getting access to resources. Before the government had it, people did not get resources, 
no education.”823 The outlined revolutionary spirit among the people and fighters alike could also be 
based on the NPFL’s seemingly high prospects in 1990 to win the decisive battle for Monrovia against the 
AFL fighters. The possibility of fast victory indeed made the ideological promises of Charles Taylor look 
more credible, as his access to the state apparatus and its redistribution mechanisms was imminent.  
It all changed r
lted in the loss of Taylor’s credibility and deterioration of the ‘freedom fighters’ image, as they 
embarked on the first looting campaign in the capital. The abuse of civilians of all tribes by the NPFL in 
Monrovia during this time was widely recorded. The most gruesome instances were reported for the 
infamous NPFL checkpoints along the roads from the capital to the faction’s bases in Kakata, Gbarnga, 
and Buchanan. It is from that time onwards that the popularity of the movement started steadily 
decreasing. For people who initially opposed the Doe government and aimed for political change, joining 
the NPFL armed group now meant participating in two uneasy tasks: torturing and killing civilians on a 
Abatement of the revolutionary appeal was not the only downside for the NPFL’s popularity. Thu
newly appearing military and political figures in the conflict who also claimed solid ethnic links to Nim
County and enjoyed popularity among Gio and Mano people – the primary support base of Taylor in the 
initial stages of the war. For example, Prince Johnson, the military leader of the NPFL’s splinter 
group, was originally from the Nimba County. This ensured popular support for him among his Gio tribe 
– a fact that could have created pores in the NPFL’s supporting pool in Nimba after Johnson procla
                                                 
822 Ogunleye, Behind Rebel Line, p. 39. Bayo Ogunleye, a Nigerian teacher, was trapped in the first Liberian 
conflict. 
823 The most surprising thing about this particular account is that this informant was from the Krahn tribe, associate
with the President Doe, and his family was not poor on Liberian st
d 
andards, as his father was reported to work as a 
 Ghana, winter 2008). medical worker prior to the war and his mother was a trader (From my interviews in
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his faction’s independence from Taylor some time between February and July 1990.824 The scope of  
Taylor’s followers from the Nimba County could have also decreased after Jackson Doe, a prominent 
pol r’s 
ord he 
199 lar 
amo   
lar support in the Nimba County was seriously diverted by the INPFL 
e 
s popularity across time and geography, be it on ethnic or 
rev
elections in Liberia in 1997, where the NPFL leader won against all political competitors. “Far from being 
                                                
itical figure in Monrovia who also enjoyed popular support in Nimba, was assassinated on Taylo
ers sometime before August 1990.825 This act of violence cost Taylor a number of votes during t
7 elections, as Harris argues: “Allegations, such as those from the family of Jackson Doe, still popu
ngst the Gio and Mano, that Taylor was responsible for his murder… could have been damaging.”826
Whether the NPFL’s popu
splinter group and damaged because of the assassination of Jackson Doe remains unknown. It is possible 
that Prince Johnson, and perhaps more so Jackson Doe, represented the cosmopolitan Gio and Mano, the 
ones who migrated from the Nimba County to Monrovia some time prior to the war. Meanwhile, the Gio 
and Mano people who resided in the rural Nimba County gave their hearts and minds to Taylor and his 
military organization. Consider the following incident which occurred in Monrovia in 1994: 
“When he [Issac Musa – the NPFL battlefront commander representing Charles Taylor in th
capital at a certain point of time] arrived in Monrovia to take up his political position, he, a Gio, 
publicly ‘expressed outrage and consternation at the ambivalent manner’ with which the citizens 
of Nimba in Monrovia treated him when they expressed disapproval of his faction. He made 
speeches in which he stressed that continued division between the people of Nimba and Monrovia 
could only widen the gap and make reconciliation difficult. This was a clear attempt to use the 
moral codes of Nimba village life, based on the solidarity of kinship and neighborhood, in the 
service of national politics, as has become usual in Liberian politics over many years.”827 
 
This episode demonstrates how the difference between Gio in the capital and the countryside was 
cultivated by the NPFL itself. It is difficult to establish why Issac Musa would stress this schism at the 
expense of not converting Gio people in the capital to the rebels’ side, unless this ethnic group’s support 
in Monrovia was already mobilized by rival faction of the INPFL and politicians such as Jackson Doe. 
Despite the varying degree of the NPFL’
olutionary grounds, overall it can be said that the group did attract a significant amount of ideological 
support. Moreover, it can be argued that relative to other armed factions in Liberia the NPFL’s 
mobilization campaign and capacity were notorious. In addition to the examples above, consider that 
besides combatants, Taylor presided over a full range of officials in the Greater Liberia zone during 1990-
94, upon which he enjoyed the support of technocrats and people under their administrative rule, 
throughout the war.828 The culmination point of popular support for Taylor was evident in the ultimate 
 
re details on this incident see Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 85.  
824 For Johnson’s tribal affiliation see Young, “Costly Discrimination and Ethnic Conflict,” p. 7. 
825 For mo
826 Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 446. 
827 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 140. 
828 Ibid., p. 135. 
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a brutal warlord,” he “was seen by many Liberians as the liberator of Liberia from the undoubtedly 
violent, predatory and deeply unpopular regime of Samuel Doe.”829 
Of course, many soldiers of the NPFL were also known to join the faction for short-term material 
gains from loot and rebels’ control of natural and other country’s resources. Other reasons such as an 
attempt to avoid the dire circumstances of war -- hunger and fear of abuse and irrational killing – could 
have also played their role, along with forced recruitment. What appears important, however, is that 
ideo
ith defensive 
ideo ic 
line es, 
whi of 
crea hn 
peo he 
an rd ng to Boley 
ry 
was
                                                
logical motives, more ethnic rather than revolutionary, featured among the reasons given by people 
for joining the NPFL faction. In relative terms, compared to other armed factions, the NPFL can be 
regarded as the most popular and thus should be assigned the value of ‘high’ on the variable of 
mobilization capacity.   
Liberia Peace Council (LPC) 
Mobilization campaign of the LPC faction was also based on ethnic politcs, but w
logical logic embedded in the motives of recruits. The group was mobilizing fighters along ethn
s, counting on the Krahn and Sapo populations originating from the Grand Gedeh and Sinoe Counti
ch were under the NPFL control until the LPC’s arrival in 1993-94. In fact, the whole purpose 
ting the LPC in the first place was, at least in rhetoric, to free the Grand Gedeh County and its Kra
ple from the NPFL. George Boley, a former Ulimo member, organized the LPC arguably “because t
dingos [in ULIMO] weren’t going to spill blood to liberate Grand Gedeh.”830 Acco iM
himself, “the LPC was formed because of “continued acts of atrocities by the NPFL in southeastern 
Liberia” since the Cotonou agreement.”831  
The actual mobilization of the Grand Gedeh’s Krahn people, however, must have occurred elsewhere 
but in the County itself. This is because at the time of the NPFL control of the Grand Gedeh its territo
 “decimated,” as more than 100,000 Krahn out of the 102,810 pre-war county population fled as 
refugees to Ivory Coast.832 George Boley meanwhile adimtted that “most of his fighters were refugees 
from the Ivory Coast,” presumably of Krahn origin, “who had been forced to flee from the NPFL.”833 
Although the numbers cited above virtually exclude the possibility of any presence of the Krahn people in 
Grand Gedeh during its occupation by the NPFL, some of this ethnic group’s communities were scattered 
in the County as they either decided not to migrate or simply got trapped in the war during their attempt to 
escape. Most of these people were hiding in the bush on their own. As one of my interviewees reported, 
he was on the run across the whole Grand Gedeh for three years, at first with his family and then with 
 
d for International Oversight.      
eaks on Issues of the Day,” The Perspective. 
ts Abuses by the Liberian Peace Council and the Need for International Oversight. 
829 Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ President,” p. 447. 
830 HRW, Human Rights Abuses by the Liberian Peace Council and the Nee
831 Ibid. 
832 “The Liberian Democratic Future Sp
833 HRW, Human Righ
209 
  
community members after his parents’ death, until the LPC arrived. He joined the group’s ranks to end 
his migratory existence. For people like this informant it was either die or pick up a weapon for protection 
and
po tribe for the LPC was raised in the Sinoe County, where the faction arrived in 
 in the text, many Sapo people joined the LPC “enthusiastically so as to 
take
hey both pursued the same goal of defeating Taylor’s forces 
“to 
 defense in an effort to drive the NPFL forces out of the Grand Gedeh land.  
Fighting for the LPC could bring a resurrection of Krahn to the country’s power and as such must 
have been appealing to the Krahn people. One of my interviewees, recruited in Grand Gedeh, commented 
on the popularity of the LPC there precisely for that reason. Another ex-child soldier admitted that, 
although he was forcibly conscripted by the LPC, after a short stay with the group he started to like the 
ideological goals of the movement. That same person was later captured by the NPFL during a battle, but 
managed to escape and cross back to the LPC to continue to fight against Taylor’s forces.  
The support of the Sa
1993-94. As mentioned earlier
 revenge on their Kru neighbors, whom they accused of having earlier joined the NPFL to attack them 
and loot their property.”834 Support of Sapo for the LPC was significant relative to other tribes, and the 
group “was estimated to be some seventy percent composed of Sapo” towards the end of the war.835 
Overall, the facts suggest that the LPC had large ideological support in the south-eastern Liberia where 
the faction operated between 1993 and 1996. The mobilization capacity of the LPC and its popularity are, 
therefore, assessed at being ‘high’. 
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Ulimo): Ulimo-K and Ulimo-J Factions 
Ulimo-K and Ulimo-J initially started as two different dissident movements uniting as the Ulimo 
armed group to fight against the NPFL.836 T
pave the road for the safe return of Mandingos to Liberia by preventing the NPFL from taking over 
the power in the country.”837 The difference in mobilization trends among the two wings of the same 
movement was evident from the very onset of Ulimo. One of its branches and the predecessor of the 
Ulimo-K faction was the organization called ‘Movement for the Redemption of Muslims’ (MRM). It was 
formed in February 1991 in Guinea among Mandingo refugees under the leadership of Alhaji Kromah, a 
former journalist and Liberian information minister. Through active propaganda and emphasis on his 
Muslim religion, Kromah hoped to rally the support of Mandingo refugees and the Guinean state, as well 
as obtain financial assistance from the Middle East. Despite his efforts, Kromah and his organization 
                                                 
834 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 129. The LPC occupied Greenville – the provincial capital of the Sinoe County – 
in 1993, when it first came to existence. For a larger discussion of the historical grievances between Sapo and Kru, 
as well as for the debate in the literature about who initiated the militarized antagonism between the two ethnic 
groups in the First Liberian Civil War, refer to this chapter’s sub-section elaborating on the NPFL’s mobilization 
roup’s split along the ethnic lines, as well as the specific mobilization trends at the beginning of its 
 Ulimo at first. 
campaign in the Sinoe County.  
835 Ibid., p. 129.  
836 The g
formation, necessitate a historical comparison of two organizations which constituted
837 This discussion of Ulimo formation is based on Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 94-95.  
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attracted only a few fighters, as most Liberian exiles, including many Mandingo from Guinea, preferred 
to join yet another organization called ‘Liberian United Defense Force’ (LUDF). The latter was led by 
General Albert Karpeh and formed in 1991 in Sierra Leone.  
The popularity of Karpeh’s LUDF may have been achieved due to the professional military image of 
the group which included former soldiers from the Doe army with extensive experience. Karpeh himself 
was formerly a US-trained special forces officer and a minister of Defense in Liberia, as well as Doe’s 
last Ambassador to Sierra Leone. From Sierra Leonean refugee camps Karpeh mobilized many former 
AFL veterans, mostly of Krahn origin, who formed the core professional fighters of the group. The 
authoritative military leadership and experienced soldiers of the LUDF, in turn, attracted many civilian 
Kra
 1990, preceding Ecomog’s arrival. Mandingo refugees came mainly 
ffered 
doc
hn and Mandingo refugees. The former, residing primarily in Sierra Leonean camps, and the latter, 
who lived in both Sierra Leonean and Guinean refugee settlements (and walked from Guinea to Sierra 
Leone to join Karpeh as opposed to Kromah in Guinea), were eagerly joining the forces of LUDF. Their 
primary motive was purely ideological – to win back land and power in Liberia from which they were 
expelled.  
Many Krahn in Sierra Leone hailed from their homeland in the Grand Gedeh County, where the 
NPFL was killing their tribe since early 1990. Others fled Monrovia on the eve of NPFL’s imminent 
attack on the city in the summer of
from the Nimba and Lofa Counties. Nimba was the first Liberian territory where Mandingo su
umented looting and extinction by the NPFL.838 The first attack of Taylor’s forces on the Lofa County 
later on in July 1990 “culminated in a major massacre of the Mandingo at the town of Bakedu, an old 
commercial center on a trade route from the coast to the savannah, controlled by the Malinke and 
Mandingo traders.”839  
In May 1991, the LUDF and the MRM formed an alliance, “giving birth to the United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia (ULIMO).”840 Ulimo became active by fighting against the RUF with Sierra 
Leonean government and Nigerian forces in an attempt to undermine Taylor’s proxy abroad and obtain 
support of the Sierra Leonean government for its future anti-NPFL campaign. By September 1991, Ulimo 
reentered Liberia and fought the NPFL on Liberian land until, due to “political, commercial, and military 
rivalry,” it split into two sub-factions in April 1994.841 Ulimo-K was commanded by Kromah and 
                                                 
838 For these accounts refer to Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 114.   
839 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 128. 
840 This discussion of Ulimo’s operations is based on Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 95-96. 
probably long overdue. Throughout the group’s existence, Kromah was using media to advance 
ation of 
hts to lucrative 
 
841 Ulimo’s split was 
himself and trying to convert people within Ulimo towards his military wing. Then there was the assassin
Karpeh on June 1, 1992 on Kromah’s order. And, ultimately, it was the inability to delineate the rig
diamond and timber resources between the two wings that facilitated the split of the group. 
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predominantly consisted of Mandingo supporters from the Ulimo group, whereas Krahn-dominated 
Ulimo-J was led by Roosevelt Johnson.842  
Despite the existence of the cumulative force of Ulimo, it can be argued that the faction was divided 
alon
ith violent acts of looting and plundering the local communities, leading in 1993 to Loma and 
Kpe
of Gbarnga. It was the center of an artificial government where officials were all 
inte
                                                
g the MRM and LUDF lines throughout its existence. Besides isolated leadership, these military 
wings seemed to be operating separately, each conquering respective territories, having their own 
alliances with Ecomog, and paving their own way to the acquisition of Liberian natural resources.843 
From the point in time when the group split, the popularity of its two sub-factions of Ulimo-J and Ulimo-
K should be evaluated from the perspective of mobilization of people in Liberia from 1994 and historical 
recruitment of people since 1991 for Ulimo’s wings from refugee camps of Sierra Leone and Guinea 
By 1994, Ulimo-K was established in Liberia in the upper Lofa County and parts of Bong, where it 
was fighting the NPFL and defending its newly acquired territories. Both counties were regarded as 
hostile to the Ulimo-K fighters. Mandingo soldiers of Ulimo-K were former civilians expelled from the 
Lofa County by the Loma and Kpelle people with the help of the NPFL.844 Thus, once in Lofa, Ulimo-K 
retaliated w
lle joining the LDF militia “established in refugee camps in Guinea with the primary aim of hitting 
back at the hated Ulimo-K.”845 In Lofa “the LDF fighters had the full support of the communities on 
whose behalf they were fighting, turning the war in the upper Lofa areas into an ethnic contest between 
Mandingo on the one side, and Loma and Kpelle on the other.”846 
 The territories of the Bong County, to which Ulimo-K had access at some point, were no less hostile 
to the predominantly Mandingo soldiers of the faction. In fact, the Bong County was considered to be the 
NPFL home base land where the capital and the military base of Taylor’s Greater Liberia were 
established in the town 
rtwined into Taylor’s network of material resource extraction and where the population, as a result, 
was dependent on this new ‘administration’. Therefore, it is hard to imagine that Ulimo-K could have 
mobilized a lot of popular support in the Bong County.  
In the Cape Mount County, which Ulimo-K did not control for too long, mobilization must have also 
been low. Consider how civilians of Cape Mount were reported to suffer at the hands of Ulimo-K, which 
presupposes low popularity for the movement in that region: 
 
842 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 137. 
ntered Liberia… and was getting support 
The Mask of Anarchy, p. 95). In August 1992, the MRM wing of Ulimo with 
ted taking valuable 
843 For instance, “By September 1991 the LUDF wing of Ulimo re-e
from… contingents of Ecomog” (Ellis, 
support of Ecomog (who also bought some NPFL commanders in Lofa) entered Lofa and star
agricultural and timber lands of the County from Taylor (Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 98). 
844 For more information on this historical ethnic tensions see Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 128.  
845 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 105. 
846 Ibid., p. 105. 
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“In late February [1995], ULIMO-Mandingo fighters killed 27 persons in Gbarma, Grand Cape 
Mount, and burned to the ground the 
Mandingo fighters killed hundreds o
neighboring villages of Tarkpoima and Zuo… ULIMO-
 f civilians in Menkor Town, Grand Cape Mount, and 
J on 
Bom
p er exceeded their numerical strength: 
they
g itself as a revolutionary movement and playing 
the 
 Ivory Coast, Prince Johnson of the INPFL 
was already marching small numbers of his troops to the capital. With such speedy developments within 
e for a coherent mobilization campaign. It is likely that the INPFL 
abducted many others, whose fate is unknown… ULIMO-Mandingo fighters entered Kpeneji 
town in Grand Cape Mount on April 4, killing three civilians and setting the town afire, including 
a large refugee/displaced persons camp… Mandingo forces murdered 55 civilians in Guthrie in 
late April.”847  
 
Overall, with its initially low mobilization as the MRM movement in Guinea, and its operation in hostile 
territories, Ulimo-K is assigned the value of ‘medium low’ on the mobilization capacity variable.  
After the 1994 Ulimo split, Ulimo-J established itself in the Bomi County and was present in the 
Cape Mount and lower parts of the Lofa County. Not much is known about mobilization for Ulimo-
i and Lofa land. But, unlike in the case of Ulimo-K, those territories were not hostile to the group 
and, therefore, some mobilization could have occurred, especially if communities suffered under the 
NPFL rule prior to the arrival of the Roosevelt Johnson’s forces. The Cape Mount County was taken by 
Ulimo-J after the Ulimo-K fighters had to abandon it.  
Ulimo-J’s leader, General Roosevelt Johnson, was originally from the town of Tchien in the Zwedru 
district of the Grand Gedeh County, and, therefore, could garner the support of the Krahn people of his 
home county.848 Many of the Krahn members in Ulimo-J joined the faction directly from the AFL 
forces.849 In general, it seems that Krahn people were mobilizing for the armed movement quite well. 
This is illustrated by the following account: “Krahn’s armed ow
 constituted only 4 percent of the population and therefore feared for their survival.”850 Taking into 
consideration Ulimo-J’s overwhelming initial support among refugees in Sierra Leone, and later the 
confirmed mobilization on the Liberian territories, albeit of an unknown scope, the overall popularity of 
Ulimo-J can be assigned a value of ‘medium high’.  
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) 
The popularity of the INPFL is somewhat difficult to assess compared to other Liberian factions. The 
group began in the same manner as the NPFL, advertisin
ethnic card against Kranh and Mandingo. Unlike the NPFL, however, it was not stationed in the ethnic 
hub of its primary supporters – Gio and Mano ethnic groups residing in Nimba. In February 1990, just 
two months after the NPFL came to the Nimba County from
the group, there was simply no tim
leadership was not contemplating any serious cultivation of supporters in the first place, as it planned to 
                                                 
847 U.S. Department of State, Liberia: Human Rights Practices, 1995. 
848 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 137. 
849 Howe, Ambiguous Order, p. 141. 
850 Ibid., p. 141. 
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arity of 
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apacity, and territorial access.  
e a coup-like military ousting of the Doe government in Monrovia. To achieve that goal, the INP
 building its outstanding military capability on the basis of just a small number of highly profession
ters, including international mercenaries. Overall, therefore, the INPFL’s popularity and the variab
obilization capacity for the group can be assigned a ‘low’ value.    
lanatory Powe
Table 15 below summarizes the values of the mobilization capacity variable assessed in this section 
for each Liberian armed group in my case study. Consequently, with the different levels of popul
e factions, their probability and scope of recruiting children should be determined by different 
explanatory factors, according to my extended argument. More specifically, as Table 15 reflects, for the 
factions with high mobilization capacity, such as the NPFL, LPC, and Ulimo-J, the child recruitment 
practice should be predicted by the groups’ fighting capacity and ethnic persecution variables. For the 
factions with low mobilization capacity, namely Ulimo-K and the INPFL, child soldier practice should be 
determined by the levels of fighting capacity, material c
Table 15. Armed Groups Popularity and Factors Explaining their Child Soldier Recruitment  
Popularity Armed Faction Mobilization Capacity Factors Explaining Child Recruitment 
Actual Child Soldier 
Recruitment  
NPFl High High 
LPC High High Popular 
Ulimo-J Medium High 
Fighting Capacity 
Ethnic Persecution 
Medium low 
Ulimo-K Medium Low Medium high 
Unpopular 
INPFL Low 
Fighting Capacity 
Material Capacity 
Territory Control Low 
 
As can be seen from Table 15, five Liberian armed groups from my case study vary on the dependent 
variable of child recruitment not only across all five of them, but also within the two sub-groups of those 
PC and Ulimo-J, which were highly popular 
amo
however, certain cells of Table 16 with values of the independent variables are marked with shading for 
nd territorial access variables are shaded 
Ulimo-J. This reflects the fact that these two explanatory factors are not 
with high and low mobilization capacity. Thus, the NPFL, L
ng their constituencies, had ‘high’ and ‘medium low’ rates of child recruitment. Similarly, Ulimo-K 
and the INPFL, while having lower mobilization capacity, varied in their child soldier rates from 
‘medium high’ to ‘low’ levels, respectively. Therefore, from the methodological point of view, the case 
study of five Liberian armed groups offers a unique setup to test my extended argument. More 
specifically, it provides the opportunity to determine whether the two respective sets of independent 
variables for each of the two categories of popular and unpopular armed groups are able to predict the 
established differences in child soldier practice within each category.  
Table 16 presented below is an updated version of Table 14 from Chapter 6. Unlike Table 14, 
exclusion. More specifically, the cells for the material capacity a
in the case of the NPFL, LPC and 
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proposed in my extended argument to explain the variation in child recruitment practice for popular 
armed groups.851 As can be seen from Table 16, the two remaining variables of fighting capacity and 
ethnic persecution offer a good prediction for child recruitment outcome, as the last columns of predicted 
and actual values of the dependent variable match very well. More specifically, ‘high’ levels of the NPFL 
h levels of 
chil
and LPC’s fighting capacity and their access to ethnically persecuted populations predict hig
d recruitment for these two groups – a trend which did materialize in this case. Similarly, ‘medium 
low’ levels of fighting capacity of Ulimo-J and the absence of direct ethnic persecution for its 
constituency should have incurred ‘low’ or ‘medium low’ levels of child soldiering, which also matched 
with reality.  
Table 16. Factors Determining Child Soldier Recruitment by Armed Groups 
Liberian 
Armed 
Faction 
1. Fight  
Capacity 
(Intensity) 
2. Material 
Capacity 
(Rewards) 
3. Ethnic 
Killings 
(Defense) 
4.Territorial 
Access 
 (People) 
Child  
Soldier 
Predicted 
Child  
Soldier  
Actual 
NPFL High {HIGH}* 
Low 
{HIGH} 
High  
{HIGH} 
High 
{HIGH} HIGH HIGH  
Medium Medium High LPC High {HIGH} {MEDIUM} {HIG
High  HIGH HIGH  H} {MEDIUM HIGH}
Ulimo-J {MED W} 
Medium Low 
IUM LO
High 
{LOW
 
{LOW} } 
Low Medium 
{MEDIUM} 
(M
LO
DIUM 
LOW  
edium) ME
W 
Low U Medi gh {MED H} 
Medi
{Mlimo-K 
um Hi
IUM HIG
um 
EDIUM} {LOW  
MEDI MEDIUM 
IGH  } {MEDIUM}
Medium UM 
(High) H
INPFL Low 
 
{ {LOWLOW} 
High 
} 
Low 
{LOW} 
 
LOW LOW  Low {LOW} 
* In
inde
rated different predictions for child 
 curly brackets {} I report the predicted value for child soldier recruitment from one specific value of the 
pendent variable reflected in each cell. The penultimate column stands for the overall predicted value of child 
soldier practice based on the analysis of all four predictive values from each explanatory factor.   
 
For two unpopular armed groups of Ulimo-K and the INPFL, the combination of the three factors, 
after the exclusion of the variable of ethnic persecution, also predicts child recruitment accurately. We 
witness the ‘medium high’ levels of child soldiering in the case of Ulimo-K, whose fighting capacity was 
assessed at that same level and whose variable of material capacity took the value of ‘medium’ on a 3-tier 
scale (‘low’, ‘medium’, and ‘high’). The low levels of all three independent variables for the INPFL 
group predict very well the ‘low’ levels of the dependent variable.  
It should be noted here that for the popular NPFL, LPC and Ulimo-J, the excluded variables of 
material capacity and territorial access in most cases would have gene
                                                 
851 As has been noted earlier in Chapter 3 on the explanatory framework, in the case of popular armed groups, 
material compensation is less likely to establish itself, as insurgents might have difficulty to have both compensated 
and non-compensated soldiers in their ranks at the same time. As to the territorial access, in the case of popular 
armed groups, a certain number of children are always willing to join and walk towards the groups for either 
ideological reasons or feelings of insecurity. 
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soldier recruitment than the included combination of fighting capacity and ethnic persecution factors. 
Moreover, material capacity and territorial access would not have been able to explain the lack of 
variation across child soldier practice by two out of the three armed groups in question. Thus, the values 
of ‘high’, ‘medium’, and ‘low’ of the material capacity variable for the NPFL, LPC, and Ulimo-J, 
respectively, do not suggest why the NPFL and the LPC both had ‘high’ child to adult ratios. Similarly, 
‘high’, ‘medium high’, and ‘medium’ levels of the territorial access variable do not reflect the absence of 
any difference in the child soldier values for the NPFL and the LPC.  
In the case of the unpopular Ulimo-K and the INPFL armed groups, the exclusion of the ethnic 
persecution variable also offers a more meaningful prediction of the difference in child soldier ratios 
between the t lanatory 
fa ot pre ifferen  th  high’ and ‘low’ values of the dependent 
va r these d group e, on of les th opo e 
les tant in  child so uitm  case o  and unpopular armed groups 
appears empirically ed.  
Narrative Reco  the r F ri
Ta  resu  exte lanat rk app  the c y 
an rt e g cing packin le ar   
five Liberian armed groups in question. Once the popularity levels of these factions were established in 
this section, it is possible to offer short narrativ  the groups’ popul d 
different combinations of explanatory factors interacted.   
ditional recruits. 
Its l
 indeed important in explaining the 
NP
children and 71% of those child soldiers who joined the group voluntarily. 
child 
wo factions. With its values of ‘low’ for both Ulimo-K and the INPFL, this exp
c ntor can
riable fo
dict the d ce between
s. Therefor
e m ‘mediu
 two arme the exclusi the variab at were pr sed to b
s impor explaining ldier recr ent in the f popular
 justifi
nstruction of Arg t foumen iv ee Lib an Factions 
ory framewoWhile ble 16 presents the lts of my nded exp lied to ase stud
alysis, fu he  br insights may a rained by t  or “un g o” the wh gument for each of the
e stories of how exactly arity an
The NPFL, highly popular relative to all other factions, had also established itself as the most 
militarily effective armed group with high fighting capacity and thus high demand for ad
arge popularity could have filled the necessary ranks for the group. Therefore, child recruits in the 
armed faction could be driven by extremely insecure environments in the regions where the NPFL 
operated. In fact, the group was reported to attract many Gio and Mano child orphaned victims of the 
AFL ethnic persecution campaigns in the Nimba County at the beginning of the war.852 The relatively 
high rate of all children in my survey citing protective reasons for their decisions to enlist into the group 
also supports the point that the ethnic persecution variable was
FL’s large child soldier ratios. As I show elsewhere in this dissertation, according to my survey, the 
ratio of all NPFL children who joined for the reasons of protection was rather high at about 34% of all 
The variables of material capacity and territorial access may be less important in explaining 
recruitment for this group relative to other factions. However, as I show below in Section 2, the NPFL 
                                                 
852 HRW, Easy Prey, p. 8. 
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exhibited dynamically changing levels of popularity over time. More specifically, in the temporal within-
case study analysis I demonstrate how the factors of material capacity and less so territorial access 
started exerting their influence on child soldier recruitment when the group’s popularity plummeted.   
With its overwhelming popularity, especially at the initial stages of the conflict, the NPFL attracted 
many people just on the promises of future political change, so that pecuniary rewards were not even 
necessary in the case of this armed group. Similarly, this popular faction did not have to engage in forced 
recruitment of unwilling adults, which could ultimately lead to conscription of children as a better 
alte
, children were joining the LPC to end their dire circumstances hiding in 
e of such children seeking 
pro
Sierra Leone and on the Liberian soil. While 
attr
xample of Ulimo-J shows that 
my
rnative in this context. Without the necessity to recruit minors forcibly, the role of territorial access in 
the case of popular NPFL was relatively minor, as suggested by my extended argument. 
 The LPC faction, popular among Krahn and Sapo in the south of the country, generated ideological 
mobilization of people on a large scale. In combination with the group’s extremely high fighting capacity, 
however, popularity alone may not have satisfied the group’s need for additional combatants. Besides, the 
LPC operated on the territories where people of Krahn origin were awaiting armed defense against the 
abusive NPFL soldiers. Hence
the forest in fear. As shown elsewhere in the text in percentage terms, the shar
tection within the LPC was very high and constituted about 50% of all children in my survey who 
reported to be with this faction.  
The recruitment of children for the relatively popular Ulimo-J can be best assessed by adding a 
geographical dimension to it. Thus, as can be evident from my discussion above, the group experienced 
different levels of mobilization in the refugee camps in 
acting many ideological supporters of Krahn and Mandingo origin from Sierra Leonean and even 
Guinean refugee camps, Ulimo-J did not have a comparably strong ethnic base in any of its occupied 
counties of Bomi, Lofa or Cape Mount. Thus, within Liberia the mobilization capacity for the group 
could be regarded as ‘low’. It is possible that due to low levels of Ulimo-J’s fighting capacity the demand 
for soldiers was rather low and the group’s ranks could be filled even with the existing ideological 
recruits from refugee camps. However, it is evident that the group employed certain strategies to attract 
adult fighters in the absence of a full-scale support of the population. More specifically, Ulimo-J was 
compensating people from various Liberian counties for their military services. This resort to cash 
salaries by the faction in geographical regions where it suffered low ideological mobilization could have, 
in turn, filled the gaps in its ranks. Under such circumstances the levels of child soldier recruitment by the 
group could be expected to be low, as it indeed occurred. This particular e
 argument is robust not only across time, but also across space, as it rationalizes some geographic 
variations and trends in the variables.  
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The Ulimo-K armed faction, restricted with its popularity only to its limited Mandingo supportive 
base in Guinean refugee camps, was also observed to have high fighting capacity and high ambitions in 
pursuing its status of one of the major militarized players. Devoid of the ability to attract supporters from 
oth
o the position of 
hav
ed in the face of the spreading starvation in Monrovia. With the 
com
time in the conditioning variable of mobilization capacity for the 
NPFL armed group over time to identify which of my proposed factors should be more important in 
er ethnic groups, the group had to make sure that it exploits all the Mandingo reserves it had. Thus, it 
introduced semi-rewarding pecuniary incentives for new Mandingo recruits by allowing them to loot and 
to sell the stolen goods in Guinea. In this strategy it mirrored Ulimo-J, which managed to meet its demand 
for fighters in this way. What was different, however, is the clearly higher number of fighters needed by 
Ulimo-K, which was necessitated by the group’s higher fighting capacity, as well as the lower scope of 
ideologically driven people, compared to Ulimo-J. This combination put the group int
ing to recruit more children than Ulimo-J. The importance of the territorial access variable in this 
case is hard to establish, but with its ‘medium’ level in my analysis the access to people was not seen as a 
constraint.  
As to the INPFL armed group with the established low level of popularity, the story for this faction 
can be reconstructed as follows. The faction’s low level of fighting capacity could result in moderate 
demand for combatants. As the group did not attract many followers on ideological grounds, to recruit 
even relatively few fighters it had to resort to the practice of paying its combatants in food rations, upon 
which some adults indeed join
bination of low demand for combatants and presence of material compensations to the fighters, the 
need to recruit children by the INPFL as an alternative to forced recruitment of otherwise unwilling adults 
could not even occur. Without a demand for children, in turn, the role of the variable of territorial access 
was most likely reduced in its importance. At the same time, the extremely difficult access to people in 
the case of the INPFL, contained to only single community of the Caldwell area in the capital, might have 
ensured that the group’s soldiers could not access many children for recruitment.  
Section 2. Temporal Within-Case Study 
In this section, I conduct a temporal within-case study analysis of child recruitment by the NPFL 
armed group during the First Liberian Civil War. First, on the basis of my survey data, I construct a 
longitudinal continuous measure of the dependent variable of child soldiering for each year between 1989 
and 1996. This measure records the absolute number of former NPFL child soldiers from my survey who 
reported being recruited in that given year. Second, I analyze if my proposed explanatory variables of 
fighting capacity, material capacity, ethnic persecution and territorial access, as well as the control 
variables from my argument, exhibited any change over the same period of time and how, if at all, that 
change led to any corresponding temporal trends in the NPFL’s child soldier recruitment practice. After 
that, I demonstrate the variation over 
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exp
mation on the date of their entry into the 
fact
the location of the informants’ m rating in those areas right after 
the 
laining the change in the dependent variable at various stages of the group’s existence. I conclude the 
section with a summary of results from this temporal case study analysis. 
Temporal Variation of Child Soldier Recruitment for the NPFL Armed Group 
Graph 1 shows the distribution of child 
recruitment for the NPFL across time, as revealed in 
my survey data. In the questionnaires that my 
enumerators and myself were administering during 
the survey of the former Liberian child soldiers in 
Ghana, the informants were asked to recall the year 
they first entered an armed faction. Altogether, there 
were 137 former NPFL child soldiers in my survey 
and the infor
ion was recorded for all of these informants.  
During my own survey sessions, I made sure I 
verified the data with my respondents against the 
timing of well-known events occurring in Liberia at that time.853 Many of the youth surveyed by 
enumerators were then interviewed by myself, whereby I would always double-check the date of their 
entry into the group, to ensure the correct reporting of the values of this important variable. The survey 
sheets which I did not verify personally and directly in the field were examined by me carefully 
afterwards to see whether the date of entry into the armed group corresponded with the informants’ 
answers to other questions. For example, I examined the entry dates against 1) the name of the group (to 
double-check that the group actually existed at that time); 2) the geography of recruitment (to verify the 
possibility of the group’s presence in the reported region at the time of enlistment or conscription); and 3) 
Graph 1. Child Recruitment for the NPFL
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ilitary units (to assess if the group was ope
reported entry date). Some of the surveys, unverified in the field, were accompanied by narrative 
stories of respondents outlining the sequence of events in their lives during the Liberian conflict. Those 
written accounts would also put the reported entry year into a broader time perspective. In sum, I feel 
confident that the information on the year of recruitment, collected from former child soldiers in my 
survey, was close to reality.  
Temporal data extracted from a survey could become problematic if potential misrepresentation 
occurred in the sample and children who entered armed groups later as opposed to earlier were 
overrepresented among respondents. Indeed, it is conceivable that those recruited earlier would have 
                                                 
853 For example, after recording the entry date from respondents I asked them whether they were recruited before or 
after the Operation Octopus or the April 6 war – two of the major time reference point in the Liberian conflict.   
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lower chances of survival due to a potentially longer stay with an armed group and thus could have been 
absent from the data. While this problem might indeed exist, the distribution of my data does not show 
 the earlier stages of 
the he outlined problem might not become an issue. 
ous measure for the dependent variable of child 
m each year of the group’s existence. 
ear to year, 
ar. More importantly, however, one might observe 
1992, and 1996 – the three most important years in 
ia sparked. Below I trace temporal changes in my 
nerated the decreasing trend and yearly 
ractice. I also establish the variation in the values of 
 for the NPFL over time, so that in the discussion of the 
tem d assess if the effect of such changes was, in fact, 
t practice.  
hat the fighting capacity of his group, if combined with the expertise of the 
INP
any skewness towards the later dates of recruitment, but on the contrary, is tilted to
war. Thus, I believe that in the case of my data, t
Therefore, I use my survey to construct a continu
soldiering expressed in the numbers of new recruits fro
  As can be seen on Graph 1, recruitment of children into the NPFL faction varied from y
and, overall, was decreasing towards the end of the w
prominent spikes of recruitment in the years of 1990, 
the first Liberian conflict when the battles for Monrov
independent variables in order to see if any of them could have ge
spikes in the values of the NPFL’s child recruitment p
the conditioning variable of mobilization capacity
poral changes of my independent variables I coul
relevant for the explanation of child soldier recruitmen
Temporal Variations in the Values of Explanatory Factors behind Child Recruitment Practice  
Fighting Capacity 
Prior to the first series of armed battles for Monrovia in the summer of 1990, the NPFL’s fighting 
capacity was much higher than that of the government, who would have lost Monrovia if it was not for 
the arrival of the Ecomog soldiers. The AFL forces, once supported by Ecomog, were able to push 
Taylor’s rebels away from the capital and successfully secure the city and the surrounding areas of 
Greater Monrovia. At the same time, however, the combined forces of the government and peacekeeping 
troops were not prepared to face guerrilla fighters of the NPFL elsewhere in the country. Consider, for 
example, the following account of Ecomog’s struggle in combating NPFL fighters in the countryside: “... 
ECOMOG too was trying to minimize its own losses in the jungle terrain in pursuit of the rebels, who 
were not fighting a conventional war.”854 Thus, although the NPFL lost the 1990 attacks on Monrovia, the 
group could organize staunch resistance to the government and Ecomog troops elsewhere in the country. 
The failure of the second attempt by the NPFL to overtake Monrovia in 1992 was not so obvious to 
Charles Taylor. He believed t
FL soldiers, could present a viable challenge to the AFL and Ecomog forces.855 An unanticipated 
                                                 
854 Ogunleye, Behind Rebel Line, p. 133. 
855 That was the setup of the Operation Octopus in October 1992. It was the last-minute betrayal of the INPFL leader 
that ruined this initiative. For more information on the Operation Octopus, as well as for Taylor’s confidence in 
wining this battle, refer to Terrence Lyons, Voting for Peace: Postconflict Election in Liberia (Washington, DC: 
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event – withdrawal of the INPFL’s leader Prince Johnson from the negotiated deal with Taylor – resulted 
in devastating consequences for the NPFL in its second attempt to conquer Monrovia.856 After his second 
failure during this Operation Octopus, Taylor revised his strategy of taking over Monrovia militarily and 
switched to diplomatic means in getting access to the center of the country’s administrative power. 
Nevertheless, four years of negotiating produced no satisfactory political outcome for the NPFL leader.  
It was not until early 1996, when Taylor managed to form another military alliance that was meant to 
play
alists in the capital to arrest him, 
nce building by Taylor was so elaborate that the NPFL and Ulimo-K even obtained 
wea
 to his advantage in his third attempt to overtake the capital. In December 1995, Taylor made a deal 
with Ulimo-J, promising Roosevelt Johnson military and financial assistance if, contrary to the Abuja 
peace agreement, the Ulimo-J fighters would not abandon their western diamond fields and instead attack 
the Ecomog forces there.857 This attack at Tubmanburg by Ulimo-J was performed around December 
1995-January 1996. Although it was not the primary goal of his political-military maneuver, the NPFL 
leader managed to divert attention of the Ecomog troops from the capital, if not directly undermine their 
capability.858 At the same time, in his new status as a member of the governing council, Taylor took 
advantage of Ulimo-J’s violation of the Abuja peace agreement and, together with Ulimo-K forces in 
Monrovia moved towards the positioning of Roosevelt Johnson’s loy
“under the rhetoric of respect for law and order.”859  
This latter allia
pons assistance from Ecomog.860 In this last battle for Monrovia, all that stood between Charles 
Taylor and full military control by his forces of the whole of Liberia, including the capital, was the 
Barclay Training Center, the last stronghold of any potential rival military presence in Monrovia.861 
However, at this decisive military standoff, several unanticipated factors shifted the balance of power and 
precluded Taylor from reaching the full-scale victory: Ulimo-J obtained backing from Ecomog, received 
                                                                                                                                                       
Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 28-34. For details on Prince Johnson’s betrayal see Ellis, The Mask of 
Anarchy, pp. 98-99. 
856 According to one former NPFL child soldier whom I interviewed and who participated in these events, the NPFL 
suffered severe losses during the Operation Octopus (from my interviews in Ghana, winter 2008). For dire 
consequences of the Operation Octopus refer to Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 98-99.   
857 E
858 Th
e 
First, as a response to Ulimo-J’s attack on Ecomog in Tubmanburg, the Nigerians started helping Taylor and 
Kromah, fighting against Ulimo-J. Shortly afterwards, however, the peacekeepers’ commanders realized that 
overtaking of the Ulimo-J’s last base at Barclay Training Center by the NPFL would result in the establishment of 
nd thus should be avoided by all means. Ecomog immediately switched its 
llis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 107.  
e attack of Ulimo-J in Tubmanburg reportedly incurred significant Ecomog and civilian casualties (“Liberia” 
in Africa South of the Sahara, p. 604). 
859 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 107-108. 
860 This was the most infamous moment in the history of Ecomog’s partisanship exhibited in th Liberian conflict. 
Taylor’s military control over Monrovia a
support from the NPFL and Ulimo-K to Ulimo-J faction, thus making the infamous case of “arming both sides in the 
battle” (Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 107-108). 
861 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 108. 
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additional weapons delivery from the U.S. PAE security company, and managed to rally the support of 
some other militias “threatened by the prospect of complete military takeover” by the NPFL fighters.862  
Overall, I would argue that the NPFL’s fighting capacity remained rather high throughout the 
conflict. The fact that the group lost some of its control over the country to three new armed groups by 
1994 should not be interpreted as a change in its fighting capacity, but rather viewed in the light of a 
mul
d larger infantry than guerrilla fighting in the back 
cou
moments in its history. Overall, the effect of the fighting capacity variable can be assessed as strong. 
The temporal case study allows me to perform some process-tracing and establish the sequential 
ically, 
apital at 
er child recruitment practice by armed groups. These temporal 
1 
ks on 
tiplied number of opponents (from one to four) who still could not drive Taylor out of his core 
territories and could not prevent his marches to Monrovia. Taylor’s firm belief in his group’s military 
strength made him attempt to overtake the capital three times. It is the NPFL’s ability to challenge the 
government in the countryside during the first stages of the war that made Taylor confident that his troops 
would be able to crush the AFL in Monrovia in 1990. They would have, if it was not for Ecomog’s 
intervention. Then, upon the negotiated deal with the INPFL in 1992, Taylor believed to match his 
fighting capacity to the one of the AFL and Ecomog forces during the Operation Octopus mission to 
overtake Monrovia. With yet another masterminded plot in 1996 during the ‘April 6 War’, Taylor was 
poised to win over Monrovia.   
Each of the three battles for the capital required a boost to the NPFL forces, since the conventional 
war in the open field required more body mass an
ntry.863 As my survey and Graph 1 demonstrate, the NPFL’s child recruitment intensified during the 
years of major Monrovia battles: the first NPFL attack on the capital in 1990, Operation Octopus in 1992, 
and the April 6 War of 1996. A large share of the NPFL child soldiers in my survey sample were 
recruited in Monrovia (43%), as opposed to the rest of the country (57%). These temporal and spatial 
patterns imply that the need for fighters was especially critical during the times of the NPFL’s attacks on 
the capital and that the group resorted to the increased recruitment of children during those particular 
relationship between my variables, including fighting capacity and child soldiering. More specif
although the NPFL’s fighting capacity remained unchanged and high throughout the time of its existence, 
this characteristic of the armed group resulted in multiple attempts by the NPFL to attack the c
di rgument, it is these attacks on the capital caused by high fighting 
capacity that should lead to high
fferent times. According to my a
observations allowed me to assess the influence of Monrovian battles on child recruitment. Graph 
confirms large effect of the fighting capacity variable by showing that the years of the NPFL attac
the capital coincided with the years of spikes in child soldier recruitment by the group.  
                                                 
862 Ibid., p. 108. 
863 For clarification of this point see the relevant section of Chapter 3 on the explanatory framework.  
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This temporal exercise of tracing the events chronology addresses the potential problem of 
endogeneity from my large-N analysis. In Chapter 5 reporting on the empirical results, I mentioned that 
the 
hree factors from my argument is particularly important in this regard. 
Ma
PFL 
div
                                                
variable of fighting capacity could be endogenous by reverse causality to the dependent variable of 
child soldering, if we consider that recruitment of children by an armed group can increase (or decrease) 
its ability to challenge the opponent militarily. From this temporal case study it is clear, however, that it is 
the preparation for battles for the capital, which are the result of the group’s high fighting capacity in the 
first place, that led to increased child soldier recruitment, and not the other way around. Alternatively, if 
any potential reverse causality did take place, then the decreasing scope of child soldier recruitment by 
the NPFL over time should have been associated with the declining fighting capacity of the group. As I 
showed in this temporal case study, the NPFL’s fighting capacity, or ability to challenge the government 
and other opponents elsewhere in the country except Monrovia, remained high throughout the war. While 
it is clear that fighting capacity was associated with child soldier recruitment by the NPFL during attacks 
on the capital, that variable did not explain the decreasing trend in the group’s practice. Thus, the 
following examination of other t
terial Capacity 
It might be argued that the material capacity of the NPFL, as well as its policy or ability to 
compensate its fighters, has evolved throughout the group’s existence. In terms of its financial capability, 
the group got hold of multiple industrial and trade concessions already at the beginning of the conflict in 
1990 and managed to keep them until the end of the war. The absence of cash compensations to the NPFL 
soldiers was also persistent throughout the war, with Taylor paying only his high military commanders 
and important administrative people on the territory of the Greater Liberia.864 There was just one minor 
and probably insignificant change in that policy which occurred after 1994 when the NPFL started paying 
1,500 Liberian dollars (US$40) per month to its Motorcade Unit personnel.865 This was the N
ision responsible for Taylor’s personal security, as well as the group’s intelligence provision. The 
Motorcade unit consisted of pre-selected loyal fighters from the commanding ranks, whose ardent support 
for the faction needed to be further nourished as time went on. Unlike the foot soldiers in the infantry 
divisions, the Motorcade personnel required experience and training and could not be easily refilled by 
ordinary new recruits. While the introduction of salaries for the Motorcade unit represented some change 
in the NPFL’s paying practice, it did not result in compensation to new recruits. Therefore, this latter 
change cannot be interpreted as a temporal shift in the NPFL’s rewards system.  
 
864 Absence of payment by the NPFL to its soldiers, with the exception of high military commanders and 
rsonnel, was noted in Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, pp. 91, 114.  
8). 
administrative pe
865 From my interviews with a former NPFL child soldier from the Motorcade Unit (Ghana, winter 200
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One policy related to material compensation of fighters – that is allowing soldiers to loot – has 
undergone significant changes since 1990, however. During the first several months of the NPFL’s 
existence, until the unsuccessful attacks on Monrovia in 1990, the soldiers of the group were prohibited 
from looting civilians. At least two witnesses to Charles Taylor’s address to his fighters in 1990 and 1991 
reported the NPFL leader’s call for no looting or raping.866 While such public speeches could have been 
designed to impress foreigners and civilians alike, whose political support Taylor was seeking, some other 
accounts provided below tend to show that at least in some geographical places and by some NPFL units 
this rhetoric was actually implemented. Thus, one of the former NPFL child soldiers, whom I interviewed 
and who was with the NPFL in the Bong and Nimba Counties during 1990, noted that commanders were 
providing “food and things” to fighters and the soldiers were not allowed to loot.867  
The loss by the NPFL in Monrovia in the summer of 1990, however, somewhat changed that 
restriction on the soldiers’ discipline. The realization by ‘freedom fighters’ that the promised 
revolutionary redistribution of benefits will not occur, as the group did not win the capital, made them 
resort to capturing themselves what they could. The looting of the city began, and was widely recorded in 
n
the literature:  
“Looting, which had been checked to the barest minimum among the rebels before the arrival of 
the intervention force, suddenly rose to an unprecedented level when the rebels saw their dreams 
shattered by ECOMOG. So as not to lose out completely, they resorted to large-scale looting of 
electronic goods, equipments, and electrical appliances, etc. Most looted properties found their 
way across the border for sale in Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone while some were retained for 
personal use in Liberia in the belief that, even if they finally ended up not gaining power in 
Monrovia, they would still need goods to settle with – the only way they could compensate 
themselves, since they earned no salary.”868  
 
“When the NPFL first reached Monrovia in July 1990, fighters flocked to the battlefront to be in 
at the climax. This was the chance of a lifetime to acquire something valuable from Monrovia, 
home of the wealthy and source of imported goods. Many of the you g country boys and girls 
who joined up to take part in the battle of Monrovia had never been to the city before. The 
fighters were in carnival mood, especially those lucky enough to catch a ride down to the 
battlefront… As the fighters came into Monrovia’s suburbs they often painted their names on 
individual houses, believing that when the fighting was over they could come and reclaim the 
property as a prize of war. Everything they could carry, they took away.”869  
 
                                                 
866 For example, Mark Huband, a British journalist who happened to attend the parade of the NPFL’s forces at the 
faction’s base in Nimba County in 1990, recalled Taylor’s address to the fighters: “Anybody found raping or looting 
will face a firing squad” (Huband, The Liberian Civil War, p. 77). According to another witness of Taylor’s speech 
to soldiers and civilians alike in Kakata, Margibi County, in June 1991, the NPFL’s leader again urged the military 
personnel to treat civilians well and asked the citizens to report any misdeeds to G2 offices or Police Stations 
(Ogunleye, Behind Revel Lines, p. 66). The G2 refers to the NPFL’s military intelligence organ (Ellis, The Mask of 
Anarchy, p. 113). 
867 From my interviews in Ghana, winter 2008. 
868 Ogunleye, Behind Revel Lines, p. 81. 
869 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 115. 
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“By July 1990 there was a booming trade in looted goods exported overland by NPFL fighters for 
sale in the markets of Cote d’Ivoire, especially in the town of Danane.”870 
 
The plundering in Monrovia in 1990 by Taylor’s fighters was distinct, however, from the other 
subsequent looting of the capital by the NPFL in 1992 and 1996. First, it was more concentrated on public 
property, such as warehouses, large stores, and supermarkets, rather than civilian property.871 NPFL’s 
focus on bigger targets is reflected in the example when the group captured a Greek ship with rice and 
redirected it from Monrovia to Buchanan, where the fighters’ base was established by that time.872 
Second, as the example above also suggests, there was a tendency during this first stage of the NPFL 
looting practice to accumulate the wealth in the hands of high military command, which also implied the 
surrender of booty by foot soldiers after the looting missions. Consider the following ethnographic 
acco
ccount: 
ovia in 1990 did not spill into uncontrolled chaos in the 
terr o-
call ast 
199 n 
of G ot 
civi ’s 
hea id civilian landlords for 
stay on their property.876 Remarkable in this regard is the journey of one witness through the battle-
r 
unt from Ellis: “The chances of a lowly fighter making enough money to retire from the fray were 
slim, at least after the first battle of Monrovia, since a commander would soon detect any object of value 
being held by one of his or her combatants and would relieve the fighter in turn.”873 The same tendency of 
unequal loot opportunities was persistent during the second attack on Monrovia in 1992, as evident from 
the following a
Many of them, during [Operation] Octopus [in 1992], went to their early deaths hoping to acquire 
valuables from their misadventure in Monrovia. For those who were lucky enough to obtain 
anything at all, the Generals of some General took it away from them. And, as a young fighter put 
it, ‘you go to the front, you fight, anything good you get, they take it from you. That’s why you 
see some of those boys at the Front they don’t want to come to Gbarnga because if they bring 
anything good, they will take it from them’.874 
 
The looting practice first established in Monr
itories under the NPFL’s control. On the contrary, the behavior of the NPFL fighters behind the s
ed ‘rebel lines’ on the territory of Greater Liberia was more contained and restrained until at le
4. For example, according to one non-partisan witness account recorded for villages around the tow
beh, Margibi County, which were under the NPFL’s control, the ‘freedom fighters’ did not lo
lians but rather bought things and sometimes women in exchange for food obtained from the group
dquarters in Gbarnga.875 Somewhere near Monrovia commandos even pa
ing 
torn Monrovia in 1990 into the detention and hostage camp for the Nigerians upon Taylor’s orders fo
                                                 
870 Ibid., p. 114. 
871 Ogunleye, Behind Revel Lines, p. 39. 
872 Ibid., p. 39. 
873 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 126. 
, 105. 
874 Ibid., p. 126.  
875 Ogunleye, Behind Rebel Line, pp. 103
876 Ibid., pp. 129-30. 
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con og 
rc pletely of their money, but 
wer
tell a rebel that your things had been taken by his colleagues, lest you incurred his 
wra
ith 
thre he 
poli he 
towns they occupied.”  The infamous “Tappita Massacre” in Nimba County refers to the “lethal intra-
fact
tainment and extinction of this nationality which was disproportionately represented in Ecom
es. More specifically, he and his fellow captives were never robbed comfo
e solicited to pay bribes at the checkpoints in Monrovia, a detention center in Kakata, and on the way 
to and within the remote hostage camp on the Kakata-Bong highway where they ultimately ended up 
being incarcerated.877 In relative terms, the NPFL was even regarded as one of the “least destructive” 
occupying factions, which apparently “was one of the reasons causing people to vote for Charles Taylor 
as president of Liberia in July 1997.”878  
In a sense, there was this illusion cultivated by rebels during the first Liberian conflict – that is of 
them being ‘freedom fighters’. It prevented them from looting openly and at large, but at the same time 
did not preclude from getting at least something, albeit clandestinely. Consider how the rebels tried to 
preserve this ideational image of themselves: “the money and goods seized from the hostages at Kakata 
depot was said to have been used to “buy essential items” for the inmates,” or “drugs for local clinic.”879 
In other words, this behavior created a vision that “daily life continues with some degree of normality” – 
in line with the headlines issued by Charles Taylor.880 As Ogunleye assessed this situation in his own 
words: “You dared not 
th, because they were ‘freedom fighters’ and their work was to protect lives and property.”881  
This atmosphere of ‘normalcy’ largely collapsed after 1994, when renewed fighting of the NPFL w
e new armed groups in addition to the government increased the pressure on Taylor’s forces and t
cy of not paying them backfired: the “NPFL troops in some areas took to wholesale looting of t
882
ional firefight” and execution of town leaders and civilians as a result of tensions over the city’s 
looting rights between the NPFL units.883 The last battle for Monrovia was a culmination of this tendency 
that led to the “orgy of looting.” Unlike the plundering of the city in 1990 and 1992, this time it went 
completely out of the control, with an absolute breakdown of law and order. “Crucially, Taylor’s forces 
were more interested in looting than fighting,” as reflected in the infamous nickname given to this April 6 
War offensive by the NPFL fighters – the ‘Operation Pay Yourself’.884 According to Ellis, this was “the 
last great attempt to loot ‘as a form of compensation for the combatants who have fought for several years 
                                                 
877 For such multiple encounters between Nigerians and different NPFL soldiers refer to Ogunleye, Behind Rebel 
Line. 
878 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 129. Consider in this regard the following account of one Kissi chief: “‘Taylor is 
our son,’ because ‘when his men came, they left us alone. We were doing our farming. They did not take our 
hen ULIMO [K] arrived, they took everything across the border’” (Ibid., p. 129). 
sk of Anarchy, p. 91. 
.  
in, “The Rape of Dinah,” p. 362. 
rchy, p. 108. 
belongings. But w
879 Ibid., pp. 118, 121. 
880 Ellis, The Ma
881 Ogunleye, Behind Rebel Line, p. 118
882 Ibid., pp. 91-92. 
883 For the description of this incident refer to Ca
884 Ellis, The Mask of Ana
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without any benefit from the leaders.’”885 At the same time, the battle also served as material enrichment 
opportunity for new recruits: “Some sources reckon that a disproportionate number of fighters in April 
1996 were from Lofa, people who had previously little chance for serious looting.”886 Ironically, by April 
1996 “many fighters seemed to have no idea why they were fighting at all, other than to acquire loot.”887 
In sum, it can be concluded from the discussion above that with time, particularly after 1994, the 
opportunities to acquire wealth through loot for every NPFL soldier, no matter how low-ranking, had 
increased. This boosted the numbers of adult volunteers enticed by profiteering and thus, according to my 
argu
Not
ment, helps explain the decrease in child 
recruitment for the NPFL over time. The 
accounts above also stressed the uniqueness of 
the year 1996, when the possibilities of looting 
in Monrovia were wide open for incumbent and 
new recruits alike, irrespective of their ranks. 
This trend can be reflected in Graph 2 which 
shows a difference across time in the regional 
patterns of recruitment of minors by the NPFL. 
e that at the initial stages of the war the 
group’s child recruitment outside Monrovia 
prevailed. At a later stage, though, the relative 
recruitment rates in and outside the capital largely matched up until 1996 when the child recruitment 
occurred primarily in the capital, not in the countryside. Thus, Graph 2 demonstrates that the changes in 
material compensation to the NPFL soldiers across time could have indeed affected the group’s child 
recruitment practice in the way my argument postulates.888 More specifically, it is most likely that the 
initial demand for soldiers in the countryside in 1996 prior to the attack on Monrovia was filled by adult 
soldiers who joined to participate in the city loot. When the NPFL forces reached Monrovia, however, 
those profiteers, uncommitted to the group’s goal, started deserting immediately after their ultimate 
personal objective to acquire loot had been satisfied. At this point, as Graph 2 shows, the recruitment of 
Graph 2. Recruitment of Children for the 
NPFL in and outside Monrovia
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children in Monrovia skyrocketed, arguably to fill in the depleting ranks of the NPFL.  
 
                                                 
885 Ibid., p. 108. 
886 Ibid., p. 124. 
887 Ibid., p. 127. 
888 In this chapter’s sub-section on ethnic persecution I show that this recruitment pattern of the NPFL in 1996 
by the ethnic persecution variable. In the discussion dedicated below to the territorial access 
t be attributed entirely to the 
l towards the end of the war. 
cannot be explained 
variable I also establish that this geographical differences of child recruitment canno
reduction of the NPFL’s territorial contro
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Ethnic Persecution 
As has been discussed in the cross-group case study of Chapter 6, the ethnic persecution motives 
should have ranked among the strongest ones for children joining the NPFL, as the group was operating 
in zones where ethnic cleansing was perpetrated by all parties to the conflict. Ethnic killings were evident 
in t
 the Nimba County.889 Krahn and Mandingo children 
protect the lives of themselves and their families by 
ct the people of endangered tribes to either perish in 
PFL control. As such, the persecution of Gio and Mano 
of 1990 and the pool of Krahn and Mandingo tribes in 
ed. As noticed in the literature, over time the “NPFL 
ges soon gave way to systematic looting and arbitrary 
hter motivation.”890  
r other armed factions in Liberia whom children could 
o. This ensured, for instance, that most Krahn and 
 for the NPFL in exchange for protection of their own 
ged by two armed 
ings of the Ulimo armed group in the north and the LPC faction in the south. As a result, from 1994 
until the end of armed hostilities in late 1996, the NPFL only sustained control in parts of the Nimba, 
d, Margibi, and Grand Gedeh Counties, which geographically represented less than a half 
                               
he country at the first stages of the war: with the persecution of Gio and Mano by Doe government 
soldiers in 1989-1990 and the immediate response of the NPFL group itself by mass genocidal execution 
of the Krahn and Mandingo tribes. Children, orphaned as a result of these campaigns, were allegedly 
among the first voluntary recruits for the NPFL in
from my interviews attested joining the NPFL to 
striking such a deal with the perpetrators.  
As time went on, however, one would expe
bloody killings or migrate out of the areas of the N
people in the countryside and Monrovia ceased as 
the country should have decreased as the war rag
targeting of Krahn and Mandingo in the early sta
violence, deliberately encouraged as a means of fig
In addition, from 1992 there were at least fou
have joined for protective reasons if they had t
Mandingo people did not have to enlist voluntarily
lives and the lives of their families, as it was common during the initial stages of the Liberian conflict. 
Thus, the variable of ethnic persecution exhibited a declining trend from its high values to lower ones. 
This, in turn, could have explained the decreasing trend in the child soldier ratios of the group, due to 
fewer children being accepted on the grounds of ethnic orphans protection.   
Territorial Control 
The NPFL group was known to control the largest amount of territory out of all five Liberian 
factions. However, this was not the case throughout the entire conflict. Taylor’s forces started the armed 
struggle successfully by establishing control over all of Liberia except Monrovia. These possessions 
reduced by some 50% between the years of 1993 and 1994, as the NPFL was challen
w
Bong, Marylan
                  
889 HRW, Easy Prey, p. 8. 
890 Quentin Outram, “It’s Terminal Either Way: an Analysis of Armed Conflict in Liberia, 1989-1996,” Review of 
African Political Economy, Vol. 24, No. 73, 1997, p. 367, cited in Harris, “From ‘Warlord’ to ‘Democratic’ 
President,” pp. 447-48. 
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of the Liberian territory. Therefore, the potential difference in the falling NPFL’s child recruitment rate 
cou
NPFL 
con
Tem
tlined in Chapter 3 on the 
ork, the conflict duration argument postulates the extinction of adult manpower 
reso
explanatory framework, however, the control variable of conflict intensity stresses the importance of 
al 
s in the 
ld have been explained by increasingly difficult access by the armed group to territories and people.  
To test the role of the territorial access variable in the dynamic evolution of the NPFL’s child 
recruitment, I observe the absolute child recruitment rate in the counties with and without the group’s 
control. As Graph 3 demonstrates, the 
recruitment of minors in the territories without 
established NPFL presence (except Monrovia) 
was meager compared to child soldier rates from 
the territories to which the group had exclusive 
access. When the territories under the 
Graph 3. The NPFL Regional Child Soldier 
Recruitment 
 1
25
30
35
40
te
d
 C
h
il
d
re
n
 1
 1
 1
 1
 1
 1  1
 2
 2
  2 2 
 2
 3  3  3  3  3
0
5
10
15
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Year
N
u
m
be
r 
of
 R
e   2
20cr
u
i
1. Counties under NPFL Control
2. Greater Monrovia 
3. Counties without NPFL Control
trol started gradually receding between 1992 
and 1996, the share of children recruited in the 
remaining controlled counties started falling 
relative to recruitment in Monrovia, with the 
ultimate culmination of conscription in the 
capital in 1996.  
poral Changes in Control Variables 
As has been mentioned in Chapter 4 on methodology, the temporal case study, which is a variant of 
the within-case study, represents a unique scientific setup in terms of allowing the researcher to achieve 
maximum comparability of cases. Thus, by examining only one armed group across time I ensure that my 
control variables, such as pre-war poverty levels, for example, and the timing of conflict, do not change. 
As to the control variable of conflict duration, it is this very time dimension and the change in factors 
over the years that is being analyzed in the temporal case study. As ou
explanatory framew
urces towards the end of the conflict and the increase of child soldier recruitment practice as a result 
of it. My data on the NPFL’s child recruitment demonstrates, however, that the values of the dependent 
variable were declining over time, not increasing, contrary to the conflict duration argument. Thus, the 
support offered in the temporal case study for this control variable was relatively weak.    
Another control variable from my explanatory framework, conflict intensity, requires more attention. 
In this chapter, in the sub-section on fighting capacity, I discussed the variation in the armed struggle 
intensity over time in terms of occurrence of conventional battles for the capital. As specified in my 
manpower availability and therefore war casualties or the number of all armed events as the tradition
measures of the concept.  It was not possible for me to identify yearly observations of battle death
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Liberian war in general and, even more so, for the NPFL armed group specifically. Nevertheless, I could 
collect information on the yearly number of armed events that this faction engaged in during the course of 
the 
ny armed cl
cas
conflict.  
Graph 4 demonstrates yearly changes in the 
number of NPFL’s battles, both in Monrovia and 
elsewhere in the country, juxtaposed with the
absolute numbers of children recruited for the
group in my sample. Arguably, it might b
concluded from this graph that the child
recruitment patterns follow more closely the
events in Monrovia rather than conflict intensity
elsewhere in the country. Thus, the temporal case
study allows me to show that it is not the conflict 
intensity of an armed group per se that leads to
child recruitment, but its military strength to 
challenge the opp
Graph 4. The NPFL's Battle Engagement and 
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 of engaging the latter in direct military confrontation over the 
ashes in the periphery, but lose them all, in which capital. An armed group might engage in ma
e its chances to recruit children are lower than if it had won those marginal battles and proceeded to 
attack the capital.   
The analysis of the NPFL group’s child recruitment over time permits to assess the predictive power 
of yet another control variable of orphaning. If the NPFL were targeting orphans specifically, every time 
an orphan was recruited, the ratio of orphans to children in the ranks of rebels would increase. Thus, if the 
data had displayed a decreasing rate of orphans 
relative to all recruited children over time, it could 
have signified that ‘orphans argument’ was 
working as orphans were less targeted and, 
therefore, the number of child soldiers recruitment 
by the NPFL dropped.  
Graph 5. Orphans and the NPFL Child Recruitment
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Graph 5 contrasts the trend in child 
recruitment with the changes in ratios of double 
orphans (both parents died) to non-orphans and 
single-orphans (one parent died) combined. This 
visual representation demonstrates the presence of 
a similar trend for the first three years. More 
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specifically, both absolute numbers of the NPFL recruited children in my sample and the ratio of orphans 
among them dropped. This could mean that over time the NPFL was targeting fewer orphans and, as a 
result, its numbers of child recruits dropped. However, after 1992, the association between orphans and 
chil mbers of child soldiers were steadily decreasing, the 
ating and remained high. Thus, the NPFL temporal 
conclusive support to the ‘orphans argument.’  
of the Mobilization Capacity 
e mobilization capacity of the NPFL armed group 
ically, the group’s popularity decreased as the war 
ple on ethnic and revolutionary ideological grounds 
g on Gio and Mano (as well as other tribes in the 
sident Doe and his Krahn and Mandingo supporters. 
n 1, “Taylor’s war had been widely popular when it 
Taylor’s method was to exploit the genocidal rage of 
a group did not last too long.892  
 the group was fighting for. One of the informants in my survey, who enlisted into 
Tay
used by civilian population.894 
With the decline in the NPFL’s popularity over
according to my extended argument, should be ex
Liberian conflict and towards its end. More specificall
child recruitment should be explained primarily by the
The variables of fighting capacity, material capacity a wever, should matter more 
                                                
d recruitment became less clear-cut. While the nu
ratio of orphans to non-orphans was actually fluctu
data on child recruitment provides some limited but in
Temporal Variation in the Conditioning Variable 
As has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, th
was exhibiting some changes over time. More specif
was raging. The faction succeeded in mobilizing peo
at the initial stages of the conflict, primarily drivin
country) antagonistic feelings against the ruling Pre
As one source summarizes what I detailed in Sectio
began. Everyone wanted to get rid of Doe.”891 “But 
the Gio and the Mano,” and as such the popularity of 
NPFL’s arbitrary violence against civilians and purges within the ranks of the armed group itself soon 
diminished the people’s appreciation of the ‘revolutionary’ group and its ‘freedom fighters’. As time went 
on, even recruits who joined the movement for ideological reasons became disillusioned and started 
doubting the causes
lor’s group voluntarily, left the faction soon afterwards because he felt that the “motif of NPFL was 
not right” and the group “was killing their own soldiers and was very wacky to their own members.”893 
Thus, the label of ‘freedom fighters’ in relation to Taylor’s forces had soon given way to a word ‘rebels’, 
 time, the levels of the group’s child recruitment, 
plained by different variables at the onset of the 
y, in the initial stages of the war I would expect that 
 factors of fighting capacity and ethnic persecution. 
nd territorial access, ho
 
891 Bill Berkeley, “Liberia Between Repression and Slaught
892 Ibid. 
893 From my interview with a former NPFL child soldier in Ghan
894 At least two of my interviewees while delivering their st
fighters’. Both were describing the events of the NPFL’s m
other child soldiers who spoke to me about their encounters
fighters’ in relation to the group, but emphasized the hypoc
of Taylor’s soldiers. Otherwise, most of my informants referred to the NPFL fighters as ‘rebels’.  
er,” The Atlantic Monthly, December 1992.  
a, winter 2008. 
ories referred to the NPFL insurgents as ‘freedom 
ilitary advancement towards Monrovia in 1990. Two 
 with the NPFL in 1992 and 1994 mentioned ‘freedom 
risy of using such term which did not reflect the behavior 
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towards the end of the armed struggle. The outcomes of my extended argument, as observed in the 
temporal case study, are summarized in Table 17.  
Table 17. NPFL’s Popularity and Prediction of its Child Soldier Recruitment over Time 
NPFL 
timeline 
Fighting 
capacity 
Material 
capacity 
Ethnic 
persecution 
Territorial 
access 
CS 
predicted 
CS  
actual 
Popular 
initial stage High {High} Low {High} High {High} High {High} HIGHER HIGHER 
Unpopular 
later stage High {High} High {Low} Low {Low} Low {Low} LOWER LOWER 
* In
for the NPFL. High 
valu
territorial access variable for the NPFL at this stage of conflict. It could 
also
compared to other factors in my non-extended argument. Thus, the levels of material capacity and 
 at the popular stage of the armed grou high rates of child soldier 
ent. Similarly, the low level of ethnic persecution towards the end of the conflict could also 
ue to 
ns, 
 curly brackets {} I report the predicted value for child soldier recruitment from one specific value of the 
independent variable reflected in each cell. Column 6 stands for the overall predicted value for child soldier practice 
based on the analysis of all four predictive values from each explanatory factor.   
 
The fighting capacity variable in the case of the NPFL did not exhibit any change while maintaining 
high values throughout the war. Therefore, the decreasing trend of child soldier recruitment should be 
explained by other variables in the two sets of explanatory factors for popular and unpopular stages of the 
NPFL (listed in the non-shaded cells of Table 17). During the initial popular stage of the group the factor 
of ethnic persecution should be at its highest level to generate high child recruitment 
es of the variables of fighting capacity and ethnic persecution thus predict high ranges of child 
recruitment at the popular stage of the group.   
Towards the end of the war, when popularity of the rebels decreased, the alternative variables of 
material capacity and territorial access should have increased their explanatory power. As the temporal 
change in the policy to allow looting has demonstrated, the increased load of material rewards for new 
adult recruits could have been associated with more adult volunteers and thus fewer child soldiers. The 
loss by the group of half of its territories to the rival factions towards the end of the armed struggle is 
reflected in the lower level of 
 contribute to the lower levels of child soldier recruitment.  
It should be noted here, though, that unlike in the cross-case study, in the temporal analysis I could 
not establish that explanatory power of my four independent variables should be different for popular and 
unpopular stages of the armed movement. While my analysis did confirm the predictive power of 
restricted variables, it did not suggest their exclusive importance in relation to the excluded variables 
territorial access p could also predict 
recruitm
suggest low child recruitment. It is unclear whether the inconclusiveness of this particular point is d
data limitations, mere correlation of the excluded variables with their potential child soldier predictio
or their actual explanatory power. 
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233 
led case study has established the differences in the 
predictiv
and unpopular arm . One roups FL –  unique case in itself: since 
its on ca  chan tim igh to w, it is possible to review the 
relative predictive power o
m se study in Section 2. 
 C  t tu L  ge ve s. 
fighting capacity remained mostly unchanged over the course of the war, the dates of attacks on the 
capital, as a result of persi
ital in 1996 more adults joined the faction for this 
lucrative opportunit
ndent variable, which could have made 
territorial access responsible for a part
different child soldier outcomes very accurately.  
Summary 
Extended Cross-case Comparison. This detai
e power of my four proposed explanatory factors behind child soldier recruitment for popular 
ed groups  of these g – the NP
e from very h
 represents a
 very lomobilizati pacity was ging over 
f explanatory factors within this case across time. This is what I attempted in 
y temporal ca
Temporal ase Study. The emporal case s dy of the NPF  armed group nerated se ral finding
First, disaggregation of the group’s child recruitment by year of conscription revealed spikes in my 
dependent variable of child soldiering in the years of the group’s attacks on the capital. While the value of 
stent and high fighting capacity of the rebel movement, were spread over time. 
This allowed me to trace the strong effect of fighting capacity variable on child soldiers: the NPFL’s child 
recruitment intensified during the years of major battles for Monrovia. 
Second, the temporal case study identified a change in the variable of material capacity over time, 
revealing more opportunities to loot for adult combatants towards the end of the war. Therefore, this 
variable could have explained the decrease in the absolute numbers of children recruited by the NPFL. 
Moreover, in the largest plundering operation in the cap
y than ever before. It is in this year that the geography of NPFL’s main incidence of 
child recruitment turned from the countryside to the capital.   
Third, the temporal analysis demonstrated that the variable of ethnic persecution also changed over 
time. Both the policy of the NPFL towards killing rival tribes and the numbers of victims towards the end 
of the war were abating. Therefore, the variable of ethnic persecution could also help explain the 
observed decreasing trend in the NPFL’s child recruitment. Fourth, the variable of territorial access in the 
case of the NPFL changed in the same direction as the depe
 of the declining trend. Fifth, the case study also demonstrated that 
none of the control variables which developed over time (conflict duration, conflict intensity, and 
orphaning) was a significant predictor of the decreasing temporal pattern of NPFL’s child recruitment. 
Sixth, the temporal case study also showed that the variable of mobilization capacity in itself was not 
an explanatory factor of child recruitment. As the NPFL’s popularity decreased over time, a potentially 
matching increase in child recruitment did not occur, with the actual child soldier numbers decreasing 
over time. As a conditioning variable, however, the mobilization capacity generated two distinct phases in 
the existence of the NPFL – popular and unpopular – in which different independent variables predicted 
  
Chapter 8: Plausibility Probes 
Up to this point my explanatory framework was largely confirmed in both large-N empirical tests on 
the sample of African insurgencies and in case studies on Liberia. In order to assess the potential 
generalizability of my argument to armed movements outside of the African continent, in this chapter I 
conduct two plausibility probes of my explanatory argument in the South-East Asian and Latin American 
context. More specifically, I evaluate the predictive strength of my hypotheses when applied to the LTTE 
armed group in Sri Lanka and the FARC guerilla movement in Colombia. The importance of such an 
exercise is highlighted by the fact that, unlike in the African context, we might expect both historical and 
modern armed movements of Asia and Latin America to be more popular among their populations. In 
contrast, insurgencies in Africa tend to be subjected to a lower degree of popularity (the average score on 
the mobilization capacity variable in my African sample was 0.45 on a scale between 0 and 1). 
Meanwhile, in my search I did not encounter any reference to an Asian or Latin American group that 
could be labeled as unpopular to the extent found in Africa.     
As empirical tests of my extended explanatory framework confirmed so far, in the case of popular 
rebels, ethnic persecution predicts the scope of child soldier recruitment by the militants. Moreover, the 
control variable of poverty was also found in my analysis to affect the level of child recruitment of 
popular armed groups, albeit to a lesser extent then ethnic persecution. Therefore, in the two case studies 
which are to follow in two consecutive sections in this chapter after a brief summary of each conflict, I 
first establish the high level of popularity of armed groups in question. Then I assess the values of my 
predictive factor of ethnic persecution and control variable of poverty through the analysis of the 
secondary sources. I then make a prediction for the child recruitment practice on the basis of the values of 
the independent variables. Finally, I compare the predicted values with the actual levels of child 
recruitment, the data for which I obtained from existing reports, books and articles. In conclusions to this 
chapter I comment on the strength of my argument. 
Section 1: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka 
Conflict Description 
The secessionist militarized conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the 
Sri Lankan government started in 1983. Since the onset of armed struggle, the LTTE was seeking an 
independent homeland for the minority Tamil population in the north and east of the country.895 One of 
the longest-running civil wars in Asia, the conflict lasted for over 25 years with brief cease-fire 
                                                 
895 Charu Lata Hogg, “Sri Lanka: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Child Recruitment,” CSUCS, 
Forum on Armed Groups and the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Chateau de Bossey, Switzerland, July 
4-7, 2006, p. 1. 
234 
  
intermissions in 1990, 1994-95, and 2001-20  which has its own Tamil population in the 
sou
ellupillai Prabhakaran.899  
he country’s north in 
earl
03.896 India,
th, deployed a peacekeeping force in 1987 that left three years later following the escalation of 
violence.897 During the ensuing conflict, the LTTE was able to challenge Sri Lankan forces from the 
Jaffna Peninsula in the north down through the eastern side of the island.898 Since the end of this last 
cease-fire in early 2000s, the Sri Lankan military has been trying to root out the LTTE and, following a 
fierce, year-long military offensive, the government claimed in May 2009 that it had defeated the 
separatist group and killed its leader V
As a result of armed hostilities in the country, more than 70,000 people were estimated to be killed by 
2008.900 The last few months of fighting between the government and the militants resulted in a large 
number of civilian casualties and censure from the international community.901 By 2005, the conflict 
displaced about 800,000 internally and about 600-800,000 as refugees to other countries.902 More than 
200,000 refugees were just as a result of hostilities in Jaffna in 1996.903 In February 2007 the UN 
estimated that more that 200,000 civilians have fled their homes since April 2006, raising the total 
number of internally displaced to nearly half a million.904 Increased fighting in t
y 2009 was reported to uproot an additional 250,000 people.905 According to recent reports by Human 
                                                 
896 Jayshree Bajoria, “The Sri Lankan Conflict,” Backgrounders from Council on Foreign Relations, URL: 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11407. For peace accords and cease-fires in the Sri Lankan conflict refer to Hogg, 
“Sri Lanka,” pp. 2-3; “Ceasefire Raises Sri Lankan Peace Hopes,” The Guardian, February 22, 2002, URL: 
http://www.g
was
Inno
 Bajoria, “The Sri Lankan Conflict.” 
uardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,655451,00.html. In December 2001 “a unilateral cease-fire 
 declared by the LTTE on 25 December 2001” followed by “peace negotiations, facilitated in part by the 
Norwegian government” (“Child Soldiers: CRC Country Briefs,” Pre-Sessional Working Group, 33rd Session, 
February 3-7, 2003). “A formal ceasefire agreement between the government and the LTTE followed in February 
2002” (CSUCS, Child Soldiers, 2004, op. cit., p.1). “Peace talks and negotiations took place in Norway, Germany 
and Thailand in 2002 and 2003… In April 2003 the talks broke down, according to the LTTE…The ceasefire held” 
(Ibid., p.1).  
897 Bajoria, “The Sri Lankan Conflict.” 
898 Ibid. 
899 Ibid. “But the group may continue to launch guerilla-type attacks on the country” (Ibid.). 
900 Randeep Ramesh, “Jailed Tamil Warlord has Deadly Influence on Election,” The Guardian, March 7, 2008. 
Aproximately 64,000 people were killed in a war by the year 2006 (Hogg, “Sri Lanka,” p. 1). 
901 Bajoria, “The Sri Lankan Conflict.” 
902 The conflict “displaced an estimated six hundred thousand from their homes since 1983” (Jimmie Briggs, 
cents Lost: When Child Soldiers Go to War (New York, NY: Basic Books, Perseus Books Group, 2005), p. 83). 
“In 2001, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimated that 800,000 people were internally 
displaced, and another 817,000 had taken refuge in other countries” (Nicolas Sambanis, “Civil War Coding Notes,” 
p. 206, Annotation to the Dataset used in Nicholas Sambanis, 2004, “What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical 
Complexities of an Operational Definition,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (6): 814-858).  
903 Sambanis, “Civil War Coding Notes,” p. 207. 
904 Somini Sengupta, “Sri Lankan Government Finds Support from Buddhist Monks,” The New York Times, 
February 25, 2007, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/25/world/asia/25lanka.html?pagewanted=1 (last 
accessed December 6, 2009). 
905
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Rights Watch and Amnesty Interna tary and the LTTE were violating 
inte
mil people abide. With some exceptions, 
they
’s base movement, movement with the people’s 
support... B  struggle, 
some milita is is more 
roductive in terms of commitment, but my leader decides whether that person 
tional, both the Sri Lankan mili
rnational laws of war, engaging in widespread human rights abuses, and placed civilians at risk.906  
Group Popularity 
The LTTE enjoyed high levels of popularity among its constituency since its inception. The LTTE’s 
struggle for a Tamil homeland of Eelam has been characterized as a liberation struggle which would 
ultimately lead to the creation of a casteless Tamil nation.907 The LTTE based its political ideology on the 
belief that “the majority Sinhala nation will not recognize the Tamil people’s national identity and their 
legitimate claim to political power and an armed struggle to fulfill this ultimate objective is both 
necessary and desirable.”908 Its particular brand of Tamil nationalism selectively revives religious 
concepts relating to a martyr cult.909 Such claims found wide resonance among economically deprived 
Tamil agricultural workers whose families lost their livelihood due to economic reforms in the late 1970s, 
as well as unemployed urban Tamil youth who faced “economic and social discrimination.”910  
Stories of dedication to a popular armed group by the Ta
 were reported to join the armed movement willingly throughout the conflict. Moreover, as a part of 
the LTTE’s strategy, its members were willing to sacrifice their lives in suicide bombings for the 
independence of the Eelam. Between 1987 and ceasefire in 2002 the LTTE has carried out more than 170 
suicide attacks, “exceeding any other single group around the world.”911 An infamous practice of LTTE’s 
fighters to swallow cyanide capsules prior to being captured by the government also attests to the 
dedication to the movement’s cause.  
The Tamil propaganda branded the group as “freedom fighters” to foster further support in Sri Lanka 
and abroad.912 The degree of dedication to the group by its members stands out among other conflicts in 
the world. The following extract represents the perceptions about the group’s membership of one local 
LTTE commander interviewed by a journalist in the field:  
“The LTTE succeeds because this is the people
ecoming a Tiger is a personal choice. In the course of participating in the
nts prefer to commit themselves to be a member of the Tigers. I feel that th
constructive and p
                                                 
906 Bajoria, “The Sri Lankan Conflict.” For example, “in April 2009, Human Rights Watch reported while rebels 
were preventing civilians from leaving the last tiny strip of land where they were fighting the government forces, the 
government forces repeatedly and indiscriminately shelled the area. UN satellite images suggested the government 
shelled "no-fire zone" (Guardian) where more than 50,000 people were trapped” (Ibid). 
907 Hogg, “Sri Lanka,” p. 5. 
908 Ibid., p. 5. 
909 Ibid., p. 5. 
910 Ibid., p. 9. 
911 Tore Bjørgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward (New York: Routledge, 2005), 
pp. 108-114, p. 110, p. 109. 
p. 73, citing Gunaratna 2000 and Schweitzer 2001. 
912 David Gray, Tom Owen Matchin, “Children: The New Face of Terrorism,” International NGO Journal, June 
2008, Vol. 3(6), 
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is capable, suitable or preferable to be a member of the Tigers. This is the manifestation of the 
highly motivated commitment to sacrifice their life for the liberation of Tamil Eelam.”913  
 
According to the observations of the same correspondent, the place of the LTTE control where the 
interview took place was in a “well-maintained and comparatively prosperous” district.914 
Massive financial support of the group by the Tamil diaspora is yet another testimony to the group’s 
immense popularity. Various sources estimated the amount of money flowing from the Canadian diaspora 
to the LTTE in the late 1990s at somewhere between Cdn$1 million and Cdn$12 million a year.915 Some 
80 t
Lankan security forces gladly sent funds to support the LTTE’s war against the government, viewing the 
LTTE as a legitimate representative of the Tamil people and their interests.”919  
It is quite probable that during over 25 years of conflict, the popularity of the movement could have 
id 
encies. 
ke 
at 
e 
o 90 percent of the LTTE’s mid-1990s’ military budget “came from overseas sources, including both 
diaspora contributions and income from international investments and businesses.”916 Overall, the 
overseas financing for the group, including diaspora remittances, was reported to remain at a high 
estimated $200 million to $300 million per year for several years prior to its defeat, thus making the LTTE 
“one of the wealthiest militant organizations in the world.”917 Some suggest that the LTTE often used 
intimidation to secure at least part of its funds from the Tamil diaspora abroad.918 Others claim that the 
intentions behind the overwhelming diaspora support were deeply rooted in the intrinsic popularity of the 
group, as the following account suggests: “Many Tamils who had suffered or witnessed abuses by Sri 
diminished. However, even if such a trend was occurring, the following fact still remains: the LTTE d
care about obtaining the support of its people throughout the conflict, unlike many African insurg
Therefore, one would still expect the group to conduct its child recruitment policy accordingly to ma
sure the latter does not intervene with the domestic legitimacy of the group. Below is the example th
seems to support such a conjecture. As of September 2008, all humanitarian agencies were asked to leav
                                                 
. 
nt 
pdf; 
), 3 June 2000, and 
 Hogg, 
ily members back in 
n Sri Lanka for ransoms secured overseas. Members of the Tamil 
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amil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and Operations – A Preliminary Analysis,” 
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914 Ibid., p. 99. 
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ewart Bell, “Groups Act as Fronts for TerrSt or,” The National Post, 9 December 2000, 
http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/index.html, cited in Hogg, “Sri Lanka,” p. 8. 
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Sri Lanka, as well as kidnapping affluent Tamils i
community abroad say the culture of fear that surrounds such tactics is enough to coerce them to fund the LT
(Ibid.). 
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cited in Hogg, “Sri Lanka,” p. 7. 
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Sri Lanka, including the ones who set up a monitoring framework to name and shame the LTTE voluntary 
child soldier practices. Since the withdrawal of the external watchdog, however, government agencies on 
 that the LTTE “has not massively expanded its underage recruitment policies out of 
fear
Eth
ement with the LTTE were extrajudicially executed, “disappeared,” 
and
se 
sus on 
for 4. 
After its disbandment, remaining elements of the Karuna group have continually ambushed and attacked 
                
the ground reported
 of losing public support from the local population.”920 
Assessment of Predictive Variables 
In the previous section I established that the popularity of the LTTE armed faction was very high. 
Therefore, according to my theoretical framework, the recruitment of children for the group is expected to 
be predicted by the ethnic persecution variable. Ethnic persecution in my model stands for the concept of 
extreme insecurity in the country. In this section I show how ethnic tensions between the predominantly 
Sinhalese government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil people of Eelam led to the sense of insecurity among 
Tamil adults and youth. I then demonstrate that his was further associated with largely voluntary 
participation of children in the LTTE.  
nic persecution 
The root of the conflict in Sri Lanka was ethnically based. The LTTE apparently provoked in 1983 
the anti-Tamil violence in the south on an unprecedented scale, after the newly formed insurgency 
ambushed and killed 13 government soldiers near the northern peninsula of Jaffna.921 Ethnic persecutions 
and ethnic violence were attributed to both parties of the conflict responsible for deliberate killings of 
civilians or their disappearances.922 Many Tamils “experienced or witnessed abuses by government 
forces” and those suspected of involv
 were “tortured by the security forces.”923 The Tamil youths have been specifically targeted by the 
Sinhala security forces. They were often detained for interrogation, torture, execution, or even rape. 
During the so-called ‘Operation Liberation’ in 1987, youths were either summarily shot or shipped off in 
chains to the Booza camp in the south by the army.924  
The LTTE also contributed to the feeling of insecurity among its own people by killing tho
pected of being informers or considered to be “traitors.”925 This behavior and thus insecurity situati
Tamil people was further exacerbated after the Karuna split within the LTTE in March-April 200
                                 
hts Watch communication with UN protection official, November 19, 2008, cited in Human Right 
d and Mistreated: LTTE Abuses against Civilians in the Vanni (HRW: New York, 2008), p. 6. 
nka,” p. 2. 
 killings of Sinhalese and Muslim civilians (Ibid.).  
rnational Reports 1996 to 2002.   
920 Human Rig
Watch, Trappe
921 Hogg, “Sri La
922 Ibid., p. 2. 
923 Ibid., p. 2. The LTTE also “engaged in retaliatory
924 Gray and Matchin, “Children: The New Face of Terrorism,” p. 110, citing Somasundaram, 2002.  
925 Hogg, “Sri Lanka,” p. 3, citing Amnesty Inte
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the nt 
crac
ct, Sri Lankan 
gov
cy of the group was not 
com
revealed that during the height of the Eelam Wars “at least 40 per cent of the fighting force consisted of 
and 18.”932 Thus, the cited percentages vary from 40 to 60 percent, 
LTTE and those affiliated with it. The LTTE has sought to regain control of the east through a viole
down, not just on Karuna supporters, but on any dissent within the Tamil community.926  k
Overall security in the country also deteriorated because both the army and the LTTE “failed to take 
adequate measures to avoid civilian casualties.”927 Thus, in the course of the confli
ernment forces reportedly engaged in a pattern of indiscriminate military campaigns, involving aerial 
and artillery bombardment of areas populated by civilians, “shelling, helicopter strafing, round ups, 
cordon and search operations, destruction, mass arrests, detention, shootings, grenade explosions, and 
landmines.”928  
Overall, it can be argued that the situation of insecurity in Sri Lanka, driven primarily by ethnic 
tensions between the government and the LTTE, as well as on ideological motifs within the LTTE itself, 
was quite high. Therefore, one might expect that this insecurity might have produced numbers of child 
soldiers who joined the LTTE for defense purposes. In the next section I first show that child recruitment 
by the LTTE was a frequent phenomenon throughout the war. Then I show that most of the recruitment 
was voluntary, thus supporting the underlying proposition of my argument that popular groups would 
most likely not use coercion. At the end I establish that the voluntary recruitment was driven primarily by 
feelings of insecurity, as opposed to other factors which might influence a decision of an individual to 
join, and thus was acceptable among the community so that domestic legitima
promised.   
Child Recruitment 
The LTTE has recruited and used children as soldiers throughout the Sri Lankan civil war.929 
“Government soldiers have often described how they were forced to confront LTTE battalions of women, 
teenage girls, and boys as young as 10 years old.”930 Sri Lankan government authorities estimate that “at 
least 60 per cent of LTTE fighters are below the age of 18.931 Estimates of LTTE cadres killed in combat 
girls and boys between the ages of 9 
                                                 
926 Hogg, “Sri Lanka,” p. 4. There are allegations by the LTTE that Karuna is funded and supported by the Sri 
Lankan government. If these allegations are correct, the group becomes a paramilitary organization affiliated with
the government but, unlike the latter, with freer hands to commit human right
 
s violations. Similar situation can be 
a,” p. 3, citing Human Rights Watch Report 1995, and Gray and Matchin, “Children: The New Face 
ram, 2002. 
, “Sri Lanka,” p. 10, citing Second periodic report of Sri Lanka to the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
observed in the situation of Colombia, as my plausibility probe case study analysis further demonstrates.  
927 Hogg, “Sri Lanka,” p. 3. 
928 Hogg, “Sri Lank
of Terrorism,” op. cit., p. 110, citing Somasunda
929 Hogg, “Sri Lanka,” p. 10, citing Amnesty International, Children in South Asia –Securing their rights (AI Index: 
ASA 04/001/1998), 22 April 1998. 
930 CSUCS, Asia Report, July 2000, citing Rädda Barnen, Children of War Newsletter, No. 1/98. 
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Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/70/Add.17, 19 November 2002, para. 170, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. 
932 Hogg, “Sri Lanka,” p. 10. 
239 
  
and can be considered as rather ‘high’. The average age of children at the time of recruitment into the 
LTTE was 15.37. According to estimates by UNICEF, as of 30 April 2006, at least 1,440 cases of child 
recruitment were still outstanding with the LTTE. Out of these, 859 children were under-age at the time 
of recruitment but subsequently turned 18 years of age.933 
The prevailing form of the LTTE’s child recruitment was voluntary. Although reports of forced 
recr
ent of children.”937 According to Tamilselvan, the LTTE “rejects 
cruitment” and “nobody forces” children.938  
uitment by the group have surfaced, voluntary enlistment by Tamils in the LTTE was believed to be 
“common.”934 The LTTE itself claimed its young recruits were volunteers and that “it would be 
unthinkable to refuse their desire to combat Sinhala imperialism which is the concern of all Tamils.”935 
Similarly, the group has denied the presence of forced recruitment of children into its ranks.936 In a 
meeting with Human Rights Watch, the secretary-general of the LTTE’s political wing, S.P. Tamilselvan, 
referred to child soldiers and claimed that the group did “not have such a phenomenon,” and “that the 
LTTE did not practice forced recruitm
the term of forced re
While denial of the practice by an armed group, especially the one that is conscious about its 
domestic image, might not represent the actual situation on the ground, the general reports on the LTTE 
do not emphasize forced recruitment practices by the group. The instances of forced recruitment that have 
been reported were mostly claimed to take the form of threats to the family, as opposed to blatant 
abductions, although the latter has also been alleged occasionally. A “one family one child” policy was 
introduced by the group in some regions during certain times, upon which “the LTTE has pressured Tamil 
families to provide a son or daughter for “the cause.” If a family resisted, they were often subject to 
threats and harassment. In many cases, a child was eventually taken by force.”939  
                                                 
933 Hogg, “Sri Lanka,” p. 10, citing Under-age Recruitment as of 30 pril 2006, monthly statistics provided by 
UNICEF Sri Lanka. 
934 DIRB, 26 June 1997, cited in War Resisters’ International, “Sri Lanka,” 25/07/1998. 
935 “The secretary-general of the LTTE’s peace secretariat, S. Puleedevan, told Human Rights Watch that the LTTE 
 A
is “working very hard on this issue,” and denied that the LTTE practices forced recruitment” (Human Rights Watch, 
Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (HRW: New York, November 10, 2004), p. 51). 
936 According to the secretary-general of the LTTE’s peace secretariat, S. Puleedevan, “there is no threat of forced 
recruitment. The LTTE is voluntarily giving their service to the people” (HRW, Living in Fear, op. cit., p. 51, from 
the Human Rights Watch interview with S. Puleedevan, Secretary General, LTTE Peace Secretariat, Kilinochchi, 
t 
al” (Ibid.). 
 in Fear, op. cit., p. 51, from the Human Rights Watch interview with S.P. Tamilselvan, General-
August 13, 2004). Puleedevan also mentioned that “there may be some lapses. Some forces may force one or two 
children, but that doesn't mean that the leadership is giving a green light to do those kind of forcible recruitmen
cases.... Abduction is margin
937 HRW, Living
Secretary of the LTTE political wing, Geneva, October 5, 2004. 
938 Ibid., p. 51. 
939 HRW, Living in Fear, op. cit., p. 5. 
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The only available percentages I could find on relative voluntary and forced LTTE child recruitment 
were based on the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) reports of 2002.940 According to these 
num
 the LTTE recruitment of children is mostly voluntary does not tell us anything about the 
mot
dren will seek protection when in such danger.943 The LTTE’s 
 was also a contributing factor. It “helped create an environment where children feel 
safe
violence personally. […] In response, many children joined the LTTE, seeking to protect their families or 
bers, for example, from February to August “a total of 55 cases of underage recruitment and 43 cases 
of abduction” by the LTTE were reported.941 With the prevalence of reports on voluntary recruitment, 
taking into consideration that abduction cases are the most visible ones in the community and thus most 
likely overrepresented in this small sample, these numbers still corroborate the general assessment of 
practitioners that child recruitment in Sri Lanka has mostly a voluntary character.  
The fact that
ives of those children and what drives their decisions to enlist with rebels. In this respect, my 
argument emphasizes the sense of insecurity which makes underage recruits join the group. The following 
accounts that I identified in the secondary sources tend to support my hypothesis that the overall state of 
insecurity, described above and related to ethnic persecutions of Tamils and indiscriminate war tactics of 
the government and rebels, was high enough for people to consider joining the insurgency as the preferred 
option of self-defense.  
For example, one study of the LTTE child recruitment suggests that the ethnic and indiscriminate 
military targeting of Tamils “has only emboldened children as well as young adults to fight back.”942 To 
the authors of that study it is no doubt that “the psychological effect that all of these events can have on a 
child is insurmountable” and that chil
propaganda campaign
 against the attacks by Sinhala security forces. […] it is no wonder, after examining the actions and 
attacks by the Sinhala government and security forces, that for almost the past three decades children 
would choose to join the ranks of groups such as the LTTE.”944  
According to the Human Rights Watch, “children who witnessed or suffered abuses by Sri Lankan 
security forces often felt driven to join the LTTE.”945 Meanwhile, as a 1993 study of adolescents in 
Vaddukoddai in the island’s northern part found, “one quarter of the children studied had witnessed 
                                                 
940 “The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) is an autonomous international organization, established by the two 
efire Agreement (CFA) of 2002, as an impartial instrument to monitor the agreement. 
 the organization is scheduled for completion in mid-
riefs,” Pre-Sessional Working Group 33rd session, February 3-7, 2003, p. 23. 
., p. 5. 
Parties to the Sri Lanka Ceas
The SLMM was set up as a civilian mission jointly financed and staffed by the five Nordic countries. The operation 
ceased in January 2008 and the administrative termination of
2009” (SLMM Official Website, URL: http://www.slmm.info/).  
941 “Child Soldiers: CRC Country B
942 Gray and Matchin, “Children: The New Face of Terrorism,” op. cit., p. 110. 
943 Ibid., p. 110. 
944 Ibid., p. 110. 
945 HRW, Living in Fear, op. cit
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to avenge real or perceived abuses.”946 Another work, by proposing the link between feelings of 
insecurity and enlistment among Tamil people for the LTTE, even questions the importance of the 
group’s popularity levels: 
“The extent of genuine support which the LTTE commands from the civilian population is 
a
4, 
23.8
c zen told the Guardian 
correspondent the following: “We have a saying that when a tiger goes hungry he does not eat grass. 
These people [Karuna Tamil Tigers] were thugs before and they are still thugs.”952 However, without 
proper knowledge of the LTTE’s membership composition based on a survey study and comparative 
erty 
 
 
 
difficult to assess. There is a correlation between Sri Lankan army excesses in the north and east 
and increased willingness to show solidarity with the LTTE, especially in the climate of fear 
which has been accentuated since the November 2005 Presidential elections.”947 
 
It is possible that in the context of Sri Lanka, ethnic persecution, albeit a significant factor, was not 
the only driving force for children to enlist. As my empirical work suggested, in the situations of popul r 
armed groups, for example, the control variable of poverty from my model might have some, albeit lower, 
explanatory power for child recruitment. Poverty was mentioned in the literature on Sri Lankan conflict as 
a potential cause of child recruitment for the LTTE. For example, Gray and Matchin suggest that “the 
economic conditions in Sri Lanka for some [children] have left no choice but to fight.”948 “According to 
the Sri Lanka Labor Force Survey taken in 2002, among young people between the age of 15 to 2
% of males and 34% for females are unemployed.”949 The Human Rights Watch reported that 
“deprivation, including poverty and lack of vocational and educational opportunities often fueled 
recruitment” and “enlisting in the LTTE was perceived as a positive alternative to the other options 
children saw around them.”950 
The potential influence of the poverty variable can be inferred from the fact mentioned above that the 
popular base of the LTTE came from the impoverished Tamil population which suffered the 
repercussions of the economic reforms in the country in the 1970s.951 More importantly, though, when 
commenting on the LTTE’s Karuna branch membership, one Sri Lankan iti
analysis with control sample it is very difficult to say anything definitive about the role that the pov
factor played in the decisions of Tamil children and adults to join the LTTE.  
Below I show through two examples that even though both insecurity and poverty affected child
enlistment in Sri Lanka, poverty had a weaker explanatory power. First, it has been established by
international organizations that most of the LTTE child soldiers originated from the Batticaloa region in
                                                 
946 Ibid., p. 5. 
947 Hogg, “Sri Lanka,” p. 9. 
948 Gray and Matchin, “Children: The New Face of Terrorism,” p. 110. 
anka,” p. 9. 
lord has deadly influence on election,” The Guardian, March 7, 2008. 
949 Ibid., p. 110. 
950 HRW, Living in Fear, op. cit., p. 5. 
951 Hogg, “Sri L
952 Randeep Ramesh, “Jailed Tamil war
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the 
sed willingness to show solidarity with the LTTE” suggested.  
nda and popularity of the group, and, as 
suc
primarily by the feelings of insecurity generated by ethnic persecutions and ethnic targeting by both 
east of the country, as opposed to the north where the armed group also had a control over territories. 
Both explanations of insecurity and poverty seem to fit in this context, but to a different extent. Existing 
reports on civilian attacks attributed to the Sri Lankan government army demonstrate that most of the 
attacks between 1984 and 2006 occurred in the eastern Batticaloa region as opposed to northern Jaffna.953 
Thus, the insecurity in the eastern Batticaloa was more evident than in the north. At the same time, Tamil 
families from the eastern districts tended to be “typically poorer and considered of lower status than 
Tamils in the North.”954 
The second example further examines the importance of poverty as a factor. While it is indeed 
conceivable that regional poverty levels deteriorated steadily throughout the conflict, the variable cannot 
explain the observed cyclical variations in child recruitment for the LTTE. The phenomenon of child 
recruitment fluctuated from year to year, as opposed to moving in one single direction. These fluctuations, 
in turn, could have been explained by the changing levels of insecurity and scope of ethnic persecution 
campaigns, as the above mentioned account about “correlation between Sri Lankan army excesses in the 
north and east and increa
The establishment of the link between insecurity or poverty and child enlistment into the LTTE does 
not exclude the possibility of other factors in predicting child soldering, such as extensive propaganda by 
the armed group, feelings of patriotism or nationalism, and obsession with the military. However, I regard 
all these factors as secondary ones to the key factors of security and poverty. Thus, propaganda helps to 
view the group in a necessary light of a defender. Propaganda aimed at feelings of patriotism or 
nationalism is primarily targeted at adults. In the presence of their enlistment, it becomes redundant and 
possibly counterproductive for the group in terms of domestic legitimacy to accept children. Obsession 
and fascination with the military is tightly linked to the propaga
h, bears the same secondary role in motivating children to join the LTTE and insurgents in general.955  
*** 
In sum, the plausibility probe of my argument on the Sri Lankan case supports my explanatory 
framework. Thus, in the case of the highly popular LTTE armed group, child recruitment was driven 
                                                 
953 World Health Organization, “Sri Lanka Situation Report, 2007,” URL: 
http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Sri_Lanka_SLR-ESR_14-26Jan07.pdf 
954 Human Rights Watch, Living in Fear, November 10, 2004. 
955 According to the Human Rights Watch, “sophisticated LTTE propaganda machine regularly exposed Tamil 
children throughout the North and East to special events honoring LTTE heroes, parades of LTTE cadres, public 
araphernalia, and speeches and videos, particularly in the schools. Families of LTTE heroes were 
espect, and children were drawn to the status and glamour of serving as cadres” (HRW, Living in 
displays of war p
afforded special r
Fear,op. cit., p. 5). 
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government and the rebels themselves. Poverty could have potentially contributed to the enlistment of 
children with the LTTE, albeit not crucially, as accounted for by my theoretical framework. 
Section 2: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
Con
tly 
ong en different guerrilla 
grou
6 as “the only peasant-based guerrilla movement.”  At its earlier stages 
of e
flict Description 
The Colombian conflict with its 42 years of continuous hostilities “is the oldest of the curren
oing civil wars that is being fought.”956 By the late 1970s, there were about a doz
ps operating in Colombia, each with its own ideology and political and military strategies, but all 
seeking to overthrow what they referred to as a “closed and unrepresentative political system dominated 
by the traditional oligarchy”957 or, put similarly by other accounts, fighting against “wealthy landowners 
and a conservative government.”958 The most prominent among those and the only ones that remained 
active until the present time have been the FARC and the ELN.959 In defense against these leftist 
guerillas, “businessmen, property owners, and sympathetic army commanders” created the AUC 
(Autodefensas Unidas del Sur del Casanare, or United Self-defence Forces of Colombia), a right-wing 
coalition of paramilitary groups allied with the state.960 Until recent demobilization of the AUC and a 
peace agreement with the ELN, Colombian government forces were fighting both the ELN and the 
FARC, “with the unofficial support of the paramilitary AUC.”961 
FARC was founded in 196 962
xistence it embraced the Soviet-style Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation and relied on the 
Communist Party for its arms supplies and financial assistance.963 In 1988, the FARC was the largest of 
Colombia’s guerrilla groups.964 In contrast, ELN was created by a group of students that had returned 
from Cuba. After taking the town of Simacota in 1964, the organization stated its goal, which at the time 
was to bring down the government. ELN and FARC, although mostly fighting the government separately, 
                                                 
956 Uppsala/PRIO Conflict Database, “Colombia.” 
957 Ibid. The weak Colombian state, furthermore, paved the way during the 1970s for self-defence groups coming 
into existence as private armies for rich landowners and drug lords. During the following decades lucrative drug 
trafficking and business kidnappings made these paramilitary forces increasingly independent. In 1997 the United 
Self-defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) was formed as an umbrella organisation for s
groups active throughout Colombia. 
everal local paramilitary 
958 B
959
962 Uppsala/PRIO Conflict Database, “Colombia.” Some guerrilla activities related to a stated incompatibility 
 and the government took place since 1964 under the name of ‘Bloque Guerrillero Sur’ (Ibid.) 
atabase. 
RC’s early phase of operations came 
unding, between 1966 and 1968.” After it appeared “incapable of mounting sustained operations” 
p “enjoyed a resurgence during the late 1970s and 1980s.” “In September 
garded as the strongest of the guerrilla groups” and remained so until late 1980s” (On 
riggs, Innocents Lost, p. 41. 
 A somewhat less known and weaker EPL (People’s Liberation Army) “has also been active as late as in 2004” 
(Uppsala/PRIO Conflict Database, “Colombia”).  
960 Briggs, Innocents Lost, p. 42. 
961 Briggs, Innocents Lost, p. 42. 
between FARC
963 On War Project Conflict D
964 Uppsala/PRIO Conflict Database, “Colombia.” “The height of the FA
shortly after its fo
for a short time in early 1970s, the grou
1980, the organization was re
War Project, “FARC Insurgency in Colombia 1968-Present,” Armed Conflicts Event Online Database). 
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have sometimes coordinated their activities, especially in combat against the paramilitaries, but they have 
also clashed “on occasions.”965  
There were several attempts to negotiate peace in Colombia, but most of them failed to strike a deal 
with the rebels. While another armed group, the EPL, negotiated an agreement with the government in 
1991, the FARC and the ELN failed to do so at that time or during the subsequent peace talks between 
1998-2002.966 The conflict claimed over 45,000 lives since its start.967 It was also infamous for 
“disappearances.” About two million people have been displaced and three million children had no access 
to educational opportunities at the beginning of the new millennium.968 In 2004 the United Nations 
described the situation in Colombia as “the largest human rights crisis in the Western  Hemisphere.”969 
Group Popularity 
FARC can be regarded as a widely popular armed movement in Colombia. As I show below, three 
major factors can be identified as determining the high popularity level of the group: its appeals to 
popular ideology, its discipline and behavior towards civilians, and the miscalculated policy of the 
government towards FARC’s support base.  
First, in its rhetoric the group claims to be the people’s army “fighting on behalf of the common 
people’s economic and political rights.”970 The early membership of the FARC was composed of 
communist ideologues as well as peasants driven on ideological grounds.971 In fact, the predecessor of the 
FARC was a peasant self defense group representing “more of a roaming community” with a family 
structure “than a guerrilla proper.”972 These historically popular origins of the movement are represented 
today by the large percentage of female members in the organizational structure of FARC: between 20 
and 30% of FARC members are reported to be women.973 Similarly to the Sri Lankan LTTE, the FARC’s 
popularity among the people was high enough to have attracted many women on a voluntary basis.  
                                                 
ppsala/PRIO Conflict Database, “Colombia.” 
966 For a detailed description of these peace talks and why they failed see Uppsala/PRIO Conflict Database, 
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968 Jimmie Briggs, Innocents Lost, p. 41. 
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971 On War Project Conflict Database 
ted at the Conference “Building 
ptember 2006, p. 11 These were 
ed the Conservative government harassment and fell 
r, 
“Organizing Minors,” p. 12. 
972 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors,” Working Paper presen
Knowledge about Children in Armed Conflict,” University of Pittsburgh, Se
communities “initially composed by Liberal families that escap
under communist influence.” “They were an association of households, with women dedicated to domestic labo
men switching between cultivating the land and fighting, and children being reared in the meantime. Some 
participated in combat21. The familial structure was technically not sustainable, and when the FARC was formally 
created in 1966 it had already become much more guerrilla-type.” 
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Towards the end of the 1970s and continuing throughout the following decade the FARC was 
“protecting and taxing” drug crops grown by low-income Colombian farmers in its areas of influence.974 
This strategy create nces and, later on, 
f party ideologists in the group somewhat thinned after the decline of the Patriotic 
Uni
blogs appearing online chastising the group’s 
prac
entering the FARC–EP maintained demilitarized zone (DMZ), acquired by the insurgency during the 
ly 
e 
held 
–
protection or solidarity. During peace negotiations between the insurgency 
d a relatively solid support base for the group both in terms of fina
recruits. As the ranks o
on or La Unión Patriótica (UP), towards 1990 the FARC’s newest recruits began to come increasingly 
from drug growing Colombian peasants.975 Overall, FARC’s civilian base has been concentrated in its 
zone of influence and territorial control in southeastern Colombia.  
Second, unlike many armed groups in Africa, which claim to be fighting for their people but in reality 
abuse the very constituency to whom they swear their allegiance, FARC’s treatment of civilians largely 
corresponds with a revolutionary movement image. According to the Human Rights Watch, the FARC 
“prohibits unruly conduct by its fighters, especially when they are among the civilian population” and 
“robbery, extortion, threats, sexual abuse, and the irresponsible use of firearms can be capital offences” 
punished with the death penalty.976  
It is sometimes claimed that after the group engaged in extortions from kidnappings as one of the 
means to generate finances, its popular support in Colombia diminished. Several anti-FARC 
demonstrations took place in larger cities along with 
tices. However, in reality the latter strategy, aimed at rich people, urban dwellers, and foreigners – all 
capable of paying ransom – did not seem to affect the attitudes of the group’s core support base 
represented by a different population strata of farmers not targeted for kidnappings. In fact, the material 
rise of the FARC due to taxing of coca leaf buyers (but not producers) and kidnappings coexisted with the 
considerable support of the movement from the civilian population.977 According to James Brittain, “no 
better example of the growing support for the FARC–EP exists than the number of rural inhabitants 
peace talks [1998-2002]. The DMZ, prior to (official) FARC–EP consolidation, had a population of on
about 100,000 inhabitants. By the time the Colombian government invaded the region and ended th
peace negotiations there were roughly 740,000 Colombians who had migrated to the guerrilla-
978territory.”   
Over the past several years, an increasing number of rural dwellers have begun to migrate to FARC
EP inhabited regions, be it for 
                                                 
974 This strategy of the armed group coincided with extorting regional landowning elites and newly emerging 
druglords. 
975 James J. Brittain, “The FARC-EP in Colombia: A Revolutionary Exception in an Age of Imperialist Expans
Monthly Review, Volume 57, Number 4, September 2005, URL: http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905brittain.htm.. 
976 Human Rights Watch, You’ll Learn Not to Cry: Child Soldiers in Colombia (HRW: New York, 2004), p. 69. 
977 Brittain, “The FARC-EP in Colombia.” 
978 Ibid. 
ion,” 
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and the Colombian government (1998–2002), over 20,000 people migrated to the FARC/EP-held Villa 
Nueva Colombia in one year alone. Many preferred to live in the rebel safe haven since it provided a 
sens
ch 
 of seeing family and, more importantly, a non-negotiable ban on leaving the group 
afte
to a stronger sentiment for the group and an increase in its 
mem
In late 1990s and early 2000 Plan Colombia (1999) and Plan Patriota (2004) were initiated by the 
state military with the support of U.S. government funds to impede coca cultivation while providing 
o the drug trade. It has been announced by the Colombian 
 retreat. 
ailed in destroying the rebels, who regrouped for further 
ARC support base, which, in fact, only intensified, according to 
e of security and the ability to create alternative community-based development projects.  
The strength of the existing popular support for the FARC is substantial, as the following examples 
demonstrate. Despite the absence of forced recruitment or material compensation in the form of any 
salaries to its fighters, the group yearly attracts between 3,000-5,000 highly committed members.979 In 
addition FARC was said to have “several thousand more supporters, mostly in rural areas.”980 Moreover, 
“the guerrilla recruiters boast that they can allow themselves the luxury of selecting among the hundreds 
of applications they get.”981 Taking into consideration a very strict disciplinary code of the group, whi
includes prohibition
r joining, the participation in the group is highly ideological and must be based on a very high level of 
popular support for the group, albeit within a relatively narrow social stratum.  
Third, during the conflict the government took certain miscalculated policy steps to undermine the 
support base of FARC, which, in fact, led 
bership. Between 1978 and 1982 the Colombian government adopted abusive measures in 
prosecution of rebels and their suspected collaborators. While FARC itself was not the most affected 
guerrilla force at this point in time, it gained new recruits. Then, during the 1980s, the CIA provided 
secret support for illegal paramilitary groups in Colombia to seek control over the drug business and 
peasant drug growers. The FARC claimed that this tactic failed, as surviving guerrilla sympathizers would 
have become FARC members to protect their lives. More recruits also joined after the creation of the 
Patriotic Union (UP) and subsequent violent persecution of its members by druglords, paramilitary forces 
and members of Colombian Army and Police.  
development for rural economic alternatives t
government that it extended its presence throughout the country and pushed FARC fighters into
982  Both plans, however, are said to have f
offensives, and in undermining the F
                                                 
979 Ibid., p. 12. 
980 Global Security Database, “Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),” URL: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/farc.htm. 
981 Ferro and Uribe, 2002, cited in Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors,” p. 17. According to Gutiérrez Sanín, it 
“sounds exaggerated, but not plainly absurd, at least in some regions.” 
. 982 Brittain, “The FARC-EP in Colombia,” op. cit
247 
  
som
e Colombian conflict. Moreover, even 
if o
divisions within the Colombian society. Therefore, ethnic or religious 
viol
ota campaigns. The latter were effectively oriented at the change of practices in terms of 
grow
communities under FARC control were well protected throughout the war. The fact that fewer people 
at the 
e observers.983 Many say that “eradication actually has alienated cocaleros from the military, and has 
motivated them to deny intelligence on the FARC to government operatives.”984 
Assessment of Predictive Variables 
Overall, it can be concluded that the FARC of Colombia has been a popular movement, similar to the 
LTTE case study. Therefore, according to my theoretical framework, the recruitment of children for the 
group is expected to be predicted primarily by the ethnic persecution variable. However, in contrast to the 
LTTE case, ethnic persecution was not an issue in the context of th
ne treats ethnic persecution in my model as a very specific and limited operationalization of the 
concept of extreme insecurity in the country, there were no other significant concerns for the physical 
security of any segment of the Colombian society, except for wealthy people outside of the scope of 
potential guerilla supporters.  
Ethnic Persecution and Other Sources of Insecurity in the Country  
There are no ethnic or religious 
ence and persecutions could not be a factor in the context of this conflict. The major societal division 
was along economic classes whose division lay at the roots of the Colombian conflict. Therefore, the 
persecutions can relate to the targeting of the political supporters of the FARC’s communist ideology – 
those being either Communist party members not affiliated directly with the armed movement or civilian 
supporters and sympathizers who contribute to the group directly by providing funding and recruits. As 
has been mentioned above, the members of the UP party in Colombia were once targets of violent 
persecution by the Colombian government and paramilitaries. That policy, in fact, led to a certain but not 
significant increase in the ranks of the FARC. This was due to the fact that the UP was mostly based and 
targeted in the cities, not in the rural areas with the group’s overwhelming presence. Thus, this political 
targeting in the cities was not likely to generate the overwhelming insecurity situation in the region of the 
insurgency operation similar to the scale observed in the Sri Lanka in the LTTE controlled areas.  
As to the actual support base of civilians in the FARC controlled areas, the government of Colombia 
has not seemed to crack down with severe violence on the coca farmers even during the Plan Colombian 
and Plan Patri
ing coca, as opposed to arresting or interrogating or persecuting the suspected FARC supporters. 
While some violence was recorded against these groups committed by paramilitaries, overall the 
died in the Colombian 40-year old war than in Sri-Lankan 25-year armed struggle despite the fact th
                                                 
983 Ibid. 
984 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Target the Drug Lords in Afghanistan, Not the Farmers,” Brookings Institution official 
w.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0715_counternarcotics_felbabbrown.aspx 
website, December 14, 2009, URL: 
http://ww
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Colombian war intensity was higher than that of the Sri Lanka, indicates that Colombian civilians were 
more secure and fewer of them perished as a result of combat and non-combat related deaths. Thus, the 
physical insecurity so widespread in Sri Lanka, was not occurring at a comparable level in Colombia.   
Ch
nge), likely to reach almost the double of FARC’s.  
                                                
After establishing that ethnic persecution, unlike other sources of insecurity in the country, was, in 
fact, low, my explanatory framework predicts low levels of child soldier enlistment into FARC. As I 
show below, the low value of ethnic persecution in Colombia helps explain lower levels of child 
recruitment for FARC compared with the LTTE. However, the ethnic persecution factor alone cannot 
explain the absence or presence of child recruitment practice. Thus, despite the fact that ethnic 
persecution in the country was low, FARC still had a certain percentage of children in its ranks, albeit 
much lower than in the LTTE. Therefore, in this section I assess other potential factors besides low level 
of ethnic persecution, or even levels of insecurity in general,  that could possibly account for the fact that 
a certain low level of child enlistment was occurring in case of the FARC.  
ild Recruitment  
According to the Human Rights Watch 2003 report, “a conservative estimate would put the 
proportion of children in the FARC-EP at between 20 and 30 percent.”985 This corresponds to 3,300 and 
4,950 child soldiers out of the overall number of about 16,500 FARC fighters as of 2004.986 This 
percentage is confirmed to a certain degree by field statistics. In two recorded battles where FARC 
children were killed or captured, the distribution of child to adult combatants was 10% and 50%.987 
According to another estimate, children might have constituted up to 40% of the FARC armed forces in 
2002.988 In absolute terms, all these percentages may not appear as the ones to be labeled as ‘low’. 
However, the range between and estimate of 20-30% and 40% is comparatively lower than the ones 
identified for the LTTE armed group (40-60% ra
Similarly to the Sri Lankan conflict, most of the FARC recruitment has been voluntary, according to 
Human Rights Watch.989 Thus, it is claimed that “nearly 83 percent of children who enlist in the illegal 
armed groups [including FARC] do so voluntarily.”990 The FARC leaders themselves “provide a very 
reasonable explanation for their attachment to “free will”: an unwilling soldier is bound to shoot his/her 
superiors in their backs, and has the ideal conditions to do so in an irregular war.”991 In the reduced 
 
985 HRW, You’ll Learn Not to Cry, op. cit., p. 24. See also Human Rights Watch. “Colombia: Armed Groups Send 
Children to War,” February 22, 2005. 
986 Ibid, p. 24. 
cents Lost, p. 43-44. 
 minors that were 
ramilitaries between 1999 and 2004. 
nocents Lost, p. 43. 
ing Ferro and Uribe, 2002. 
987 Briggs, Inno
988 Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors,” p. 12. This estimate is based on a sample of 2110
captured or deserted from Colombian guerrilla groups and pa
989 HRW, You’ll Learn Not to Cry, op. cit., p. 29. 
990 Beatriz Linares, Office of the People’s Advocates, cited in Briggs, In
991 Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors,” p. 22, cit
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sample of demobilized youth mentioned above, children who joined voluntarily also constituted 80% of 
all 316 respondents.992 
As I established in the previous section, the level of ethnic persecution variable for FARC in 
Col
order to trade their life for combat services. Meanwhile, extreme insecurity 
 example of Colombia itself. Thus, 
it sh
ng and 
arm
through which insecure children can flock into the group with the demand for them.  
ombian context was low. According to my theory, it predicts low levels of child recruitment by this 
popular movement, especially compared to the LTTE. While the observed low levels of child recruitment 
in the FARC, relative to the LTTE, confirm my theory, it remains unclear what explains the presence of 
some child soldiers in the ranks of the FARC in the first place. In other words, why do we see those 20%, 
30% or, even 40%, of children enlisted into the group? 
In my large-N analysis I used the indicator of ethnic persecution in the country as the most extreme 
existing way of insecurity. As evidence shows, fear of being killed on ethnic grounds makes people join 
even the perpetrator ranks, in 
in a conflict can occur in other forms as well. This can be shown on the
ould be noted that the FARC almost always coexisted “with other warlords and narcotraffickers” in 
the same regions, making departments like Antioquia, Guaviare and Meta a source of recruits for both the 
guerrillas and the paramilitary and, “surely, also for the narcos.”993 This suggests that security in the 
FARC operating regions could have been the worst one relative to other regions due to competing armed 
groups and paramilitaries.  
Therefore, although the value of the ethnic persecution variable, as the indicator chosen to represent 
the concept of extreme insecurity in the country, was low, the motives of self-defense in the situations of 
extremely insecure environments could have been present could have acted through different channels in 
the Colombian conflict. Thus, the Colombian case study might point at the fact that while ethnic 
persecution can be the ultimate expression of insecurity in the country, other security concerns, such as 
fighting among competing factions, might also generate viable self-defense motives among adults and 
children alike. At the same time, most conflicts exhibit the level of insecurity related to fighti
ed clashes between the opponents, and yet that type of insecurity does not explain the variance of 
child soldier recruitment across armed groups.  
In addition, some armed groups operating in the contexts of this type of general insecurity do not 
recruit children. This is because they might not have a demand for combatants to begin with. In the case 
of the FARC, the fighting capacity variable can be regarded as high, because the group has been clashing 
with the government forces periodically and meets the state army face to face in many battles. Therefore, 
according to my argument, the demand for soldiers of such an insurgency is high, which opens a channel 
                                                 
992 Ibid., p. 27. 
993 Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors,” p. 25. 
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The existing survey mentioned above can actually shed the light on whether or not the extreme 
insecurity, represented by other indicators than ethnic persecution, can have an effect on child 
recruitment. According to these survey data, only 10% of all predominantly FARC children (83%) in the 
sam
r competing categories in that particular questionnaire, in addition to forced 
recr
a
olds 
hav
s
percentages of children in FARC, as opposed to the LTTE. It should be noted here, that unlike FARC, the 
0 
     
ple of 316 demobilized child soldiers reported joining out of “fear or vengeance.”994 This category 
can represent cases such as the following cited in Briggs: 
The foot soldier went to FARC in 1997 after his parents, poor coffee and sugarcane farmers from 
the Huila department in the country’s southeast, were shot to death by right-wing militiamen 
because his father ‘lent a mule to a guerilla.’995 Seeking vengeance, Luis offered his services to 
the rebels.996 
 
From this particular survey it is clear that although in the Colombian case low insecurity could have led to 
some child enlistment, it did not fully account for the motivations of all children who joined FARC. It is 
useful in this regard to refer to the same survey in order to identify what other motivations were given by 
former child recruits behind their decisions to join FARC.  
Thus, three othe
uitment, were the “false promises (salary, good treatment)” (16%); “conviction” (12%); and “allure of 
weapons and uniforms” (20%).997 Neither directly contradicts feelings of insecurity and children could 
cite all three instead of referring to fear. If they actually stand out as prominent and independent reasons 
children gave for their enlistment, then it can be said that the ethnic persecution factor, or insecurity, in 
my argument, competes with at least three other potential explanations of child recruitment of popul r 
armed groups.  
First, it can be said that poverty can account for the 16% of all recruits (“false promises: salary, good 
treatment”). This does not contradict my argument, as poverty has been proven in my empirical testing to 
have some predictive power for voluntary child enlistment. While it is known that “the FARC strongh
e been coca growing regions, and/or rich in other natural resources,” and therefore “one would expect 
its peasants to be better off than the rest,” the results of the survey still identify the motives of poverty 
among the most prominent ones.998 This example stre ses the importance of gathering data at the micro 
individual level, as opposed to macro level, even at the regional and not the national level. At the same 
time, relatively low levels of poverty in the Colombian context can also be responsible for lower 
AUC paramilitary group actually paid its combatants, allegedly a salary between 900,000 and 1,200,00
                                            
994 Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors,” p. 34. 
995 Brigg, p. 56 
996 Ibid., p. 57. 
997 Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors,” p. 34. 
998 Ibid., p. 25. 
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Colombia pesos (approximately US$366 to US$488) each three months.999 As a result, most of the AUC 
child soldiers interviewed by HRW “said that money was their primary motivation for joining” the 
para
te the high popularity of the group, “conviction” 
acc
iers in any conflict, because weapons and uniforms are present in every armed 
stru
ary education only, whereas that number in Sri Lanka 
con
militaries. 
The second competing reason from the cited survey is “conviction” (12%). Conviction can be related 
to what I call popularity in my argument. Thus, as is suggested in my argument, popularity of a group in 
itself will indeed attract a certain portion of children, similar to the ways it will attract ideologically 
driven adults, as child agency is assumed and not discounted in this study. However, what this percentage 
of 12% from the existing survey suggests is that despi
ounts for the same percentage of children’s reasons as the variables of poverty and insecurity, both of 
which in the Colombian context score very low. This relative distribution of percentages might suggest 
that the importance of poverty and insecurity in children’s decisions to enlist into armed groups is, in 
general, much higher than that one of group’s popularity. As is shown in the FARC’s example, only 12% 
of children reported fascination with the group’s goals as the reason for joining, despite the fact that 
FARC experienced very high levels of popularity among certain segments of society.  
The third competing reason is the one called “allure of weapons and uniforms” (20%). This is 
something that would be tempting to call a discounted factor – i.e. something that would generate a 
certain amount of child sold
ggle. Nevertheless, some conflicts have practically no child soldiers involved in them. Hence, it might 
be the case that “allure of weapons and uniforms” does not necessarily motivate children in every 
militarized context in the same way, but perhaps more strongly in those where outside options are very 
poor.  
For example, in Colombia a large percentage of youth has difficult access to education. While my 
data do not reveal whether those most affected were, in fact, residing in the FARC controlled areas or 
elsewhere, at the national level the statistics report that three million Colombian children aged 11 to 17 in 
2004 did not have access to educational opportunities.1000 For comparison purposes, in Colombia there 
were 524,000 children without access to prim
stituted only 38,000.1001 Some practitioners claim that “lack of educational opportunities, and lack of 
jobs in rural and marginal areas” along with “social exclusion and mistreatment” drive children to 
abandon their homes and seek a better life with the guerillas.”1002 From the sample analysis mentioned 
above we learn that the average age of entry of FARC child soldiers into the military organization is 
                                                 
999 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, “Colombia’s War on Children,” February 2004, p. 29. 
1000 Ibid., p. 3; Jimmie Briggs, Innocents Lost, op. cit., p. 41. 
1001 UNICEF, “Children Out of School,” organization official website. In 2008, the overall population in Sri Lanka 
was 20mn, whereas Colombian one was not much higher – about 40mn people (World Bank, World Development 
s, Innocents Lost, p. 43. 
Indicators). 
1002 Beatriz Linares, Office of the People’s Advocates, cited in Brigg
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15.9
file of a 17-18 year old guerilla combatant in 
Col
 
c eer. Often, they are manipulated with power by being given a gun and told, ‘You 
n context supports my argument to the extent 
that
the LTTE.  
t
                                                
3.1003 By that time one might expect at least 8 years of education completed by a child raised under 
normal circumstances. However, the average educational attainment for FARC child soldiers was 
estimated to be only 3.9 years. This fact points at some structural problem within the Colombian society 
in relation to access to education for children. For someone who finished high school, further 
opportunities might be quite limited, as the following pro
ombia suggests, according to the government: 
The young guy who joins militia [ELN or FARC] in Saravena often doesn’t have anything to do. 
They finish high school at seventeen, eighteen years old, and there’s no work or opportunity to 
continue a ar
will collect extortion’. A motorcycle is given to them, and they’re told to take cut. Then, they 
may be told to attack an installation.1004 No social spending in the region by the government, no 
education, no opportunities.1005 
 
*** 
The plausibility probe of my argument in the Colombia
 the ethnic persecution variable can explain the difference across two armed groups in terms of their 
child recruitment practices. Thus, a lower degree of insecurity among Sri Lankan civilian population 
accounted for higher child soldier rates in the LTTE than in FARC. Low insecurity levels in Colombia 
diminished the necessity of children to join the guerilla for protection reasons. Similarly, in the absence of 
such a motive, FARC could not enlist too many children without violating its public image. Thus, the 
levels of child recruitment in FARC were lower than those of a comparable (in terms of popularity) Asian 
armed group of 
The Colombian case study also demonstrated that the factor of poverty when expressed in a certain 
level of child deprivation or severe lack of educational opportunities can contribute to the explanation of 
the occurrence of child enlistment practice into popular armed groups with the existing demand for 
fighters. Thus, high rates of children out of school in Colombia, both in absolute and relative terms when 
compared with Sri Lanka, generated many willing underage recruits for FARC. This Colombian example 
brings a very important point to he findings of my study. When analyzed on the macro cross-group 
dataset and assessed with national levels of GDP, the poverty factor can only partially reveal the complex 
picture of the role of deprivation for voluntary enlistment of children in different armed conflicts. The 
Colombian example also demonstrated, that one of such levels of deprivation worth exploring across 
different cases is the access of children to educational opportunities, especially in the conflicts where 
 
1003 Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors,” p. 18. This figure comes from the “ICBF database of minors that were 
ong the more than 1155 FARC entries “there are 166 cases, or 
rted having joined when they were under 15. Big and ugly, but it shows that the 15 years old rule is 
plicitly in practice.” 
illo by Jremie Briggs, Innocents Lost, p. 55. 
captured or deserted between 1999 and 2004.” Am
14.4%, that repo
used implicitly or ex
1004 Interview with government forces Major Cast
1005 Ibid., p. 55. 
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societies have not collapsed altogether and where some variance in educational and other opportunities 
for children might still exist, even during the conflict stages.  
The section on outliers in Chapter 5 of this dissertation further contributes to the discussion about 
the 
ties for children in 
the 
C, because Tamil children were joining the group for the reasons of self-defense fearing ethnic 
per
bian context could be responsible for lower child soldier rates within 
e 
xplanation for a certain proportion of the child enlistment. Indeed, the poorer Sri Lankan 
importance of alternative measures of impoverishment. In the case of the popular armed group of 
the TPLF in Ethiopia, the ethnic persecution factor could not explain well the presence of child 
soldiers in the organization’s ranks. There I argued, similarly to the case of FARC, that such presence 
of children could have occurred due to a constellation of inadequate policies of the Ethiopean 
government towards gender inequality and the TPLF’s efforts to provide for equal opportunities for 
women in the affected areas under rebels’ control.  
The Colombian case also revealed that popularity of an armed group can be regarded as a sufficient 
but not a necessary condition for a minimum level of child soldiers present in the group. It is sufficient 
because when it is present, at least some number of children will get enlisted. It is not necessary, however, 
because if the group is unpopular, it does not mean it should not have child soldiers. Similarly, we might 
say that the variable of poverty, if measured by alternative or educational opportuni
country, can be named as a sufficient but not a necessary condition in explaining child soldier 
occurrence within popular armed groups. When there are no educational opportunities, children will be 
joining insurgencies. When schools are functioning, voluntary child recruitment might not shrink though, 
as other factors, such as the ethnic persecution, for instance, can also drive child soldier rates up. This is 
shown by the example of the LTTE above. Thus, a much better situation in educational opportunities for 
children in Sri Lanka than in Colombia did not lead to lower levels of child recruitment by the LTTE than 
in FAR
secution from misguided policies of the government and intra-group fighting along ethnic lines. Thus, 
the presence of other factors in addition to educational opportunities attributed to the enlistment of 
children in the case of the LTTE.  
Summary 
The plausibility probes of my argument to the Asian and Latin American contexts largely supported 
the explanatory framework suggested in my work. Thus, two popular armed movements of LTTE and 
FARC were proposed to have high and low child soldier rates based on the values of the predictor 
variable of ethnic persecution. Thus, high levels of ethnic insecurity in Sri Lanka led to high levels of 
child soldiers within the LTTE (about 50%). On the contrary, virtually absent ethnic or other insecurity 
concerns of civilians in the Colom
the FARC armed movement (about 30%).  
The two plausibility probe case studies also demonstrated that the control variable of poverty could b
a possible e
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northern and eastern regions exhibit higher child soldier recruitment than the coca growing richer 
Colombian communities. Moreover, poorer regions within Sri Lanka itself experience higher child 
recruitment rates. The latter, however, coincides with a higher degree of insecurity in the regions of 
prevalent recruitment. Moreover, in the Sri Lankan context poverty did not withstand a test of 
significance for its explanatory power when confronted with temporal cyclical variation in child 
recruitment by the LTTE, unlike the insecurity variable of ethnic persecution.  
he 
FA ic 
per lar 
arm  
he impact of educational opportunities may enter indirectly through the popularity of the armed 
group. However, as described in Chapter 3 on the t tical framework, an armed group’s popularity can 
attra
Another important point raised by the plausibility probes is the fact that child recruitment in t
RC armed group was not completely absent, despite the low level of the predictive variable of ethn
secution or insecurity. This implies that other factors can lead to the presence of children in popu
ed groups besides ethnic persecution. 
T
heore
ct a certain number of highly motivated children to the insurgency ranks along with the ideologically 
driven adults. This was confirmed in the Colombian case study. In other words, as long as the group is 
popular, a certain base amount of children will always enlist. However, in itself popularity is not able to 
explain the difference in child soldier recruitment levels across two different popular groups, as 
exemplified by FARC and the LTTE. This highlights its importance popularity as a conditioning variable 
as opposed to an independent factor in my explanatory framework. Thus, the difference seems to be 
explained by the proposed factor of ethnic persecution, conditional on the group’s popularity.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
Summary of Findings 
In this dissertation I proposed a new argument for explaining the variance of child soldier recruitm
practices across different armed non-state actors in the world. Thus, I argued that first, the recruitment
children was more likely for armed groups whose fighting capacity is high. Second, I proposed that arm
groups with higher material capacity were less likely to have children in their ranks. My third explanati
of the child soldier practice suggested that armed groups that operated in conflicts with ethnic persecutio
were more likely to have children in their ranks. In the fourth proposition of my argument I postulat
that armed groups with larger territorial access were
ent 
 of 
ed 
on 
n 
ed 
 more likely to recruit children.  
y large-N analysis supported my theoretical argument. Thus, armed 
groups were found to be more likely to recruit ebels operated in conflicts with intense battles 
(po
ested that armed groups offering material rewards to their 
mem
I further extended my argument by proposing that insurgents differed in their child recruitment 
decision making process depending on how popular they were among the people. Thus, I proposed that 
popular armed groups were more likely to recruit children if their fighting capacity was high and if they 
operated in conflicts where military actors engaged in ethnic persecution. Unpopular groups, meanwhile, 
were proposed to have a higher probability to have children if, again, their fighting capacity was high, 
they had more territory to control and access, and if they did not offer material rewards to their fighters.  
This explanatory framework is primarily based on factors that I newly identified – such as ethnic 
persecution in the armed conflict, armed groups’ fighting and material capacity, as well as insurgents’ 
territorial control ability at home and abroad. The existing literature on child soldiers has not analyzed 
these factors as potential explanations of the phenomenon. I subject my argument to empirical testing and 
conduct large-N statistical analysis on a new dataset that I compiled. Systematic empirical examination of 
proposed theoretical arguments is extremely rare in related existing literature. I complement my empirical 
analysis with in-depth case study analysis of five Liberian armed factions, and plausibility probes on two 
insurgencies in Asia and Latin America.  
The empirical results from m
children if r
ssess high fighting capacity in my operationalization). This relationship was found to be stronger for 
unpopular rebels. The results also showed that armed groups engaged more intensively in the practice of 
child recruitment if they operated in conflicts characterized by extremely insecure conditions (situations 
of ethnic persecution in my operationalization), with this effect being larger for popular insurgencies. The 
large-N analysis findings also corroborated my proposition that armed groups with access to larger 
territories were more likely to recruit children, especially if rebels’ popularity was low.  
In my explanatory framework I sugg
bers were less likely to have children in their ranks, especially for unpopular belligerents. This 
conjecture was partially supported by the large-N data. Only the increase in diaspora support as one of 
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the three potential funding sources of rebel organizations was found to reduce the probability of child 
recruitment, and only for unpopular armed groups, as predicted. When measured by the cumulative index 
of all three types of material support that unpopular rebels might receive, or by the index of third state 
support alone, the factor of material capacity proved to be a weak predictor of child soldiering. If 
measured as access to natural resources, however, the material capacity showed a positive relationship 
with the dependent variable.  
In sum, the empirical tests of my hypotheses revealed that three factors from my argument had the 
strongest effect on the probability of armed groups to recruit child soldiers: groups’ fighting capacity, 
ethnic persecution in the country, and groups’ territorial access. Although insurgents’ material capacity 
was also found to affect child recruitment, it did so to a lesser extent and only when measured in diaspora 
sup
nt variable 
of child soldier recruitment. Thus, high values on three variables and low material capacity in the case of 
the NPFL and LPC produced high child soldier rates in those two insurgencies. Different variations of 
medium levels of the predictive variables in the cases of Ulimo-K and Ulimo-J generated medium high 
and medium low levels of child recruitment in those factions. Low levels of three variables and high level 
of material capacity of the INPFL correlated with fewer child soldiers in the ranks of that group. 
Moreover, the extended cross-case comparison of these five Liberian armed groups has also established 
the differences in the predictive power of the four proposed explanatory factors behind child soldier 
recruitment for popular and unpopular armed groups among them.  
One of these Liberian armed groups – the NPFL – represented a unique case in itself: since its 
mobilization capacity was changing over time from very high to very low, it was possible to review the 
relative predictive power of explanatory factors within this case across time. The temporal case study of 
the NPFL armed group generated several findings. First, disaggregation of the group’s child recruitment 
by year of conscription revealed spikes in my dependent variable of child soldiering in the years of the 
group’s attacks on the capital. While the value of fighting capacity remained mostly unchanged over the 
course of the war, the dates of attacks on the capital, as a result of persistent and high fighting capacity of 
port. Moreover, the findings also demonstrated that all of these factors had different effect magnitude 
and presence for popular and unpopular armed movements, largely confirming the behavioral patterns 
proposed in my extended argument. More specifically, fighting capacity, territorial access and material 
capacity measured in diaspora support mattered only for unpopular groups. While the role of fighting 
capacity in predicting child recruitment by popular armed groups was not established, ethnic persecution 
did affect child soldier recruitment in the case of popular insurgencies, as predicted.  
The results from my case study analysis corroborated my argument and the findings of the large-N 
analysis. In the comparative case study of five Liberian armed factions, the reconstructed values of the 
four proposed independent variables accurately predicted the categorical values of the depende
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the rebel movement, were spread over ti ce the strong effect of fighting capacity 
s: the NPFL’s child recruitment intensified during the years of major battles for 
Mo
larg
rating on the territories where civilians were largely secure and 
free
nnot explain the 
diff
me. This allowed me to tra
variable on child soldier
nrovia. 
Second, the temporal analysis demonstrated that the variable of ethnic persecution also changed over 
time. Both the policy of the NPFL towards killing rival tribes and the numbers of victims towards the end 
of the war were abating. Therefore, the variable of ethnic persecution could also help explain the 
observed decreasing trend in the NPFL’s child recruitment. Third, the variable of territorial access in the 
case of the NPFL changed in the same direction as the dependent variable, which could have made 
territorial access responsible for a part of the declining trend.  
Not only did the Liberian case study corroborate the findings supported by the large-N analysis, it 
actually also confirmed the potential strength of the material capacity variable in the Liberian context – 
the proposed effect that the statistical analysis on the larger African sample did not detect. Thus, the 
temporal case study identified a change in the variable of material capacity over time, revealing more 
opportunities to loot for adult combatants towards the end of the war. Therefore, this variable could have 
explained the decrease in the absolute numbers of children recruited by the NPFL. Moreover, in the 
est plundering operation in the capital, in 1996, more adults joined the faction for this lucrative 
opportunity than ever before. It is in this year that the geography of NPFL’s main incidence of child 
recruitment turned from the countryside to the capital.   
The results from the plausibility probes of my argument on two armed movements, in Sri Lanka and 
Colombia, also demonstrated that my propositions for popular armed groups were well applicable in the 
contexts of Asia and Latin America. Thus, ethnic persecution and larger insecurity in the north and 
eastern parts of Sri Lanka, where the LTTE operated, resulted in much higher child enlistment for that 
group than for the FARC in Colombia ope
 from ethnic or any other persecutions.  
This Colombian example also revealed the effect of one specific indicator of impoverishment – that 
being access to educational opportunities. Thus, extremely low levels of Colombian children’s 
enrollment in schools, meant almost non-existent outside options for the category of youth around 16 
years old. The Colombian example also demonstrated, that such alternative measure of poverty and 
deprivation, such as educational opportunities in a country, should be explored as a separate factor across 
different cases. 
What the plausibility probes also suggested was that, although popularity in itself ca
erence in child recruitment practice across armed groups, it might, in fact, ensure a similar minimum 
amount of children to be enlisted in any group with similar characteristic. In other words, popular groups, 
as opposed to unpopular ones, would always have at least a small amount of children in their ranks. The 
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strict sufficiency but not necessity of this condition for child soldiering did not imply the absence of 
children in unpopular armed groups. It suggest though that fewer children would enlist into such 
movements voluntarily, relative to being forcibly recruited.  
Both the large-N analysis and the case studies demonstrated the lack of an effect of the control 
variables of conflict duration and conflict intensity. Analysis of original field surveys of former Liberian 
child combatants embedded in the temporal case study of the NPFL did not confirm the effects of poverty 
or o
d, proved to be less 
imp
, I offer a new theoretical framework 
for 
rphaning. Poverty was also found to be a weak predictor of child soldiering in the statistical analysis, 
although it did exhibit some occasional significance for both popular and unpopular armed groups. In the 
plausibility probe case studies the potential effect of poverty was observed but not confirmed as the key 
one. Also, quite importantly, both statistical and case study analyses showed that the variable of 
mobilization capacity in itself was not an explanatory factor of child recruitment. The effect of conflict 
timing in statistical analysis turned out significant but small relative to any other variable in my model.  
Implications for Child Soldiers Studies  
In my work I offered a new original test of most of the existing explanations of underage recruitment 
in the child soldier literature. Thus, the factor of poverty exhibited some partial influence on child 
recruitment, especially for popular armed groups. Conflict duration, on the other han
ortant as it showed no correlation with child soldiering. The conflict intensity argument based on 
battle deaths and the ‘orphans argument’ also did not sustain the scrutiny of the empirical test. Thus, my 
study offered little support to the commonly cited explanations in the child soldier literature. However, 
my own explanatory framework is primarily based on factors that I newly identify – such as ethnic 
persecution in the armed conflict, an armed group’s fighting capacity to challenge an opponent, as well as 
insurgents’ territorial control ability at home and abroad. Therefore, the biggest implication of my work 
to conflict studies literature is in suggesting new and very specific variables which sustained the empirical 
test and proved to explain child recruitment variation across different contexts.  
My explanatory framework builds, to some extent, on the existing theoretical approaches, but it 
departs from them significantly as I offer an original design for empirical analysis. My work advances the 
literature on the child soldier issue along several dimensions. First
child soldier probability prediction that is directly amenable to empirical analysis and testing. Existing 
studies that delve into theory building have mostly engaged in model development as a theoretical 
exercise without any empirical content beyond a few motivating stylized facts. A prominent study in this 
category is Andvig and Gates (2007) who suggest that interacting supply and demand for combatants 
create the market situations for theorizing about child recruitment. However, they remain unclear about 
what specific factors affect demand and supply of combatants.  
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Another relevant study by Gates (2004) offers a principal-agent model whereby the recruits of a 
military organization (the agents) join voluntarily if they receive sufficient utility, and  the leadership (the 
principal) finds a way to reward the soldiers with the lowest financial costs. Again, while providing many 
inte
ions of a survey-based study of Blattman 
(200
Imp
capable of running their operations and engaging in armed 
stru
  
resting insights into the issue, this paper does not offer testable operationalizations of many of the 
employed concepts. In contrast, the testability and empirical content of my work has enabled me to assess 
which exact factors out of the potential ones speculated on by the literature actually affect child soldier 
recruitment and under what type of circumstances. 
Second, my work further extends the rare empirical studies on child soldiers. A recent pioneering 
work by Beber and Blattman (2008), based on the conclus
6), found that rebels of the LRA in Northern Uganda were abducting young adolescents for their 
guerrilla skills perceived as more effective than younger children while more gullible than adults.1006 My 
work, in contrast, allows me to distinguish between the impact of explanatory factors among different 
types of groups, namely popular and unpopular ones, and groups that possess different types of resources 
with the associated constraints. Moreover, my extensive data set allowed me to perform such an analysis 
on a large scale using evidence about over a hundred armed groups. Thus, by identifying and 
operationalizing nuances in the child recruitment process that were unnoted by the previous child soldier 
literature my analysis explores the issue in more depth and generalizes to a wider scope of cases than 
considered in previous studies.  
lications for Conflict Studies and International Relations Fields 
New Wars and Survival of Military Organizations. My findings have broader implications for the 
field of conflict studies. One of the most significant findings of my research is that child soldiers appear 
in greater proportions in more recent wars, but under a certain condition – that is if the new armed 
movements are unpopular. What it means in reality is that armed groups which previously had little 
chance of organizational survival are now 
ggle due to child soldier recruitment. Mainstream theories of rebellion postulate that armed groups 
lacking both material and ideational endowments have a low chance of formation and survival. However, 
my sample included many of such groups (29% of all African insurgencies) which were active and 
exhibited high struggle intensity and average duration of hostilities. In fact, out of unpopular groups that 
Weinstein would predict to be based on material resources, only 50% in my sample actually had material 
endowments.1007
                                                 
1006 Blattman, “Causes of Child Soldiering”; Beber and Blattman, “The Industrial Organization of Rebellion.” 
1007 Interestingly, this latter finding undermines the claim of economic theories of rebellion, according to which 
armed groups that lack both material and ideational endowments have a very low chance for survival or even 
formation. 
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By compensating for the lack of adult combatants with children, insurgents have a higher chance of 
survival than predicted by the conflict literature. More importantly, rebels without endowments were 
more likely to recruit children than most other groups, suggesting a potential effect of child soldier 
recr
 interesting results from my study are related to the conflict 
stud
ent types of finances for 
arm
uitment on insurgency formation, or conflict onset. Based on this finding, in my future research I plan 
to reexamine and contribute to existing theories on conflict onset and recruitment for armed struggle. 
My work also demonstrated that in the past the child soldier practice was not as widespread as in the 
conflicts of today. What the time dimension captures, however, is the corresponding change in the values 
of my predictor variables of child soldiering over time. In other words, all four of my independent 
variables (fighting capacity, material capacity, ethnic persecution and territorial access) were found to 
increase in their values over time.1008 Thus, my work contributes to the current research in conflict studies 
on the specific characteristics that the new armed conflicts possess, besides debatable private loot, lack of 
popular support and gratuitous violence.1009  
Funding of Rebel Groups. A series of
y literature on the link between different types of funding for non-state armed groups and various 
conflict dynamics variables, such as conflict onset, escalation, duration, and even termination. The first 
most direct contribution of my study is the notion that the differences in types of material assistance 
available to armed groups shape the implications of material assistance. Thus, in the context of their 
effects on child soldier recruitment, all three types of material endowments available to armed groups – 
i.e. diaspora support, third state assistance, and access to natural resources – exhibited varying degrees of 
influence on rebel’s child recruitment practices. The material capacity variable measured in diaspora 
support had a negative relationship with child soldiering within unpopular armed groups, third state 
support did not yield any significant effect on child soldiering, and access of unpopular rebels to natural 
resources was associated with more child soldiers.  
These diverse results suggest different processes behind reliance on differ
ed groups. This finding highlights the desirability of new investigation in the conflict studies literature 
to treat the variable of material assistance to rebels as a heterogeneous factor and to disaggregate different 
types of such assistance. According to Kalyvas, there is currently a gap in the literature in this regard:  
“The demise of the cold war potentially affected the way in which civil wars were fought, if 
not their frequency. Clearly, the disappearance of external sources of legitimation and 
funding provided by competing superpowers puts a premium on local resources. Yet, the 
                                                 
1008 For example, the mean value for the variable of fighting capacity for armed groups that operated after 1997 was 
0.49 – an increase by 20% from the mean of 0.41 for groups that ceased to exist prior to 1997. Similarly, the mean 
values of the variable territory control by unpopular groups rose from 
increased in case of popular groups from the mean of 0.24 to 0.48 for p
0.71 to 0.91. Ethnic persecution values also 
re-1997 and post-1997 groups respectively. 
The variable of material compensation also increased over time, from 0.66 to 0.85. 
1009 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New’ And ‘Old’ Civil Wars,” p. 102. 
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exact mechanisms that link funding and war—from diasporas to lootable resources— and 
how they affect the ways in which civil wars are fought remain inadequately specified.”1010  
 
My findings about diaspora support and lootable resources shed some light into the logic of such 
mechanisms. More specifically, one way in which civil wars are fought, that is by recruiting child 
soldiers, is affected in different ways depending on whether armed groups rely on diaspora remittances or 
access to natural resources. My empirical research also demonstrated that insurgencies in newer wars rely 
more on all of these sources of financial support.  
The extent to which a monetary component is present in the material capacity variable can also differ 
across different measures of this factor (diaspora support, third state support, or access to natural 
resources). For example, one interesting finding related to the material component in assistance type was 
that the material capacity variable measured in the third state support did not yield any significant effect 
on child soldiering. This finding could have occurred in my case because states’ support comes mainly in 
the form of military assistance, as opposed to direct funding. This suggests that receiving a third state’s 
military and logistical assistance does not augment rebels’ disposable funds to redistribute among group 
members in the form of salaries. In a sense, the third state support measure is probably the least precise 
indication of the actual financial solvency of a military organization, compared to the index of access to 
the easily cashed natural resources or diaspora’s direct monetary assistance. 
The different redistributive potential of different types of resources has also permeated through my 
 which pecuniary rewards were 
prop
ve noted the negative impact of rebels’ access to revenues from 
natural resources on the wide-spread private profiteering and trust and discipline within the 
extended argument. Thus, in the case of unpopular armed groups, for
osed to have a negative effect on child soldiering, material capacity proved to have a positive effect. 
A potential explanation of this finding can in itself represent an important and interesting result for the 
conflict studies literature. More specifically, it is possible that besides generating revenue to armed 
groups, access to natural resources also affects military organizations by cultivating greed among their 
leadership personnel. Unlike in the case of diaspora money which ends up in the hands of the highest 
leadership of the rebel movement, revenue generated from diamond mining or drug production is less 
prone to hierarchical control. Any low-ranking commander may have access to production, supervision, 
transportation or looting of natural resources, and thus profit from the commodity in question either 
openly or clandestinely.  
The logic of this argument is reflected to some extent in existing literature on conflict and armed 
movements. Thus, previous studies ha
                                                 
1010 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New’ And ‘Old’ Civil Wars,” p. 117. 
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insu
rces 
(res
tional checks and balances within armed groups not based 
on 
 other hand, for popular movements, my extended 
theo
rgency.1011  What my investigation suggested, however, and what might be developed further as a 
potential future contribution to the conflict and natural resources literature, is an alternative description of 
the underlying mechanisms behind this relationship than the ones described in the existing studies in this 
context. My research does not support one such mechanism while providing evidence to another. For 
example, in his book Jeremy Weinstein postulates that armed groups with access to natural resou
ource-based organizations) end up having greedy profiteers (attract opportunists) who care about 
short-term benefits, not the overall purpose of the organization.1012 While I also find it plausible, 
however, unlike Weinstein, I assume that such a pursuit will occur only in unpopular resource-based 
organizations, and not in the popular ones. Meanwhile, as my data demonstrate, there is no correlation 
between popularity and material capacity (measured by all four different indicators in my analysis).  
Another underlying mechanism that my study does support relates to Weinstein’s argument, which 
establishes that military discipline and institu
ideational endowments are difficult to maintain.1013 On the contrary, more ideational (or popular) 
armed groups are more likely to be able to institutionalize the checks and balances on members’ behavior 
and, as a result, the long-term commitment of their fighters.1014 This proposition is supported by the data 
in my sample that shows a statistically significant difference between popularity of a group and the 
strength of its center, measured as a categorical index of the extent to which the top leadership of the 
movement can control its troops and thus discipline within the organization.1015 
Yet another consequence of examining the material capacity variable in my study was a somewhat 
controversial finding about diaspora support’s potential positive association with child soldiering in the 
case of popular movements. On the one hand, I proposed that additional revenue of unpopular armed 
groups should increase the capacity of the insurgency to pay and attract adult soldiers who would 
otherwise not join unpopular movements. On the
retical framework did not postulate any influence of the group’s material capacity. This outcome may 
                                                 
1011 These works focused mostly on diamonds and include United Nations (UN), Report of the Panel of Experts 
Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone (New 
York: United Nations, 2000); Le Billon, “The Political Ecology of War”; David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in 
Sier
1012 
1013 
1014 
1015 Reported p-value of the chi-square coefficient is 0.017. The data to measure the strength of the central leadership 
were taken form the NSA Project Dataset. “This variable gives a categorical indicator, measured as “high, moderate, 
s 
adership disputes” 
ra Leone (Oxford, U.K.: James Currey, 2005), cited in Le Billon, “Diamond Wars?” p. 362. 
Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, pp. 139, 171. 
Ibid., p. 139.  
Ibid., p. 139. 
or low” of the strength of the leadership’s control over its forces. An example of a group with a high degree of 
control would be the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in Mexico, where Subcommander Marcos was at 
the top of a clear chain of command in a well-organized group. An example of a group with low control of its force
is the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which did have a central 
command organizational structure, but was beset by constant fractionalization and le
(Cunningham and Gleditsch, “The NSA Project,” pp. 5-6.) 
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lt from collinearity of the variable of ethnic persecution with material capacity measured in diaspo
ort money. A theoretical argument for such a potential correlation can indeed be fou  inp
literature. As one study on rebel financing suggests, “the increasing number of ethnic or communal 
insurgencies relative to ideological conflicts increases the relative prevalence of diaspora support.”1016 
This is precisely why Latin American military organizations are believed not to receive much diaspora 
support – that is because ethnic insurgencies “in general are rare” on the continent.1017 By identifying this 
relationship, my study thus offers empirical suppo
ittances and conflicts. 
Transnational Networks. Furthermore, my finding that unpopular armed groups with diaspora support 
money recruit fewer children has a broader implication for the field of international relations in general. 
Thus, from the international legitimacy point of view this finding is particularly interesting, as diaspora 
constituency – one specific example of transnational networks – plays an important role in promoting or 
prohibiting international norms. Identifying and testing the mechanisms leading from diaspora money to 
child recruitment forms a part of my future research agenda linked to the study of international norms 
dynamics, diffusion and socialization, as well as identification of conditions under which armed non-state 
actors comply with the international humanitarian law.  
Refugee Studies. The existing effect of rebels’ presence across national b
 an implication for the international relations literature that links security of refugee camps to conflict. 
One of the existing mechanisms behind presence or access in the camps and conflict onset or prolongation 
can thus be recruitment of children as the last resort of the unpopular movements without any material 
support.  
Policy Implications  
According to the reevaluation by international activists of strategies for curbing the child soldier 
practice, they “must take into account that what may be effective in influencing one group may have little 
impact on another.”1018 My findings fully confirm this statement and offer some insights into the 
conditions under which the current strategies against child recruiters can become effective, as well as 
suggestions on prospects of the success of the policy community.  
The first condition th
ed group. Thus, I argue, it would be hard if not impossible for the international community to 
influence the behavior of unpopular armed groups recruiting child soldiers who do not manage or are not 
interested in cultivating the domestic civilian support base. Such groups are not bound by the domestic 
 
1016 Byman et. al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, p. 42. 
1017 Ibid., p. 41. 
1018 CSUCS, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, p. 25. 
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legitimacy concerns and thus naming and shaming strategies, as well as educating the community about 
illegality of child soldier recruitment, will simply not work in these cases.  
Recruitment of children allows for survival of otherwise challenged military organizations as it 
provides them with the necessary and cheap (or free) recruits. Thus, if an unpopular armed group 
recruiting children does not depend on third states for material assistance, it would be practically 
impossible to influence the child recruitment behavior of such a group. Not only would the anti-child 
soldier recruitment international movements not be able to cement their strategies against the absent 
domestic legitimacy concept in such cases, they also would not be able to rely on the power of 
international legitimacy or the leverage of third states, as the links between such armed groups and the 
international society are minimal. In addition, because child soldier recruitment is, in fact, the crucial 
stra
ho cited the group’s “fear 
of l
distance from the conflict did not appear to mitigate their strong ideological support and appreciation of 
ad 
n. This finding is 
or the policy community that proposes the undermining of rebel funding as a possible 
tegy without which the group has no ideational or material resources needed for organizational 
survival, the abandonment of this strategy under the “pressure” of international activists is quite unlikely.  
For popular armed groups the prospects for potential success in reducing the child recruitment 
practice are higher. Popular armed groups are responsive to the attitudes of their domestic support base 
and can adjust their recruitment policies accordingly. The following example from Sri Lanka mentioned 
in Chapter 8 with plausibility probes confirms this point. In September 2008 all humanitarian agencies 
were asked to leave Sri Lanka. Since the withdrawal of child soldier monitoring groups, however, no 
increase in child recruitment by the LTTE was reported by domestic agencies w
osing public support from the local population” as the major reason.1019  
It is not clear whether international campaigns aimed at educating civilians about the harmfulness of 
condoning child recruitment will succeed in developing the public opinion along this direction. Consider, 
for instance, the results of an existing study on the attitudes among the Tamil diaspora in Norway towards 
child recruitment by the LTTE. While no organization has probably worked with the diaspora on 
educating them about the illegality of this practice, their exposure to western standards and the physical 
the insurgency despite their demonstrated knowledge of LTTE’s child recruitment practices.1020   
While many unpopular armed groups do not have to rely on material assistance from abro
nowadays in order to sustain their operations, those who actually do recruit fewer childre
very important f
solution to a child soldier problem. In fact, as my findings suggest, such a strategy would be 
                                                 
1019 Human Rights Watch communication with UN protection official, November 19, 2008, cited in Human Right 
Watch, Trapped and Mistreated: LTTE Abuses against Civilians in the Vanni (HRW: New York, 2008), p. 6. 
1020 Stephanie Therese Lee, “Diaspora Efficacy in Homeland Conflicts: Interpreting the Tamil Diaspora’s Inaction 
on the Child Soldier Issue,” MA project in International Relations at the Australian National University 
Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), 2006. 
and Peace 
265 
  
counterproductive to the efforts of international activists, leading to the increase, not decrease, in the 
numbers of recruited minors.  
Overall, my findings suggest a picture for a varying success of the international activists in Africa. 
This is because about 55% of all African insurgencies recorded in my sample were unpopular and, as I 
argue, it is hard to influence the recruitment strategy of such armed groups once they are already 
recruiting children, which 38% of all these unpopular movements did, according to my dataset. More 
bright prospects, I would argue, exist for activists trying to address the issue of child recruitment by 
armed non-state actors in Asia and Latin America. As my preliminary research suggests, most of the 
arm
 new factors as well as the existing findings from 
the 
 armed groups only. While my argument was largely confirmed in the plausibility probes on an 
ican armed movements, a definitive answer to my research question would require 
an e
my best in identifying as many sources 
as p
the estimates and numbers from those reports are technically not precisely calculated ratios based on the 
ontexts, like Liberia, for example, 
                                
ed groups in Asia and Latin America are popular. In fact, I could not identify any unpopular 
movements in these regions for the plausibility probe analysis.  
Limitations and Future Research 
This work is novel in the sense that it is the first one to my knowledge that performs an empirical 
analysis of child recruitment across different conflicts. As Blattman, cited above, admits, “Based on data 
from a single case, these policy implications are best regarded as unproven but testable implications of a 
general theory of recruitment, to be examined in other contexts.”1021 With the macro nature of its large-N 
empirical analysis, this work offers an original test of my
survey research across different contexts. However, as with every empirical macro work, it may be 
subject to certain limitations due to the approximation nature of statistical modeling and data collection 
and coding. Below I will outline several such potential limitations. 
It should be noted, however, that the large-N empirical analysis in this study is conducted on a sample 
of African
Asian and Latin Amer
mpirical analysis of a larger sample that would include all insurgencies in the world, and not only the 
African ones. I am working on the compilation of such a dataset, and this work is a part of my future 
research agenda.  
One disclaimer should also be made regarding the quality of macro data on child ratios across 
different armed groups. During my dataset compilation work I did 
ossible and obtaining the best estimate out of the available ones in each particular case. However, for 
the most part, the statistics provided in field reports of practitioners and observers are based on their 
encounters with some units of rebel organizations. Those encounters vary to a certain degree from being 
just occasional to deeper familiarizing with insurgents’ organizational composition and structure. Thus, 
counts of demobilized or registered armed combatants. While in some c
                 
1021 Blattman, “Causes of Child Soldiering,” p. 26.  
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we do know child to adult ratios on the basis of the post-conflict counts of ex-fighters, such a method of 
estimation is a relatively rare practice in the existing reports and in general, and is also prone to certain 
cou
rrent analysis, which I aim to 
add
uitment 
sho
individual level. It should be noted here, however, that I tried to eliminate this concern by offering 
f 
e 
d 
nting errors. For example, the remaining issue with demobilization will always be the number of those 
soldiers who did not choose to come to the DDR centers to disarm.  
Several additional data issues, addressed in Chapter 4 of my work, relate to the definition of child 
soldiers. First, the definition and thus the data collected on child recruitment instances (and the only data 
available on a large scale suitable for comparison) do not distinguish between the age of recruits, as long 
as they are under 18 years old. Meanwhile, this benchmark of 18 years old, based on western norms about 
childhood, often might not translate well to the context of Africa where, according to some, the age of 
adulthood is often reached much earlier, with some countries specifying it as low as 15 years old. The 
second possible problem relates to the treatment of child soldiers as a homogenous entity, without 
distinguishing between combat and logistical tasks of underage recruits.  
Another feature of my study which may or may not translate into a limitation is that my measurement 
of the dependent variable of child soldier does not distinguish between voluntary and forced enrollment 
methods, again due to data limitations. Compilation of such disaggregated data on methods of recruitment 
is a part of my future project. It should be noted, however, that a systematic data compilation of this 
information is very difficult because often armed groups either utilize both methods of recruitment, their 
mix, or switch from one to another across time.  
This brings us to yet another potential limitation of the scope of the cu
ress in my next project. As of now, my dependent variable does not offer a time dimension, as it does 
not distinguish between child recruitment at different stages of conflict. Meanwhile, the resort to such a 
practice can occur only at a certain stage of armed conflict or may change in linear or even cyclical trends 
over time. As I described in Chapter 4 on methodology, I do not anticipate any adverse effects of a 
potential bias for my current large-N analysis in the absence of time series data. Moreover, I include the 
control variable of conflict duration into my large-N analysis and examine the temporal development of 
child recruitment in one of my case studies. Ideally, however, future work on child soldier recr
uld take the notion of timing into account and enrich the analysis by adding a time dimension to it. 
Since my work is based to a certain degree on a macro-level large-N study, by definition it could have 
suffered from the ecological fallacy problem. For example, using ethnic persecution and poverty as 
factors behind child soldier reasons to enlist assumes that this aggregate measure holds also at the 
additional analysis to my study. While keeping those macro level measures to account for the role o
individual motivations in the overall model of child soldier predictions (without them the model would b
simply incomplete), I also conducted survey analysis on individual former Liberian child-soldiers an
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m. Thus, I verified at the micro-level of individual data that my proposed 
fact
 and tested by conducting micro-analysis 
le, I examined two factors behind child motivations in my analysis – 
inse
degree of popularity. The advisability 
and
ble questionnaire design.  
examined existing surveys from other contexts (for example, of the FARC in the plausibility probe) with 
the goal to diminish this proble
or of ethnic persecution and poverty retain their explanatory power. I also examined if other 
individual-related factors offered in the child soldier literature but refuted by me for methodological 
reasons as the possible crucial factors in explaining the variance of practice across different non-state 
armed groups actually have any significance.    
On the basis of my own combined exercise described above, I do believe that the research on the 
child soldier phenomenon should ideally combine both – surveys and macro studies. This is because any 
model of child recruitment, including my model, would inevitably include factors reflecting motivations 
of children and military commanders, which are best identified
through survey research. For examp
curity and poverty. This does not necessarily mean that children who enlisted with armed groups 
might not offer different reasons during surveys, as my plausibility probe case study of the FARC armed 
group demonstrated. However, in my argument I do claim that ethnic persecution and, to a lesser degree, 
poverty are the most crucial motivations that can actually explain the variation in the degree of child 
enlistment across cases unlike other child motivations cited in the literature and identified in the surveys.  
Thus, I suggest that such motives of children as fascination with uniforms and weapons, for example, 
would be identical for all conflict contexts in which popular armed groups operate. Similarly, motives 
such as “conviction” should be the same for groups with the same 
 necessity of further survey research is substantiated by other potential concerns of child soldier 
research in general outlined in this section. Thus, disaggregation of data by age and roles of child recruits 
might address the existing deficiencies brought about by aggregation in current NGO data collection. 
Survey data will also pick up the trends in recruitment methods – forced or voluntary – so crucial for the 
cross-country or cross-group examination of the practice. A time dimension can also be embedded in the 
survey with a suita
  
APPENDICES 
Acronyms and Initialisms Used in the Study 
ADF  Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces  
AFL  Armed Forces of Liberia 
AI   Amnesty International 
AL
FA
ILO
NG
F  Afar Liberation Front (Ethiopia) 
CAFF  Children associated with fighting forces 
CSUCS  Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 
DDR(R)   Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (and Rehabilitation)  
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo  
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States 
Ecomog  Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
ELN  National Liberation Army (Colombia) 
EPDM  Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement  
RC  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Colombia) 
FDU  United Democratic Forces (Congo-Brazzaville) 
FLEC  Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Angola) 
FUC  United Front for Change (Chad) 
HRW  Human Rights Watch 
ICC  International Criminal Court  
IDP  Internally Displaced People 
   International Labor Office  
IO   International Organization 
IRC  International Rescue Committee  
INPFL  Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
LDF  Lofa Defence Force  
LPC  Liberia Peace Council 
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda) 
LTTE  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka) 
MFDC  Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (Senegal) 
NDA  National Democratic Alliance (Sudan) 
O  Non-Governmental Organizations 
NPFL  National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
NPFL-CRC  Central Revolutionary Council of the NPFL  
PTSD   Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 
RCD-ML   Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement 
RENAMO   Mozambican National Resistance Movement 
RPF  Rwandan Patriotic Front  
RUF  Revolutionary United Front 
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SPLA  Sudan People’s Liberation Army  
UCK  Kosovo Liberation Army  
Ulimo  United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy 
Ulimo-J  United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy – Johnson faction  
Ulimo-K  United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy – Kromah faction  
UNITA  Union for the Total Independence of Angola  
UN   United Nations 
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF   United Nations Children’s Fund 
UPDF  Uganda People’s Defense Force  
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Figu ria 
 
re 3. Map of Libe
 
Source: M  World, URL: http://www.mapsofworld.com/liaps of beria/liberia-political-map.html
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β-coefficients and Marginal Effects 
The formal model structure also provides a useful guidance for the interpretations of various 
quantities involved. From the index function it is apparent that theβ -coefficients do not have the same 
interpretation as in the multiple linear regression model where the β -coefficients measure the constant 
partial derivatives of the DV with respect to IV. In the logistic regression, the β -coefficients measure the 
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change in the unobservable continuous d with a change in one of the IVs. This 
quantity provides useful insights into the system but is typically not the only object of interest. A more 
useful measure of the analyzed relationship among variables is a so-called marginal effect (ME) which 
evaluates the change of the DV resulting from a (unit) change of the IV. In the case of a continuous IV 
 the ME is defined as 
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Note that while the variable  is subject to change, all other variables are fixed at a particular value 
of interest. There is no specific rule on what this value should be. A number of texts recommend the 
average value for such variables, which is statisti  valid even for categorical variables such as 
ies. A mean value for dummy variables does not have a direct interpretation but this is not the 
object to be interpreted. Such a value merely positions the system at its numerical averages to avoid the 
effects of extremes entering the calculation of the rginal effects on the variable of interest which 
changes along its natural scale from 0 to 1.  
For the continuous IV the marginal effect in the logistic regression measures a quantity that is 
conceptually equivalent to the β-coefficient in the l multiple regression model, that is the partial 
derivative of  
logistic regression arises due to the nonlinearity in the functional form of the regression which needs to be 
taken into account for the differentiation.  
jix
dumm
the DV with respect to the IV. The difference between marginal effects and β-coefficients in
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Since in the logistic regression the e marginal effects represent two different 
alculated in different ways, their pattern of significance may differ. Thus, for 
exa
valu
 β-coefficients and th
quantities, and are c
mple, one can obtain a statistically significant β-coefficient on a certain variable, while the marginal 
effect of that variable may in fact not be statistically significant. This means that even though the 
underlying unobserved index variable *iy  changes significantly with the relevant IV jx , the resulting 
change in probabilities )|1()|1( ** initialjii
final
jiij xypxypME =−==  is not significant. For example, this 
may happen in cases when )|1( * initialjii xyp =  is already quite high (say 0.95) and even a substantial 
change in jx  will not raise the probability much further. A similar situation may occur for very low 
* initiales of |1( jii xyp = ) .  
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Table A.  Logistic Regressions of Child Recruitment with Interaction Terms w/o Mob*Cap 
 5* 6* 7* 8* 
Mobilization Capacity     
     
Fighting Capacity 2.284** 3.184** 2.285** 2.003** 
 (0.91) (1.23) (0.91) (0.89) 
 9.816 24.143 9.826 7.411 
 [1.65; 58.42] [2.17; 269.02] [1.65; 58.48] [1.30; 42.41] 
Material Capacity (Index) -0.708    
 (0.66)    
 0.493    
 [0.14; 1.80]    
               Diaspora Money  -3.107**   
  0.045   
  [0.00; 0.72]   
           Third State Support   -1.233  
   (1.06)  
   0.291  
   [0.04; 2.33]  
         Natural Resource Access     1.646* 
    (0.910) 
    5.186 
    [0.87; 30.86] 
0.238 0.517 -0.284 
(1.39) (1.00) (0.99) 
 1.793 1.269 1.677 0.753 
 [0.23; 14.04] [0.08; 19.34] [0.24; 11.91] [0.11; 5.24] 
Territorial Access  2.811*** 3.593*** 2.825*** 1.638* 
 (1.04) (1.22) (1.00) (0.84) 
 16.627 36.343 16.861 5.145 
 [2.17; 
127.66] [3.33; 397.10] [2.38; 119.70] [0.99; 26.69] 
Interactions:     
Mobilization*Fighting -0.472 -0.004 0.013 0.211 
 (1
 
 9.34]    
  [0.03; 13.01]  
  (1.42)   
Ethnic Persecution 0.584 
 (1.05) 
.17) (1.30) (1.18) (1.19) 
0.624 0.996 1.013 1.235 
 [0.06; 6.18] [0.08; 12.73] [0.10; 10.23] [0.12; 12.72] 
Mobilization*Ethnic 2.564 0.909 3.339** 4.176*** 
 (1.64) (1.88) (1.52) (1.60) 
 12.988 2.482 28.191 65.105 
 [0.52; 
323.24] [0.06; 98.87] [1.43; 554.57] [2.83; 1498.17] 
Mobilization*Material (index) 0.608    
 (0.83)    
 1.837    
 [0.36;
              Mobilization*Diaspora  7.547***   
  (2.30)   
  1895.049   
  [20.88; 171.9K]   
           Mobilization*State   -0.492  
   (1.56)  
   0.611  
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    Mobilization*Resources    -2.634* 
    (1.41) 
    0.072 
    [0.00; 1.14] 
Mobilization*Territory -1.455 -2.583** -0.789 0.022 
 (1.01) (1.06) (0.89) (0.84) 
 03; 1.69] [0.01; 0.60] [0.08; 2.60] .20; 5.30] 
Poverty (log) -0.934 -1.052* 
 (0 (0.60) (0.59) 
 5 0.181 0.393 0.349 
 .34] [0.04; 0.79] [0.12; 1.27] [0.11; 1.11] 
End Before 97 -2.125** -2.685*** -2.355*** -1.828** 
 (0.83) (1.01) (0.87) (0.76) 
 
 0.233 0.076 0.454 1.022 
[0. [0
Controls:     
-0.904 -1.711** 
.61) (0.75) 
0.40
[0.12; 1
19
 0.119 0.068 0.095 0.161 
[0.02; 0.61] [0.01; 0.49] [0.02; 0.52] [0.04; 0.71] 
Conflict Duration     
     
     
     
Conflict Intensity     
     
     
     
Cons 4.156 8.649* 4.065 4.483 
 (4.268) (5.25) (4.31) (4.17) 
N 80 77 80 80 
Pseudo R2 0.40 0.53 0.42 0.43 
_hatsq in linktest 0.453 0.332 0.521 0.999 
Log likelh (Prob>chi2=0) -33 -24 -31 -31 
Goodness-of-fit test, p-value     
Hosmer-Lemeshow  0.440 0.618 0.683 0.917 
Pearson  0.460 0.722 0.614 0.701 
Max VIF 5.38 3.39 4.67 3.70 
Min tolerance (1/VIF) 0.19 0.30 0.21 0.27 
AIC 87.38 71.00 85.31 83.99 
Note: Logistic regression coefficients are marked with * when significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and below are odds ratios and their 95% confidence intervals (in square brackets). 
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Table A1. Determination of the Fighting Capacity Values for Five Liberian Armed Groups 
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Faction 
Military Effectiveness 
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Table A thnic ersecution Values for Five Liberian Armed Groups 
Armed 
Faction 
Access to Endangered Tribe
Alternative Protection Mea s 
% CS Given Protective 
Reasons in My Survey 
E
P
3. Determination of the E P
s w/o 
n
thnic 
ersecution 
NPFL Defense: Gio, Mano, Lom  Exchange: Krahn and Ma % H
a, Kpelle
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Table A4. Determination of the Ethnic Persecution Values for Five Liberian Armed Groups 
Armed Amount of Territory Pool of Accessible People Territorial Control 
 
Faction 
NPFL 
90% of Liberia but 
Monrovia until 1994; 
6 counties in 1994-96 
900,000: 76 0 in Liberia; 
120,0  refugees HIGH 
1,00
00
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0- ,0
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Table A5. Territorial Control of Armed Factions and Ecomog in the First Liberian Civil War (1989-96) 
AFL/ Ecomog 
Montserrado INPFL(Caldwel gl, Lo un Town, New Kru Town, 
wn) 
AFL omo/Ec g AFL/Ecomog 
Duala, Via to
INPFL 
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ULIMO-K (Upp a)er Lof ; 
ULIMO-J (Lower Lofa  UL  
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NPFL  NPFL  
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1999); 3) U.S. Department of State, Lib  Human ts Pra tices, 1995 rch 1996, : 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report eria.ht ast 7, 20 ib  
Liberian Collections Project, Indiana State University, URL: http://onlib /liberia_since1980.h
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